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LAH 5/11/73

consistently dodged the First Amendment question regarding
whether use of the flag is symbolic speech.

There is

also an overbreadth problem since it is possible that
arne uses of the flag would be constitutionally protected
but wearing one on the seat of the pants would not.

In

this case, the DC and CA decided both that the State law

-

was impermissibly vague and that it was overbroad.

I

think Coffin is right about vagueness, or at least close
enough to being right as to make that an a dequate
ground upon which to refuse to decide the First Amendment
issues.

Therefore, I would dismiss.

(Coffin has writtten

a 30-page opinion that you might want to read if you
think the First Amendment question should be decided.)
DISMISS

LAH

PRELIMINARY MEMO
May 17, 1973
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 72-1254

1/
SMITH (Sheriff of
Worcester County, Mass.)

Appeal from First Circuit(Coffin, McEntee; Hamley
concurring in part)
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1.

Timely
Appellee was convicted of "publicly treat[ing l contemptuously"

the flag of the U.S.

The Mass. Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.

Petr

1/

u

This case does not involve a Three-Judge Court. Appellant seeks
an appeal on the basis of 28 U.S. C. § 1254(2) from a decision of CA 1
holding a state statute to be invalid under the Constitution.

- 2 sought federal H/C relief in DC, D. Mass.

The DC found the statute

unconstitutional on the ground that it was vague and overbroad.

CA 1

affirmed.
2.

FACTS:

On January 30, 1971, appellee was observed by a police

officer in Leominster, Mass.
3 by 5

(Jt
inches~

He had an American flag, approximately

4 by 6 inches, sewn to the seat of his pants.

A while later,

another police officer observed appellee walking through the business
district of the town with the flag sewn to the seat of his pants.

Appellee

was arrested for violating Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 264, § 5 (set out below).
He was charged with "publicly treat[ingl contemptuously the flag of the
United States.

11

Appellee was tried in Mass. District Court, found guilty,

and sentenced to 1 year in jail.

He exercised his right to trial de novo.

jury found appellee guilty and imposed a 6-month sentence.
The statute in question reads in full:
Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 264, § 5:
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces
or treats contemptuously the flag of the United
States or of Massachusetts, whether such flag is public
or private property, or whoever displays such flag
or any rep res entation thereof upon which are words,
figures, advertisements or designs, or whoever causes
or permits such flag to be used in a parade as a receptacle for depositing or collecting money or any
other article or thing, or whoever exposes to public
view, manufactures, sells, exposes for sale, gives away
or has in possession for sale or to give away or for
use for any purpose, any article or substance, being
an article of merchandise or a receptacle of merchandise or articles upon which is attached, through a
wrapping or otherwise, engraved or printed in any
manner, a representation of the United Stc::_te.s flag,
or whoever uses any representation of the arms or

A

- 3 the great seal of the commonwealth for any advertising or commercial purpose, shall be punished by
a ~ ss than ten nor m ore-tlian one hundred
~rs ~ risonment for not more than one
)
~oth. Words, figures, advertisement ~ or designs attached to, or directly or indirectly connected
with, such flag or any representation thereof in such
manner that such flag or its representation is used
to attract attention to or advertise such words, figures,
advertisements or designs, shall for the purposes of
this section be deemed to be upon such flag. Notwithstanding the foregoing, there may be attached to the
staff bearing a flag of the United States or of Massachus etts belonging to an organization of veterans
of the Civil War, to a camp of the United Spanish
War Veterans, to a post or department of the American Legion, or to a post or department of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, or to
a post or department of the Jewish War Veterans
of the United States, or to a camp or department of
the Sons of Union Veterans of the Civil War, or to
a barracks or department of the Veterans of World
War I of the U.S. A., or belonging to or used in the
service of the United States or the commonwealth, a
streamer having inscribed thereon the names of battles
and the name and number of the organization to which
such flag belongs. For the purposes of this section, a
flag shall be deemed to continue to belong to any or ganization of veterans hereinbefore specified, although such organization has ceased to exist, during
such time as it remains in the lawful ownership or
custody of any other of the aforesaid organizations
or of the commonwealth or of any political subdivision thereof, or of any patriotic or historical society
incorporated under the laws of the commonwealth
or determined by the adjutant general to be a proper
custodian thereof. 11
After the Mass. SJC affirmed his conviction, appellee sought federal
H/C relief.

The DC found the statute to be unconstitutional.

on alternative grounds.

CA 1 affirmed

-

First, the CA treated the statute as if it did not

raise a First Amendment issue.

Citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksondll e ,

405 U.S. 156 ( 1972) and Grayned v. City of Rockville, 408 U.S. 104 ( 1972),

..

c

- 4. -

the court held that appellee was entitled to challenge the statute on
its face under the void for vagueness doctrine.

CA 1 found that the

statute did not adequately warn potential defendants of what the State
"commands or forbids" in the use of the words "treats contemptuously."
The court stated:

,te..

We do not see how the statt} could be so interpreted as
to cover appellee and exclude others who placed the flag
in odd positions, or in conjunction with deprecatory
symbols, gestures, or slogans, or who merely dislplay
it while acting out or speaking that which many Americans
might consider obnoxious. Additionally, the statute's
words make it clear that the Massachusetts legislature
did not intend to confine maltreaters of the flag to those
who mutilate, trample upon, or deface the flag but meant
to cover separately other types of contemptuous treatment.'!:_/
Second, the CA found the statute vague since it does not give sufficient
guidelines to prosecutors.

Third, the statute was found to be vague

in that juries and courts are not given sufficient standards as to what
"treats contemptuously" means. · In this portion of the opinion, Judge
Hamley concurred, criticizing the majority for going further, since the
above holding disposed of the cas e.

]:_/

We therefore conclude that resolution of appellee's
challenge to the statute as applied to him necessarily
adjudicates the statute's facial constitutionality, and
we proceed to address appellee 1 s vagueness argument.
Appellee claims that the decision of the CA holding the statute facially
vague was thus also a ruling that, as applied, the statute was vague.

- 5 -

c.

I

The majority then treated the statute in ·its First Amendment
context.

The State claimed that no First Amendment values were

~

U

concerned since the statute was only intended to protect the "physical --:::;..
integrity" of the flag.

The court noted that it was unable to find any

state authority, e. g. state court or AG opinion, which so construed
the statute's language.

The court proceeded to find that display of

the flag constituted symbolic speech, just as the armband in Tinker.
~
The interests which the State claimed to exist in protecting the flag
were (a) the preservation of the flag as a symbol of unity , and (b)
preservation of the pea·ce.

As to the first, theCA held that the statute

attempted to deter individuals from expressing their beliefs.

If two

individuals treated the flag in the same manner, one could be arrested
because he felt contempt, while the other would go free if he felt
patriotic.

As to the latter, the court admitted that the State had a

valid interest in preserving the peace, but noted that the statute
was not confined to circumstances in which a breach of the peace was

'}_/
an immediate threat.
3.

CONTENTIONS:
(a) Appellant contends that the constitutionality of the

statute was not argued in appellee's briefs in state court.

Consequently ,

appellee has not exhausted state remedies.

The above description covers only a ·portion of the CA
opinion.

- 6

r-

Appellee notes that the Mass SJC, in affirming, stated:
We reject the claim that the statute is on its face or
as applied to him a restraint upon the right of freedom
of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
It also stated that, "Whatever the uncertanties in other circumstances ,

we see no vagueness in the statute as applied here."
(b) Appellant argues that the statute is not vague, and
that it applied only to the physical integrity of the flag.

Unlike other

flag statutes, this statute does not apply to items which are similar
in appearance to the flag but only to the flag its elf.

Appellants claim

the statute is also narrow since it requires proof of "culpable intent."
Furthermore, the words "treats contemptuously" are claimed to "take
color" from the first phrase in the statute.

______

......_
(c) Appellant
claims that the statute furthers an
important state interest.

No s eech is involved as the statute only

proscribes acts which touch on the physical integrity of the flag.

~~------------------------..----------------------------------------

statute helps to preserve the public peace and furthers the State's
interest "in the preservation of the flag as a symbol of unity on
national ideals and purpose.

11

The State ends by stating:

There is nothing on the face of the statutes indicating
that it will unduly interfere with an individual's right
to possess and use the flag of the United States. Indeed,
individuals who wish to exercise their constitutional
right to assemble, to picket, to protest, etc., may still
do so and may do so with use of the flag. The statute only
prohibits acts which touch and physically dishonor the
flag. [The statute] is not overbroad.

The

- 7 ,.

c

Appellee contends that the CA not only found the statute facially
unconstitutional, but that it also found it unconstitutional as applied.
(See fn. 2.) Consequently. the court's broad statement about the
statute was unnecessary in affirming appellee's release.
contends that, in

a~tempting

Appellee

to preserve political unity, an asserted

justification for the statute, the State is trying to censure expression
on the basis of content.

One individual may fly the flag as a symbol

of unity, but another may not fly it as a symbol of disunity or dissent.
See Street v. N.Y. , 3 94 U.S. 576 (1969).

Furthermore, the statute,

as an att e mpt to preserve the peace, prohibits far more conduct than
is necessary to this objective.
4.
it needs to.

DISCUSSION:

The opinion of CA l goes much farther than

I agree with Judge Hamley that resolution of the question

of vagueness is dispositive.

In regard to the vagueness claim, the

words "treats contemptously" appear to give little warning to either
tnT--->

4/

appellee) .Y the jury.-

.
Even if the prosecutor's statement that the

statute goes only to physical intrusion is accepted, the State has still

,.. ,..

I

~

I do not know how the jury was charged. I infer from the
CA' s opinion that they were charged that "treats contemptously"
means "the feeling with which one regards that which is esteemed
mean, vile or worthies s. " It is not clear what evidence was presented
as proof, except for the place where the flag was worn. The Mass
SJC states: "The jury could infer that the violation was intentional
without reviewing any words of the defendant." I do not know whether
this refers to the question of whether the appellee was intentionally
contemptuous.

- 8 '
not defined the meaning of being intentionally contemptuous.

Further-

more, it is not at all clear that sewing a flag on a piece of clothing
interfers with the physical integrity of the flag, any more than
putting it on a car antenna.
The questions involving flag statutes were before the Court
previously in Street v. N.Y. , 3 94 U.S. 576 ( 1969).
the issues are well known.

I would assume

If the Court does not wish to reach them,

but wishes to affirm as to this individual, it could vacate the opinion
below, asserting that the statute is vague as applied in this case.

It

could also hold that the opinion is affirmed insofar as it held the
statute unconstitutional as applied (see fn. 2).

(\__/

There is a motion to Affirm.
Diamond

Op CA in appx
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Jack B. Owens

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: October 23, 1973

72-1254 Smith v. Goguen
I spent a couple of hours last night with the briefs and opinions
in the above case. I will need your advice.
Judge Coffin's opinion (which reads more like a law review than
an opinion addressed to the case at hand) does specifically identify and discuss - several areas which are difficult for me in light of my lack
of experience and learning in the criminal law. The doctrines of
"vagueness" and "overbreadth" have seemed to me to enable subjective
decisions by each judge with relatively no objective standards or benchmarks.

I am not sure that Coffin's opinion helps me a great deal in this

respect.
But he does focus specifically on an issue which I have found
particularly difficult: when and under what circumstances, in the application of the vagueness doctrine may a court consider whether the statute is
facially unconstitutional as distinguished from addressing its validity as
applied in the particular case. One may concede that in many situations it
might be difficult to tell whether conduct is "contemptuous" with respect to
the flag.

But in this case Goguen's conduct - as found by the Massachusetts

court -was intended to be contemptuous and could have been nothing else.

2.
This contrasts sharply, as you have pointed out, with the case of the person
hanging the American flag out of the window with a peace symbol on it.
Judge Coffin accepts Raines as stating the general rule that a person
may not plead facial unconstitutionality of a statute that is constitutional
as to him, but then lists and purports to apply exceptions which to me seem
unconvincing. What do you make of this, and what guidelines - if any have been established by the Court?
As to Coffin's gratuitous discussion of the First Amendment and
overbreadth, I read his opinion as saying in effect that no state may
validly protect the flag from contemptuous conduct or treatment, however
one defines this. In what seems to me to be an oversimplistic approach,
he reasons (i) that the flag is "a pure symbol"; (ii) that "most, if not all,
conduct associated with the United States flag is symbolic speech"; (iii)
that this is "closely akin to pure speech"; (iv) that the function of the flag
is to "encourage patriotism and love of country among its people" (citing
Halter); and (v) that "promotion of loyalty and patriotism may not
constitutionally furnish a justification for imposition of criminal penalties".
It may not surprise you to know that I am not immensely impressed

by Judge Coffin's opinion (except by its length and vocabulary). I certainly
will not buy the full sweep of his First Amendment absolutism. But if we
must consider the facial constitutionality of the statute under a vagueness
test, it is easy enough to think of scores of situations in which it may

3.
be difficult to know whether or not the statute is applicable.
If, however, we may inquire only whether the statute is vague

as applied to Goguen, I would think it is not.
confront the First Amendment question.

ss

Then, we would have to

MEMORANDUM
Jack B. Owens

TO:

DATE: October 23, 1973

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

FROM:

. I spent a couple of hours last night with the briefs and opinions
·in the above case. I will need your advice.
Judge Coffin's opinion (which reads more like a law review than
an opinion addressed to the case at hand) does specifically identify and discuss - several areas which are difficult for me in light of my lack
of experience and learning in the criminal law. The doctrines of
"vagueness" and "overbreadth" have seemed to me to enable subjective
decisions by each judge with relatively no objective standards or bench., marks. I am not sure that Coffin's opinion helfls me a great deal in this
respect.
But he does focus specifically on an issue which I have found
particularly difficult: when and under what circumstances, in the application of the vagueness doctrine may a court consider whether the statute is
facially unconstitutional as distinguished from addressing its validity as
applied in the particular case. One may concede that in manp situations it
might be difficult to tell whether conduct is "contemptuous" with respect to
the flag. But in this case Goguen's conduct -as found by the Massachusetts
court -was intended to be contemptuous and could have been nothing else.

'

.

2.
This contrasts sharply, as you have pointed out, with the case of the person
hanging the American flag out of the window with a peace symbol on it.
Judge Coffin accepts Raines as stating the general rule that a person
may not plead facial unconstitutionality of a statute that is constitutional
as to him, but then lists and purports to apply exceptions which to me seem
unconvincing. What do you make of this 1 and what guidelines - if anyhave been established by the Court?
As to Coffin's gratuitous discussion of the First Amendment and

overbreadth, I read his opinion as saying in effect that no state may
validly protect the flag from contemptuous conduct or treatment, however
one defines this. In what seems to me to be an oversimplistic approach,
he reasons (i) that the flag is "a pure symbol"; (ii) that "most, if not all.>
conduct associated with the United States flag is symbolic speech"; (iii)
that this is "closely a-kin to pure speech"; (iv) that the function of the flag
is to "encourage patriotism and love of country among its people" (citing
!!~lter);

and (v) that ''promotion of loyalty and patriotism may not

constitutionally furnish a justification for imposition of criminal penalties".
It may not surprise you to know that I am not immensely impressed
by Judge Coffin's opinion (except by its length and vocabulary).

I certainly

will not buy the full sweep of his First Amendment absolutism. But if we
must consider the facial constitutionality of the statute under a vagueness
test, it is easy enough to think of scores of situations in which it may

3.
be difficult to lmow whether or not the statute is applicable.
If, however, we may inquire only whether the statute is vague

as applied to Goguen, I would think it is not. Then, we would have to
confront the First Amendment question.
L. F. P., Jr.

I'

•'f

,.,

-

;ltl\.

---~-

-Jf.L41i~ _ fo~

-----.lf-1--- - - - - -

---+1-- : : -;-- .- - ~ ~~-~
:t

'i'

I'

f

...

:.

.•(''"'

---

----

{'.!(

t:J

:r:

-

·,.f.

'

~e! .s~
.;
'liO

'•'

r, ~

- - - - -- - - -- -

- -~ .{N# ~~ __:ft

·.->-

-

....·.;

....

'(5 ,..

·:~.:.

,,

-- -

-

'!..

O~'b.

2

S, F/73

d"• _
·~

t

1lce ~~~& -~;'e.ifJ.

~

...
•'

'

r.

t

~ '

~ kk~~

~frj
11-'

'

~~

~
; •.•

~~ ~ ~

~ ·~

~.;: "t ' ~

'· ··.i•

T

~~ -ffw}J/\ ilY~ ~
·J~

..

;:
~

~

Cj%~.

r

u:. cr~

ceJ ~ ~~L
.,

tt

II
""i·

J
. ~ vP;jW-M/4
-

- ~~ --

--

..

'

~- ~

-

- ~.,f lo

~~~

~' "t.·~

t.

~

~u4e)

/

'-- h.
,·,

~

~
-

.

~v

.. . .
':/.:t

.

~

-

~

k. -~ U"[5'u~

.(). _

-

-

~c~~-fl2__ _-

. .
c{''

~.

f

• : :;

··:;,· .
~

,

:kyW u:.
IUrt-v -

--

'·

-

116 ~

, .1·•,

'I!"

•"

~···

;:ku~ . Lt

'

~~

r

~ ~/~

_.,.

~y~k;
~

f

//

·l·

~

kP. ~t<e~)
.•

(!' ~~ '

:jl.;

'

tuUo

ks. 6~?

i4
.

li ~
.~

//~~

~->

·''

..
t'

10~ ~~
··t

f,

,,;,·

\

0
'

'

;

~:l"IUJ:

4~

1

t.

'

I

--

~-- ~ tr:::t

.. ··.. p6- ~~# ' r-~ pw~

"'

r - --

~~ - ~:··: ~ - ~~ ~· ~ - ~tW~
1-o '

I

~ ~

'\

fUM~ . 14 ~ - -:- .

.,.

·.i~~-

~<
-

1

-

..
tl<_Q. t~~

i

jo~?k,

1:!•.

l1_

-.
&-~-# ~

~
?

~•

..

7k,j

i~

r~s- ~'

1/4

~

·

-3-

II

I

++

-

.

.

----r --- - ,-

· _ ~ __6__ :6 ~d

~

_ V'~~1 • .-. ~t-e
~- ~,.,

p

,.•

1t

•',fill

"

~ ··~ ~EU? tfu

"-

,.

·l- "-

f:

I;

.'

~~· eM ~~~

,,

~

.~

. ~ /w;..

~

IlL

~7
"-·

'

. ·. ~
"

io<

~·· ' f#~ ~7cf ~ ·· ~, ' ac0i~ /
't-.-'.

1~~oL ~-:~ .·-~

~.

li

iov.. '+ .t( l
J

t

(~.e¢ ~ ~

cf'

:-~

•'}:~

>(

itu ~"'-7 ~)
,, ... "

I
,,,~

-

At-?/~~

~ ~ .~~
1.-,.

4eeA_

//1

~

~-~ ·

, ;4

·Ad ~

1

--

e&w.~

ttee .

-

...

\,&...d& 7r.~~

I
t

-:·-- ~ t~*~/ ";,;;~
I

,;~-... ·~r·w·.,.;:

,\,

--

--

r-- -

~ _. · .
II
+

---

·

·~·

wtu& ~..

~ rc:z~ 10. a {#21!.K'.
'.'
-

-*

~·- (j' ., ~a~
'"'

t

l::

o;•

,-~_,,

:":j

¥~. ·~.,;;§,..... ~-il~'t·

"t;

.~_. If'*'~ \:~~0;

' ., -.~.,.

.

'

jj

II

";.'

···"··

~·,

~. ·'·

1.'

-

1'\

M ···-

•

I

-_ 0~
't )

'

~

~

wu£

~-t4e

,, '•' .,

th.

r~

<

~

fP4

J .
.,

r

..~?

•

'

r

~

.

/)~.

;;v

7£a

it
.i
!/Jf)!J2 ~

~

~····

"'

-A''''"'i

~:

it

ikfl,,, ·~

h

~

tk.~

90~4~/l ~~ ~

~

lo k

~

.

~ ·: u~

<·

·'·

/'173.J

// .

..

~~

,

~&

!fft.Wi
.$': "

.$•'

J~ 2~
~

;-b

~~~ - _AP-lj~ ~

" i.·:.:'· · ~ ~~;q iD
II

' Ui

·"

~-a..
H
II

·~ ~~

0

~ '

~ ~-~-c:-~

I'

•

:r1

I

ll

":0:,

'

::-x/if

~fli

1"

. . ! f3roo...~'av u. oldu ~<-

~~~

,AI'.'

\

;9tr14~ .._~...• ~-. ~(U~tt

~.i

,!'~

~ ·~

07lfl~.~:~ ~~~ fr'~'
~~
.
ku~ ,~./tdJ4-t2fl t'!tvt&. ~~~.-,4 ;.·:· ~

I

,!
<J:~

a>~ · ~~

t::~

.

·'"'

te;;t&t . u;

~ c~)

·--

,

it.'

'

--

- ~-_j

b;

.~ 'l ..

!{,,'

- ~ ~~;· fi(

ttte

-

p

-~

·•

~~· ~· ·_

tv-< / '

7

'<

-#

~ ;,udv> 0;r~d ~ · ~

I
("'§.

'·
·r;r

1i

·~k

-4~~~

'1f1

·~;~. F~

tftA;~

0JL. ·tus..

-

c~k 52.

++

~d!g(J ~ ~- k~~·
vu.e
Jl

' ' '

'it?t
~-

~

ltu

•. t:

t
!

<

'

. '!V ~ 0 t1-&tJ
~tf1A

eeAl

{

''"•'

~

C'4R.

'

~

n

lz> k " ~ ti1Q ,: ~
~tv~ ~~d . ~:,~,;&
tkl

4Ae.fP-

~-~-.

~~ V'J.-?tu!

·euv

(4

../2,-tol

4_~~~~

~
/IZVU~
M
T ~ -A tt;ad LM-<-7k'l ?~f-}P/l/1-u.J ~
. lJ' - .~ ll;.cf ;f / r~l!ttt.:;' ~ ~ia ~ ~t:lo.l ~ ~ y~~ /o.-cfb-:r-~ '

';

II
'

~ ·-10.

J: f) t.s'.f1v..div..:.s

/Jff..<.e"t4f:,

<"-«-cor2

''

·.. '

t

~

I+

r~oP~
h

~'

,jl,~· ~.''

1/.

,.

~

/~

•

u.c_,Jl .

~CJ!1~~ ~d

{j_

d4r~
,·

-

tfu~

i

;['

.

~-Q?

tz[!L

efta

~

t:Za40'... .

'll

zZu

Ji

;J,.

'"

/* ~~~IJ-.

jil:f

~ i£~; ~ &cfrv~

+

~~~ ~

k:Jt' v'WtJit:

~e!~.

",,

.r ..•.
!

'

.

~~

.

4d-~)~&

'' .
~

rth'dl
,
"

' ;; wd4tf2t.cil

'

I ..

ht:.cr ·

~~-~ ;fvG,~ ~

/lw.

-~ ~ ~-j ,.~

;uf#<L<l
<li;J!

<i

. •

~A

~ ~u·':f', '1J

t7

}0

&~/&

. .

~

~~

#L-

.

-~ ~~ /) ~f{,eci/~

.,: ....

'

'

lj

J;zr0whcic,

~d~)

d- r~-- ~~

l

..

.

'

~ ~ v4~ ~~luf ~~

~

,,,

~.

~ ~

.''

' ~t<b ~ ~/U/1{!~) ~ ~ 1

... r.'

.....

~···~···

~

/){

~·.~

~

~ ~'~

.

/I

·~.
_i~

,.

~

~

t:k.:c.P

/u~ ~ ~ 1~%

/P

t

J'f

OtJeA ~~
I

~sl

u

).:~ -~"'-

~

- :r.

.Aot>r- ' ~

t

~

Pz;.s.t

~J~~

rs~·~o::·

A ~/1 .t:h:2ub.

!
I

t..u£/LA-VLA-1.-VU-t·u~

~~ I{

~c:lrt-~,~

·i~ ·

I /W-&?tteJ

J4

.

-

df.At/f

~~<e~

t_·-p__~,__t_i•_L4_;;t~>&_-_ _1i_-a_ 'd gjt;;

,

tlu

a"tLt-<

~

:,

I

~/2
~ .{j/1.1 ~~

f~
U-<J

,..

·-

>4< ••

~'~./!:.~.:.

~

: 0•

~~ ~

~;;; ~~
•.

, •

-

~-f*"'·'!

r&

tYf~.a-uA..t'c:~~ ·-·~ ~hr.;?~... ().

k1A~~ .
~-[.,~ •

~

~ ~uik· )

•

t

(

~

.

--.:: -

..v +tiU~ '£ ;
~.f!:tt& 1k.i
1 tt~
~ ~-

~

.

0

/3

kJ ~
.,

~/ ~

d

,

~~

I

o-w2r

\o.

~~;

c:;:

I

'

b{.U.A..(3P~- /"'Ul!d~etl

tl h r~·.~ ~~
I

~

,::·

,:-~ ,.
'·
~ ikJ' fl 'i ddc.;dz; ~ ~~ ~

r

"

y

.

-.

, ~{

.,

15'

~ ~~ iJ)
~1';\

tl4

~ tt* ~

'; tfld-

/f.&lr~

{/1-.
~

~~/£t04t_J ~~)

.

'(Luc_~
I

{.;C

~

,~

I

- -

-

~

,

-:1

~.·~ -~ ;~- -" ~~~'
\_
'

'

~

'

..·. ~ _ ,fM,·,..tJ
-

_· '

~-

-

'

-

M'!t

-

·~

fiAt"~-

,•·

'd

1)~ ~ U#~f
ho Ph<-f

!W4

·lo

~~~--t
-

~~

~~ -tu,

-

Uu-;..4)J~

-

-

;d~

ol

-,,. - ~,

;·

•

·'"'~-

• o;_

t/1A

~·· c; ~ou~

~7

-~/
• -

.J

tot)~ ·~

)l-v

, '· 1

J3 (_{

c~ .

{)u_e "(;

~ - ~,;:;_u~ ~ s: ~

~ t?..A-M~?' &

~'1

,,a,w§"*7

,

~=izx7/u.~fl 76,'~
'"

,,,

II
~.

....

-~

If'.,.'

..- -

-

/1-1-<~~

:. .vr
~

-t
~~

"\,j!

~

/Lt/A; '7

. ~ ...~

[._
'·

..

--

~~ t!r!P~<--Inee-c4f4
-

f:,;d- ~ /d-~

Lr

. . " _-JP~J:

~u/ ~~ ~

lr.e _;~:e. jp

)1-<.eu).

- --

,.;, ""-

'

/h'-4?

-~

>.

-f:ke

~

,# 4(2~

~/a&'-

71:
-

-

+-+-

-

-

..;,..;

-

-

';

++

.1

,

.

'

/0
''·
1'i

'\•:

r·

~<:':

.

-

-

- ;;; ~._ . ~ it<0

ptev-r

~

d-

++

' f~ P3 ~' ~
\~'

t'

~-~

Juo

ht ~ ~7

UnJ

~ rtfocd'~

~

~ A.at~~_,_;_

,,

"

q

\"

£j_h-J/lA. vi? t-h~

I

~ . 1-Y#t ~~~ ~A#> r6~

* Jq

:1

w.£f

Ag-ted
~

lo

:•''t

~ ...........

··"'-·"'·"'-·--

~~-----~

... - - ·'!'.•• .-(

.!'"'-.~• .. ;;;' .. '

::{; "

..,;.:;.

&4w/ ~
?&~1 '-~'

tt«u-J

/htJ/~

h

r

fJ-e

II
•.-;,;

-,.\,

\

fm?-o~dl:tt'

7lu-

/lk&«fJ

..~u~~

~

C'tUR/

otJVtth~)

~

t&l 1/h tAR-

buJ~

~~~~

11/tu.JI-

,/

~ ~~

b-1r II#,

U

{~

J

~

?U-<.af

cuiud-

.I

lW<l

v((/tkdl

~

~((~--~

~~

l ~~ ~
'"
f~~/1 ~ ~ay ~ ~

~

,

'I

I (~

~~

'\:

j;jl

b _

u~~

~~ dat-~.

!:?

]l
7lte

4h cf;~

(~

~-tt:.

)-

1/fft&~
~~

(}1Ae

"~

a.ftcA- (~~

/}au

lfw.>·./4-dtLI.fA/
~ /1 . ' /~ LJocd-.(Qv- IJ~rta<k>
~· ~:

·., ;:.-., -

'r.:·

i

~ ~ ,.

k

'~~'

"'

;oq

'~

/)o~ ~

,;..

(lcrto)

ll.ftt . i./lev . 67

I

~

t4;f

~

..

+t

; ~.Jb-tJ~

-

Unu~~ i4cv./\

' ''

I!

tt

~ '

t1?<7

ur

1}1udJ '

0~ ~ /

ll

;/.

)

7h

'

~ ?#7/IL~ ~ ~)
j~

~
II

I~

f-udt

,-/t;

tdj~

4
~

'

. iJ;

~~

/O

r,

~

/96D

"'-~

lv
.6tu_

fr ~

Jp,._~ 7-~

( .£ee_ :J.S a:i ~i-{)

/l-tV\.

S.J ~)

tlr--."-*-;0-oTh-~. -~~ 1 0/!fl-b ~
~~

flu.et.._

~

ClAA-

cr~i2e.

~-wf}

·m

.

(3

~ Ill.

~~

~~

~ ~"

-

~ ~ ~el .-,lz; drt> ..&> ~ ~

'

- - •r

. ~~ -!;..... ·

~

f

< ~ .

j

- tMe~ .~tAcQ.

1
~
~

lf

q

t

7D

~ _·__ ·_

b"'

'

....:/;J {'~"6f;1

_;J .

lf/tt ~{l~ dae /W~ .

4-(~ d< ~~- ~--

t·'

--

-

r:kcYT~J ·~tt~~b6

u·,,:at;ll

•

--

of ~

1'7~~. lo ~/UZ

tt
.

~·

&_

"

~a.R r..4& t:C»o

~

t'HP-e<-tn0!P _

.

:!~

I
t

,2~ -021).

J

~i -p_...a:~ - iw _ LP~I

t -:; Vaiw ~
tl

3S~.

~.'

wd:£..

~1· -~

.5ee

(

.

~ · t7VJ2

it<_..

.

o~~

CCut

-

iu~~~ \A~~

~ r;!.

j .'

7f'~ ~ ~ .

j

7htJ -k«c4...:y/

::)~

¥
.
J;j
It
•
~

· ....~

~

k

/~

I! ~ :~

~)

~01
I

a4

•

-~~

.7

~(l~ ~

f•i·~:' --,¢}J
'

v"r~
1

~~~~ ~¥
fUSI

I

~~ ~~

M~

&r-

--

~-.....__-

', -

.·

-

j,U/2-_.~
- 1·
--

.tr;UdN-L

-

-

~

- r

--

~

. -

- - -

~~ ~

""!~...

,--- .....:.>(~

++

- -

---

1

Pu

-~~I

iv:?

'

£.K

; ~ wP ~ ~-A
l-'

-

(?1Y112-t..#r?

- ; /J1044. -~~ ~~ -

axde-e

~r~

zdid - ~ -

\

v, ·

-

/Ubf

{/:7

----

~
IC··'-~ I

3t·;:;_ U.s. l7 { !tf~o)

I?, ,

/C~ J

Ia~

~-. ~ ~, ~,

I

au~.*"

'" ~

++

. Jl- 1/}.

+t

.~

..eu.e'IA.

~f/~~d

li
t£4

II - -

l

J J~&

/A£?1fti/U1

~ ~~cf)M_j,_
~
'

1

A:-

~r J'UZ-1-? {~. /

t....

I/

8

(a)-

~u-~

Z7

!ltJL:? 4~~ . ~c;,1 s #

(A_

.ftt_

g Pj·.p.,

~-~;__

7 ~'>W •~ ~~
1%,

-f;0_

4 .s.

{

t

l
i

,I

:& !)t<J2 .

·ft Al totftt ~ /Ut'Lt2 /)t,tJ~Pl ~e'd
btJ;CJW-ue-hj t)~0.A4tbz, JLI:5i...r,Z frtL4«f&M-12v_:/2~

.I

~ ~ ~ ~ qj/v:.._

/2~<:?61 _La~

?;.,._

~

~0

.

;r
<

'
,.,_,.... !

,[ ~ ~~;_; o/~) ~ ~7~~~ ~
~ .~.·, ~4/

' u

,/

1

/:;Jf4d0:

~~~ c~P -tJu
~ ~ LU'4 !M~

·

.~·

:r~ ,~~

.(/'-L

f;iu,.

~
-

~

tl

-~cr44 ~

/J

lV-?Jzu,ftP

t!AA

,,

Ut:l ~ .

-~ ~~

~ lb~
tlS. -4~<-€;, ... ~~
.

'

~ '~ t-~ ~·

h

/aR

4

1

.....

.••

•

~-- ., __ .~·· .....

',.·-

4.0·~

~·

"""

rrd}

· rtfl"b ~)

Ct!/7/14~~~~ ~.

~ J'-<4~ ~1~ ~

,_

.

~ ~
1:4_,_

!6

·f

rtt

lt-<J

t/1

,;?!A

~t1 eL-

tfae-e

d:uz_

'-0

I

+I-

] /~~/
~

if ~ ~ 4/z~ ft

J 06~ u~ 1UP

-tw. ~~J\ ~ 4

~ ~

"""

~ b.~?

I

t+

.l ~ I
- i

zc)

>

1

~

~

~~ }?;

-~ . -~e-~ -~~ ~

· e;.J6

!
..

~

~&<~~

St<-c~

re.o;u.

<+

1 lfVlU}

fP

vk

4e~ tuJ- .

/1 U

&t~~IU~

/

/}-ttr

~.}

C:t12~

Wt>4

vr

~

th>clrt-4~
M-h

e>dd

~

-lo

I-ce~

.

1--~----~

_zt/ !k ~!* ~PL-HtZ/o., ~ U: /tA.. 8 %
/?vott~ ~d)
'' d {..V'/1!4 .A'!.(Ji JC.bQ~ .

.. At-~UJ L;,.; /2~ J ~ ~ ~4!! ~M
t ~cew~~ ~ U?«of fr ~~ ~ %-6}~
::;§ k .../~ _A-:f~. "

'1

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Jack B. Owens

DATE: November 9, 1973

No. 72-1254 Smith v. Goguen
The Massachusetts Flag Contempt Case
This will respond to your memorandum of October 23, 1970,
on the above subject as well as take into account the conversations we
have also had on this subject.
The principal question posed in ,your memo is when a court
in dealing with the vagueness doctrine may review a statute on its face
rather than as the statute applies to the litigant before the court.
First, I will address that question solely as it applies to the 14th Amendment due process vagueness doctrine.

Then I will discuss it more

broadly in relation to both the vagueness doctrine and the 1st Amendment
related overbreadth doctrine.

As I pointed out to you in our discussion,

Judge Coffin's separation of the doctrine of vagueness from the doctrine
of overbreadth is analytically correct but is not fully faithful to recent
precedents of this court dealing with cases that raise 1st Amendment
issues.
When only 14th Amendment vagueness is at issue, the traditional
rule is that a party to whom a statute is not vague may not raise a facial
vagueness attack on that statute.

Judge Coffin circumvented that rule

2.
by applying certain exceptions to it that he took from the case of U.S. v.
Baines, 362 U.S. 17 (196() ( Brennan, J. ).

The exceptiomrelied on by

Judge Coffin were cases in which a state statute has been stricken in
so many particulars by a state court that what remains cannot reasonably
be construed as what the legislature intended, and cases in which the

state courts have invalidated a statute with regard to an application
of that statute that is indistinguishable from the case at bar. However,
as Judge Coffin frankly recognized, the state statute he was dealing
with had not been construed at all by the Massachusetts courts; the
statute was too new for extensive state court construction• to have
taken place.

Judge Coffin applied the two Raines exceptions on the

extremely dubious ground that if the state courts had construed the

statut~ they would have plac~ it under one of the two Raines exceptions.
I think the state is right in arguing that this is a misapplication of the
Raines case.
The Raines exception that Judge Coffin should have relied on is
the exception created for cases raising 1st Amendment issues.

Judge

Coffin was not able to rely on that exception because he started out by
treating the vagueness doctrine as distinguishable from the 1st Amendment
aspects of the case. Thus, I think Judge Coffin erred for two reasons
in allowing Goguen to attack the statute as vague on its face -- (1) He
misapplied the Raines case and (2) he failed to treat the case as has

3.
this Court in recent years in dealing with cases that raise mixed vagueness/
overbreadth claims.
If Judge Coffin was going to treat vagueness distinct from the

------------~-------------------- -

overbreadth questions presented, he should havEL_gllowed Goguen to

-----------------------

attack the statute only as a

lied to him. On that basis, I think the

--------~· -~..,._.._~--

statute meets one-half of the traditional

~

vaguen~ss

t est but not the other.

The first element of vagueness is the concept of notice or warning.

-

-

I find it hard to believe that someone who wears a flag on his fanny does

not have adequate notice that he has, as the statute proscribes, treated
the flag contemptuously. The second half of vagueness requires a
state to set ce!'tain

/I
reason~ble

standards to govern the discretion of

law enforcement officials as well as triers of fact in criminal trials.
With regard to this half of the vagueness test this case gives me real
difficulty.

The concept of treating with contempt, without further

l ---------

defini!!on, is so unlimited that it in essen: e allows both law enforcement
CJ!f~and

fac_t f inders to act out of personal prejudice. By failing
as
to be more specific/to what constitutes contempt -- by perhaps forbidding
~

-

-

any application of the flag to one's clothing -- I believe that Massachusetts
has failed to meet the second half of the vagueness text, and I think I

-

could with : pri.n.Qiple decide this case on that basis .
.---...___

-

'-

Turning from vagueness
alone-..____
to vagueness and
overbreadth,
... which is the common mixture in 1st Amendment cases, the controlling

4.
precedent at the moment with regard to the question posed in your
October 23 memorandum is Broadrick v. Oklahoma, June 25, 1973,
White, J. A slip opinion for that case is attached and you must review
it prior to voting in Goguen.

In Broadrick, Justice

~ite

departed from

earlier opinions that he had written in this area in recent years ~and
established the following rules for when a party may bring a mixed
'

vagueness and overbreadth attack on the face of a statute.

First, Justice

White distinguished conguct from pure speech (and obviously Justice
White would treat this as a conduct case).

Second, Justice White

established the concept of the ''hard core violatort" -- one to whom there

.

\f•

,.j

- n ut doubt that a statute applied and whose conduct could be prohibited
without violating the 1st Amendment. With regard to the hard core
violator engaged in conduct, Justice White declared that the attack could
be made on the face of the statute only if that statute was substantially
overbroad.

The tes t he created is clearly circular. If the Court

believes that a statute is substantially overbroad and vague, then the
hard core violator may make a facial attaek. If the statute is not
.,

substantially out of line, then he cannot.

Since Broadrick is the

controlling case, I think, then to answer the question posed in your
memorandum you must decide whether the Massachusetts statute is
substantiall vague and overbroad.

-5-

Justice ' White 8 s position in this case will be important
not only because of his aut~hip of the Broadrick opinion
and his swing vote, but also because of the speech/conduct line
he has developed over the last few years in the vagueness/
overbreadth cases,

u.s. 611 (1971),

For example, Coates v, Cincinnati,

402

involved a city ordinance making it a crime

for "three or more persons to assemble • • • on any of the

sid~alks , , • and there conduct themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by , , • • II

Justice Stewart,

joined by JJ. Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, and Marshall*, struck
the ordinance down on its face without specifying whether those
challenging the ordinance had engaged in conduct at the core
of the ordinance or at its outer perimeters,

("The record

brought before the reviewing courts .... tells us no more than
that the appellant Coates was a student involved in a demonstration
and the other appellants were pickets involved in a labor
dispute,")

That is, Justice Stewart and four others were willing

to accept a facial overbreadth and vagueness attack on a
criminal ordinance without specifying whether the appellants•
own position vis-a-vis the e ordinance made any difference,
On the face of the statute, it was the opinion of the Court that
.....

. .

. .

"Justice Black filed a separate op1n1on conta1n1ng a
comment that may --strike your fancy, "It is a matter of no
little difficulty to determine when a law can be held void on
its face and when such summary action is inappropriate." Id,,
at 617

-6-

"this

ordinanc~

is unconstitutionally vague because it

subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to• an
unascertainable standard, and unconstitutionally overbroad
because it authorizes the . . punishment of constitutionally
protected conduct."

Id. , at 614.

Justice White, joined in dissent by the Chief and
Justice Blackmun, . . presented the outlines of a position that
was ultimately to garner a Court in Broadrick. He noted the
"general rule" that "when a criminal charge is based on conduct
constitutionally subject to proscription and clearly forbidden
by a statute, it is no defense that the law would be unconstituttonally vague if app~ied to other behavior.
is not vague on its face.
c~rcumstances,

Such a statute

It may be vague as applied in some
on

but ruling~such a challenge obviously requires

knowledge of the conduct with which a defendant is charged."
But, as J. White pointed out, the cases "recognize a different
approach where the statute at issue purposts to regulate or
proscribe rights of speech or press protected by the First
Amendment."

"Although a statute may be neither vague, over•

broad, nor otherwise invalid as applied to the conduct* charged
against a particular defendant, he is permitted to raise its

*An unfortunate choice of words by Justice White, as
noted in the next few sentences. I think he really meant to
use the term "expression" or
"communication" at this point. If this sentence from the Coates
dissent is read literally, it directly conflicts with the
postion taken by Justice White, for the Court, in Broadrick.

-7-

vagueness or

'

overbreadth as applied to others.

~nconstitutional

And if the . . . law is found deficient in one of these respects,
it may not be applied to him either, until and unless a satisA

factory limiting construction is placed on the statu,te
~

the state courts

by

....

"

Although in recognizing the above exception 1111 the
general • • -• vagueness "on the face'' versus "as applied"
rules in First Amendment cases, Justice White used the term
"conduct," the latter part of his Coates dissent makes clear
that he intends the exception to apply only in cases where the
party making the attack was engaged in pure ._. speech.
Although he did not fully articulate what .... was to become
a full-blown position in Broadrick, he did stress that the
case presented a "regulation of conduct rather than pure
speech."

Thus, he had to dissent •

from the majority 0 s

holding that the appellants could challenge the statute at
issue on its face,

So, you have an instance of Justice White

sending up a signal in 1971 that, with regard to when facial
attacks could be made, a line should be drawn between conduct
and speeck.

Also, quite 1&

1 ...••

significantly, at that

point in the Court 0 s makepp, a majority of the Court was
willing to acc~t a facial vagueness/overbre~dth attack
without regard to • conduct/speech and without regard to
whether the party making the attack was at the core or the edges
of the statutory proscription.
In analysing Justice White's development in this
area (which has become a litmus test for the Court's position,
it appears), you should also

e

take into account Gooding v.

-8-

Wilson, 405 u.,s. 518 (1972)(JJ. Pdwell and Rehnquist no f
.

participation).

At issue there was a Georgia statute

subjecting to criminal . . liability persons who in the
presence of another used "opprobrious words or abusive language,
tending to cause a breach of the peace • • • • "

This statute

was applied by the state to what undoubtedly must be viewed
as a hard core violator.

The defendant took part in a demon-

stration blocking access to a draft induction center,

..a:

expressing his race-hatred through such volatile statement asa
"White son of a bitch, 1°11 kill you."
I'll choke you to death."
Cou~t,

"You son of a bitch,

Justice Brennan, wtiting for the
./'

stressed that the challenged statu1te
reached only
~

spoken words.

In that contexta

"It matters not that the words

appellee used might have been constitutionally prohibited under
a narrowly and precisely drawn statute.

At least when statutes

regulate or proscribe speech and when gno readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating
the statutes in a single prosecution,' • • • , the transendent
~

value to all society of • constitutionally protected

expression is deemed to justify allowing 'attacks on overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the
attack demonstrate that his own , . . conduct could not be
regulated by a statute . . . drawn with the requisite narrow
1

specificity' • • • • " (citing J. White s comments from his dissent
in Coates).

.-

Apparently because "puJ;:e" s_peech was at issue,

-------

J. White joined the 5 man . . . . majority striking down the
.

---- --

G~o~~~te

"---"

in Gooding.

(Brennan, Douglas, Stewart,

White, Marshall)

,'

-9-

If a five man majority ( inc.l uding you) <;::ontinues to

.t.t1
w·:L~· ,,
c.v"-. ltV

().,rl' i)

'' /
11""'
" V

·v
lY

vJ-': ;;.;--"~ o, "'

tyV~ ~v::;J!~

coalesce around the Justice White position expressed in
~

Broadrick, then I believe that Court
~ ·

a

w,·,

11 refuse to allow

Goguen to make a facial overbreadth or vagueness attack on
the Massachusetts flag contempt statute, because Goguen was
a hard core violatmr who engaged in conduct, not speech, and

V./ ""~ because a statuee that forbids treating the

~
/

V"'-'

1

, t,v~

)?Y
t--- .

someone Who puts the flag on the seat of his

That determination will probably end the case--

with regard to the

problems.

.~

flag

contemptuously is not "substantially" overbroad (or vague) with

~ ~ __.,)- regard to
lr;t~.}ui ~..;+t:V-Ybritches.

~·

u.s. •

statute~

facial problems and its as appled

That is because of the circularity of the reasoning

adopted by J. White in Broadrick. This statute is not vague/
overbroad as
violator.

ap~lied

.

to Goguen, because he is a hard core

Since it is not bad "as applied," Goguen loses under

that approach.

Furthermore, since . . it is not bad as

it equally is not "substantially"

overbraad,

,'

app~ed,

Statutes

that are not substantially overbroa? cannot be challenged on

---

their face by hard core violatmrs,

-------------

-

.._

-

-

Thus, Goguen loses under

.;

the on the face approach as well, and the case must be reversed.

Q.E.D •

~,e,Q

.--r-1 ~ ;vlr-fV
~

L.!) ·J,.~pvlu

/~~~
~ ~vv

v

tV'
vA,A/~

'--._./

JJ.vftr/ '

v--~ .

I don't mean to oversimplify the approach of the Cout

in • Broadrick.

The critical determination is, of course,

whether Goguen is a hard core violator (that determination

VV'
~ in

t•¥~ ~t~
t;Vtt.,e.J

•

essence resolves the case, under the Broadrick approach).

To make that determination, J. White would, I take it, have
to determine whether Goguen was as close to the core of what

-10-

the statute

p~oscribes

in Broadrick.

as were the state governmental employees

That will be no easy task, because what the
,o~-~-------

r..,

. .

--

statute proscribes has been dtfined in this case with a total

--------

lack of particularity on the part of the state
the state courts.

However, I

legislatur~ or

-am fairly certain that

Justice

White will conclude (and certainly the Chief, J. Blackmum, and
J. Rehnquist will be with him on this) that whatever the legislature meant to forbid, they certainly must have had Goguen°s
conduct in mind,
I must warn you 57

against assuming that the Court

has developed hard and - fast rules in this area, or at . . .
least in assuming that the Court has always been consistent,
Broadrick may signal an attempt to put the on the face/as
applied question to rest, at least as it arises in conduct
~..._earlier

cases,

But it is . . written against a backgDound of,tcases

in which the • court has either failed to discern the difference

.

between on the face and as

I

app~ed

,

attacks or has • chosen not

to make an issue of the . . distinction.

In 1960, the author

of the classic piece on vagueness wrote thata"To challenge a

fl(... Jfk1?
"' '- ~c~'-'
{l¥v-~~. Ji --:-;;;x~

"The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court," 109

(A/W~

f ~ f/.-c- .
~

.

f-.0

~~u·~f

.~
~~~

Jv

);~
~

~~~~Q.·~~

?>-t.P-t-v&~

statute as vague or overreaching, at litigant must still be
as
one ,..to whom it is vague or whom it may overreach." Amsterdam,

-

b'~ - U- ':" 0

U,Pa.L.Rev. 67, 101.

the Court failed to adhere to this maxim in many of the leading
vagueness cases prior to 1960 (See J.S. at 24, nn. 5, 6) and •

.
:!;/.ui-r
{1_ ct.~ i:las failed to do soa
-~

'-- &~

(<

in a number of cases since, some of them

quite recent and some of them authored by J. White (See J.S. at
26-27).

~~1.'··

w

But, as J, Coffin correctly points out,

~

-11--

It is my personal belief that an effort to
Court's cases dealing with the question you asked in your memo
fit together in principle leads to paralysis.

Given that, and

since your own slate in this area is essentially clear, ..:_, ~~~d -~·
attempt to write some sense, if you have the latitude to do that

-=-

In deciding this case (as distinguished from the other flag
contempt cases which are hanging around, some of which do not
have the statu~ ambiguity posed by this case), I would
focus squarely on 14th Amendment due process vagueness.
Judge Coffin is right that the vagueness doctrine is
If.../ /\~analytically distinc'tl from the W overbreadth doctrine. "1:
1!,;)'

•

'1--''UJ\...

t:/&Uivfo~t '"lj-v-'fl. Technically speaking, vaguene~s in the context of a state

vv~¥

criminal proceeding is a doctrine derived directly from the due

'J ~·

~)r

~.1

~,.A-'
lv-r'fvr
!.f"'

pr~cess

clause of the 14th Amendment.

of the First Amendmentl.

demand~air

prosecutorial and

~~-

Jt<. -~~
~

q-

•

.. P/
,~?
· r;v- b~

..;r -,

~-·

__,X ~-

) "'

~

·
· ~.1

;-....,.)<-~
r~

~~I

It presumes that due process of law

an~ined

-

channels for the exercise of

discretion.

fa~t-finder

Overbreadth, on the

~-----------------------~

other hand, is thought of primarily as a First Amendment related
doctrine.

. A~

warning

Its roots area independent

Assume that Aus activity falls outside the scope ..

*As noted above, in opting for analytical clarity, J •
Coffin departed from the precedents of this Cout, which have
miXed the two doctrines up in 1st Amendment cases for the last
decade and a half. "T~ ueness do2_tri!_1~S been almost wholly
~~.QY~.!'~ad~h_ <:toctri,.ne when s~a_!:utes covering first
amendment ac£_vities ar~ a~_J.s;?ue." Note;-a "Thel'irst Amendment
0~ Doctr1.nef;"'
83 Harv.L.Rev. 844, 873 (1970). This
commentator, as other~?, espouses this development, because, it is
argued, 1st Amendment rights are peculiarly susceptible to "chill"
when vague statutes are • in operation. However, i.n cases where
ypu bel~ve, as I think you do in this case, that the 1st Amemdment
does not cover' the activity engaged in, it does not appear that .
yelu neeCf~a such uidance to ~ix up vagueness and overbreadth.

I
I

(~ S14~C

1\'

&

•

~~

.
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of the First ~mendment, but that B's communicative activi~y
cannot constitutionally be proscribed.

A state statute that

(as pared down by the state courts, if at all) reaches

A~

The doctrine has oft~ been used to dodge tough

B is overbroad.

First Amendment questions.

. . . Suppose that the constitutional

status of A's expressive activity poses a ........ Courtsplitting First Amendment question.

It the statute at issue

forbids I* B's clearly protected expression (or indeed can be
by this Court to
read
2 .. ,forbid B's expression), there has been an understandable tendency to knock the statute down in toto on the basis
of • its application to B, thus

--*

avoiding

ha~ng to confront

A0 s . case head on, yet nevertheless granting A relief.
Although I don't advocate reaching out to decide tough
First Amendment questions (the First Amendment may too oft~
be the worse for the • wear), I am equally no fan of the doctrinal
• confusion

a

that has been engendered by the above tendencies

~

of the Court.

•

& Like Judge Coffin--although hopefully with

more temperate language--! would attempt to decide this case
on 14th Amendment vagueness grounds at the outset.

And, I would

B2! go on to • say anything in this case about the 1st Amendment.
In this z? 3

respect, I think my former mentor, Judge Hamley,

was right in the • brief opinion he authored in this case.
earlier,

un~er

As noted

my view of vagueness, which I believe is supported

in thm cases, this statute is ..._ vague because of the unbridled
--------- -z:

at large under a criminal statute.
~
Under this
of vagueness, note that the concept of
the hard core ... violator (so central to the views of Justice

-13-

White and, I believe, to those of the Chief and Justice
Blackmun) has no meaning.

The very notion of vagueness, as

I lunderstand it, is that there is no "core• to the statute.
-----------

That is precisely the problem,
g~e-

'"~='

The legislature has failed to

I'

definition to the crime to be able to determine,

as a law enforcement official, a prosecutor, or a criminal factfinder, what

conduct is at the core and therefore prohibited

and what is not,

The due process clause fmrbids a legislature
·----------·~----~---~·----

from setting state officials and juries loose on such

----

unrestricted field,
"\....-~------

anA

As Judge • Coffin noted, an effort to

...

enforce this law "would be the exact equivalent of an effort to
carry out a statute which in terms merelw penalized and punished
all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and
unreasonable in the estil.mation of . . court and jury,"
the Cohen Grocery case,

(Citing

one of the vagueness groundbreaker

precedents).
As you have

correctl~

pointed out, deciding this case

on vagueness grounds will not relieve the Court of deciding the
• flag contempt issue for very long, ._. since so many cases
are now

that issue

Thus, you will

have to come to rest on the substantive first amendment issue,
and now is as good a time as any.

Before I commit anything to

paper on that, I urge you to read

Jilt

in Street v. New York, 394

u.s.

Justice Harlan's opinions

576, 590-94 (1969)(note in

particular the reliance on the Barnette "flag salute'' case)
and Cohen v. California, 403

.•·'·'

u.s

15 (1971).

Then I would like

-14-

to discuss the issue with you again.
the importance of the First

a

I also think, given

Amendment issues that are

involved, that you might also discuss the case with one of
the other clerks, so that your thinking will not be influenced
solely by my own somewhat settled views.

You ought also to

have a look at United States v. O'Brien, 391
the draft card burnigg case.

That case

u.s.

does~

367 (1968),

not control here,

in my view, because in the opera~n of a draft system the
requiere
state has certain legitimate needs thatA
it to channel
conduct with no primary purpose of attempting to tiB censor
communication.

In this case, the state has no interest or

purpose other than foreclosing certain categories of communication,
which is what gives me such First Amendment problemso

I
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CHAMBER S OF

November 21, 1973

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

MEMO TO JUSTICES BRENNAN, STEWART, l>fARSHALL AND POWELL:

I have put in summary form
v. Goguen.

my

conclusions in 72-1254, Smith

As I recall the Conference discussion Bill Brennan affirmed

on First Amendment grounds as did Thurgood.
Potter, I recall went

-

~

on vagueness and overbreadth.

Le'\·ris, I believe, went only on vagueness.
Anyone can,· of course, write his own personal views.

~

concern at this time is whether we can get a Court.
I have stated

-

my

-

preferenc~s

in

my

memo.

-

I believe, ....go
on vagueness
as-- ,,..well
as ....overbreadth
•
...........
.-..._.._
.....
._
.
~

~.

~

~

--

But I could,

Perhaps either Potter or Lewis should write this opinion.
Perhaps the five of us should have a brief conference.
23rd at 3 p.m. itTould be ·o.-k. with me.

•,

~

-(

.J
!

(-1) -:-ri--J!~ ~.
cY-

II

15.
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Jack B. Owens

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: November 26, 1973

No. 72-1254 Smith v. Goguen
At the Conference today, and after considerable discussion,
Justice Douglas assigned this case to me to write solely on the vagueness
issue.
Bill Brennan indicated that he might concur separately and
reach the First Amendment issue, but said he would join an opinion
for the Court solely on what he called "old fashioned" 14th Amendment
due process vagueness. I had previously stated that if I wrote, it would
be on that basis.
You will find in the file my conclusory summary of the position
which I took at the Conference today.
It is important to bear in mind that Justice Stewart thinks that

there was no adequate notice under this statute. At one point you and I
had thought that the notice was sufficient. Yet, as I thought about the
case further, I have come around to Justice Stewart's view that the
basic infirmity of the language here is that it doesn't give anyone notice
or guidelines. The remarkable concession by the Attorney General
pretty well illustrates that a citizen just can't know when he would be

2.
prosecuted, and indeed the prosecutor himself wouldn't known in advance
because he would have to make a subjective judgment as to the intent of
the person arguably violating the statute.
No mention was made at the Conference of Broadrick.
Justice Brennan, in particular, was anxious to know whether the
other Justices present thought we would reach the First Amendment issue
in Spence.

I stated that I believed we would, and certainly that we would

or could reach it in one of the other pending cases.

Justice Brennan

expressed the opinion that we would have to reach the First Amendment
issue in Spence, and Justice stewart was of a like view. Neither Justice
Douglas nor Justice Marshall expressed an opinion on this question. It
is fair to say, however, that Justice Brennan was willing to go along with
a narrow decision in this case on the assumption that we will reach the
First Amendment issue in one of the cases now pending.
As we agreed, I would like to write this case as narrowly as
we can write it and still deal fairly and explicitly with the issues and
the relevant authorities.

Justice stewart expressed the opinion that

there were several Supreme Court cases (which he did not identify
specifically) which would strongly support a 14th Amendment vagueness
decision.
One final footnote: To the extent that we can use the views of
Justice Douglas (as expressed in his memorandum) without compromising
a principled and consistent opinion, I would like to do so.
L.F.P., Jr.
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MEMORANDUM·
TO:

Mr. Jack B. Owens

FROM:

Lewis F. P owell, Jr.

DATE: November 26, 1973

No. 72-1254 Smith v. Goguen
At the Conference today, and after considerable discussion,
Justice Douglas assigned this case to me to write solely on the vagueness
issue.
,,

Bill Brennan indicated that he might concur separately and
reach the First Amendment issue, but said he would join an opinion
for the Court solely on what he called "old fashioned " 14th Amendment
due process vagueness. I had previously stated that if I wrote, it would
be on that basis.
You will find in the file my conclusory summary of the position
which I took at the Conference today.
It is important to bear in mind that Justice stewart thinks that

there was no adequate notice under this statute. At one point you and I
had thought that the notice was sufficient. Yet, as I thought about the
case further, I have come around to Justice stewart's view that the
basie infirmity of the language here is that it doesn't give anyone notice
or guidelines. The remarkable concession by the Attorney General
pretty well illustrates that a citizen just can't know when he would be
I

I

2.
prosecuted, and indeed the prosecutor himself wouldn't known in advance
because he would have to make a subjective judgment as to the intent of
the person arguably violating the statute.
No mention was made at the Conference of Broadrick.
~Justice

Brennan, in particular, was anxious to know whether the

other Justices present thought we would reach the First Amendment issue
in

Spe~ce.

.~

I stated that I believed we would, and certainly that we would

or could reach it in one of the other pending cases. Justice Brennan
expressed the opinion that we would have to reach the First Amendment
issue in Spence, and Justice stewart was of a like view. Neither Justice
Douglas nor ,Justice Marshall expressed an opinion on this questioo. It
is fair to say, however, that Justice Brennan was willing to go along with
a narrow decision in this case on the assumption that we will reach the
First Amendment issue in one of the cases now pending.
As we agreed, I would like to write this case as narrowly as
we can write it and still deal fairly and explicitly with the issues and
the relevant authorities. Justice stewart expressed the opinion that
there were several Supreme Court cases (which he did not identify
specifically) which would strongly support a 14th Amendment vagueness
decision.
One final footnote: To the extent that we can use the views of
Juiltice Douglas (as expressed in his memorandum) without compromising
a principled and coosistent opinion, I would like to do so.
L. F. P., Jr.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUST ICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

November 26, 1973

Dear Chief:
In 72-1251~, Smith v. Goguen·

the opinion has been assigned to Leins.

c.uv
W'illia.m 0. Douglas

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

No. 72-1254 SMITH v. GOGUEN
The Sheriff of Worcester COtmty, Massachusetts, appeals
from a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First
' \ J! ~( )

CircuitAthat the desecration provision of the Massachusetts
statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

fl~

misuse

Goguen v. Smith,

471 F. 2d 88, aff'g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (D. Mass. 1972), probable juris.
.

noted, _u.S. _

~~··u.t n•~ ~~

vJ ,
(1973). We affirm on theAbasis of •-=~~

· the Fourteenth Amendment due process doctrine of
yagueness. We do not reach the correctness of the holding below
on overbreadth or other First Amendment grounds.
I

I
~

Goguen wore a small cloth version of the United States flag sewn

,

to the seat of his pants.

The slender record in this casi reveals little more than that

'

I

~

[c

If'

OY

The flag, approximately three by five

inche~

1l1e of~t~

J

or four by six inches, was clearly visible to passersby. On January
30, 1970, two officers of the :bee-minister, Massachusetts Police

o~ L~ .. w ~ ~f...

'~

Departmen~ saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. The first officer

•

·

2.
encountered Goguen standing and talking with a group of persons on a
public street.

The group was, apparently, not engaged in any demonstra-

7
tion or other organized protest associated with Goguen's apparel.
.

~~~~

d-.No

disruption of traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this
officer approached Goguen to question him about the flag, the other
persons present expressed their amusement. Some time later, the
second officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking in the
downtown business district of Leominister.
The following day the first officer swore out a complaint against
Goguen under the desecration provision of the Massachusetts flag misuse

J

.statute.

At the time, this provision read, in relevant part:

''Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces
or treats contemptuously the flag of the United states . . . ,
whether such flag is public or private property . . . ,
shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more
than one hundred dollars or by :imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both. . . . "
Despite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was not charged

il

with any act of physical desecration.

As permitted by the disjunctive

structure of the desecration provision, the officer charged specifically
and only that Goguen "did publicly treat contemptuously the flag of
the United states.

II

. -r c>~~,_·
I 4r C\\

~~

v

~

.)\.:;1'

I
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3.

·/~£;.~~"
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A jury convened in the Worce ster County Superior Court fatmd

f(p (;;

Goguen guilty.

The court imposed a sentence of six months in the

Massachusetts House of Corrections.

Gog.1 en appealed to the
~¥'/-~ ( '

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed in a b:Pief{~i·I.,;;/Jrl-1~(

?

~s~fPl:)opiniol}t

{1

(t'L\

~·(.

i,

/(~J.tC<'.:.

Commonwealth v. Goguen,

N. E. 2d 666 (1972).

Mass.

_,

279

That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argumentc,

I

inter alia, with the comment that "[w ]hatever the uncertainties in
~

.............,_

other circumstances, we see no vagueness in the statute as applied
Mass. at

here. " Id. ,

__, 279 N. E.

2d at 667. In support of

its holding on the doctrine of vagueness, the court cited no Massachusetts
precedents interpreting the statutory language under which Goguen

to
was charged. The vagueness issue was simply given res ipsa ·loquitur
treatment.
After Goguen began serving his sentence, he was granted bail
and then ordered released on a writ of habeas corpus by the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
Smith,

~upra,

343 F. Supp. 161.

The District Court found the flag

desecration portion of the Massachusetts statute

l1
1
1

Goguen v.

~~

~permissibly

vague

4.
under the Due process Clause as well as overbroad under the Firs t
Amendment.

A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed in all respects.
rt

Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d 88.

·~

l
l

Th71 Circuit Judge, now Senior

Circuit Judge Hamley, sitting by designation from the Ninth Circuit,
concurred solely on vagueness grounds, without reaching any First
Amendment issues.

~·,

at 105.

II
7

·Appellant devotes a substantial portion of his opening brief,
~

as he did his oral argument, to the contention that Goguen failed to

pre~ve his :r:n•-e-sent- due process vagueness claim for the purposes of
l

1

I

federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Appellant concedes that the issue

,1

.1

l
'

j

7
of "vagueness as applied" is properly before the federal courts.

-4-"-c. ~$,~-.s e'f.s
Attacks on I\ statute as being vague on its fact or as applied are,

however, treated by Appellant as distinguish ·ble here.

Appellant

believes that Goguen has only a facial vagueness argument and that
that claim was not presented to the state courts with the requisite
fair precision.

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971).

8
The exhaustion of remedies argument is belatedly raised and

fails to take the full measure of Goguen's efforts to mount a vagueness
9

attack in the state courts.

We do not deal with the point at length,

however, for we find the pertinent statutory language impermissibly
vague as applied to Goguen. In light of the Massachusetts Supreme
~-

Judicial Court holding on va(f#ness and appellant's concession, we
have no doubt that "the substance" of this claim was "fairly presented"

6.

to the state courts under the exhaustion standa.rds of Picard, supra,
at 275, 278.
In addition, we do not iiJ'gree with appellant's view that the

v

Court of Appeals held only that the challenged statutory language is
void on its face, and not as applied to Goguen. It is true that the
Court of Appeals at first posited arguendo appellant's claim that Goguen's
dress was so obnoxious that he personally had no vagueness argument,
regardless of the statute's facial application to others.

471 F. 2d

+ke co~
at 91. It seems clear, however, that.A
engaged in this

assumption solely to deal with appellant's citation of United States v.
Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), a

· red herring that appellant dragged
10

across the court's path with temporary success.

Following the

discussion of Raines, the court concluded "that resolution of [Goguen's]
challenge to the statute as applied to him necessarily adjudicates
the statute's facial constitutionality. . . . "471 F. 2d at 94. (Emphasis
added).

As we see it, the Court of A.pp· ".tls found the "publicly . . .

treats contemptuously" phrase of the Massachusetts statute so devoid
of standards that it provided no means for distinguishing Goguen's

7.
behavior from a broad range of unceremonial treatment of fla gs.
Id., at 42, 94.

Accordingly, the court viewed as-applied and facial

~J~~#
challenges to be essentially identical in this case, and thus it · " 'h

..'

1dl both.

For the reasons stated below, we agree that the statutory

phrase at issue is void for vagueness in Goguen's case, as it would be,

•
in its presently unnarrowed state, in any criminal prosec{ijion for
flag contempt.

8.
III

The settled principles of the due process doctrine of vagueness
require no extensive restatement here. 11 The doctrine incorporates
/d.

notions of fair warning. Moreover, it requires legislatures to set
reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers
of fact, in order to deter "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state
interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the
First Amendment, the doctrine requires a greater degree of
specificity than in other

contexts.'~-/ The

statutory language at issue

here, "publicly . . . treats contemptuously the flag of the United
;'If

,..

States . . . , "has such scope,

~-~·

street v. New York,394 U.S.

576 (1969) (verbal flag contempt), and at the relevant times was

...
without the benefit of judicial clarification./.!::>
Flag contempt statutes have been described as impermissibly
vague for lack of notice on the theory that "[w ]hat is contemptuous
lit;

to one man may be a work of art for another." Goguen's behavior
can hardly be described as art.

Immaturity probably comes closer

13

9.
to the mark.

But we see the force of the District Court's conclusion:

that since the flag has become "an object of youth fashion and high
D,.$

I

camp • . . , " it is by no means certain as it might have been at
)\.

another time in this country's history that wearing a miniature
flag on one's clothing constitutes criminal contempt.

343 F. Supp.

at 164, 167. I Unceremonlal treatment of the flag in many contexts
/\..

I

1

has become a widespread, if unfortunate, contemporary phenomenon,
/

(. as both lower federal courts noted.
:

we h~

aro.vc.

'Thus,

cAc>IAh f.s ~c~k"t.~~ cit ti

At=D==t:;=~illil£:~tl·~·~~reasonably

••t

Ibid., 471 F. 2d at 96.

clear to those of "common

int elligence, "Connally v. General Construction Co., supra,

269 U.S. at 391, that the statutory language at

issue proscribes

Goguen's behavior.
Appellant argues that any notice difficulties are ameliorated
by the narrow subject matter of the statute, "actual" flags of the
'
11
United States. This allegedly "takes some of the vagueness away
I<

from the phrase, 'treats contemptuously: . .
notice as to what this statute proscribes,

.'l
1

" Anyone who "wants
. immediately knows

10.
that it has something to do with flags and if he wants to stay clear
of violating this statute, he just has to stay clear of doing something
11

•

to the United States flag. " Aside from the difficulties pre~ented by
d-.0

the concept of an "actual" flag, we fail to see how this alleged
particularit:· resolves the central vagueness question presented -the standards for defining contemptuous treatment.
Appellant's argument that the

language provides adequate

warning of what constitutes contempt rests in large measure on,
as the Court of Appeals put it, the "unarticulated premise" that the
statute "is not vague as to one who sews a flag to the seat of his
pants. "471 F. 2d at 91.

The argument presumes that contemporary

community understanding sufficiently distinguishes that treatment from,

~\ouue., 4Uct ct"'-~t'~ ._,le~c... ~,·, t:S ~. ~ o.~ we~
for example, displaying the flag on the bumper of a car. A)/fe cannot

Stvf-1

-~

.

·ui~"
j ~ .
l1
l

j

l

M

r'\()teJ

find that shifting trends for displaying something as ubiquitous as the
United States flag or representations of it provide
warning under the statutory language at issue.

,a:~:a

sufficient

Precisely because

display of the flag is so common and takes so many forms, changing

lfff'

Ii
l

from one generation to another, a legislature should define with
precision those exhibitions it means to outlaw.
contemptuously" phrase does not do so.

The "publicly treats

•
11.
Furthermore, whatever doubts may exist here about whether

.•

Goguen was fairly warned or should haveJmown the consequences of
his behavior simply by the force of its offensiveness are overcome, in
our view, by the Massachusetts statute's substantial failure to meet
the other principal requirement of the vagueness doctrine.

The

a1
vagueness concept of notice has a certain fictional flavor. This is
as
particularly so in a noncommercial context, wherE/a general rule
behavior is not mapped out in advance on the basis of statutory
language. In such cases, perhaps the most meaningful aspects of
the vagueness doctrine is not true notice, but the requirement that
..

:
.· \ ·Vl
(l

JVh(\~
f"" \\).!,1 ·'~In this
~

i

J L..w

. r ft1f f.,.K.
l

-\~~

~~~ ~'

1

a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.

()"-'I

regard, the language under which Goguen was charged as

its most severe deficiencies.
In its terms, the language at issue is_sufficiently unbounded

to, in the District Court's words, "prohibit any public deviation from
formal flag etiquette. . .

" 343 F. Supp. at 167. Enacted in 1899

&R
and unchanged until after Goguen's conviction, the "publicly.

~3 --------------------------------

time in this case Of a narrowing state court interpretation

.'---------------------------------

12.

"Ji

l
j

of c ourse, are without authority to cure that defect.

Statutory language

.l.

1
J

of such a standardles s sweep allows polic emen, prosecutors and juries

l

..

'l

i

to pursue their personal predilections.

Legislatures may not so -

abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal

I _\- J,J
'

!} JP~ffy r

. 0- /'JJ'l

,..,.,

r.t-'

}\~~>

law.

~·_g.,

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, supra, 405 U.S.

at 166-168.

...,.,....,

·"' ........,

argument before the Court of Appeals about the enforcement standards

. ~).f-o.,

~
l. ~\~ft.
•

.N""

t.' ~""'

-~~tf.Yt Jl ~ b~0-0
il

for this statute suggests the aptness of Mr. Justice Black's warning
in Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 117, 120 (1969), against ·
entrusting lawmaking "to the moment -to-moment judgment of the
policeman on his beat: "
". • . [A]s counsel admitted, a war protestor who,
while attending a rally at which it begins to rain, ,
evidences his disrespect for the American flag by
contemptuously covering himself with it in order
to avoid getting wet, would be prosecuted under the
Massachusetts statute. Yet a member of the American
Legion who, caught in the same rainstrom while
returning from an 'America - Love It or Leave It'
. rally, similarly uses the flag, but does so regrettably
and without a contemptuous attitude, would not be
prosecuted. " 471 F. 2d at 102.
)

Where inherently vague statutory language permits such selective law
enforcement, there is a denial of due process.

13 .

...
Accordingly, we find ihc "publicly treats contemptuously"
'A

phrase vague as applied to Goguen.

It avails nothing to suggest,

as does appellant, that Goguen 1 s behavior rendered him a hard core
violator to whom the statute was not vague.

The gravamen of the

due process doctrine of vagueness is that a statute, plus any
accompanying judicial gloss, has no core.

The doctrine voids a

criminal statute that is vague "not in the sense that it requires a
person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but .m;::~;altmlllll21!1
comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no
standard of conduct is specified at all. " Coates v. City of Cincinnati,
402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).

The absence of any reasonable ascertainable

set of standards for inclusion and exclusion, and particularly for the
guidance and control of law enforcement officials and triers of fact,
is precisely what offends the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Where this deficiency exists and until it is corrected
either by amendment or judicial construction, it affects all who are
prosecuted under the statutory language. The language at issue is
void for vagueness in Goguen 1 s case because it subjected Goguen

14.
indefinite that the police

to criminal liability under standards so

and the jury were free to express essentially nothing more than their
own preferences for treatment of the flag.
Appellant's arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.

1 :~· <tl',))
1 '-'

.I Jt'l

, ~i
·

fJI"'c Appellant asserts that the first six words of the statute add specificity

eG)fi'~. J
1

Q

l>lr(

·./.,.,

•

t·()(

to the "treats contemptuously" phrase.
().$

v•f

"'~~ ~

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
'.

It is alleged that the

Cour~applie6

a principle of statutory

interpretation of construing general language to take on color from
more specific accompanying language. But it is conceded that Goguen
was convicted under the general phrase alone, and that the highest

d-5

specific prrnciple of statutory interpretation in this case.

Appellant

also argues that the Supreme Judicial Court has in Goguen's case

;;;.6

restricted the scope of the statute to intentional contempt.

Aside

from the problems presented by an appellate court's limiting
construction in the very case in which a defendant has bem tried
;}7

under a previously unnarrowed statute, this still does not resolve

Ltoll\t-~ "'cA-

'of\$+.'+~

Wfiat-

·:;;.\contempt, whether intentional or inadvertent.

15.
.

Finally, appellant argues that

.......

sta~

.

law enforcement authorities

have shown themselves ready to interpret this penal statute

.-

narrowly and that the statute, properly read, reaches only direct,
immediate contemptuous acts ·
physical integrity of the flag.

that "actually impinge upon the
" There is no support in the record

~~

for the former point.

Similarly, nothing in reported state court

J,;..e.l"'dl.:,,........ "'Pi"'t~
opinions~r

~~ 6oJ'4"'-a.s ~~~ ute1
in the language under which Goguen was charged upholds

··~
the latter.
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature and
variety of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot establish
standards with great precision.

Control of the broad range of disorderly

conduct that may inhibit a policeman in the performance of his official
duties is one such area.

Cf.) Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).

But there is no comparable need for committing broad discretion to
law enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt.

.l

Nothing

prevents a legislature from defining with substantial specificity what
~q

constitutes forbidden treatment of ·.

Jl'lA• .sAdA~eH.s I

United States flags. +Hfte

J

~

1
...

~-~!f~i:~fi~~~~~~ lt~ffi~;
.

~c..& ....v:...,~ .~v...t,~ ,.).,;.._
;iot woa:id::btJ;::sbxqdn;! n so

state.

Db Go3 ~.t~·.r eoa.1_tJitAtW... .

d

16.
IV

...

Although we hold the "publicl~treats contemptuously"

l

l

l

ph rat S e.

m;;:~ void for vagueness, we do not address in this case the .J+~.:fJe'.J

first six words

0~·~

~e-eef!!t@e 811 ~I.@

commercial misuse provisions.

~

In light of the universal adoptio1of flag desecration statutes by the
31

federal and state governments, we • • •

emphasize that we also

do not hold that the due process doctrine of vagueness invalidates

all flag

1"

contem~

statutes.

The validity of such statutes will, insofar

as the vagueness doctrine is concerned, depend on their particular
30\.
language, judicial construction, and enforcement history. And, as

noted earlier, we do not deal here with the question whether the
Massachusetts statute or other statutes are valid under the First

a

Amendment.

33

3:.1
Goguen's "silly conduct" finds no sympathy here.

But this

is a country devoted to the rule of law, and the requirements of the

jQ

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to those

j
j

well as to anyone else.

An irony in this is that those who benefit

.J

1

17.
most from a government of principled laws are probably the least

1

likely to reflect on their good fortune. .The judgment is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
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Raines is not a vagueness case, as the Court of Appeals

itself noted.

u.s. _,

471 F. 2d at 91, n. 3. Cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
U.S. (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Thus,

that court's substantial treatment of Raines was unnecessary.,_.
lildll?I!Illl·•••llltiii. .,IIIfi'sllrMit•'-•r•s••s-lllitlllll*•~•e.

Raines involved a statute

that unambiguously prohibited certain conduct on the part of state
officials as well as private persons.

The state officials did not

deny that the statute could constitutionally be applied to them.

Rather,

they attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the statute's
application to private persons. Applying normal third party standing
rules, the Court held that the state officials could not do so.

There

was no doubt what the statute in Raines required nor whether the state
..

<)-

officials were within its scope. This case• raises just such issues.
,#

Raines also dealt' with certain exceptions to the general rule
that a party lacks standing to assert the rights of another.

The Court

of Appeals read these exceptions "as not depending upon the historic
fortuity that a statute has already been subjected to [narrowing] holdings
but as depending upon the possibility of such holdings inAited by the
/

working of the statute. " 471 F. 2d at 92. This is a misreading of
Raines, §

-'

b.,,~

ich was not in point to · '
('

,._~and we do not endorse it.

~--

,w

.

·~
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FOOTNOTES - No. 72-1254 Smith v. Goguen

1. The record consists solely of the amended bill of exceptions
and opposing briefs before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
the complaint under which Goguen was prosecuted, and Goguen's
petition for federal habeas corpus.

'

~

·I
~
l

Appendix 1-38, 42-43. We do

not have, nor did any state or federal reviewing court have, a trial
transcript or a copy of the jury instructions.

Trans. Or. Arg. 6, 51.

Appellee's claim that he was plainly engaged in protected expression
and Appellant's arguments about the narrow grounds on which appellee
must have been convicted are ill-suited to such a marginal record.
2.

Trans Or. Arg. 5-6, 35-36.
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Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 264, § 5 (1971).
time of
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arrest and prosecution, the statute read as foll ows :
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wlti .. !t stwlt flag !Jl'h>n:,:, . l~or t It (• Jll 1r.
lll>St·s of tlti, S<'l'l ion, a flng sh:tll hP
olt•rnu·ol to < " <~ltlillu< · l'o IH · Ion~ t c> any or·
~:ani z at iun t>f l'l 'lt·r·: tii S IH ' I'o ' illl•t• fon• ~ Jo l' r·
ifio·ol, :tltli(Jllj; lt snl'l1 or;; :llti z:ttit.n liltS
('(':t s t•t! to t' :d .s t, dul'in:,: ~tlt'lt titll (' a., it
rt'lll:tin ., in lito' l:twful 11\\' llt'l'' ltip 11 r
•·u s tool,l' <•f Hll,l' 1ot l1• ·r t•f IIi• · afort ·said or gn1tizations or of 1111· ('IIIJJltlllll\lt ·:tlilt
or of :tll,l' joolitio ·al sttlodil'i s ioll tl,..rt •of,
or of 1111.r p :ll rioti. · o1 · lli s tori, ·:ll ~· wi 1 · ty
illt 'Pt'JIUI':I It•r) II lido• I' t /10 • 1:111 s of t Jt(•
f'lllillllOII \l'o':t I ill Ill' oil'! <'11 11 i llo•ol loy t IH • ad jut ant J:•:tll ·l':ll t" fo, . ll J•l'ttJH' r ,.11 ., .
tuoli:tll tlll'l'l'ttf.

)
I

3.
The statute is an amalgam of provisions dealing with

flag

desecration in general (the first twenty -six words) and with commercial
misuse or e:Arploitation of flags of the state and national government in
particular. This case concerns only the desecration portion of the
J

l

-l

statute.

In 1971, subsequent to Goguen's prosecution}hat portion of

the statute was amended twice.

On March 8, 1971, the legislature,

per St. 1971, C. 74, modified the first sentence by inserting ''burns

.

or otherwise" between the terms "publicly" and "mutilates, " and,
in addition, by increasing the fine.
§

Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 264,

5 (1973 Supp. ). On August 12, 1971, via St. 1971, C 655, the

legislature appended a new sentence defining "the flag of the United
States" phrase appearing in the first sentence: "For the purpose of this
section the term 'flag of the United States' shall mean any flag which
has been designated by Act or Resolution of the Congress of the
United States as the national emblem, whether or not such a designation
is currently in force. " Ibid.

The 1971 amendments are relevant

to this case only in the tangential sense that they indicate a recognition
on the part of the legislature of , the need to tighten up this
imprecise statute. Sec n.

......

~0 ,

infra.

4.

of.
4.

-fkt. ol t'.f.ftC.t.t-tt, o .f

bcc au se~Y~ G~tt'l"iref Apl~Q.Q.,

P erhaps this was

the question wheth er Goguen's conduct constituted phys ic a l desecration
of t he flag .me::.

Sf·)
'~.l:t:;;QnD-.

"

Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d at
.A

91, n. 4 ( ". . . [w Je are not so sure that sewing a flag to a backgr ound
clearly affects 'physical , ...

integrity. '")

c)~ MJ ~ tk t~h f6 ~;; '~ ~ L-l~.
~ c'f.

5. Appendix 4.
6.

(t,A

-tfM . ~-.re~ ~ b ·

Appellant correctly conceded at oral argument that Goguen 's

case was the first Massachusetts appellate court reading of the
statutory language under which Goguen was ~nvicted.
Ar g. 17-18.

Trans. Or.

There is one turn· of• the-century interpretation of one

of the commercial misuse provisions of the statute, but that case

..1

has no relevance here.
189 Mass. 76,
7.

Commonwealth v. R. I. Sherman Manu. Co. ,

N. E.

Reply Brief 4.

(1905).

.;
5.

8.

The District Court and the Court of Appeals decisions in

this case were entered subsequent to

tz3t?j:!~~~~m•:c, :lll·

Picard,

supra. Yet it appears that appellant did not raise his present exhaustion
be~o""&
argument w"'either court.
0

The District Court commented specifically

on this !fission: "No contention is now I!a;;Q:!II!a& made

that ~~

(Goguen] has not exhausted state remedies, nor that the constitutional
issues
.... «presented here were not raised appropriately in state proceedings. "
343 F. Supp. at 164.

~,V:~

~pr)

\j.r

~

9.

6.
Goguen filed in state

Q~~- S~perior Court an unsucc essful
k.e cd·ed

motion to dismiss the complaint in which,_,the Fourteenth Amendment
and alleged that the statute under which he was charged was "impe rmissibly
vague and incapable of fair and reasonable interpretation by public

before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, since it was
incorporated in Goguen's amended bill of exceptions. Ibid.

In

addi~on, Goguen's brief before that court raised vagueness points and
cited vagueness cases. Id., at 19, 26-27, citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451 (1930), and Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (1971)
(North Carolina flag desecration statute unconstitutionally vague
as well as overbroad). Appellant is correct in asserting that Goguen
s~-..4t. ~ -

failed to compartmentalize in

hi~brief

the due process

<8*~t~.

doctrine of vagueness and First Amendment concepts of overbreadth.
See Appendix 19-24. But permitting a degree of leakage between
those particular adjoining compartments is understandable. -Cf.,
Note, "The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, " 83 Harv. L. Rev.

,1

7.
844, 871-875 (1970).

The highest state court's opinion, which dealt

separately with Goguen's First

. ~
c-141~)
Amendmen~vagueness ~~

1

l

j
l!
I

i
1

j

l
l
l

Mass. at _ , 279 N. E. 2d at 667, indicates that that court was
well aware that Goguen raised both sets of arguments.

8.
10.

Raines is not a vagueness case, as the Court of Appeals

itself noted.

u.s. _,

471 F. 2d at 91, n. 3.

-Cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma,

U. S. ( 1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

'

Thus,

that court's substantial treatment of Raines was unnecessary_,

.I

j
j

·j

that unambiguously prohibited certain conduct on the part of state
officials as well as private persons.

The state officials did not

deny that the statute could constitutionally be applied to them.

Rather,

they attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the statute's
application to private persons.

Applying normal third party standing

rules, the Court held that the state officials could not do so.

There

was no doubt what the statute in Raines required nor whether the state
officials were within its scope.

This caseet raises just such issues.

Raines also dealt with certain exceptions to the general rule

l

that a party lacks standing to assert the rights of another.

The Court

I

of Appeals read these exceptions "as not depending upon the historic
fortuity that a statute has already been subjected to [narrowing] holdings
but as depending upon the possibility of such holdings inXited by the
working of the statute. " 471 F. 2d at 92.

This is a misreading of

'
ba~,~

Raines, which was not in point to

,._with, and we do not endorse it.

9.
11.

The prillciples have been developed ill a large body of

precedent from this Court.

The cases are categorized in,

~· ~·

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972).

,

See,

Amsterdam, "The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrille ill the Supreme
Court, " 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 ( 1960).
12. ~· ~·, Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451; 453 (1939):
"No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as to the meanillg of penal
@--~~tes. All are entitled to be informed as to what
the ~ commands or forbids." (citations omitted);
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385; 391 (1962):
". . . [A] statute which either forbids or requires
the doillg of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first -·
essential of due proce~ of law. " (citations omitted).

j

.j

1.0.

~)
13.1' Grayned, supra, 408 U.S. at 108j

~oe-=tlds61!!•

5 ~~

United Slates v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., ·255 U.S. 81, 89 f3 (1921)
••

( ". . . [T]o attempt to enforce the section would be the exact equivalent

1

l

of an effort to carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized and

t

l

punished all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and
unreasonable in the estimate of the court and jury. "); United states
v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) (''It would certainly be dangerous
if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible

offenders, and leave it to the courts to

step inside and say who

could be rightfully detained, and who could be set at large.").

,.

l

.1

I
I

I
I
j

11.
14. §. _g:. , Gr ayned

supra, 408 U. S. at

)

I

l

i

109; Smith v. Ca lifornia, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).

Compa re the less

stringent requirements of the modern vagueness cases dealing with
•

DGt~!\

purely economic regulation.

~·

_g:., United states v. National

Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) (Robinson-Patman Act).
15.

See n. 6, supra.

16.

Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev. · 1040, 1056 (1968).

17.

Appellant's Brief 17; Trans. Or. Arg. 9.

18.

Trans. Or. Arg. 9.

.•.

19. Ibid.

statute referred simply to "the flag of the United states . . . , " without
further definitjon.

That raises the obvious ·question whether a 6T>J~b\ 1 s

minature cloth flag constituted "the flag of the United states. .

"

Goguen argued unsuccessfully before the state courts that the statute
applied only to flags that met "official standards" for proportions,
such as relation of height to width and the size of stripes and the
field of stars, and that the
standards.

cloth he wore did not meet those

Trans. Or. Arg. 11-12, 24 - 26; Appendix 2.

There was

12.

-I
l

no dispute that Goguen's adornment had tho requisite number of stars
and stripes and colors. Trans. Or. Ag. 11-12. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court found Goguen's cloth flag to be covered by
the state statute, noting that "[t Jhe statute does not require that the
flag be 'official"' Commonwealth v. Goguen, _Mass. _ , _ ,
279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972).

The lower federal courts did not address

this holding, nor do we. · We note only that the Massachusetts legislature apra rently sensed an ambiguity in this respect, because
subsequent to Goguen's prosecution it amended the statute to define
what it had meant by the "flag of the United States. " IIIIIs See n. 3,

j

l
.i
l
' 1

l
1

l

i

~

l

supra. Flag defilement statutes that fail to define with _..,.
reasonable precision what they protect have not fared well before
vagueness challenges in the federal courts.

~· ~·,

Long Island ·

~O'r~.\o't~

Vietnam Committee v. Cahn, 437 F. 2d 344 (CA2),
400

u.s.

264 (1970).

cert. denied,

13.
21.

Amsterdam, supra, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 83, n. 79.

produced record court opinions.

Trans. Oral Arg. 28. In 1968,

a teenager in Lynn, Massachusetts was charged, apparently under the
present statute, with desecrating the United States flag by sewing
pieces of it into his trousers.

New York Times, August 1, 1968,
~--~4-t. 4~ ~fr.(J ~J-

p. 31, col 1.

The teenager was

essay on the flag.

Clv.-----_,..-::--:

orde~d.Ato

prepare and deliver an

Jll.ga-., Because the £1mmaa court continued

the case without a finding or reported opinion, it has no precedential
effect.
24.

~- ~·,

United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S. 363,

369 (1971).
25.

j
l

i

I

f
1

Trans. Oral Arg. 48.

14.
26.

The Massachusetts court commented simply that "[t]he

jury could infer that the violation was intentional without reviewing
any words of the defendant." Commonwealth v. Goguen,
279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972).

Mass.

Thus, the court held that

the jury could infer intent merely from Goguen's conduct.
apparently also a holding that the jury

~t

This is

find contemptuous

intent under the statute, although the requirement amounts to very
little since it is so easily satisfied.

The court's reference to verbal

1

communication reflected Goguen's reliance on Street v. New York,

1
1

394

u.s.

579 (1969) .

.I

l

27. · ~· ~·, Asht~ v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 198 (1966) .

. ·J

..

• I

15.
z~

A·
I

j

With regard to prosecutorial policies, appellant cites

'fl1 A U Cl\ C.. k 1.\J ef1 .S
two published opinions of the ~/\Attorney General.

4 Ops. of

j

Att. Gen. 470 (1915) (REJFJroduced at Appellant's Brief 30); Report

·l

of Atty. Gen.·, Pub. Doc. No. 12, p. 192 (1968) (Reproduced at

i

1

I
J

i

i
.l
.1

j

Juris. Statement App. 53).

Appellant concedes that neither deals

with the desecration portion of the statute under which Goguen was

Tl.\11.~; ~

(Moe,

Y\1\t-\-

~~ po\~ ~. ~ p'roi.H~" t j14~t.Pa-c.c, lc

r\o

~

convicted. [Nevertheless, appellant is cor red that they s ow a
,..

fJit'.

~

~\·"'·~

-4+J.~

~ l~J~·

.
tendency on the part of the 1:ate Attorney General to read

¥at i~s

portions of the statute narrowly.· At the same time, they show the

k.d( c6 pre~~ re.c.{4..M.~"'! ~vt>tt5~....+-- ·. e. ft1tA.lSA~•* ~~~ MU. 44 ~

I
l

~~ ¥Ci\€§QQ14SB~-em~"in

il

l1tl\ll1@~ il:nl'~~tatute.

The

1915 opinion noted that one portion of the statute, prohibiting
exhibition of engravings of the flag on certain articles,
read

1

t'ftis

~

if

wo~

literall~

make it a criminal offense to display the,......__

flag itself "in many of its cheaper and more common forms. "
Appellant's Brief 31-32.
Id., at 32.

This would be a "manifest absurdity".

The 1968 opinion advised that a flag representation

,,

,,

pai1ted on a door was not a flag of the United States within the
meaning of the statute.

Juris. Statement App. 53-55.

A contrary

16.
interpretation would "raise serious questions under the First and

l

I

Fourteenth Amendments . . . , " given the requirement that belftiior
made criminal must be "plainly prohibited by the language of the
statute. " Id. , at 54~

17.
'

j

j .,

29.

The federal flag desecratio+tJt.tute, for example,

i

reflects a Congressional purpose to do just that.

In response to a

warning by the United states Attorney General that the use of such

'' d.efa'e,s •'
unbounded terms as" ··

or "casts contempt . . . either by

word or act" is "to risk iJ?,validation" on due process -

grounds,

S. R.ep. No. 1287, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1968); H. R.. R.ep. No. 350,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967), the bill which became the federal
statute was amended, 113 Cong. R.ec. 16449, 16450 (1967)>to reach
only acts that physically damage the flag.

The desecration provision

of the statute, 18 U. S. C. § 700(a), declares:
"(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any
flag of the United states by publicly mutilating, defacing,
defiling, burning, or trampling upon it shall be fined
not more than $1, 000 or imprisoned for not more than
· one year, or both. "
The legislative history reveals a clear desire to r~h only defined

IIIIBt physical acts of desecration. H. R.. Rep. No. 350, supra, at
3 ("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful, not
accidental or inadvertent public physical acts of desecration. "))
S. Rep. No. 1287, sup:r:,e., at 3 ("The language· of the bill prohibits

18.

willful, not accidental or inadvertent
public physical acts of desecration of the flag. ")• The act has been
so read by the lower federal courts, which have upheld it against
vagueness challenges.

United States v. Crosson, 462 F. 2d 96

(CA9 1972), cert. denied,

u.s.

(197_); Joyce v.

United States, 454 F. 2d 971 ·(CADC 1971), cert. denied,
(1972).
1

i
.

.:.j .
..

1

.<..

U.S.

19.
30.

See n. 3, supra .

.s:.u.

V'\. ?,.. ~ -4 ':'f~

.

31. AAll fifty states have flag contempt statutes.

The statutes

are synopsized in Hearings on H. R. 271, et al, Before Sub. Comm.
No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. , 1st Sess.,
ser. 4, pt. III at 324-46 (1967).

The flag contempt statutes of most

states are patterned after the Uniform Flag Act of 1917, which 11
§

t \1\.

3 provides that:
"No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile,
defy, trample upon, or by word or act cast contempt
upon any such flag, standard, color ensign or shield. "

Compare)9B Uniform Laws Annotated 52-53 (1966) with Hearings on
.'

H. R. 271, et al, supra, at 321-46. Massachusetts, which has one
of the "older flag laws, " Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 F. Supp. at
164, is among the handful of states that have not adopted the Uniform
Flag Ad or a derivation.

~0.

3C1.

t.-t,

·. . See cases cited n.

supra.

Some state flag contempt

statutes have been substantially narrowed by judicial interpretation.
~~~·,

State v. Royal,

N.H.

__,

3·05 A. 2d 676, 679 (1973)
0~~

(New Hampshire flag contempt statute reaches

/1

of acts . . . . ").

"physical abuse type

See also, State v. Hodson, 289 A2d 635 (Del.

Super. 1972). Others have not and have not fared well in federal
court.

~· ~,

Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (W. D. N.C. 1971)

(3 judge court) (North Carolina flag desecration statute void for
vagueness and overbreadth).

See also, Long Island Vietnam Mo:attorium

Committee v. CQhn, 437 F. 2d 344 (1970), cert. den.

U.S.

(197_) (New Yo;rk statute). Cf., Crosson v. Silver, 319 F. Supp.
1084 (D. Ariz. 1970) (3 judge court) (Arizona statute).

21.

33. We are aware of course of the Firi;;t Amendment questions
wrapped up in the flag contempt controversy.

'

dealtlt with these issues at length.

The Court of Appeals

Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d

~

·j

1

'l

at 96-105.

See,

~·

_g:., Thayer, "Freedom of Speech and Symbolic

i
l

Conduct: The Crime of Flag Desecration," 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 71 (1970);

'·.

Note, "Developments in the Law -the National Security Interest and
Civil Liberties," 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1138-1141 (1972); Note,
66 Mich. L. Rev. 1040 (1968).

However, we think the slim record

in this case renders treatment of Goguen's First Amendment arguments
difficult.

Goguen's counsel argues that Goguen was engaged in a

"demonstration of one" with a clear purpose to communicate. Trans.
Or. Arg. 36-37.

The record does not back him up. particularly in light
~

t.ve. Ave /e+-4- -lo spec......ttt.h ~~....-. &oJM~·s f'14¥f~·
of Goguen's decision not to take the stand1A Perhaps Goguen's P""~•e

I
<

ll

wasl'!llnlllilillllldl: communication. Or perhaps Goguen was engaged in
nothing more than a thoughtless example of contemporary clothing
fashion.

The difficulty of the First Amendment issues posed by

j

n~.f. dec.lrJc~ ..f-'t.te""' ~
outlawing flag desecration counsels forA
$&4~

A.\1\

. , ·· · -,

a case where an

.~~,--~ ~~._A

intent to communicate rests on a n~nHH' fs6l8PR~foundation.
34.

Goguen v. SmitE, supra, 343 F. Supp. at 166.

~~ t1; ~ vot.2P ~ v~ ~ dkn:)r~

1.

. . The -

.

have been developed in a large body of
~·

precedent from this Court. The cases are categorized in,

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972).

g:. ,
See,

Amsterdam, "The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court," 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960).

a

<i.

~·

g:., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939):

''No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
All are entitled to be informed as to what
;;--~:.::::::.:~~ ommands or forbids. " (citations omitted);
3

Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 391 (19A2):
"
. [A] statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first - - •
essential of due proce~ of law. " (citations omitted) .

,.

(

~~r:.~ ~hi-A1ft ~

L( . ,') .

.•

.

~

tJ
~~-~

)

~

I~ 2

va.e.A-i6~ ~

LICf 7 '2._) ),

)
I

/

/

4.

o+

if,t.t. ~;+~,(.M.,., o.f
Perhaps this was because·.,....••••••lllill•=••

4.

the question whether Goguen's conduct constituted physical desecration
of the flag iiiUL 11CCI ,,.

c:£·)
1

"

#

Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d at

91, n. 4 (". . . [w]e are not so sure that sewing a flag to a background

clearly affects 'physical••• integrity."')
5. Appendix 4.
6.

Appellant correctly conceded at oral argument that Goguen's
tll1Uov-t.kl

case was the firs) Massachusetts • • • • court reading of the
statutory language under which Goguen was ~nvicted.
li0,

Trans. Or.

e~ ~ hliA ~ ~ ~(l~-?/__!1__:fJitc& 41t-tJ J')r~~

___.--.,.e~.P· ~--------.___

Arg. 17-18. A There is one turn-of-the-century ·sr
"
1\.

-

~1

1

1

of one

of the commercial misuse provisions of the statute, but that case
has no relevance here. Commonwealth v. R. I. Sherman Manu. Co.,

IG"

1/

189 Mass. 76, ~ N. E. ~ (1905).

..
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FOOTNOTES -No. 72-1254 Smith v. Goguen
1.

The record consists solely of the amended bill of exceptions

and opposing briefs before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
the complaint under which Goguen was prosecuted, and Goguen's
petition for federal habeas corpus.

Appendix 1-38, 42-43. We do

not have, nor did any state or federal reviewing court have, a trial
transcript or a copy of the jury instructions.

Trans. Or. Arg. 6, 51.
xpression

~

"""(A /.4.-Y'I fit

re ill-suit
2.

Trans Or. Arg. 5-6, 35-36.

FOOTNOTES - No. 72-1254 Smith v. Gog;uen

I
I

1. The record consists solely of the amended bill of exceptions

I

and opposing briefs before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,

1

the complaint under which Goguen was prosecuted, and Goguen's

i

. 1
' ··l
·~

'·1I

petition for federal habeas corpus.

Appendix 1-38, 42-43. We do

not have, nor did any state or federal reviewing court have, a trial
transcript or a copy of the jury instructions.

2.

j
·1

Trans Or. Arg. 5-6, 35-36.

Trans. Or. Arg. 6, 51.

?.
l

.1

J.

§5 (1971. ).
Mass. Gen. I aws Ju1n. c h . ")61.•,
~
~

several
sentences protecting the ceremonial

Omit~ing

,

activi~es

of

'

certain veterans groups, the statute read at the time of
Goguen's arrest and conviction as follows:

* : ;\Yluwvrr
. Fln~;

penal! y fo·r mi~usr
J>uhli<"lY IHUtilnt<'~. t r:unplPs
npOH, ,]1-(ar·t•s or tn•:lts t•ont~mptuonsly
the fln~ o( the ~nitt••l Statrs. 01· of
;llassachust'U~. wh~tcr snt:lt fla:; Js pu_h·
lie or privatt• propt•rty, <>r who<'n·r
plny~ sneh fin~ or nny n•prl'st'l~tnllon
tltPI'I'O( 111'011 wltit'h :tr" Wt)I'US, ftJ~III'CS,
:\ll\'f'l'l ist'tllClltX 01' llrsi~n~, 01' whOPVCI'
1
11
<'fiiiS<'H
• prrmits Slll'h flnr: to he
"'''

•:ts·

01

in

parutl•• as a rcc·rpt:ll'lt! for tlc:
positin~ or t·ullc·etin~ 1110111')' or an)
other nrtit-lt• or thill~. or wltrwn•r ex·
vosPs to puhlit: vit'w, lll:"lllllf:lt·tures,
sl'll~. t·xpo:-;P:-: for :-<:\lt', gi\'t'~ :~wn,r or
hns in lHlSSt'ssion ft)l' ~alt' or to ~1\'t' :n~·ny
Ol' for liS<' fnr auy purpose, nny artH:lc
or suhstalH'P, ht·ing an nrtidc of tn~~r
t·hnwli~P or a rPf't'pt nc~h' of nwn·handlsl~
or nrt il'ks upon wltidl is n~tac•h<'tl,
tltron .~h a wr:tppin!' or otherWISt', t'll·
J:r:l\·r·•l tll' printctl in nny llt:IIIIICr, ll rPp·
n

rl'st•ntation o( 11111 l·nitr•l !-'tnt<'s. flng,
or whul'\'CI' IIHCS nny represt'lltatHlll of
the arms or the grPat. ~t'nl ~[ thl' t·om·
monwralt It (ur any ntll'l·rtismr:. or t·om·
mer..ial purpos<', shall l.H~ Jllllll~hctl hy
n fine of not lt•ss than trn ~or ~norc
than onQ hnlt<ll'<~<ltloltars nr hy 1111 1>1'\son·
mcnt for nut niOr<' than <>110 ~·,•ar, 01:
hot h
\\" ortls, fiJ-:11 I"('S, ar\ l't'l't ISCIIICI~t~
or tl;•signs at't:!l'ht•tl to, or tlii'I'C"tl;' o_r Ill:
rlin•l'lll' •·onn•·•·t<•tl with, Slll'h fln!, 01 nny
rC}trt•St~lll :1tion t ltt•rpo( in Sllt'h 111:11\1.\CI"
that Htll'h fl:t:,: Ill' its l't'(ll't'St'll(:ltiOII
is nst•tl to attr:wh ntto•ntion to or ~·l·
v••rt i~l' ~\l('h wnnl:-:. ri~nrr-~. :Hln!rt tsc·
lll<'lltS Ol' t\toHi"liS, shal\ fnr thP ]tlll"jlOSCS
of this st•dion hi' tlt•l'lll<'tl to he npon
stll'h

fin~.

t

I

t

I

3.
The statute is an amalgam of provisions dealing with

flag ·

misuse or exploitation of flags of the state and national government in
(.oM.l-e~-1-

particular.

This case concerns only theA

portion of the

statute. In 1971, subsequent to Goguen's prosecution}hat portion of
the statute was amended twice. On March 8, 1971, the legislature,
per st. 1971, C. 74, modified the first sentence by inserting ''burns

....

or otherwise" between the terms "publicly" and "mutilates, " and,
in addition, by increasing- the fine.
§

Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 264,

5 (1973 Supp. ). On August 12, 1971, via St. 1971, C 655, the

legislature appended a new sentence defining "the flag of the United
states" phrase appearing in the first sentence: "For the purpose of this
section the term 'flag of the United states' shall mean any flag which
has been designated by Act or Resolution of the Congress of the
l

.J

!

.J

United states as the national emblem, whether or not such a designation
is currently in force. " Ibid.

The 1971 amendments are relevant

to this case only in the tangential sense that they indicate a recognition

~]

on the part of the legislature of , the need to tighten up this
imprecise statute.

4.

o+
4.

] _

Tk.t. ~ t"+·4\C.M~ o .f'

P erhaps this was because

.•

~·

'

:1

1

'

the question whether Goguen ' s c onduct c onstituted phys ical desec ration

. S£·)
of the flag

~

~~al~

A

Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d at

91, n. 4 (". . . [w]e are not so sure that sewing a flag to a background

5.

Appendix 4.

6. Appellant correctly conceded at oral argument that Goguen's
tllflC()I~J,J

case was the

firs~Massachusetts

Q'.l&S:S• court reading of the

-- -

c

statutory language under which Goguen was "onvicted. Trans. Or.
~ e~<-:t~ ~(rte Ju.:~ ~~ .e-kJI!"-Jl~~~ cf!.e.v" ~?f!.__!j__ .:,{lk'--t~ 12""J /'ll'.k~/c-.4,. _
..---..----f" ec.-:1, ~------ _

Arg. 17-18. A There is one turn· of-the-century ·

"

of one

/\

of the commercial misuse provisions of the statute, but that case
has no relevance here.

,:;
189 Mass. 76,

rM-

Commonwealth v. R. I. Sherman Manu. Co.,

1[

N. E.~ (1905).

s-.
7.

prec edent from this Court.

The cases are categorized in,

~·_g.,

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109 (1972). See,
Amsterdam, "The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court," 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960).
Sl

~·_g.,

Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939):

''No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as to the ·meaning of penal
statutes. All are entitled to be informed as . to what
the
commands or forbids. "(citations omitted);
3

Connally v. General C_o nstruction Co., 269 U.S. 385; 391 (19,&2):
"
. [A] statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first
· .
essential of due proce~ of law. " (citations omitted).

G.
~)
Grayned, supra, 408 U. S. at 108J· . .gee alf:l& ~·,
/' -

a,t..Q..

·4)-

United Stat es v. L. Cohen Groc ery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 t$ (1921)
( ". . . [T]o attempt to enforce the section would be the exact equivalent
of an effort to carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized and
punished all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and
unreasonable in the estimate of the court and jury. "); United States
v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) ("It would certainly be dangerous
if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible

offenders, and leave it to the courts to

step inside and say who

could be rightfully detained, and who could be set at large. ").

;.

10.

supra, 408 L". S. at ·

~· ~·'

109; Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). Compare the less
stringent requirements of the modern vagueness cases dealing with
•
.0Gt¥"')

purely economic regulation.

~· ~·,

y

United states v. National

Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) (Robinson-Patman Act).
See n. 6, supra.
1~.

a.

Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1040, 1056 (1968).

1?:..

•·

Appellant's Brief 17; Trans. Or. Arg. 9.

/L/,

*·

Trans. Or. Arg. 9.

IS"
•. Ibid.
1?.,

a

At the time of &:3i:!ql51D Goguen's

pro~

.~ ution,

the

statute referred simply to ''the flag of the United states . . . , " without
further definition.

That raises the obvious ·question whether t. ~J"'~ 1 s

·#

minature cloth flag constituted "the flag of the United States. .
.
A

"

Goguen argued unsuccessfully before the state courts that the statute
applied only to flags that met "official standards" for proportions,
such as relation o'f height to width and the size of stripes and the
field of stars, and that the
standards.

cloth he wore did not meet those

Trans. Or. Arg. 1.1-12, 24-26; Appendix 2.

There was

no dispute that Goguen 's adon1ment had th e r equisite numbe r of star s
and stripes and colors. Trans . Or. Ag. 11-12. The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court found Goguen' s cloth flag to be cove r ed by
the

statute, noting that "[t] he statute does not require that the

279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972).

_, _,

Mass.

flag be 'official"' Commonwealth v. Goguen,

The lower federal courts did not address

this holding, nor do we. We note only. that the Massachusetts legislature appl rently sensed an ambiguity in this respect, because

1V.

o,..<d? f:~f'

subsequent to Goguen's prosecution it amended the statute to define
.A

what it had meant by the "flag of the United States. " .._ See n. 3,
t:l>Vtt e wtp

supra. Flag,....

t
statutes that fail to define with

--~

reasonable precision what they protect have not fared well before
vagueness challenges in the federal courts.

~·_g.,

Long

Island ,.,....~.,..

ft'o\"4.\o't ~

. ;1

VietnamACommittee v. Cahn, 437 F. 2d 344 (CA2),

j

400

J

.. l
~

...

u.s.

264 (1970).

cert. denied,

'1.
17.

Amsterdam, supra , 109 U. Pa .L. Rev . at 8J, n. 79.

18.

Goguen

v~

Smith, §Upra, 471 . F.2d at 90, n.2.

See

note J, supra.

19.

portion of

See note 6, supra.

the Massachusetts statute seems to have lain fallow for
almost its entire history.

There apparently have been a

half dozen arrests under this part of the statute in recent
years, but none of them has led to recorded court opinions.
Trans. Or. Arg. 28.

In 1968, a teenager in Lynn, r1assachusetts

was charged, apparently under the present statute, with
desecrating the United States by sewing pieces of it into
his trousers.
1.

New York Times, August 1, 1968, p. Jl, col.

The teenager was ordered by a state district court to

prepare and deliver an essay on the flag.

The court continued

the case without a finding, depriving it of any precedential
value.

20.

E.g., United States v. 37 Photographs, 402

36J, 369 (1971).

21.

1

Reply Brief 4.

u.s.

22.

'rhe D:tstr 1ct Court dec is ion in this case vuJ ~-;

entered subsequent to Picard, supra . . Yet it appears

th~t

appellant did not raise his present exhaustion of remedies
argument before that

court.

The District Court

commented specifically on this omission:

''No contention

is now made that [Goguen] has not exhausted state remedies,

'

l

nor

that the constitutional issues presented here

were not raised appropriately in state proceedings."

343 F.Supp. at 164.

1

I

I f.

}W

Goguen filed in .~tate c:Jrp~!!l Supe.rior Court an unsuccessful

k.e ct~ed
motion to dismiss the complaint in which,.the Fourteenth Amendment
and alleged that the statute under which he was charged was "impermissibly
vague and incapable of fair and reasonable interpretation by public
officials." Appendix 1.

This motion,....-'41"t'M iiGfNWQNiQp#fft;t;uaiJy

before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, since it was
incorporated in Goguen's amended bill of exceptions. Ibid. In

addi~on, Goguen's brief before that court raised vagueness points and
cited vagueness cases. Id., at 19, 26-27, citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey,

. I
I

306 U.S. 451 (1930), and Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (1971)
CC!ti\.~ew•..p

(North Carolina flag

f.:.

+statute unconstitutionally vague

as well as overbroad). Appellant is correct in asserting that Goguen

.s4-At. ~
failed to compartmentalize in hi~brief the due process

ea=aa.

doctriJie of vagueness and First Amendment concepts of overbreadth.
See Appendix 19-24. But permitting a degree of leakage between
those particular adjoining compartments is understandable. -Cf.'
Note, "The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, " 83 Harv. L. Rev.

1
'1

•'

.

t;t

.

j

844, 871-875 (1970).

'! .·- -

.

The highest state court'~ opinion, which dealt ·

~

":

....

~141~)

separately with Goguen's First Amendmen~vagueness ~~>

~

'1·. ~
..

,.

Mass. at _ , 279 N. E. 2d at 667, indicates that that court was

'

,, ·'

.

I

• "1,.

.

well aware that Goguen raised both sets of arguments.

.

'~

'.

_:··l·
..
·.q
-~

~

.'J

l
i
l

24. II Trans. Oral Arg. 48.

,-;.
(),5'

The Massachusetts court commented simply that "[t ]he
jury could infer that the violation was intentional without reviewing
any words of the defendant." Commonwealth v. Goguen,
279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972).

Mass.

Thus, the court held that

the jury could infer intent merely from Goguen's conduct.
apparently also a holding that the jury

~t

This is

find contemptuous

intent under the statute, although the requirement amounts to very
little since it is so easily satisfied.

The court's reference to verbal

communication reflected Goguen's reliance on Street v. New York,
394

u.s.- 579 (1969).
~4:>.

•

j

~· ~·,

Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 198 (1966).

I~.

WHh rcp,·:1rd to prosCC\.llorh1lpol.ieics, appcllJnt cites
Y¥\ L\ ~ ~ C\ f ~ 1-t ~·,.J c-f·f .J
iwo published opinions oi the
~Attorney

Ge ncr:~l.

4 Ops. of

Att. Gen. 470 (1915) (Ilqr:roduced at Appellant's Brief 30); Report
:l'
!

of Atty. Gen., Pub. Doc.· No. 12, p. 192 (1968) (Reproduced at

J

Juris. Statement App. 53).
.iI
.·,

.,
'l
J

i

Appellant concedes that neither deals

(l\Vv~~,+-

with the11

portion of the statute under which Goguen was

·"

TIA~~ J ~ a.v-e.~-\- .~ po~~ ~. ~ p-ro1.n~..J_..:f~A-~t.P~u. ~

Y\o

~~

convicted. Ar-:Nevertheless, appeiiant is correct that they s 1ow a

f.J't'o. l-k.t.
~v~

--4+~~

p

~~~~·

tendency on the part of theftate Attorney General to read"~
portions of the statute narrowly.

~ D-6 pre~td-v...

rec..kAt.r\·vs

re.CiedAt the same time, theyll
the

~vo't.S~w.J- ·~te. fl'ltA.:.s(..~e.ll.r ~~~ M~l4s..a.

rs:r:n~~u~~~s,.px:ob1-e:m·s··4n-th~-i'11'lp'lle-G>i~e,!tatute.

The

1915 opinion noted that one portion of the statute, prohibiting
exhibition of engravings of the flag on certain articles

if

wor.J.el
read literallJA make it a criminal offense to display

the ~~

flag itself "in many of its cheaper and more common forms. "
Appellant's Brief 31-32.
Id., at 32.

This would be a "manifest absurdity".

The 1968 opinion advised that a flag representation

,,

,,

pahted on a do1.0 r was not a flag of the United States within the
meaning of the statute.

Juris. Staten1ent App. 53-55.

A contrary

IS.

interpretation would "raise serious questions under the First and

j

Fourteenth Amendments . . . , " given the requirement that belfti.ior

j

made criminal must be "plainly prohibited by the language of the
statuL,;. " Id. , at 54.

' .

..

If.. .

2Q. The federal flag desec ratioTt'Jttute, for example,
reflects a Congress ional pur pose to do jus t that.

In response to a

warning by the United Stat e s Attorney General that the use of such
\I

cie f a'es ,,

unbounded terms as At!ZmiD or "casts contempt . . . either by
word or act" is "to risk invalidation" on due proces s

grounds,

S. R.ep. No. 1287, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1968); H. R. R.ep. No. 350,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967), the bill which became the feder 8J
statute was amended, 113 Cong. R.ec. 16449, 16450 (1967)>to reach
only acts that physically damage the flag.
of the statute, 18 U. S. C.

§

The desecration provision

700(a), declares:

"(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any
flag of the United States by publicly mutilatin g, defacing,
defiling, burning, or trampling upon it shall be fined
not more than $1, 000 or imprisoned for not more than
one year, or both. "
The legislative history reveals a clear desire to r~h only defined
physical acts of desecration. H. R.. R.ep. No. 350, supra, at
3 ("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful, not
accidental or in8_dvertent public physical acts of des ecration. "))
S. R.ep. No. 1287,

supr~,

at 3 ("The langua ge of the bill pr ohibits

. ..

public physical acts of desecration of the flag. ") The act has been
•

so read by the lower federal courts, which have upheld it against
vagueness challenges.
( CA9) ~ cert. ded.

{\

United States v. Crosson, 462 F. 2d 96

4o7 u.s. 1o6'1(197 a ); Joyce v.
...""'~

United Stat~ 454 F. 2d 971 (CADC 1971), cert. ded~ '-/c.'> U.S.
~~

qf_Cj (1972).
~

••
See n. 3, supra .

.s:.u.

V\. 'l,.~ ~y-fl(,

•

3t . AAll fifty states have flag contempt statutes.

The statutes

are synopsized in Hearings on H. R. 271, et al, Before Sub. Comm.
No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 4, pt. III at 324-46 (1967).

The flag contempt statutes of most

states are patterned after the Uniform Flag Act of 1917, which 1:1 tv...
§

3 provides that:
"No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile,
defy, trample upon, or by word or act cast contempt
upon any such flag, standard, color ensign or shield. "

Compare/

Uniform Laws Annotated 52-53 (1966) with Hearings on

H. R. 271, et al, supra, at 321-46. Massachusetts, which has one
of the "older flag laws, " Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 F. Supp. at
164, is among the handful of states that have not adopted the Uniform
Flag Ad: or a derivation.

'1
'

I
?J'

t..<S,

. Sec cases ciled n.
/'

P ---supra. Some state flag contempt

statutes have been substantially narrowed by judicial interpretation.
~~_g.,

State v. Royal,

N.H.

__,

305 A. 2d 676, 679 (1973)
o~t...,_

(New Hampshire flag contempt statute reaches 'ttl "physical abuse type
~

of acts . . . . ").

See 9l§.Q, State v. Hodson, 289 A2d 635 (Del.

Super. 1972). others have not and have not fared well .in federal
court.

~·

ff, Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (W. D. N.C. 1971)
t.-C~-t fe >ff

(3 judge court) (North Carolina flag
vagueness and overbreadth).

statute void for

See also, Long Island Vietnam Monttorium

Committee v. CQhn, 437 F. 2d 344 (1970), cert. den.

Lj()O

~U.S.

<J.. {,. 'f

_

(197,.,...,....
D) (New York statute). -Cf., Crosson v. Silver, 319 F. Supp.

,'

1084 (D. Ariz. 1970) (3 judge court) (Arizona statute).

I

(

?~
\t~
......
"-..!

\
'

• !I

;~

IL.

II)

3a.

V)'

~

.f '

We arc awa re of course of lh e Fir !-;t Amendment questions

wrapped up j.n the fl ag c ont empt controvers y.

Th e Cour t of Appeals

~

dealt[) with these issues at length.

----------

.

;
/

Gogu en v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d

at 96-105.

See,

~·

·~

fi· ,,i!'hayer, "Freedom of Speech and Symbolic

Conduct: The Crime of Flag Desecration," 12

Ariz~

L. Rev. 71 (1970);

Note, "Developments in the Law - the National Security Interest and
Civil Liberties," 84 Harv. L. Rev. · 1130, 1138-1141 (1972); Note,
66 Mich. L. Rev. 1040 (1968).

However, we think the slim record
..

Ma.-k e.>

i+ ';,." prro p11 fJl:t5

-/v t(nA.Su;b.....,

in this case/\

Goguen's First Amendment arguments.

Goguen's counsel argueJthat Goguen was engaged in a
"demonstration of one" with a clear purpose to communicate.
Or. Arg. 36-37.

Trans.

The record does not back him up. particularly in light
~

/e+.+ -k> spec.wt~ ~D~ !."""'.J to~ oa... '.s pi41r ft>Se ·
of Goguen's de.cision not to take the stand_,A Perhaps Goguen's ~;:,~
t.u e. llW'e

j(>~l'-

was l'~e:~,Pf~·~ communication. Or perhaps Goguen was engaged in
nothing more than a thoughtless example of contemporary clothing
fashion.

f: ICLj

The difficulty of the First Amendment is sues posed by

C.0"'--~"'1'+ .s~J~d-es

,

·

d e(,1'c) 1'" "'

a-'JJ.-U.<s+ -

· .. · " · . couns els

.)

.jf4; VL U~ W':;J,

J.d.t~

AfX::::..~:?:..~!~":,'..:t.m-

"v.-.?l euc~oop';o.
$1.4""' O<.V\

. .•

e

t.........

a case where an

,. . .

.r~c..+""' Q

r--·

intent to communic ate r ests on .a~R-1€':1"-fe.fiB-1\~}Joun dation. ·

\

34 .

.....___

.

~~

-----

-----~----~·-··-·--·-

-·- _.,........- --- -u--- -

to the mark. But we see the force of the District Court's conclusion
that since the flag has become "an object of youth fashion and high
tU

camp . . . , " it is by no means certain as it might have been at
.A

another time in this country's history that wearing a miniature
flag on one's clothing constitutes criminal contempt. 343 F. Supp.
at 164, 167.

~ceremonial

treatment of the flag in many contexts

has become a widespreadA••••• contemporary phenomenon,

Appellant argues that any notice difficulties are ameliorated
by the narrow subject matter of the statute, "actual" flags of the
/3

United states. This allegedly "takes some of the vagueness away

,q
from the phrase, 'treats

contemptuously~

. .

" Anyone who "wants

notice as to what this statute proscribes, . . . immediately knows

?.
that it has something to with flags • and if he wants to stay

jcut
clear of violating this statute, he lilt has to stay clear

,sof doing something to the United States flag."

But quite

apart from the difficulties presented by the concept of an
I~

uactual" flag, we fail to see how this alleged particularity
resolves the central vagueness question presented--the
a?sence of any

r

stand~d

for defining

LL-

cont~mptkous

treatmente .

Appellant's argument that the language provides
adequate warning of what constitutes contempt rests in
large measure, as the Court of Appeals put it, on the
11

unarticulated premise" that the statute • "is not vague

as to one who sews a flag to the seat of his pants.n
F.2d at 91..

e

471

,...
""

The arguament assumes that it would be

reasonably clear to anyone of "common intelligence",
Connally v. General Construction Co, 269

u.s. 385,

391

(j932), that this particular use of the flag would constie..ueV\ ~~ ~ s~ ~ 4o cle.+t~ ~~+~ /YeJ~.
tute criminally contemptous behavior, ~ Or, putting it
~ iU-e- ~ ct> ~ ../)~ J~'4f k ~ ~
differently, appellant is forcedAto argue that contemporary

community understanding . . . should enable a reasonable person
to distinguish the culpability of wearing a small flag on
'

~').t~~4R~

one's pants from the many argu~ly innocent

A of our

national emblem, such as wearing it at other places on one's

moun t a vagueness at t ack in t he

stat~

~3

c ourts .

dea l wi t h the point a t l ength, however ,

We d o not

I

fo r
we f i nd

the per tinent sta tu t ory l anguage imperm i ssibly vague as
applied to Goguen.

In light of the Mas sachuse tts Supr eme

Judicial Court's explicit holding on vagueness "as applied,"
Commom>real th v. Goguen,

111ass.

, 279 N.E.2d 666, 667

(1972~ and given app~llant's concession, we have no doubt •

that the "substance" of this claim was

"fairly

presented" to the state courts under the exhaustion s'IJ%!dards
of Picard, supra, 404 U.S. at 275, 278.
Appellant's exhaustion of remedies argument is
pr:emised on the notion that Goguen's behavior rendered him

I

as

a hard core vio~atorAto whom the statute was not vague,

!!••&.
whatever its implications for those engaged in differen,t w~

I'('-

~ ~isz_ ·~
We find no merit to such a distinction in this case . .-lt-i&

~ it.te.i

~e- ~~~ ~
r~ ri~ 111 ~

kv1M4

~"' ~

.

~~ t:1f 4d-ud&;) M

0~

true that a statute may be vag:ue as to a particular violator, without

tt~ -b ~1 ~~~ ~~ ~atflrH~~- ~ ~4~~ l-ui-? ~a.
neeessa:nly bentg faemlly vague. But th1s

ca1u:~.ot~aul

1

wtth respeet

~

I

~

criminal statute .iaa:t is vague "not in the sense that it requires

a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible
normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct
is specified at all.
(1971).

Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614

Such a statute simply has !!.Q core. '-----------~
The abs ence of an asce r t a ina bl e

standa rd for i nclus ion and ex clus ion, or of guid e lines

I

8.
0 ~ -tfA.e bl.l ~p-eA. 0 .p.
clothes or displaying i~A _..................

automobile.

This line of

""'

argu~ment

"'-'

one's

fails, we think,

+oal~ 1 s

adequately to take into account ...~widely varying attitudes
and tastes for displaying something as ubiquitous as the
United States flag or representations of it.

Precisely

because display of our flag is so common and takes so many

~

of.fe,.,...

forms, changing from one generation to

ok+ft~ ~ ~~"flU-'~)
.@
9

another~

a legis-

lature should define with some precision those forms of

;t me"-V\.~
treatment of the

..•

flag~. . . . . . .

to outlaw.

I

The "publicly

treats contemptuously" phrase does not do so.
Whatever doubts may exist here as to whether Goguen

was fairly warned or should have known . . the consequences
of his behavior simply by the force of its offensiveness are
overcome by the statute's plain failure to meet the other
principal requirement of the vagueness doctrine.

The

vagueness concept of notice has a certain fictional flavor.

/1

This is particularly so in a . . noncommerical context, where
as a general rule behavior is not mapped out in advance
on the basis of statutory language.

In such cases,

perhaps . . the more meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not true notice but the requirament that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.
In this regard, the language under which Goguen was charged
is notably deficient.

~

12.

susceptible of common understanding, is precisely what
offends the Due Process Clause.

Such a deficiency is

particularly objectionable in view of the unfettered
latitude thereby accorded law enforcement officials and
triers of fact.

Where this problem exists and until 1t

.

is corrected either by amendment or ta judicial construetion, it affects all who are prosecuted under the
~ ()Lv\. opUAl;.._ ) f:l.uz. proto lbk ~(s.fs: I;_,. ~.s C-CIJ4/l- •
statutory language. A The language at issue here is void for
vagueness in Goguen's case because it subjected Goguen to
criminal liability under a standard so indefinite that
eo~~ jury

... police)

were free to express

nothing more than their own preferences for treatment of
the flag.
Appellant's remaining arguments are equally unavailing.

I~
Finally, appellant argues that

-

sta~

'

law enforcement authorities

have shown themselves ready to interpret this penal statute ••••
narrowly and that the statute, properly read, reaches only direct,
immediate contemptuous acts- that "actually impinge upon the
physical integrity of the flag.
for the former

" There is no support in the record

"1

•

point. ~

~ Similarly, nothing in the state court's opinion in 09g'Hn':~
€Cllr-l td.v- 0 'f4 k lJ...... 0~ ~ U» ~.~..AT
or in any aS I! 1 1 u P
2 · i 1· ·

IUplll

case

sustains the latter. In

{)..1/l.r).q.

any event, Goguen .was charged onlyl\. .a the wholly open-ended
language of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously".
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature and
variety of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot establish
standards with great precision.

Control of the broad range of disorderly

conduct that may inhibit a policeman in the performance of his official
Y"'~ be..

duties 1\ one such area.

Cf.J Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).

But there is no comparable need for committing broad discretion to
law enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt. Nothing
prevents a legislature from defining with substantial specificity what

.
~g
constitutes forbidden treatment o f - United States flags.
The state's
~

failure to approach this goal in the statutory language at
issue requires invalidation of Goguen's conviction.

t£ .

•
IV

...

Although we hold the "publicl~treats contemptuously"
W §

ph w-as e.

g void for vagueness, we do not address in this case the

first six words ef ~:he

~@tt+rt.M!eOy.
, er '"""
Uti

"+-..+-.J.e '.J

commercial misuse provisions.<:/1
C-oi"'JeJ.Mf+ o V"' J.eseer-a.Pto~

In light of the universal adoptimJof flag,_:
3D .fu~
federal and state governments, we

statutes by the
emphasize that we -

do not hold that the due process doctrine of vagueness invalidates
~e

all

statutes.

The validity of .-...li statutes)... insofar
wdl

as the vagueness doctrine is concerned,.. < depend on their particular
31

language, judicial construction, and enforcement history. And, as
noted earlier, we do not deal here with the question whether the

-Pl~ ~IU.k

~wA

Massachusett~statute or othe~ statutes are valid under the First

a

Amendment.

3;)..
33

Goguen's "silly conduct" finds no sympathy here. But this
is a country devoted to the rule of law, and the requirements of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to those.-::
given to adolescent behavior as
well as to anyone else. An irony in this is that those who benefit

Ito

•
most from a government of principled laws are probably the least
likely to reflect on their good fortune.

The judgment is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

.. ~
~

-~
,>

~

l
:j
~

...
-....

Although we hold the "publicly t reat s contemptuous ly"

••-Ill

"

.

phretSe

void for vagueness, we do not address in this case the J~-f..Je '.J

first six words

M-.~he

o~\~
dq
sWttt-e"o@¥ iM commercial misuse provisions.

·
·
CoMJeV<-<p+ c. ,... cl.:esec r-Jte,:.,__
In light of the universal adoptio1of flag/' - .
· ·· statutes by the
..J..~;;tt.v"-'

3D

federal and state governments, we

emphasize that

we ~

do not hold that the due process doctrine of vagueness invalidates
insofar .

~
'

.

will

!1.

,•

as the vagueness doctrine is concerned,,Adepend on their particular
.
3I
language, judicial construction, and enforcement history. And, as

noted earlier, we do not deal here with the question whether the

fl t¢q

1~ t~-;,e

Massachusett~statute

.4o-<cA.

or other statutes are valid under the First
A

-------.

-------e Process Cla~f~llef(;urteenth Amendment extend to tho ~
.

.

EE~~~~-~Sii~~ili~·~ven t;-----=-ntJ)e~

I1
Finally, appellant argues thai

-

st~t~

law enforcement authorities

have shown themselves ready to interpret this penal statute

~t

.l
narrowly and that the statute, properly read, reaches only direct,
immediate contemptuous acts

that "actually impinge upon the

physical integrity of the flag.

" There is no support in the record

,.1

~

for the former point.')

.

r----------..-

~ Similarly, nothing in the ~?tate court's opinion in 6:8~8R ' s
ectrl~ . .~ o p.11td. . . . . o.<:: -~

or: in any

~
8wn case
4

{p.;VI,.r

Mi' M:bsw•fAr;~S;es

sustains the latter. In

i-(Vtctl'l.-

any event, Goguen· was charged onlyA

·

the wholly open-ended

language of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously".
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature and
variety of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot establish
standards with great precision.

Control of the broad range of disorderly

conduct that may inhibit a policeman in the performance of his official
rv,~ h?..
duties 1\ one such area.

Cf.) Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).

But there is no comparable need for committing broad discretion to
law enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt.

Nothing

prevents a legisl<:tture from defining with substantial specificity what
.

constitutes forbidden treatment of ·.· United States

flags~g

~

The state's

failure to approach this goal in the statutory language at
issue requires invalidation of Goguen's conviction •

.

.
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72 - 1254 SMITH v. GOGUEN
The Sheriff of Worceste r County, Massachus etts, appeals
from a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First

. h o/tl, ~f;
Circui~ .

C.ovtkV>-<-f+·

theA

provision of the Massachusetts

fl~

misuse

statute fa unconstitutionally vague and overbroad . . Goguen v. Smith,

~·
/fiJ.

noted, .

U.S.

tft7v="/\

-~--·

q"s-(1973).

p;fi.A..--

We affirm on theA \D-db~.,...~·. . ~-·. .~·~;y
I\

We do not reach the correctness of the holding below

on overbreadth or other First Amendment grounds.
I

The slender record in this casi reveals little more than that
Goguen wore a small cloth version of the United States flag sewn
to the seat of his pants.

The flag, approximately three by five inches

or four by six inches, was clearly visible to passersby.

pal1 LP30, 1970,

tw~ officers

On January

tt1.

Leominister, Massachusetts

....,.~...,

2.
encountered Goguen standing and talking with a_group of persons on a
( l ( )(11.1./'a..llj.<.

public street.

The group

ft. <j

l.U .:l/.1

)~

··

not eng-aged in any demonstra-

disruption of traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this
officer approached Goguen to question him about the flag, the other
persons present expressed their amusement. Some time later, the
second officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking in the
downtown business district of Leominister.
The following day the first officer swore out a complaint against
CoVtkl¥+
Goguen under the £:!!!·~-~~=:.'··I!• it provision of the Massachusetts flag misuse
m;.

. l

··I
.

·~

j

·~

statute.

·fheV\.

~.--~...,..."'4 This provision./l.read, in relevant part:

"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces
or treats contemptuously the flag of the United states ••. ,
whether such flag is public or private property . . . ,
shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more
than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both . . . . 11 3
Despite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was not charged
with any act of physical

desecration~f

L.(J ~ 'tJ e~.--4.

structure of the0 · ·

As permitted by the disjunctive

p+·
provision, the officer charged specifically

and only that Goguen "did publicly treat contemptuously the flag of
the United states. . .

II

3.
A jury convened .in the Worcester
Goguen guilty.

~~~.~t
..
~-

Superior Court fotmd

The court imposed a sentence of six months in the

Massachusetts House of Corrections.

'.,,J.

Coun~y

Gowen appealed to the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed, • • • - -

\'l
;

·]

Mliilliiii•O:Ic~w.hXlit

.l

J

. ·j

'

Commonwealth v. Goguen,

N. E. 2d 666 (1972).

Mass.

_,

279

That court rejected Goguen's vagueness arguments_

other circumstances, we see no vagueness in the statute as applied
Mass. at __, 279 N. E. 2d at 667. 1w

here. " Id. ,

?'ZM~Ci:t:

of

it..U:auld~WilJRWtttt tlf~e~ fue court cited no Massachusetts
precedents interpreting the statutory language under which Goguen

lo
was charged.

After Goguen began serving his sentence, he was granted bail

:1

and then ordered released on a writ of habeas corpus by the United

1
'

1

.j

,~
1

j
I

·I

1

j
'I

l
l

States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.

Goguen v.

Smith, _§_u pra, 343 F. Supp. 161. The District Court found the flag
wrde,"-f+·
·
Allla:=:iZJ:;:, portion of the Massachusetts statute

IM

~pe rmissibly

vague

'

Fourteent h Arnr nd-

under the Due Process Clause of t he

me nt as we l l as overbro a d und er t he Firs t Amendment .

"' r~ l cJ ·~-

..

In

I,.L..

~====~~:a·~
.Go gue n's

void for vaguen es s

District Court concluded that the words

a r g ~ments ,

11

t he

tr eats con temptuously '

did not provide a "readily ascertainable standard of •
1/1

I d • , at /lv 1.

guilt . 11

II

Especially in these days •when flags

are commonly displayed on hats, garments and vehicles • • .
words
under which Goguen was convicted

the

11

leave

conjectural, in many instances, what conduct may subject
the actor to criminal prosecution."

Ibid.

found that the statutory language at issue

The court also
11

ma.y be said to

encourage arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. 11

A

majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F.2d 88.

Court in all respects.

The Court of Appeals concluded that "resolution of @oguen' s
void for vaguenes~ challenge to the statute as applied to

l
1
1

i'

him necessarily adjudicates the statute's facial constitutionality

. . . ."

I£·~ at

94.

Treating as-applied and on-

the-face vagueness attacks as essentially indistinguishable
'

'

ph r-c...!;.e.. .

in light of the A
~......- of the st a tutory~ ·- " .
.'Ic:~ ) J. q;)..) ct..J)
·~
at issue,Athe court foundAthe langua ge fail ed to provide
ad equa t e wa rning , failed to provid e suffici ent guiUe line s
for l aw enfor c ement officia l s , a nd set juri es a nd courts a t

.·

''

4a..

1.
.,

large.

Id., at

tfl/ -

1-1
1. •
/4J

Then C1rcujt Jud ge, now

.i

1

i

Senior Circuit Judge Hamley, sitting by designation from

l
~
I

the Ninth Circuit, concurred solely on void for vagueness
grounds.

1£., at 105.

t

Judge Hamley thouglA the majority's

extensive treatment of overbreadth and the other First
Amendment issues raised by Goguen unnecessary to the
decision of the case.

I£1£.

,.
':).

1L
J

J

l

J .

l

Wr::. ~.x!)ret: tvdi1 ht:..il4. (()w::,.,.1 .(.?cl'..""<-·.:1! '"''u.{lr tL!,::i

.,

t'Lc..&-z...

settled principles of the due process doctrine of vagueness
6~~.-Jf-.t.L t<.>t.:'d l?-<(PrPl..•,} /o -~~~v'<,.,P ke.'·i dr ·1 t.<:•p•£4 ~·f:'.i..2€?tf. /kov:z /r'-"~-•t.tf' L'-;;>

/1

.•

t\require no extensive restatement here.

~~IV'

11

The doctrine incorporates

f6

notions of fair warning. Moreover, it requires legislatures to set

"

reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers
pr-eue.c.P..
11
of fac~ in order to~
"arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

Where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state
interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the
First Amendment, the

doctrineA=~te~

specificity than in other contexts.

/0

a greater degree of

The statutory language at issue

here, "publicly . . . treats contempt uously the flag of the United

*

States . . . , "has such scope,

"

~· ~·

Street v. New York,394 U.S.
I

576 (1969) (verbal flag contempt), and at the relevant timef was
without the benefit of judicial clarification.''

Flag contempt statutes have

bee~~i=y

vague for lack of notice on the theory that "[w ]hat is contemptuous
(J..
to one man may be a work of art for another." Goguen's behavior
l(

<.rL

)"
lj
I

.~

can hardly be described as art.

. ,,

S•

,/' .. ..

J

~

~ ~01)

,,

13

Immaturity . _ comes closer

9

9.

j

l
1

·l

In its terms , the language at issue is sufficien:ly
unbounded to

"

pr~ohi bit,

as the District Court noted.

''any public deviation from formal flag etiquette. •

J4J F. Supp. at 167.

Enacted in 1899 and unchanged since,

tiS

the "publicly • • • treats contemptuously" phrase was also
devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the
~ time in this case.

lq

We are without authority to

'J_()

cure that defect.

Statutory

languag~

of such a standardless

sweep allows policemen, prosecutors and juries to
their personal predilections.

pursu~

Legislatures may not so

abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards
of the criminal law.

E.g., Papachristou v. City of
rs(>>

405 U.S.

Jacksonville,

v. City of Chicago, 394

(lctU),

166-68A

u.s. 117, 120 (1969),

ln Gregory
Mr. Justice

Black voiced a concern that we share against entrusting
lawmaking "to the moment-to.-moment judgment of the

l

policeman on his beat. tt

'I' he

aptness of Nr. Justice Black 's

warning is evident from appellant's candid concession in oral
argument before the Court of Appeals regarding state enforce-

tltwJ-ment standards forAportion of the statute under which
Goguen was convicted :

10.

.

(1-«~s~J

cot~dmitted,

".
[A]s
a war protestor who,
while attending a rally at which it begin.s to rain,
evidences his disrespect for the American flag by
contemptuously covering himself with it in order
to .avoid getting wet, would be prosecuted under the
Massachusetts statute. Yet a member of the American
Legion who, caught in the same rains1f?&hl while
returning from an 'America - Love It or Leave It'
rally, similarly uses the flag, but does so regrettably
and without a contemptuous attitude, would not be
prosecuted. " 471 F. 2d at 102.

l

Where inherently vague statutory language permits such selective law

I
enforcement, there is a denial of due process.

Appellant's arguments that the "publicly •

\

treats

contetnptuously" phrase is not imperm1ss1 bly vague, or at

~ \_~st

I
should not b1 so held in this

Appellant devotes

c

ca~e.

az

unpersuas:ve.';

substantial portion of his opening brief,

-

his oral argument, to the contention that Goguen

--

~

failed to ~serve his present void for vagueness claim for
the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.

Appellant

concedes that the issue of "vagueness as applied" is properly
a1

l

before the federal courts, but contends that Goguen's only
arguable claim is that the statute is vague on its face.

'l'he

latter claim, appellant insists, was not presented to the sstate

I\

courts with the requisite fair pa precision. Picard v. Connor,
L/D~ 4 .S. J..lo ( Jq 11) r
~~
This exhaustion of remedies argument is belatedly raised

;t
and fails to take the full measure of Goguen's efforts to
A

11.

~:;

mount a vagueness attack in the state courts.
for
deal with the point at length, however,

We do not
we find

the pertinent statutory language impermissibly vague as
applied to Goguen.

In light of the Massachusetts Supreme

Judicial Court's explicit holding on vagueness "as applied,"
Commonwealth v. Goguen,

Mass .

, 279 N.E.2d 666, 667

(1972J and given appellant's concession, we have no doubt •
that the "substance" of this claim was . .

"fairly

presented" to the state courts under the exhaustion s~dards
of Picard , supra, 404 ·U.S. at 275, 278.
Appellant's exhaustion of remedies argument is
pr~mised

on the notion that Goguen's behavior rendered him

as
a hard core violatorAto whom the statute was not vague,
whatever its implications for those engaged in differenct
St.f~' dt~h~~

conduct.

I

We do not agree with this

The

gravamen of the due process doctrine of vagueness is that a
statute has no core.

The doctrine voids a criminal statute

that is vague "not in the sense that it ·requires a person
to conform his conduct to an imprescise but comprehensible
normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard
of conduct is specified at all.''
402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).

Coates v. City of Cincinnati,

The absence of an ascertainable

standard for inclusion and exclusion, or of guidelines

...·'

Appellant argues that any notice difficulties a re ameliorated
by the narrow subject matter of the statute, "actual" flags of the

.t "'--' ~

/3 ,.,. '"""'

United States. 'i'ais

teH:;~;::takes

some of the vagueness away
tl{

from the phrase, 'treats contemptuously: .

" Anyone who "wants

notice as to what this statute proscribes, . . . immediately knows
_.L....
::L---

h

,.

that 1 t has something to with flags t=t and if he we..n ts t o s ' ay

J.usr

clear of violating this statute, he

. has to stay clear
I~

of doing something to the United States flag."
a

apart from the

~ ·

~

~~a~

But quite

.

.

presented by the concept of an

It:>

'1

actual" flag, we fail to see how this alleged particularity

resolves the central : agueness question pres:nted--the
absence of any

stand~d

for defining

cont:empt~ous

\

treatmento. \

susceptible of commo:n understanding, · is precisely wha t
offends the Due Process Clause.

Such a deficiency is

'.

particularly objectionable in view of the unfettered
latitude thereby accorded law enforcement officials and
triers of fact.

Where this problem exists and until it

.

is corrected either by amendment or Ga judicial construet1on, it affects all who are prosecuted under the
~ DU.A "P~~u"~ ) ttu.. prot,&-.. 0-.xlsk 1:.,.. ~ cc->..t.-e.. .
statutory language. A The language at issue~ is void for

vagueness 1R

ee~weR ' Q

ees · because it subjected Goguen to

criminal liability under a standard so indefinite that
Co•~

e-J. jury

. . police)
nothing more than their own preferences for treatment of
the flag.
Appellant's remaining arguments are equally unavailing.

-
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t;·c r imj.llerrJ.iability under standard~ s o
I

~
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/",

and the jl\;t;.Y ~:re fre e t 9,.4ress es s ept-ia1ly nothing 9)-~fe, than thei
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own pref7 S for trea.t m
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rtf"of the
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,,,.-'

/,/
flag. /
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-

/

Appellant's arguments to the contrary 'are ot pe

ua,_ve ..,

1\

I+

:.__...T

i~ ,~~0-.;:J:;u.'~

-~Q:=.IS~-

that the first six words of the statute add specificity

A

- 1/1.1' .k

A
to the "treats contemptuously" phrase)

.

~ 0

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Cour~a}3t}~le-of-statut ~

..

~,l.w..?44, ~

.

interpretation of const~in~feneral lan~age to take on color from
more specific accompanying language. But it is conceded that Goguen
was convicted under the general phrase alone, and that the highest

()'-/

specific principle of statutory interpretation in this case.
als o argues that the Supreme Judicial Court · ·

in Goguen's case

~~$
A restricted

Appellant

~s-

the scope of the statute to intentional con tempt.

Aside

from the problems presented by an appellate court's limiting
construction in the very case in which a defendant has bern tried

;;;h
cla.v-·1 ~-lJ
under a previously unnarrowed statute, this still does not/
.
\..l¢11\.t)~c,..f- ~$+-;+~
what - ·:;;\contempt, whether intentional or iriadvertent.

~1

l
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/-

(

IY11( .

,J :A', rt (\:

l

·-

('mu n .t-

-- ·---

------

-

(l c l,·,)'l?tt',/ . ~~., op•~t ....~ l' ·f
-·- ---·- - -----·----

--

No. 72-1254 SMITH v. GOGUEN

-::L

The Sheriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts, appeals
fro m a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First

· ho1d/(~
Cil

cui~

stat 1t e

CD V\ +-e v-.~

r+·

theA ·

provision of the .Massachusetts

unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

misuse

Goguen v. Smith,
.frolo'

.

.

fl~'

471 F . 2d 88, aff' g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (D. Mass. 1972),

. · · ft,:;. ·. ·

u.s.Atfo4-(1973). .

nm.ed, '

- -

··.· · ·

q~ s

pt;t;=l,

~t:..~••·

·.

uris .

·a ,.

We affirm on. t h e A · - - - - · · g ·
,,

We do not reach the correctness of the holding below

or: overbreadth or other First Amendm ent grounds.
I
.·.

, .......... 1':. :•·

.·•

The slender record .in this case reveals little more
than that
.
C-vguen wore a small

clo~h.

i

.

tc, the seat of his pants.

version .of the United States flag sewn

The flag, approximately three by five inches

./

ot four by six inches, was clearly visible to passersby.

poliU"·
30. 1970,

tw ~ officers

On January

1 t1.

Leominister, Massachusetts

a:s~JI

~

2.
encountered Goguen standing and talking with a group of persons on a

o rr i.J./U' .. u. '.j w .:.v.1
public street.

~isrupt ion

The group

not engaged in any demonstr a-

of traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this

Qfficer
approached Goguen to question him about the flag, the other
. ,,
~~rsons

.

p resent expr"'s sed their. amusement. Some time later, the

·...

.

1

~ e,cond ·office.r

~owntown

•.

,.

observ-ed Goguen in the same attire walkmg in the

business dist r ict of

~rhe follow.i.n~

Le~minister.

day the first officer swore out a complaint against

covde rkf+
goguen under the £::_..,;111•• provision _of the Massachusetts flag misuse
~1

· ·
.f.hel-\.
This provision.Aread, in relevant part:

statute.

. ·,.
:

,

1

Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces

or t.reats contemptuously the flag of the United states . . . ~

whether such fla g is public or private property . . . ,
shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more
than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not
·
m ore than one year, or both. . . . " 3 ·
tc

t:

Despite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was not charged
c

.

with any act of physical

desecration~

As permitted by the disjunctive

C~.H/t.JeVL,_ p·t-

structure of the0<Z

provision, the officer charged specifically

and only that Goguen 11did publicly treat contemptuously the flag of
the Unite l . 'tate ·. . .

II

3.
A jury convened in the Worcester County Superior Court found
Goguen guilty.

The court imposed a sentence of six months in the

Massachusetts House of Corrections.

Gog..t. en appealed to the

'Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmedr

.
Commonwealth v.
'

·M~~Iiillill~li=-m·m ._

1

ala!~~

"""{'

_ .,

Mass.

Goguen,

279 ·

That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argument~·

JN. ·E . 2d. 666 (1972).

with the c omment that "[w ]hatever the uncertainties in
<bther 'circumstances, we see no yagueness in the statute as applied
here. 11 ~id. /C~ Mass. at __, 279 N. E.· 2d at 667. is s

pp 1:t: of ·.

~14='!irlll'm1 fjdttM.&-:~~--.-a•s=:mmai;;'iillirilMB'+il'lli4t=l!=e=•=•PI::IIr""g--•~"' lhe court cited no Massach.u setts
1_1recedent s interpret~g the statutory language under ~h-ich Goguen

·.

t 1iF1R. :J ·: : . •: ~.
:
111 ("' (

!.:· .,

.

c

. ..

.

···. ·

.

Mter Goguen began serving his sentence, he was granted bail
and then ordered released on a writ of habeas corpus by the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
Smith, supra, 343 F. Supp. 161.

Goguen v.

The District Court found the flag
IM

liBD£:C1J portion of the Massachusetts statute lf\\Permissibly vague

4.

Fourteenth Amend -

under the Du e Proc e ss Clause of the .

me nt as we ll as overbroa d under the First Amendment.
1-1p ~t cJ ~ ~J
~~~~~~~
_ Go g uen' s

void for vagueness

l-l,
arg~m e nts,

In

t he

Dis tri ct Court conc l uded that the words "treats contemptuously"
did not provide a "readily ascertainable standard of
lQ._. , at/~ 1 .

guilt. 11

\

,,
th~se

days- •when fl ags

are commonly displayed on hats, garments and

,.
~

Ill

· Es~ecially in

.

~

-

.
t

\

v~hicl es

tl
(.l

•

•

'

words
.the lllli:d!E!IIB.Itl under -w hich .Goguen was convicted. "leave
conjectura l , in many instances, what conduct may subject
(

I

l •

(.

' ' -

the actor t o criminal prosecution."
}: l :·.' \.

t

j'-'

tO

I

•

•

•

•

Ibid.

The cour t also

f

found-tha t t he statut ory language at issue "may be said to
encourage ar bitrary a nd erratic arrests and convic t i ons. "

.

..

.

..

.

-,., ,_ ,..,),, A maj or ity of t he Court of Appeals affirmed the Dts trict
\ , "·-•··'

L

J.

•

•·

.

Goguen v. Smith, supra, 47 1 F62d 88.

Court in all respec t s.
'•

rrhe Court of Appeals concluded that ttresolution of @oguen Is
.I

.~

..

/_

void f or vaguenes~ challenge to the statute as appl ied to
him ne cessarily ad judicates the statute's facial cons t1t ut1onal ity • • • • 11

~.)at

94.

t he-face vagueness a ttacks as
'

.

'

I M\)r-e.c t ~t o~

Treating as-applied and onessentia~ly

indistingui sha ble
(Jh N.S. !C.

in light of the /l.l&lt!!:'JfBD:D:IIIfll:l• of the statutory,._,··"" :Ic~ ) J- f( J.. ) •1•J;
·Ht.;.lat is s ue,A the court f ound. t he language failed to provide
.A

adeq uate warn i ng , fa iled to provide sufficient guHle1 1ne s
fo r l aw en forcement off icia l s , and se t juri es and cou:rts at

large .

Id., at '

q'l - 96. ·

'l'hen Circuit Judge, now

Sen i or Circuit Judge Hamley, sitting by designation from
t he Ninth Circuit, concurred solely on void for vagueness

•ground s.

~.,at

105.

Judge Hamley

t

thoug~

the majority's

extens ive treatment of overbreadth and the other First
Amendment issues raised by Goguen unnecessary to the
de cision of the case.

.. .

~·

•

·. : _~- ,. ,

•

t _._, ..

#

~

. . . ...

,1' -~·

. - ·. .

II

,_ .

-· We agree with both lower federal courts that under
the due process doctrine of vagueness
.

.~

se-1.-l!-e. c.l

GPg~:Ie n W~S

entitled to federal habeas corpus relief; '-~'IJj'-o.f- ·~J c~cf...-,~~
7
p~i ncip les~require no extensive restatement here.
The

.

· doctr i ne . incorporates
.
'

.'

..

.
f . ·-

I

.....

••

•

·(lot, ~. . t> -r

f6

notions of faiAwarning. Moreover, it requires legislatures to set
r easonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers

pt-eueuf9
1
of fac~ in order to.t
"arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. '
r. · ~ · ·

,

\Nhere a statutevs literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state •

'-4~

interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the

cl e.t."-\ll.A..js
f:i'rst Amendment, the

doc~rineA

..

a greater degree of
.

I~

specificity than :in other contexts. The statutory language at issue

hie~e~ 1 'publicly . "
(] (. r

'*'

States,... .

t reats contemptuously the flag of the United

.

0, has such scope,
11

~· ~·

street v. New York,394 U.S.

576 (1969) (verbal flag contempt), and at the relevant timef was
I

without the benefit of judic.ial clarification.''

Cti.AV"~~3~
Flag contempt statutes have

bee~llt
a•••••

as impermissibly

vague for lac k of notice on the theory that "[w ]hat is contemptuous

IJ..
to one man may be a work of art for another. " Goguen's behavior
or-

II S ·,.
1
t

I

. !)

~~ ~U<C::r

II

13 .

can hardly be described as art. Immaturity probably comes closer
1\ . .
.
.

•

7-

Cour t's concl usion that since the flag has become "an
objec t of youth fashion and h igh camp •• , ," it is by
no means as likely as it mi ght have been at anothe r time•
in

·-

thi s

country's history that wearing a miniature flag

343 F,Supp at 164, 167.
Gourts noted,

,/1

casua..Q

As both lower fed.e ral

ta••

tr eatment of the flag i n ,_.
. . ..

many contexts has become a widespread contemporary
phenome non,

Ibid., 4 71 F.2d at 96, Flag wearing

in a day of relaxed clothing styles may be simply for
adornment or nothing more t han a ploy to attract attention.
To be sure, much of the tendency of youth in recent years

.
. r-c-P\-ech
to wear unor thodox • c lathing t1.' .
·

cu... .

~v<.-~-c'cd

' '

t

.. .

-l-o to,>1 H•

~~~ ·~

· !ar.c•

. ...

disagreement with the conventions, manners and values of
their e lders, as well as to express dissent from gover nmnet
policies and resentment against an unpopular

war,

But certainly in a time of widely varying attitudes and
tastes for displaying somethi ng as ubiquitous as the
United States flag or repres e ntations of it, not every
uncer emonial wearing or dis playing of the flag upo n one's
clothing can be said to consti tute criminal contempt.

And,

fails to draw reasonably clear lines between the many kinds of modern,
nonchalant uses of the federal flag. The classic vagueness cases require
that all "be informed as to what the State commands or forbids . . • , "
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939), and that "men of common
int~lli~ence"

n?t

~

forced to guess at the meaning of the c;riminal law.

C onnally v. General Construction Co., 2 69 U.S. 385, 391 (1932). Given
·.

+ot1'4j ·~

. . .

c~ess)~::> .

a DaE:llli1tendencies to treat thE:(flag J

• · those notic e standards

a re not satisfied in this case.
The language under which Goguen was charged also fails to meet
the other principal requirement of the vagueness doctrine. The vagueness
concept of notice often has a fictional flavor. 14 This is particularly so in
..

. . .··

a noncommercial context, where as a gene1~al rule. behavior is not mapped
out in advance on the basis of statutory language. In such cases, perhaps
the more meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not true notice
but the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guide lines to
govern law enforcement. In this regard, the statutory language under
scrutiny.

..

i~notably

deficient .

.

.

9.

In its terms, the language at issue is suffi ciently

"

unbounded to

pr~ohibit,

as the District Court noted,

'' any public deviation from formal flag etiquette • • •

343 F. Supp. at 167.

•

"

Enacted in 1899 and unchanged since,

16'

,,

the ..........___ treats contemptuously" phrase was also
devoid . of a narrowing state court interpretation at t he
~ r e1evant

.•

...

time in this case.
. .

C cure 'that defect.

"<• '

l&

We are without authority to

11

.

Statutory language of such a standardle s s

sweep allows policemen, prosecutors and juries to pur sue
t heir personal predilections.

Legislatures may n ot so

abd icate their responsibilities for setting the s tandards
11.

of the criminal law.

E.g., Papachristou v. City of

. c

IS(>>

40.5 ~.s.:

,Jacksonville,

(1'17~),

• 166-68A -

ln Qr.egory

'J

"v . City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 117, 1.20 (1969), l'1r • .Justice
c• Black voiced a concern that we share against entrusting
11

L

l awmaking "to the moment-to-moment . judgment of the .,
policeman on his beat.''

The aptness of Mr. Justic e Black 1 s

warning is evident from appellant's candid concessi on in ora l
argument before the Court of Appeals regarding sta te enforc e -

·thulment standards forAportion of the statute under which
Goguen was convicted:

10.

f{o r Cifpell~fJ
"• . . [A]s c~unse/actmitted~ a :var p;otestor :Vho,
while attending a rally at which It begms to ram,

I

evidences his disrespect for the American flag by
contemptuously covering himself with it in order
to avoid getting wet, would be prosecuted under the
Massachusetts statute. Yet a member of the American
Legion who, caught in the same rains~g'm while
returning from an 1America - Love It or Leave It'
rally, similarly uses the flag, but does so regrettably
and without a contemptuous attitude, would not be
prosecuted. " 471 F. 2d at 102.
Where inherently vague statutory language permits such selective law

I

\

enforcement, there is a denial of due process.

.. ·

.·

1II

Appellant's arguments that the

c·

,·

('""'

••

"'

~·

I.~ ••

II

8._..._ tr eats

~.....
&2
....

con_temptuously" phrase is not impermissibly vague. or· at
l ea~t
c;._

should not be so held in this

s

ca~e.

.

are unpersuaslve.

~

App~llant

devotes a substantial portion of his

openi~~

as he did his oral argument, to the contention that

bri ef,

~?~uen

'

fai~e d to ~serve his present void for vagueness cla im f or
\

.

t he ·. purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. · ·Appellant
c oncedes that the issue of "vagueness as applied" is properly
\~

before the federal courts, but contends that Goguen's only
arguable claim is that the statute is vague on its face .

'l'he

l atter claim, appellant insists, was not presented to the •s t ate

A

courts with the requisite fair~ precision. Picard v . Connor,
4D~ ll .S. llo (ICC11)4l
\ ~
~ his exhaustion of remedies argument is belatedly rais ed

;t
a nd fails to take the full measure of Goguen's efforts to
,1\

II
d,O
mount a vagueness attack in the sta,t e courts.

We do not

deal • with the point at length•, however, for we find the
relevant statutory language impermissibly vague as applied to
Goguen.

In light of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial

Court's explicit holding on vagueness "as applied,"
Commonwealth v. Goguen, ___ Mass.

~.

279 N.E.2d 666, 667

(1972), and given appellant's concession, we have no doubt
that the "substance" of this claim was "fairly presented"
to the state courts under the exhaustion standards of
Picard, supra, 404

u.s.

at 275, 278,

Appellant's exhaustion of remedies argument is premised
on the notion that Goguen's behavior rendered him a hard
core violator as to whom the statute was not vague, whatever
~

its implications for those enga!Ped in different conduct.
we do not believe that this concept has much meaning in

ft-es•..J-

case.

There are statutes that by their terms or as

authoritatively contrued apply without ques~n to certain
activies, but whose application to other behavior
1{"-"'Q. u.,·e. ..,.~t.Jto-; k.v..wph fv\.C>l.I{Q. s~ w(tt, lf'-U~ ·1-o .~o, ..:Jfv~.
is uncertain./\,,···· But that's not this statute. This criminal
provision is vague "not in the sense that it requires a
person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensi•
ble normative standard, but rather in the sense that .no
standard of conduct is specified at all,l"
of Cincinatti, 402

u.s.

611, 614 (1971).

Coates v. City
Such a statute

12..

simply has no core.
standard for

The absence of an ascertainable

inclusion and exclusion is precismly what

offends the Due Process Clause.

~

Such a deficiency is particular}

objectionable in vie1v of the unfettered

~Dia

thereby

latitude

~~-

accorded law enforcement officials and triers of fact.
Where this problem exists and until it is corrected al either
by amendment or · judicial construction, it affects all who are
prosecuted under the statutory language,
problem exists in this case.

In our

opinio~

the

The language at issue is . .

void for vagueness as applied to Goguen because it
subjected him to criminal liability under a standard so
indefinite that police, court and jury were free to react

rto·f.<.t~~ (\W\Q. ~
toAtheir own preferences for treatment of the . . flag.
Turning from the exhaustion point to the merits of
the vagueness question presented, ap~llant argues that any
v
notice difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow subject
/\

..-:\_

'

matter of the statulte, "acfll:Ual" flags of the United States.
v
\:,;

'd-1

Appel~ant contends that this "takes some of the vag~ness
away from the phrase, 'treats contemptuously' •••.• "

~

Anyone

who "wants notice as to what this statute c proscribes, • • •
immediately

knows that it has something to do with flags and ·

if he wants to stay clear of violating this [l statute, he
stay clear of doing something to the
United States flag,"

,')3

Apart from the ambiguities presented by

~~

'

the concept of ' an "actual" flag, we fail to see how this
alleged particularity

s·

resolve~

the

cen~ral

vagueness

question--the absence of any standard for defining
~IIIII!CII

contemptuous treatment.

Appellant's remaining arguments
unavailing.

are~equally

--· - · ·-· ----- ------------a:--- --------------------t;· crim· ttr1iability under standard/ so
/
and t,~.."'tifere

/
own

indefinite that the police

/~ . ~-~

~~- ~/

.
~

fre;_;~~~~""
ress es~ia.1ly noth~~·gJ.Ofe than~i

//
pref7~s for treatm~

/fl''

/

of the flag./

.

~Appellant's.~~-./
arguments to the contrary are
(I

I

*=;.a:!:=tl:2m._ that the first six words of the statute add specificity
"A

1\
0'
Hjj2l

to the
..;itt

"t~eat s

contemptuously" phrase)
"' '

Massachus etts Supreme Judicial

e

~ '" • ,.0 I :::..st&..

Cour~atel.dtil M £' '''"'

d~8i'Y

it h

C U!.~-o 1'11 ~,;~_..7 4J·vV.SfrW24
in4Hn~eta.fiii!M

sf

@81\8trtt~lt.generallanguage

to take on color from

more specific accompanying language. But it is conceded that Goguen
was convicted under the general phrase alone, and that the highest
Q.\'\~

state court Gapt.:m•• did not rely onl\lfal·• • • general-to;)~

specific principle of statutory interpretation in this case. Appellant
·~IA-v4.1.......; \-

~,argue s

that the Supreme Judicial Court

in Goguen's case

ha..s.
A restricted

,2(,

the scope of the statute to intentional contempt. Aside

from the pr oblems presented by an appellate court's limiting
construction in the very case in which a defendant has bem tried

~1
under a previously unnarrowed .statute, this

sti~l

whether intentional or inadvertent.

la..v-'1 ~-i:J
JT

c
r
1

does not

Finally, appellant argues that state law
enforc ement auttf.t9ities have shO\vn themselves ready to
interpret this penal statute narrowly and that the statute ,
properly read, reaches only direct, immediate contemptuous
acts that "actually impinge upon the phtsical integr ity of
the flag. • • • " There is no support in the record fo r t he
[)9;
former po~nt. Similarly, nothing in the . state court is
opinion in this case or ina any earlier opinion of tha·t
· · ·court sustains the latter.

In any event~ Goguen was char ged·

only under the wholly open-ended language of public l y
treating the flag "contemptuously."

There was no

allegation of physical desecration.
There are areas of .f human conduct where, by the
nature

of the problems presented, legi slature s

simply cannot establish standards with great preci s i on.
Control of the broad range of disorderly conduct that may inhibit a policemant in the performance of his offic ial dut ies
r€4""~~ ~ ~ Jo~ OM. lJl". -Ttu. - spt>f- ~e~·v~ t·f.. 7~ J~LR..u.i. /c. I~ :t1cA?>t,
may be one such area, A Cf., Colten v. KentuciQy, 40 7 u. s.
lf" t '(,<C•L

.104 {1972).

But there is no

comparabl~,_...

for committ i ng

broad discretion to law enforcement officials in the area of
flag contempt.

Indeed, be~se display of· the fla g is so

common and takes so many forms, changing from one generaft
.... ion
.

to ·another and often difficult to 4 distinguish in pr inci ple ,
a legislature should define with some care the flag behdv ior

....

/•.>

it means to

ou t law ~

Certainly nothing prevents a l egis latur e

from defining with substantial specifi'city what constitutes
d-Cf

forbidden treatmen t of United States S flags.

The state' s

at issue requires invalidation of Goguen's conviction.

:tV

/I

Although we hold the , .. . . . . . . .._. treats
.

contemptuously " phrase void for

'

vaguen~ss,

•

•

t

·'

•

we do not

address in this c ase the statute's first six words or its
~C>

commercial misuse provisions,

In light of the unive rsal

adoption of flag contempt or desecration _statutes by the

..

Jt

federal • and s tate governments, we further emphasize that
we do not hold

that the due process vagueness doctr ine

invalidates all s uch statutes,

Insofar as that doctri ~

is concerned, the validity of these statutes will depend on
their particular language, judicial construction, and
enforcement

history.~ Finally,

as noted earlier, we ' do not

deal here with the question Whether the Massachusetts fl ag

evvvh--o.. ue-'v\8S
misuse

statute~~a•r.-~·•·.aaa-.....
w.i&=2f~~~~~.~~!l~la

Amendment.

13

the Fir st

Insofar as the judgment below rests on the

doctrine of vaeuenes s, it is affirmed,
It is so ordered,

~

/.
NOTES

1•

No. 72-1254

Smith v. Goguen

~

The record consists solely of the amendDed

v

bill of exceptions Goguen filed in the Massachusetts
Suprmme Judicial Court, the opposing briefs before that
court, the complaint under which Goguen was prosecuted, and
Goguen's petition for federal habeas corpus.
.,~-

.,, .

Appendix 1-38,

A We do not have a trial
. . transcript,. although Goguen's
amended bill of exceptions briefly summarizes some of the

·· ·

· t0

4;,/-/,.l~~·.sc·'>' .ft.··, "'tk.. {'i· ~se(_..,)~.;_

testimony givenAat his state trial.
stand.

Goguen did not take the

Thus we do not have of record his account of what

transpired at the time of his arrest or of what his purpose
was in displaying a flag on his pants.

2.

Trans. Or. Arg. S-6, 35-36.

2.

J.

Hass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 264,

§5 (1971).

Omitting

,

several

sentences protecting the ceremonial activi)\es of

'

certain veterans groups, the statute read at the time of
Goguen's arrest and conviction as follows:

~ 5 _ Flag; JlL'llllltY for misuse
, "'horvrr publiPIY mutilnt•·~. tramtllcs
111'011. dPfar·t·s or tn•ats •·ontcmptuously
the flng . of the ~nitecl :'\tatrs. or of
;'.lnssnchusl'tts, wh~1er Sll(:h flag lH llll.b·
lie: or privatl' protll'rty, or who~n·r <~IS·
. , , or 1111 ,. r<'t•n·sPntntwn
p I:I)'S HI!ell 11' 1M
·'
•
tht•n•of upon whic-h are words, flgurt's,
:~clv('rtiscmcnts or cl<'~i{:ns, or whoever .
1'1\ll~<'s or Jl<'rlllits sn<'h flag to he usee!
in 11 pamdl' aR 11 rec·q>tnc·lc for tic·
positing or c·ollf'l'tin;: lllOIIP)' or nny
other nrtidc or thing, or whoi'Yrl' ex·
JlOSPs
to puhlic: view, mnnufndnrcs,
!wlls, "xpnsc•s for sale•, gin•s :~wny or
hns in 1111 ssc•ssion for sale! or to 1,;1\'l' ll\~ny
or for liSt' for llll.l' purpose, any nrtH:Ie
Ol' suhstnll<'<', ht•ing an artic-le of m~r
Phnnclis<' or a n•c·l'pf·ndc of uwrc·htllHhse
or nrt it-h·s upon whic·h is n~tnP\I(•tl,
thi'On:;h n wr:tppinl! or otherwise•, en·
.:r:wt·•l or printt~cl in :my manner, II rep·

. tntion of the llnitt>•l StntcR f\ng,
rt>S('Il •
t t'
of
or whol'YCI' uses rmy reprt!SCII a lOll
tht! nrnls or the grrat sl'a~ ~f the t'Olll·
monw<'nlth fur nny ncln•rtlslllg _or t·om·
.
. , s·I ,,·Ill be JHIIIISIJC<l hy
11\CI'<'llll
purpose'

n fine of not lt·s~ tltnH t<'ll ~or ~norc
thall one ltnnclre<l cloll:lrs tll' hy 11\l!ll'lSOll·
mcnt for not morr than one ~·ear, or
hoth.
\\'orcls, fi)!:llr<·s, n<ht•rttscnlt'l~ts
or tlt>sigll~ at t:wlu•cl to, or clirc•<·tly or Ill·
tlirc•dly c·onlw<'IP<l with, Slll'h flag Ol' nn~·
reprt·~<'Ht:ltion t\tt'I'Pilf ill stwh 111:11\l.lCT
that snt·h flag Ol' its ~<'Jircst>ntatton
is usrtl to nt t rac1i ntt.•nt lOll to or ~tl
Vl\rt ise sul'lt \Y4Htls. lig-n res, ndvt:rttxc·
nwnts Ill' •\cosigns. shall fol' t lu' Jill I' !lOses
o( this st•d ion ht> cl<'<'lll<'tl to he upon
stwh flag.

/

3.
The statute is an ama lgam of provisions dealing with ftj flag
c::::=maf'\.in general (the first twenty-six words) and with commercial
m isuse or exploitation of flags of the state and national government in
(olvfevu-f

particular.
statute.

This case concerns only thet\

+portion of the

In 1971, subsequent to Gogue~'s prosecution}hat portion of

the s tatute was amended twice. On March 8, 1971, the legislature,
per st. 1971, C. 74, modified the first sentence by inserting ''burns
or otherwise" between the terms "publicly" and "mutilates, " and,
in addition, by increasing the fine.
§ 5

Mass. Gen. · Laws. Ann. ch. 264,

( 1973 Supp.). On August 12, 1971, via St. 1971, C 655, the

le gis lature appended a new sentence defining ''the flag of the Unf . }
State s" phrase appearing in the first sentence: "For the purpose of this
section the term 'flag of the United States' shall mean any flag which
has been designated by Act or Resolution of the Congress of the
United States as the national emblem, whether or not such a designation
is currently in force. " Ibid.

The 1971 amendments are relevant

to this case only in the tangential sense that they indicate a recognition
on the part of the legislature of , th.e need to tighten up this . -

'-/.

4.

Perhaps this was because of the difficulty of the question

whether Goguen's conduct constituted physical desecration of the
flag.

Cf., Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d at 91, n. 4 ( ". . .

[w ]e are not so sure that sewing a flag to a background clearly affects
~·-'-physical

integrity. "')

.· . . . . .
.
6. Appellant correctly conceded at oral argument that Goguen's

. ·...

c ease was the first recorded Massachusetts court reading of the
}:statutory language under which Goguen was convicted. Trans. Or.
:· Arg. - 17-18. Indeed, the entire statute has been essentially devoid of
_:estate court interpretation.
~- of

There is one turn-of-the-century reading

one of the commercial misuse provisions of the statute, but that

~ case

has no relevance here.

Commonwealth v. R. I. Sherman Manu. Co.,

: 189 Mass. 76, 75 N. E. 71 (1905).

7.

The elements of the void for vagueness doctrine have been

developed in a large body of precedent from this Court.
categorized

in~·~'

The cases are

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109

(1972.). See, Amsterdam, "The Void-for Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court," 109 U. Pa.L. Rev. 67 (1960).
8.

E.~.,

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156,

162 (1972); Lanzetta v. · New Jersey, 306 U.s. · 451, 453 (1939):
"No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or
property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes. All are entitle·d to be informed as to what
the ~tate commands or forbids. "(citations omitted);
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (19 32):
"
. · [A] statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must ·necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential
of due process of law. " (citations omitted).

a

•

~)
f\ Grayned, supra, 408 U.S. at 108j See a-lae .!!!• J a.t

United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89

*'

~- 4)--

(1921)

( ". . . [T]o attempt to enforce the section would be the exact equivalent
of an effort to carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized and
'·

punished all acts detrimental to the public. interest when unjust and
unreas onable in the estimate of the court and jury. "); United States
• "r_

v.

•

•

•

••

•

••

••

• •

• •••

•• •

•

:' .-• . •

Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) ("It would certainly be dangerous

if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible

offenders, and leave it to the courts to -

step inside and say who

c~uld be rightfully detained, and who. could be set at la~-~~. ;,}~: :
.

..

.:.

'~

.. .

... . .
~

I

;.
1D.

a
109;

E. g. , GrayHed ...~~
- )

§.m!!!:l v.

supra, 408 U. S. at

California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). Compare the less

stringent requirements of the modern vagueness cases dealing with
•

purely economic regulation. ~· ~·,

United States v. National ~'\....
~T

. Prcx:l. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) (Robinson-Patman Act).
II·

a

See n. 6, supra.

1~.

a

Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev. · 1040, 1056 (1968).

13.

Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 F.Supp. at 166.

fti
Ja:L

Amsterdam, supra, 1'09 U. Pa."L.Rev. at 8J, n. 79.

IS

IL.

Goguen v. Smith, §Epra, 471 F.2d at 90, n.2.

See

note J, supra.
lb

••

See note 6,

Q ~pra.

The

.A

portion of

the Massachusetts statute seems to have lain fallow for
almost its entite history.

There apparently have been a

half dozen arrests under this part of the statute in recent
years, but none of them has led to r ecorded court opinions.
Trans. Or. Arg. 28.

In 1968, a teenager in Lynn, Massachusetts

was charged, apparently under the present statute, with
desecrating the United States by sewing pieces of it into
his trousers.
1.

New York Times, August 1, 1968, p.

)1,

col.

The teenager was ordered by a state district court to

prepare and deliver an essay on the flag.

The court continued

the case without a finding, depriving it of any precedential
value.

17

...

E.g., United States v. 37 Photosraphs, 402

J6J, 369 (1971).

11
~.

Reply Brief 4.

u.s.

q ...

The District

Co~rt

decision in this case wa s

entered subsequent to Picard, supra.

Yet it appears that

appellant d i d no t raise his present exhaustion of remedies
argum~:""nt

be for e that

court.

The District Cour t

commented s pecifically on this omission:

"No cont ent ion

is now made that [Goguen] has not exhausted state r emedies,
r1or

tha t the constitutional issues presented her e

·were not r a ised appropriately in state proceedings . 11

...
JD
8--0.

ll

Goguen filed in state • • • • Superior Court an unsuccessful
I

k.e cd·e.d
motion to dismiss the complaint in which,._the Fourteenth Amendment
and alleged that the statute under which he was charged was "impermissibly
·-'

•'

.

vague and incapable of fair and reasonable interpretation by public
~' f

~ ..

officials. " Appendix 1. This
bioatilstsss:pp

1

motion,.......,.il~.(!lll·#lltdll•m•••·llillr~,~~rlilll?ilii?IW2illli,_11=:•~&i=hlllllilifiuw.nl6lfl·y

ta 5 u·a1 dE wm=+i""!MiiitJOsdrd'

~

wasalso

before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, since it was
.....; ~ .-

.

_

.

~

.

incorporated in Goguen's

amende~

bill of exceptions. Ibid. In

addi~on, Goguen's brief before that court raised vagueness points and
cited vagueness cases.· Id., at 19, 26-27, citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
( u._ 0

jJ',( . I Cj IJJ

306 U.S. 451 (1930), and Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 58~~( 1J,ree J "'-<-~t {..()L"t·f)

Cbt-\.~e~u-r ·I-

(){J t~)

·krr

/.)(!1!-<.f'LA..(- .(<;

statute,,-...am'JJ:>; izrlliiJliiiHI§&C

1\(North Carolina flagt-:
c:~ Oi.~~~,L -, c~).
aatl;J;Uan:ae~aoogp)ipsq

C). Appellant is correct in asserting that Goguen

s-'-...lt.
failed to compartmentalize in

~

hi~brief

the due process SI<Mialtllli•

doctrine of vagueness and First Amel).dment concepts of overbreadth.
See Appendix 19-24. But permitting a degree of leakage between
those particular adjoining compartments is understandable. -Cf.,
Note, "The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, " 83 Harv. L. Rev.

II •

844, 871-875 (1970).

The highest state court's opinion, which dealt

.

~

.

s eparately with Goguen's First
_

c:.IAI ~.)

Amendmen~vagueness ~m;nn.,

Mass. at _ , 279 N. E. 2d at 667, indicates that that court was

well aware that Goguen raised both sets of arguments.

6l I.

\

••

....

Appellant's Brief 17; . Trans . Or. Arg. 9.

I

~roc

Trans. Or. Arg. 9.

~:>

•. Ibid.

;. t:f

a

At the time of

Goguen's prosecution, the

statute referred simply to 1 'the flag of the United states . . . , " with out
further definition.

That raises the obvious ·question whether a 6-oJ"'-eCA.' s

·:ff.

minature cloth flag constituted "the flag of the United states. .
A

n

Goguen argued unsuccessfully before the state courts that the statute
a pplied only to flags that met "official standards" for proportions,
such as relation of height to width and the size of stripes and the
field of stars, and that the
standards.

I

cloth he wore did not meet those

Trans. Or. Arg. 11-12, 24-26; Appendix 2.

Ther e was
'

.\I

\

1

no dispute that Goguen's adornment had the requisite number of stars
and stripes and colors. Trans. Or. Ag.· 11-12. · The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court found Goguen's cloth flag to be covered by
the

statute, noting that "[t] he statute does not require that the

flag be 'official"' Commonwealth v. Goguen,
279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972).

Mass.

_, ·---'

The lower federal courts did not addres s

this holding, nor do we~ We note only that the Massachusetts legislature apra rently sensed an ambiguity in this respect, becaus e
1~

.Sllbse quent to Goguen's prosecution it amended the

"'-''

e+=k-.--1-

statut~ to

define

what it had meant by the "flag of the United states. " ._See n. 3,
supra.

--

2~

a

The Massachusetts court commented simply that "[t ~1e

jury could infer that the violation was intentional without reviewing
any words of the defendant." Commonwealth v. Goguen,
279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972).

Mass.

Thus, the court held that

the jury could infer int ent merely from Goguen's conduct. This is

f&lll: apparently also a holding that the jury !!ll!§.t find contemptuous
intent under the statute, although the requirement amounts to very
little since it is so easily satisfied. The court's reference to verbal
communication reflected Goguen's reliance on Street v. New York,
394

u. s.· 579 (1969).
d-7,

a

~· ~·,

Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 198 (1966).

1'-l . .

WHh r e rr,a.rd to prose cutorial policies, appellant c ites
'fV\ M

tw o published opinion s of the

$ C.. c,., 1-t k.J

efi .J

~)\Attorney

GBneral.

4 Ops. of

Att,' Gen. 470 (1915) (Rcrr:roduced at Appellant's Brief 30); Rep ort
of Atty. Gen., Pub. Doc: No. 12, p. 192 (1968) (Reproduced at
Juris. Statement App. 53).

Appellant concedes that neither deals

Cbi!V+-e~+-·

with t he

portion of the statute under which Goguen was

11

· TV!~::., ~ ~e

""""+- ,~ po~..vl' ~. ~ f''rO~l~..J !J~;t.Pa...Gt. lc

c onvicted.['ftevertheless, appellant

fscorrect that they

r\o

~~

q....

show a

~

\"Clev-..(l
.-4

I"

~

+to:J.vhY..(

)AA.J~(..

t endency on the part oftheftate Attorney General to read"~

re.Cieclportions of the statute narrowly.· At the same time, they,...._ t he

k.d( o6 prew~ re.c..~~ ~v~4...:1- t4..t. flA.Al.StA.~dittf.r .f!fr.::;; ,.....~~.~
~us-~~~·x:ob-l-em-&-:in-4~fi~He,!tatute .

'The

1915 opinion noted that one portion of the statute, prohibiting
exhibition of engravings of the flag on certain article spa'

wo~l
read literallJA make it a criminal offense to display the

a_

:i.f

C'St~

flag itself "in many of its cheaper and more common forms. "
Appellant's Brief 31-32.
Id., at 32.

This would be a "manifest absurdity 1 \

The 1968 opinion advised that a flag representation

,,

,,

pai:lted on a door was not a flag of the United States within the
meaning of the statute.

Juris. Statement App. 53-55.

A contrnry

IS' .

interp retation would "raise serious questions under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments . . . , " given the requirement that belft~Hor
made criminal must be "plainly prohibited by the language of the
statut e. " Id. , at 54.

:t-1
•·

The federal flag desecratioT(jttute, for example,

reflects a Congressional purpose to do just that.

In response t o a

warning by the United states Attorney General that the use of such

'' ~ef a'es ~'
unbounded terms as At:, . :.
or "casts contempt . . . either by
~-

word or act" is "to risk invalidation" on due process 8J grounds,
S. R.ep. No. 1287, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 350,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967), the bill which became the fede ral
statute was amended, 113 Cong. Hec. 16449, 16450 (1967)>to r each
only acts that physically damage the flag.
of the statute, 18 U. S.C.

§

The desecration provision

700(a), declares:

"(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any
flag of the United states by publicly mutilating, defacing,
defiling, burning, or trampling upon it shall be fined
not more than $1, 000 or imprisoned for not more than
one year, or both. ''
The legislative history reveals a clear desire to r~h only defined

1118 physical acts of desecration. H. R. Rep. No. 350, supra, at
3 ("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful, not
accidental or inadvertent public physical acts of desecration. ") )
S. Rep. No. 1287, sup@, at 3 ("The language of the bill prohibits
\

\

public physical acts of de sec ration of the flag. ") The act has be en
•

--

so read by the lower federal courts, which have upheld it against
vagueness challenges.

.,

4o?

{\

......,_..

( CA0~ cert. den.

--

United States v. Crosson, 462 F. 2d 96

.
u.s. . 1o6t/(197a
);
~

~

Joyce v.

United States, 454 F. 2d 971 (CADC 1971), cert. de~p.. 4c.s U.S.
I

~

••

;e>

&

See n. 3, supra.

ZI S.,....

V\ ' 1-~

.I()

~V'!!:- .

• · AAll fifty stat es have flag contempt statutes.

The statutes

are synopsized in Hearings on H. R. 271, et al, Before Sub. Comm.
No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 4, pt. III at 324-46 {1967).

The flag contempt statutes of most

.

states are patte rned after the Uniform Flag Act of 1917, which :SI '""
§

3 provides that:
"No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile,
defy, t r ample upon, or by word or act cast contempt
upon any such flag, standard, color ensign or shield. "

Compare)9B Uniform Laws Annotated 52-53 (1966) with Hearings on
H. R. 271, et al, supra, at 321-46. Massachusetts, which has one
of the "older flag laws, " Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 F. Supp. at
164, is among the handful of states that have not adopted the Uniform
Flag Act or a derivation.

19.

...

~q)

·. See cases cited n. II supra.
/'

- - - Some state flag contempt

s tatutes have been substantially narrowed by judicial interpretation.
E. _g. , State v. Royal,

N.H.

__,

305 A. 2d 676, 679 (1973)
0~~

(New Hampshire flag contempt statute reaches a "physical abuse type
1of acts • ... . ").

See gl§.Q, state v. Hodson, 289 A2d 635 (Del.

Super. 1972). Others have not and have not fared well in federal
~· ~,

c ourt.

Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (W. D. N.C. 1971)

~~-

(f_

~~k~Jf

judge court) (North Carolina flag

vagueness and overbreadth).

.

omJ!U>t!!Ei'v.

.

ee also, Long Island Vietnam Mo~ton

.
. . ~
jj.~ ~4
~437 F. ~4{1!i7o), cert. <;len~
U.S.

~
/ -·
~w Yorkp.atnte). Cf.,

7

1084

statute void for

(DhO)

Cr

~ --

sr::::v. Silver

"/,

19 F. $nl>p.

(3 judg court) (Arizon statute)./

'

20.

w

33. We are aware,of course,of the First Amendment questions
wrapped up in the flag contempt controversy. The Court of Appeals dealt
with the s e issues at length. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d at 96-105.
See, -~ .~., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 579 (1969);

Thayer, "Freedom

of Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Crime of Flag Thsecration," '
12 Ariz . L. Rev. 71 (1970); Note, "Developments in the Law - the National

,.

Security Interest .and Civil Liberties, " 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1138-1141

'

(19'72); Note, 66 Mich. L . . Rev. 1040 (1968).

However, we think the slim

,.record in this case makes it inappropriate to consider Goguen's First
Amendment arguments. Goguen's counsel argued that Goguen was engaged
I '
I

r

in a "demonstration of one"'with a clear purpose to communicate. Trans.
Or . Arg. 36-37. The record does not back him up. Particularly in light
of Goguen's decision not to take the stand, we are left to speculate about
Goguen's purpose. Perhaps Goguen's goal was communication. Or perhaps
Goguen was engaged in nothing more than a thoughtless example of
conte mporary clothing fashion. The difficulty of the First Amendment issue
posed by flag contempt statutes counsels against deciding those issues in
a case where an alleged intent to communicate rests on such a frail factual
c./e{,~ . Jc.

foundation . We also find wisdom in Judge Hamley's

aversion · to t~:·DI8t

11

First Amendment issues where decision of them is unnecessary to resolutio1
of a c ase. 471 F. Supp. at 105.

MEMORANDUM
DATE: December 6, 1973

TO:

Mr. Jack B. Owens

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Goguen - Comment on Note No. 2
I doubt the wisdom of being as specific about the future action

of the Court

as note No. 2. The note also conveys to me a certain

self consciousness about not reaching First Amendment issues in this
case.
I would either omit the note or simply state something along the

following lines:
'We recently noted probable jurisdiction in Spence
v. Washington, No. 72-1690,
U.S.
(1973)
which may raise First Amendment questions more
specifically. "
I have not looked at the law review articlES cited.

they could be added to another footnote.
L. F. P., Jr.

ss

Perhaps

MEMORANDUM
DATE: December 6, 1973

TO:

Mr. Jack B. Owens

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Goguen- Comment on Note No. 2
I doubt the wisdom of being as specific about the future action

of the

~

as note No. 2. The note also conveys to me a certain

self consciousness about not reaching First Amendment issues in this
case.
I would either omit the note or simply state something along the

following lines:
"We recently noted probable jurisdiction in~
v. Washington, No. 72-1690, _U.s. _\I9'13}
which may raise First Amendment questions more
specifically. "
I have net looked at the law review articlES cited.

they could be added to another footnote.
L. F. P., Jr.

ss

Perhaps

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Jack B. OWens

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE: December 18, 1973

Smith v. Goguen
You will observe from Rider A, p. 10 that I have tried some
different language. I have no doubt that you can improve on my effort.
The next to the last sentence on page 10 speaks of the need
to define with reasonable precision "those exhibitions" the legislature
intends to proscribe. The word "exhibition" is appropriate to the facts
of this case, but it by no means encompasses the spectrum of flag

uses and abuses that are customarily included in statutes. Of course,
we are addressing only the "contemptuously" phrase. But I suppose
a properly drawn statute, portraying it in a grossly obscene tableau,
and the like. All of this might well be in addition to the words which
define (as does the federal statute) physical mutiliation or defilement
of the flag.
This is a difficult area, but I wonder whether a footnote would
be appropriate (keyed to the sentence in question} which leaves open
the type of situation I have just described?
L. F. P., Jr.

ss
cc: Mr. John C. Jeffries, Jr.

j)n.prmu <!fcurt ltf tfrt 'Jl;tttittlt j)btit&'
~a&'Jrittgflttt.

!9. <q.

2!l&fJl,~

C HAMBE RS OF

.JUSTIC E WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

January 8, 1974

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your opinion in

72-1254, Smith v . Goguen.

WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS

Mr . Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference

/

.iu:prtmt <!f~ud d tlft ~uitt~..itattg
J)'agfriughtn. ~. <!f. 2!lgt'!-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

January 9, 1974

Re: No. 72-1254, Smith v. Goguen
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.i~

<qottri ltf tlt't 'Jttittb .:itatts

~asftinghttt. ~.

<!f.

/

2ll~J.t.~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR.

January 10, 1974

RE: No. 72-1254 -Smith v. Goguen
Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your fine opinion in
the above.

And thank you for making the

changes in the last paragraph.

They make

clear what I thought was implicit.
Sincerely,
'

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

;/
,t:tl

f

,ju.prtntt <!foud of tlrt ~ttitt~ , ,jtN±ts

'IJa:sfrittgtttn. :!8. <!f.

2llbi'!~

CHAMBERS OF

January 10, 1974

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS f-'AL L

Re: No. 72-1254 -- Smith v. Goguen

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your opinion in this case.
Sincerely,

~~
T.M.
Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

.,

To }

.

.hJtrttttt <!fottri ttf tltt ~ttitt~ .itatts
'

._-asltht¢Mt. ~- ~· 2ll.;iJ.l.~
CHAMBERS OF

(

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

~

~

1

January 17, 1974

;

I"

Dear Lewis:
Re:

No. 72-1254 - Smith v. Goguen

I, too, shall very likely be in dissent in this case.

If

there is no writing, I shall appreciate your noting the following
at the end of your opinion:
"Mr. Justice Blackmun dissents.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

11

.iu:prttttt Q}ttttrlltf tqt ~b ~tafts
'JlasJringhtn.18. Qj:. 211,?'-J,;t
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

January 17, 1974

Re:

No. 72-1254 - Smith v. Goguen

Dear Lewis:
I shall very likely be in dissent in this
case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

.§nvrtntt Qfonrlttf tqt ~nittb .ihdte

-aelfi:ttgtlllt. ~.

<!f.

2Ll~'-"c1

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

January 17, 1974

Dear Lewis:
Re:

No. 72-1254 - Smith v. Goguen

I, too, shall very likely be in dissent in this case.

If

there is no writing, I shall appreciate your noting the following
at the end of your opinion:
"Mr. Justice Blackmun dissents.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

11

~u:.prtmt ~lllttt llf t4t ~nittP ~bdts

._aslrittghm. ~.

<If. 2llP:'1~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

February 28, 1974

Re:

No. 72-1254 - Smith v. Goguen

Dear Lewis:
Although I agree with Byron's concurring op1n1on on
the vagueness point, I do not agree with it on the constitutional protection accorded to one who sews a flag to the seat
of his pants, and therefore will undertake to write separately
in dissent on that issue.
I will try to get it done in
short order.
Sincerely,

[/.)tVJ/

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~u.pnmt

Q}autt af t4t ~mttb ~tws

'J!iasqi:ng~ ~.

<lf.

2Llgt'k~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

February 28, 1974

Re:

No. 72-1254 - Smith v. Goguen

Dear Lewis:
Although I agree with Byron's concurring op1n1on on
the vagueness point, I do not agree with it on the constitutional protection accorded to one who sews a flag to the seat
of his pants, and therefore will undertake to write .separately
in dissent on that issue.
I will try to get it done in
short order.
Sincerely,

~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

-~-,~-

-;"'"~··,.,.-.........---~-------~~..,......,------

ss

As new footnote 32, p. 16
Smith v. Goguen

3/4/74

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment of the Court,
addresses First Amenument issues t.hat we do not reach. The concurring opinion is premised on the assumptions that "the jury was
appropriately informed that the defendant, if he was to be convicted,
must have intended to treat the flag contemptuously; and the jury found
this to be the case. "

~~~

at __. These assumptions find no support

in the record. As counsel for appellant stated at oral argument, there
is not extant transcript of the jury instructions in this case.

Tr. Or.

Arg. 51. Thus, we.may only surmise that the jury was instructed in
a way that allowed them to convict Goguen because of what he attempted
to communicate, if he indeed had that purpose. Goguen's contentions
subsequent to his conviction that he was in fact engaged in communication are mere assertion. As Goguen's counsel conceded at oral
argument, there is nothing in the record defining what, if anything,
Goguen was attempting to express. Tr. Or. Arg. 37. This is due
in large measure to Goguen's failure to take the stand in his own

defense. See n. 1, supra.
The concurring opinion also would have us speculate, in the
absence of jury instructions, as to what the jury found. It may well
be that Goguen was attempting to communicate his contempt for the
flag and that the jury was instructed that such an intent to communicate
was an element of the offense. But the record before us supports

2.
neither of those assumptions. If we are to engage in speculation, there
are other assumptions that are certainly not implausible. As suggested
by the District Court, Goguen may have intended nothing more sinister

than an expression of "youth fashion and high camp • • • . " 343 F. Supp. ,

at 164. And the jury may have found that alone sufficient to justify
convietlcm.
In short, we do not reach Goguen's First Amendment arguments

for two reasons: ( n having found the challenged statutory language void
for vagueness, addressing further constitutional issues is unnecessary;
and (2) the skeletal record in this case affords a poor opportunity for
the careful consideration merited by issues of such importance.

.:J I

'*I

I <t.

Rider A, p. 16 (new footnote)
Smith v. Goguen

32. We have not addressed Goguen's First Amendment arguments
because, having found the challenged statutory language void for vagueness, there is no need to decide additional issues. Moreover, the
skeletal record in this case, see n. 1, supra, affords a poor opportunity for the careful consideration merited by the importance of the
First Amendment issues Goguen has raised. MR. JUSTICE WHITE,
concurring in the result, posits that "the jury was appropriately
informed that the defendant, if he was to be convicted, must have
intended to treat the flag contemptuously..•• " Ante, at __•
This assumption is the peemise for MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S conclusion
that Goguen was punished for what he communicated. But, as counsel
for appellant confirmed at oral argument, there is no extant record
of the jury instructions in this case. Tr. Or. Arg. 51.

March 15, 1974
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Smith v. Goguen

Dear Bill :
I have just read your dissenting opinion and, while I come
out differently in this case, I write to say that I greatly
admire the eloquence of your last few pages and, in terms of
my personal feelings, agree totally with your sentiments about
the flag.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss

;lttprmtt ~ourl .of tltt J'nif:tb' ~taft·
,raslfi:n\lhm. ~. ~· 2ll?~.;t
CHAMI!II!:RS

Or

March 22, 1974

THE CHIEF' .JUSTICE

Re:

72-1254 - Smith v. Goguen

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

lfp/ss
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No. 72-1254 SMITH v. GOGUEN

This case is here on appeal /fro~ the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit.
Appellee wore/ a small representation of the U.S. flag ~
on the seat of his trousers.

He was prosecuted under a

Massachusetts statute/ that subjects to criminal liability I
anyone who "publicly •

treats contemptuously the flag

-

of the United States."

Although other portions of the

statute deal broadly with misuse ' nd mutilation of the flag,

(__f

appellee was charged only with
"contemptuously".

treatin~, tfie ~la~

He was convicted and was sentenced to

6 months imprisonment.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the
conviction.

Thereafter,

Ia federal District Court found

the statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and
granted a writ of habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeals

affirmed.
We agree with

both~ the

of Appeals that the contempt

District Court and the Court
~ortion

of the statute is

void for vaguenes ~under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

The statute, whose sweeping

language has never been narrowed by the state courts,

)

2.
affords inadequate warning of forbidden conduct.

Moreover,

it leaves police, courts and juries ,.fre~ ~o prosecute and
to impose criminal liabilit~on little more than their own
preferences for treatment of the flag.
Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals.

Mr. Justice White has filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment.

Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist have filed

dissenting opinions, in which the Chief Justice has joined.

AprU 8, 1974

HOLDS FOR SMITH v. GOGUEN, No. 72-1254

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONF:£RENCE:
Two eases have been held for No. 72-1254, Smith v.
Goguen. They are No. 72-1359, Heffernan v. Thoms, and No. 72-1439,
Van Sl~ v. Texas. Both are schedUled for review at the Aprill2,
1974 C erenee. Heffeman was also held for Steffel v. Thompscm,
No. 72-5581, and is discussed at pp. 3-4 of Bill Brennan's memo to
the Conference on the Steffel holds. I wlll vote to continue to hold
both eases.
No. 72-1359 Heffernan v. Thoms ( Cert to CA 2)
In this ease, respondent owned a vest fashioned from a
U.s. flag which he desired to wear as an aet of symbolie protest.
He brought a § 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against the COIUleetteut flag defUement statute, which forbids placing
extraneous materials oo the flag and subjects to erimlnalliabUtty
anyone who ''publicly misuses, muttlates, tramples upoo or otherwise
defaces, defiles or puts indignity upoo'' aU. s. flag. The District
Court declared the statute uneonstttutlonal but did not issue an
injunction. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The ease dUfers from Smith v. Goguen in two ways.
One, there was no e rimlnal proseeuttcm. RiSp(iident has not been
subjected to erimlnalllablltty, as was Goguen. In that posture, the

-2-

lack of clarity in the state statute goes more directly to the
possibility of "chilling" expression-- L e., to First Amendment
overbreadth-- than to selective enforcement and criminal penalties
without warning -- L e. , Due Process vagueness. Two, the parties
and the lower federiicourts barely touched m the vagueness
doctrine. They addressed themselves almost exclusively to First
Amendment overbreadth. In Smith, by comparism, both lower
federal courts and both patties fUlly ventilated the vagueness issue.
The District Court in Heffernan held the statute invalid
under the First Amendment withoUt mentioning the vagueness doctrine.
The Court of Appeals declared that the statute "is overly vague, " but
did not develop the point and appears to have relied primarily on First
Amendment overbreadth. The petition (by the state) does not address
vagueness at all; the state seems to read the lower federal court
opinions as turning exclusively on overbreadth. The response
closes with a parting shot on vagueness but is devoted almost entirely
to the steffel issue and to the First Amendment. To the degree that
respondent touches oo vagueness, ,be does not distinguish it from his
principal argument that the statute is overbroad under the First
Amendment.
In short, in light of the way the parties and the lower
federal courts have treated it, Heffernan is not controlled by
In my view, it should be heltl for Sj)!nce v. ~ashington, No. 7 -16 0,
where the issue is overbreadth.

crsu;n.

No. 72-1439 VanSlyke v. Texas (App. from Tex Ct. Crtm. App.)
VanSlyke burned aU. s. flag, after he had blown his nose
on it and feigned an act of masturbation by rubbing the flag against
himself. He was prosecuted under a Texas statute that subjects
to crim:tnalltabiltty anyone who shal!. "publicly or privately mutilate,
deface, defile, defy, tramp upon, or cast contempt upon" aU. s. flag.
He was charged, and the jury was iistructed, essentially tn the

- 3-

language of the statute. He moved to quash the indictment on
vagueness grounds. He appears to have preserved the point at the
Texas Ct. of Crlm. App., and he sets it out in his jurisdletlonal
statement. The motion to affirm also addresses the issue.
The case is like Smith v. Go~en in that the vagueness
issue has been dealth with by all concerne and in that the Texas
statute is stated in the disjunctive and, presumably, permits
prosecut1011 solely for ca,nln
. g cootempt on the flag. But there the
slmllarJty ends. Van Slyke ,was charged under the full langUage
of the statute, which encompasses acts of physical desecra.tim,
in which he obviously engaged. Furthermore, unlike the Massachusetts
statute, the Texas statute has been significantly narrowed by the
state.eou:rts. For example, 1n Deeds v. states, 474 s. w. 2d 718
(1972 ), * the highest state court rejected a vagueness challenge to
the statute at issue in Van S~e and held it applicable to flag
burning, one of the acts lor k.h Van ·Slyke was prosecuted. In
Delorme v. State, 488 s. w. 2d 808 (1973), ** the highest state
court narrowed the statute by eliminating its appltcatim to private
acts and to spoken expression. In addition, the court n<ted that
the statute as construed has been reduced to language "similar to
that of the Federal Flag Desecration statute • • • • " 488 s. W. 2d at
811-812. SmJth v. Goguen leaves open to the states, insofar as the
vagueness doctrine is concerned, the possibility of narrowing broad
statutes by judicial constructim, and it points to the federal statute
as an example of a statute drafted to avoid vagueness problems.
It appears, in other words, that most of the vagueness
problems posed in Smith are not present here. Texas courts have

* This opinion came down a year prior. to the Texas Ct. of
Crim. App's opinim in Van Slyke's ease, although it was subsequent to
his prosecution.
** Prior to the affirmance of VanSlyke's eonvtctlon, but
subsequent to his prosedblion.

'

,;
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attempted to narrow the sweeping Texas statute, and VanSlyke's
behavior clearly violated the statute as narrowed. Thus, if
Van Slyke raised ooly vagueness issues, I would vote to dismiss.
However, since he raises Flrst Amendment arguments as well,
I think the case should be held for Spence.

L. F. P., Jr.

LFP/gg

CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 72-1254
Joseph Smith, Sheriff of
w·orcester County, On Appeal from the United
Appellant,
States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit.
v.
Valarie Goguen.
[January -, 1974]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Sheriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts, appeals from a judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit holding the contempt provision of the Massachusetts flag misuse statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Goguen v. Smith, 471
F. 2d 88, aff'g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass. 1972), prob. juris.
noted, 412 U. S. 905 (1973). We affirm on the vagueness ground. We do not reach the correctness of the
holding below on overbreadth or other First Amendment
grounds.
I
The ~ender record in this case reveals little more
than that Goguen wore a small cloth version of the
United States flag sewn to the seat of his~ The
1 Tho record consists solely of the amended bill of exceptions
Goguen filed in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the
opposing briefs before that court, the compJajnt under which Goguen~
,
was prosecuted, and Goguen's plltitign fqf federal habeas corpus
(.:lg.·hfl 01-\..- ~
Appendix 1-38, 42-43. We do not have a trial transcript, although
\
Goguen's amended bill of exceptions briefly summarizes some of the
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~woximately
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three by five inches QF £sen· ey siF-v;as eleal'l) visible to I'Htsset'f3b¥. On January 30,
1970, two police officers in Leominister, Massachusetts
saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. The first officer
encountered Goguen standing and talking with a group
of persons on a public street. The group apparently
was not engaged in any demonstration or other protest
associated with Goguen's appareJ.2 No disruption of
traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When thi.s officer approached Goguen to question him about the flag ,
the other persons present expressed their amusement.
Some time later, the second officer observed Goguen in
the same attire walking in the downtown business district of Lcominister.
The following clay the first officer swore out a complaint
against Goguen under the contempt provision of the
Massachusetts flag misuse statute. This provision then
read , in relevant part:

~mlfies,

"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon . defaces or treats contemptuously the flag of the
United States ... , '"hether such flag is public or
private property . . . , shall be punished by a fine
of not less than ten nor more than one hundred
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one
year, or both . . . . "a
tr~ tim o n~· ~i,· rn h~· witnr~~ r"

for the pro~rrution at. hi ~ ~ tate trial.
Gogurn clicl not tnkr the ~ta nd. Thn ~ wr do not haw on record his
nrrount of what tran ~ pired a t f he f imr of hi ~ nrre~t or of what his
purpo~r \\'M in di~playing n flag on hi ~ pant ~.
2
Tr. of Ornl Arg. 5-6, 35-36.
a l\fn~~. Gen . LnwR Ann. c. 264 . § 5 (1971) . Omitting Reveral
Arntenres prot ort ing t hr rrrrmoninl activit ir~ o f certain Ye1 rrans'
groups, the statutr read nt tlw tim e of Goguen's arrr;-;t and conviction ns follow~:
"§ 5. Flag; pcnnlty for mi ~mc
"Whoever publirl~r mutilnfc, , tramr1le~ upon , defnres or trcnts
contemptuously the fing of f he United States or of l\1nssnchusctts,
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Despite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was
not charged with any act of physical desecration.'' As
permitted by the disjunctive structure of the contempt
whrthrr surh flng is public or pri,·ntr proprrty, or whoever displays
~uch flag or any rrpre~entntion lhrreof upon which are word~, figurrs,
n,dvrrtisrmrnt~ or design~. or whoc,·er cn uHrs or permits ~uch flng
to be used in n par:1de n~ a recept nclc for depositing or collecting
monry or any othrr uri iclc or thing, or whorvrr rxposrs to public
Yirw, manufurture~, ~rlb, rxpo~cs for ~nlr, givr~ nwuy or has in
pos~r~~ion for ~nlr or to gi,·r nwny or for u~e for :my purJlOse, nny
n.rticlr or ~ub~tancr, bring an nrtirlr of mrrchandise or a rrcrptarlr
of mrrchnndi~e or a rticlrs upon which i~ attached, through n
wrapping or otherwi~r. enlJ:r:wrd or printrd in an~· mnnner, a representation of the United Statrs flag, or \Yhocvrr usrs any rrprcsentation of thr nrms or the great sral of thr commonwealth for any
achuti~ing or commrrci:-tl purposr, ~h:11l be puni~hrd b~· n finr of
not. le,;:;: than trn or morr than one hundrrd dollars or b~· impri:·mnmrnt. for not more than onr ~·rnr, or bot h. W"ord:;:. fignrrs, advcrtisrmrnt~ or designs n ttached to. or dirwll~· or indirectly conncctrd
with, ~uch flng or any n'pre~entation t hrrrof in ~uch mmmrr that
~uch flag or it~ rrpresrntntion is usrd to nttr:1rt attrntion to or
advrrtisc such word~. figurr~. ach-erti~rments or designs, shnll for
thr purpo. r~ of this section be dremrd to he npon such flng:."
The ~tntntr i~ :m amnlgnm of provi~ion~ draling with fl:lg contempt. in grnrral (the fir~t 2G word~) and with commNcial
misusr or rxploitntion of flngR of thr stntr :mel nnlionnl go,·rrnmrnt.
in particular. This cnse concrrns onl~r the contempt portion of the
statute. In 1971, subsertnent to Gogurn's prosrcution, that portion
of the ~tntute wn~ nmendrcl twice. On March R, 1971, tho lrgiRln-·
ture, per St. 1971, C. 74, modifird lhr first srntrnce bv inserting
"burn~ or othrrwisr" betwren the term:-: "publicly" and "mutilate~,"·
and, in addition, by incrrasing the finr. 1\'fa~,o;. Gen. Law~ Ann.
c. 264, § 5 (1973 Supp.). On August 12. 1971 , vi:-t Rt. 1071, C. G.55,
the lq~i~lnturr 11]1pendecl n nrw sentence defining "thr Ang of the
Unitrd Stntes" phrnse npprnring in the fir~t ~rntcnce: "For the
purposr of this srction thr trrm 'flag: or thr United Stntrs' shall
mean nny flag which ha8 11C'en de~ignntrd by Act or Rrsolution of"
the Congrrss of the Unitrd State~ ns t hr nnl ional emblem, whrther
or not ~uch a dr,.,ignation is currrntl.'· in forrr." Ibid. Thr 1971
nmendmrnts arc relcv::mt. to this case onl.v in the tangrnlial sense

[Footnote 4- is on 7J. 4-J
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provision, the officer charged specifically and only that
Goguen "did publicly treat contemptuously the flag of
of the Unit€d States. . . . ""
A jury convened in the \Vorcester County Superior
Court found Goguen guilty. The court imposed a sentence of six months in the Massachusetts House of
Corrections. Goguen appealed to the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed. Commonwealth v. Goguen, Mass. - , 279, N. E. 2d 666
( 1972). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness arguments with the comment that " [ w] hatever the uncertainties in other circumstances. we see no vagueness in
the statute as applied here." !d.,- Mass., at-, 279
N. E. 2d, at 667. The court cited no Massachusetts
precedents interpreting the statutory language under
which G-oguen was charged. 0
After Goguen began serving his sentence, he was
granted bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas
corpus by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343
that they indicatP a rPcognition on the part of the legislature of the
need to tighten up this imprecise statute.
4
Perhnps this was becau~e of the difficulty of the quPstion whethpr
Goguen's conduct constituted physical desecration of the flag. Cf.
Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d, at 91, n. 4 (" ... rwJe are not
so sure that sewing a flag to a background clearly affects 'physical
integrity.' ").
5 Appendix 4.
6 Appellant correctly conceded at oral argument that Goguen's
case was the first recordrd Massachusetts court rrading of the
statutory language undPr which Goguen was convicted. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 17-18. IndcPd, the entire statute has been essentinlly devoid
of sta te court interprPtation . There is one turn-of-the-century reading of one of the commercial misuse provisions of the statute, but
that case has no relevance here. Commonwealth v. R. I. Shennan
Manu. Co., 189 Mass. 76, 75 N. E. 71 (1905).
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F. Supp. 161. The District Court found the flag contempt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as overbroad under the First Amendment. In upholding Goguen's void for vagueness arguments, the District Court concluded that the words
"treats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily
ascertainable standard of guilt." I d., at 167. Especially
in "these days when flags are commonly displayed on
hats, garments and vehicles ... ," the words under which
Goguen was convicted "leave conjectural, in many instances, what conduct may subject the actor to criminal
prosecution." Ibid. The court also found that the
statutory language at issue "may be said to encourage
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Ibid.
A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed the
District Court in all respects. Goguen v. Smith, supra,
471 F. 2d 88. The Court of Appeals concluded that
"resolution of [Goguen's void for vagueness] challenge
to the statute as applied to him necessarily adjudicates
the statute's facial constitutionality . . . . " I d., at 94.
Treating as-applied and on-the-face vagueness attacks as
essentially indistinguishable in light of the imprecision
of the statutory phrase at issue, id., at 92, 94, the court
found that the language failed to provide adequate warning, failed to provide sufficient guidelines for law enforcement officials, and set juries and courts at large. I d., at
94-96. Then Circuit Judge, now Senior Circuit Judge
Hamley, sitting by designation from the Ninth Circuit,
concurred solely on void for vagueness grounds. I d., at
105. Judge Hamley thought the majority's extensive
treatment of overbreadth and the other First Amendment issues raised by Gougen unnecessary to the decision
of the case. Ibid.
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II

We agree with both lower federal courts that under
the due process doctrine of vagueness Goguen was entitled to federal habeas corpus relief. The settled principles of that doctrine require no extensive restatement
here. 7 The doctrine incorporates notions of fair notice
or warning. 8 Moreover, it requires legislatures to set
reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials
and triers of fact in order to prevent "arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." 9 '\Vhere a statute's literal
scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation,
is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First
The f'lemrnt~ of the void for Y:11!Uene~s dortrinr han been
deYcloped in n l:trl!e bodv of rercdcnt from th.is Comt. Thr cn~es
nrc categorized in e. g .. Gmynrd v. City of Rorl•fo1'd. 408 U.S. 104,
108-109 (1972). See Amsterdnm, "The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
in the Supremo Court." 10!) U. Pn. 1. Rev. 67 (1960).
8 E. g., Papach1'istou. v. City of Jacksonville. 405 U. 8. 156, 162
(1972): Lanzetta v. New Jr1'sey, :JOG U. S. 451, 453 (1939):
7

"No one mny he reCJnired nt peril of life, Iibert~· or proper(~' to
spcrulatr n8 to the mc:1ning of prnnl stntutcs. All nrc entitled to
he informed ns to what the Sinte romm::mds or forbid~." (Citntions
omiltrd.);

Connally

Y.

General Construction Co., 269 U. 8. 385, 401 ( 1932):

" . . . [A] ~tntutc which either forbid~ or requirrs thr doing of nn
net in term~ ~o 1·a~rue tlwl mrn of common intelligrnce must necr~
~arily guess nt it~ menninl! :mel diffrr a~ to its applirntion, violntrs
tho fir4 e~sentinl of due prores.'i of lnw." (Cilntions omitted.)
0 E. g., Gmyned, supra, 408 U. 8 .. nt 108:
United States v.
L. Cohen Grocery Co., 221) U. S. 81, 89 (1921) (" ... fT]o attE-mpt
to enforce the ~ection \\'otlid be the exnrt CCJUil·nlent of nn effort to
rat'!'~' out a Rtntule which in trrms merrl.1· pennlir.rd nnd punished
nil nrts detrimental to thr pnhlir in1·erest \\'hen nn.inst and nnrensonnblo in the e~tim:~tr of the court nnd jnr~r ."); United States v.
Reese. 92 U. S. 214, 221 (1 75) ("It would certain]~· be dnngerous
if the legislntme rould ~rt a net lnrge enongh lo rntrh all po~Hihle
offenders, and lcn\'C it to t hr romls to step in~idc nne! ~a~· who
conld be rightfully detained, nnd who could be set at lnrl!e.").

,~

0
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Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater degree of
specificity than in other contexts.' 0 The statutory language at issue here, "publicly ... treats contemptuously
the flag of the United States ... ," has such scope, e. g.,
Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969) (verbal flag
contempt), and at the relevant time was without the
benefit of judicial clarification. 1 '
Flag contempt statutes have been characterized as
impermissibly vague for lack of notice on the theory that
" [ w] hat is contemptuous to one man may be a work
of art for another." 12 Goguen's behavior can hardly be
described as art. Immaturity or "silly conduct" '" probably comes closer to the mark. But we see the force of
the District Court's conclusion that since the flag has become "an object of youth fashion and high camp ... ,"
it is by no means as likely as it might have been at
another time in this country's history that wearing a
miniature fiag on one's clothing constitutes criminal contempt. 343 F. Supp., at 164, 167. As both lower federal
courts noted, casual treatment of the flag in many contexts has become a widespread contemporary phenomenon. lb'id.; 471 F. 2d, at 96. Flag wearing in a day of
relaxed clothing styles may be simply for adornment or
nothing more than a ploy to attract attention. To be
sure, much of the tendency of youth in recent years to
wear unorthodox clothing reflects an intent to communicate disagreement with the conventions, manners, and
Yalues of their elders, as well as to express dissent from
E. g., Grayned, supra, 408 U. S., nt 109; Smith v . California,
361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). Compnre the less stringent requirements
10

of the modern vagtH'ne~" cn~rs dealing with purely economic regula-·
tion. E. g.. United States v. NationaL Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U. S.
29 (1963) (Robinson-Patmnn Act).
11 Sec n. 6, supra.
1
~ Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev . 1040, 1056 (1968).
10
Goguen v. Smith, su7n·a, 343 F. Supp., at 166.
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government policies and resentment against an unpopular war. But certainly in a time of widely varying attitudes and tastes for displaying something as ubiquitous
as the United States flag or representations of it, not
every unceremonial wearing or displaying of the flag
upon one's clothing can be said to constitute criminal
contempt. And, the statutory language under which
Goguen was charged fails to draw reasonably clear lines
between the many kinds of modern, nonchalant uses of
the federal flag. The classic vagueness cases require that
all "be informed as to what the State commands or
forbids ... ,"Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453
(1939), and that "men of common intelligence" not be
forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law.
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391
( 1932). Given today's tendencies to treat the flag carelessly, those notice standards are not satisfied in this
case.
The language under which Goguen was charged also
fails to meet the other principal requirement of the
vagueness doctrine. The vagueness concept of notice
often has a fictional flavor. 14 This is particularly so in_L@
noncommercial context, where as a general rule behavior
is not mapped out in advance on the basis of statutory
language. In such cases, perhaps the more meaningful
aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not true notice but
the requirement that a legislature establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement. In this regard,
the statutory language under scrutiny is notably deficient.
In its terms, the language at issue is sufficiently unbounded to prohibit, as the District Court noted, "any
public deviation from formal flag etiquette.
" 343
F. Supp., at 167. Enacted in 1899 and unchanged
14

Amsterdam, supra, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 83, n. 79.
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since/ 5 the "treats contemptuously" phrase was also·
devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the·
relevant time in this case. 10 We are without authority
to cure that defect. 17 Statutory language of such a
standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and
juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legisla-·
tures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting
the standards of the criminal law. E. g., Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 166-168 (1972). In
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 117, 120 (1969),
Mr. Justice Black voiced a concern that we share against
entrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat." The aptness of
Mr. Justice Black's warning is evident from appellant's
candid concession in oral argument before the Court of
Appeals regarding state enforcement standards for that
portion of the statute under which Goguen was convicted:
" ... [A]s counsel [for appellant] admitted, a war
protestor who, while attending a rally at which it
begins to rain, evidences his disrespect for the
American flag by contemptuously covering himself
with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be proseGoguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d, at 90, n. 2. See n. 3, supra.
See n. 6, supra. The contempt portion of the Massachusetts
statute seems to have lain fallow for almost its entire history. There
apparently have been a half dozen arrests under this part of the
statute in recent years, but none of them bas led to recorded court
opinions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. In 1968, a teenager in Lynn,
Massachusetts was charged, apparently under the present statute,
with desecrating the United States by o:ewing pieces of it into his
trousers. New York Times, Augu 't 1, 1968, p. 31, col. 1. The
teenager was ordered by a state district court to prepare and deliver
an essay on the flag. The court continued the case without a finding, depriving jt of any precedential value.
17 E. g., United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 369·
(1971).
15
16
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cuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a
member of the American Legion who, caught in the
same rainstorm while returning from an 'AmericaLove It or Leave It' rally, similarly uses the flag,
but docs so regrettably and without a contemptuous
attitude, would not be prosecuted." 471 F. 2cl, at
102.
Where inherently vague statutory language permits such
selective law enforcelllent, there is a denial of due process.

III
Appellant's arguments that the "treats contemptuously" phrase is not impermissibly vague, or at least
should not be so held in this case, are unpersuasive.
Appellant devotes a substantial portion of his opening
brief, as he did his oral orgument, to the contention that
Goguen failed to preserve his present void for vagueness
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Appellant concedes that the issue of "vagueness
as applied" is properly before the federal courts,'~ but
contends that Goguen's only arguable claim is that the
statut-e is vague on its face. The latter claim, appellant
insists. \ras not presented to the state courts with the
requisite fair precision. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270
( 1971). This exhaustion of remedies argument is belatedly raised ' 0 and it fails to take the full measure of
Goguen's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the
18 Rrpl~,

Brief 4.
District Court ckci~ion in thi~ ca~r \\'UH PntPrPd ~ub,cqu<'nt
to Picard. supra. Yet it appear~ thfil app<'llant did not rai"e hi:;
present exhan~tion of remedie:; :ugument befor<' that court. The
District Court commrnicd ~prrifically on thi~ omi~sion: "No contention is now made that rGogurn] hn~ not cxhan~tcd ~tate rrmccliCR,
nor thnt the con~titutional i~~ur~ prr~rntrd here \I'Crr not rniRed
npproprintely in ~tate proceedings." 3-1·3 F. Snpp., at 164.
1

n The
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state courts.~ 0 We do not deal with the point at length.
however, for "·e find the relevant statutory language
impermissibly vague as applied to Goguen. In light of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's explicit
holding on vagueness "as applied," Commonwealth
v. Goguen, Mass. - , 279 N. E. 2d 666, 667
(1972), and given appellant's concession. we have no
doubt that the "substance" of this claim was "fairly
presented" to the sta.te courts under the exhaustion
standards of Picard, supra, 404 U. S .. at 275, 278.
Appellant's exhaustion of remedies argument is premised on the notion that Goguen's behavior rendered him
a hard-core violator as to whom the statute was not
vague. whatever its implications for those engaged in different conduct. We do not believe that this concept has
filed in ~tntc Auprrior romt an un~urrcsRful motion to
thr romplnint in \rhirh hr citrd thr Fourtrrnth Amendment
and nllrg:cd thnt, thr stntute undrr whirh hr wns chnrg:rd wns "imprrmissibl~r Ynguc nnd inrnpnblr of fnir and reasonnble intcrpretntion
h~· publir officinls." Apprndix l. This motion wns ;ilso brforc 1hr
Mnssnchnsrtts Ruprrmr .Tudirinl Conrt, sinre it wnA inrorpornted in
Goguen's amenclrd bill of rxcrptionR. Ibid. In ncldition, Gognen's
brief before thnt Comt rni~ccl Yngurnrss points nnd cited vnguenrss
cnsrs. ld., nt 19. 25-27, citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey. 305 U. S.
4fil (1930), and Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (WD N. C.
1971) (thrC'e-juclge court) (North Cnrolim flag fl trmpt statute
void for YngurneRs nne! ovcrbrrnclth). Appellant is rorrE'c1 in assC'rting that Goguen fnilrd to compnrtm0nta lizc in his s1nte court brirf
the due proce~s clortrinc of vngnrncss nne! First Amrndm0nt concepts
of overbrmclth. Sec Appendix 19-24. But permitting n drgrrc of
lenkngr brtwcrn those pnrticubr adjoining compnrtments is understnndable. Cf. Note, "The Fir8t Amrndmrnt Ovcrbrradth Doctrine." 83 Hnrv. 1. Rrv. 844, 871-875 (1970). The highrst stntc
court'~ opinion, which drnlt separate]~' with Gogurn's Fir~t Amend-·
mcnt nnd Yaguencss rlaims,- 1\Ins~., nt - , 279 N. E. 2d, nt 557,
indicate~ that 1hat court was wrll awnrc that Gognrn f;lisrd both
sets of nrgumcnts.
20
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much meaning in the present case. There are statutes
that by their terms or as authoritatively construed apply
without question to certain activities, but whose application to other behavior is uncertain. Hard-core violator
concepts make some ~gard to such statutes. But
that's not this statute. This criminal provision is vague
"not in the sense that it requires a person to conform
his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard
of conduct is specified at all." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611. 614 (1971). Such a statute simply
has no core. The absence of an ascertainable standard
for inclusion and exclusion is precisely what offends the
Due Process Clause. Such a deficiency is particularly
objectionable in view of the unfettered latitude thereby
accorded law enforcement officials and triers of fact.
Where this problem exists and until it is corrected either
by amendment or judicial construction, it affects all who
are prosecuted under the statutory language. In our
opinion the problem exists in this case. The language
at issue is void for vagueness as applied to Goguen
because it subjected him to criminal liability under a
standard so indefinite that police, court, and jury were
free to react to nothing more than their own preferences
for treatment of the flag.
Turning from the exhaustion point to the merits of
the vagueness question presented, appellant argues that
any notice difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow subject matter of the statute, "actual" flags of the United
States. 21 Appellant contends that this "takes some of
the vagueness away from the phrase, 'treats contemptuously .... ' " 22 Anyone who "wants notice as to what
this statute proscribes ... , immediately knows that it
has something to do with flags and if he wants to stay
21
22

Appellant's Brief 17; Trans. of Oral Arg. 9.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 9.
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clear of violating this statute, he jmt has to stay clear
of doing something to the United States flag." 2 3 Apart
from the ambiguities presented by the concept of an
"actual" flag, 2 • we fail to see how this alleged particularity resolves the central vagueness question- the·
absence of any standard for defining contemptuous
treatment.
Appellant's remaining arguments are equally unavailmg. It is asserted that the first six words of the statute
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously" phrase,
and that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
customarily construes general language to take on color
from more specific accompanying language. But it is
conceded that Goguen was convicted under the general
phrase alone, and that the highest state court did not
rely on any general-to-specific principle of statutory
interpretation in this case. 25 Appellant further argues
23

Ibid.

At the time of Gogurn's prosecution , the statute referred simply
to "the flag of the United Stat es .. . ," without further definition .
That raises the obvious question whether Goguen's miniature cloth
flag constituted "the flag of the United Sta.tes . . .. " Goguen
argued un ~u ccess fully beforE' the st at e courts that the statute applied
only to flags that met "official standards" for proportions, such as
relation of heigh t to width and the size of stripes and the field of
stars, and that the cloth he wore did not meet those st andards.
Tr. of Oral Arg . 11-12, 24-26 ; Appendix 2. There was no
dispute that Goguen's adornment had the requisite number of stars
and stripes and colors. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found Goguen's cloth flag to be
covered by the statute, noting that " [t]he statute does not require
that the fla g be 'official'" Commonwealth v. Goguen, Ma ss. - ,
- , 279 N . E. 2d 666 , 668 (1972) . The lower federal courts did
not address this holding, nor do we. We note only that the Massachusetts Legislature apparently sensed an ambiguity in this respect,
because sub equent to Goguen's prosecution it amended the statute
in an effort to define what it had meant by the "flag of the
United States." See n. 3, supra.
2 5 Tr. of Oral Arg. 48.
24
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that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has
restricted the scope of the statute to intentional contempt.~r.
Aside from the problems presented by an
appellate court's limiting construction in the very case
in which a defendant has been tried under a previously
unnarro,Yed statute," 7 this still does not clarify what
conduct constitutes contempt. whether intentional or
inadvertent.
Finally. appellant argues that state law enforcement
authorities have shown themselves ready to interpret
this penal statute narrowly and that the statute. properly read. reaches only direct. immediate contemptuous
acts that "actually impinge upon the physical integrity
of the flag .... " "~ There is no support in the record
for the former point."" f\imilarly. nothing in the state
~"The M:1~~:1chu~etts romt commonird Rimp]~, th:1t "rtJhe jury
rould infer that the violation was intent ionr~l without reviewing any
words of the defendnnt." Commomrealth v. Goguen,- l\fa~R. - ,
- , 270 N. E. 2d 666, 6GR (1972). Thus, the court held that the
jury could infer intrnt mrrcly from Gognrn'R conclurt. This is
n.ppnrentl~' abo :1 holding t h:1t thr jur~' must find cont rmptuous
inirnt under thr ~tatutc, nlthough thr rr(]uirrmrnt ammmts to vrry
little ~ince it iR ~o ca~ih· ~ati~fircl. Thr court'~ rrfrrcnrr to Yerbnl
<"ommuniration reflrctrd. o cfrjen'~ reliance on St1'eet v. New York,
~94 U. S. 579 (1969).
~• E. g., Ashton v. Kenttttky, 384 U.S. 195, 19R (1966).
2R Appellant'~ Brirf 22.
2 u iVith regnrcl to J1l'O~rc·utori:il policie~, appl'llant rite~ t\\'o published opinion~ of the Mn~~nchu~rtt~ Attorney Grneral. 4 Ops. of
Att. Orn. 470 (HJ15) (Rrprocltwed at Appellnni'~ Brirf 30): Rrport
of Att)'. Gen., Pub. Dor. No. 12. p. 192 (190R) (Rcproduced a.t
Juri~. Statement App. 5:3). Apprllnnt ronrede~ that nriihrr de:ils
\\'ith the contempt 11ortion of the ~1 nt utr nndrr "·hirh Gognrn waR
rmwirted. Tim~. i hry n rr not in point herr. They proYided
guidnnre to no one on the rrlrnmt Rtatutory lnngnnge. N rvrri hele~s, np]1elbnt i~ rorrert that iher ~ho\\' a tendenr~· on thr part of
the state Attornry Genernl io rrad other portionH of the statute
nnrrowly. At the same time, they reflect the lark of preci~ion
recurring throughout the l\1as~arhusett~> flag misuse statute. The
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court's op1mon 111 this case or in any earlier op11110n of
that court sustains the latter. In any event, Goguen
was charged only under the wholly open-ended language
of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously." There
was no allegation of physical desecration.
There arc areas of human conduct where. by the nature
of the problems presented. legislatures simply cannot
establish standards with great precision. Control of the
broad range of di~orcler]y conduct that may inhibit a
policeman in the performance of his official duties may
be one wch area. requiring as it docs an on-the-s~
assessment of the need to keep order. Cf. Coltfo: v.
'-.::....~
Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972). But there is no comparable reason for committing broad discretion to law
enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt.
Indeed. because display of the flag is so common and
takes so many forms. changing from one generation to
another and often difficult to distinguish in principle, a
legislature should define with some care the flag behavior
it means to outla''"· CPrtainly nothing prevents a legislature from defining with substantial specificity what
constitutes forbidden treatment of UnHccl States flags.an
1915 opinion notrd that one portion of thr ~tatutr. prohihitin~
rxhibition of cn~r::l\·in~s of the nn~ on crrtnin articlrs if rrmllitcrally
would make it. H rrimina.l offrnsr to displny 1 hr fia~ itself "in many
of its cheaprr :mel more common forms." Ap]wllant 'R Brirf 31-32.
This would bo a "manifrst ab~mdit~·." !d., at 32. Thr 1968
opinion ::1dvi~cd that a~ rrpre~rn a 1011 pamtrcl on a door was not
"a fia~ of thr United Statr~" within thr mranin~ of the statute.
Juris. Statrmrnt App. 53-55. A contrary in1Nprctation would
"rai~e serious qurstions unclrr the Fir~t and Fomtcrnth Amendments . . . ," gi\·cn the rrquirrmrnt that brh:wior maclr crimin::1l
mu~t he "plainly prohibitrd b~· thr l::1n~ua~c of thr tatutr." !d.,
::lt 54.
~ 0 Thr fcclrml fia~ clr~ccration stntutr, for cxamplr, rrflrcts n
con~ressionnl purpose to do juHt that. In rc~ponsc to a m1rning
by the United States Attorney Grncral that the usc of such unbounded
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The State's failure to approach that goal in the statutory
language at issue requires invalidation of Goguen's
conviction.

IV
Although we hold the "treats contemptuously" phrase
void for vagueness. we do not address in this case the
statute's first six words or its commercial misuse provisions.31 In light of the universal adoption of flag
contempt or desecration statutes by the federal and
state governments, 3 ~ we further emphasize that we do
terms as "defir~" or "cnstf' contrmpt ... either by word or act" is
"to riRk invalidation" on due procrss ground~, S. Rep. No. 1287,
90th Cong., 2d Srs~., 5 (1961\); H. R. Rep. No. 350, 90th Cong., 1st
se~:;:., 7 (1967), thr bill which brcame thr frdeml statute was
amrnded. 113 Cong. Rec. 16449, 16450 (1967), to rrach only acts
that physically damagr thr flag. The desrrration provision of the
statute, 18 U. R. C. § 700 (a), drclnres:
"(a) Whoever knowing]~, ca ·ts contempt upon any flag of the
United States b~· publicly mutilating defacing, defiling, burning, or
trnmpfing upon it shall br fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
for not more than one year, or both."
The lrgislative hdory revrals a clrar desire to reach only defined
physical acts of drsrcration. H. R. Rep. No. 350, supra, at 3
("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful. not accidental or inadvertent public !)hysical acts of desecration."); S. Rep.
No. 1287, supra, at 3 ("The language of the bill prohibits intentional,
willful, not acridental or inadvertent public phyRical acts of desecration of the flag."). Thr act has been so re,'ld by the lowrr federal
courts, which have upheld it against vagueness challenges. United
States v. Crosson, 462 F. 2d 96 (CA9) cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1064
U. S. App. D. C. - , 454 F.
(1972); Joyce v. United States, 2d 971 (1971), ccrt. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972). See lloffman v.
United States,- U.S. App. D. C.-, 445 F. 2d 226 (1971).
31 See n. 3, supra.
32
Sec n. 29, supra. All 50 States have flag contempt statutes.
The statutes are synopsized in Hearings on H. R. 271, et al., before
Sub. Comm. No. 4 of i he House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 1st Scss., ser. 4, pt. III, at 324-346 (1967). The flag con-
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not hold that the due process vagueness doctrine invalidates all such statutes. Insofar as that doctrine is concerned, the validity of these statutes will depend on their
particular language, judicial construction, and enforcement history.a:l Finally, as noted earlier, we do not deal
here with the question whether the Massachusetts flagmisuse statute contravenes the First Amendment.'H Intempt statutes of most Statrs arr patterned after the Uniform Flag
Act of 1917, which in § 3 provides that:
"No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defilr, defy, trample
upon, or by word or act rust contempt upon any such flag, standard,
color design or shield."
Compare, 9B Uniform Laws Annotated 52-53 (1966) with Hearings
on H. R. 271, et al., supra, at 321-346. Massachusetts, which has
one of the "older flag laws," Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 F. Supp.,
at 164, is among the handful of States that have not adopted the
Uniform Flag Act or a derivation.
33 See cases cited n. 30, supra.
Some flag contempt statutes have
been substantially narrowed by judicial interpretation. E. g., State
v. Royal, N. H. - , 305 A. 2d 676, 676 (1973) (New
Hampshire flag contempt statute reaches only "physical abuse type
of acts .... "). See also State v. Hodson, 289 A. 2d 635 (Del. Super.
1972). Others have not and have not fared wrll in federal court.
E. g., Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (WDNC 1971) (threejudge court) (North Carolina flag contempt statute void for vagueness and overbreadth).
34
We are aware, of course, of the First Amendment questions
wrapped up in the flag contrmpt controversy. The Court of Appeals
dealt with these issues at length. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F.
2d, at 96-105. See, e. g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 579 (1969);
Thayer, "Freedom of Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Crime of
Flag Desecration," 12 Ariz. L. Rev. 71 (1970); Note, "Developments in the Law-the National Security Interest and Civil Liberities," 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1138-1141 (1972); Note, 66 Mich. L.
Rev. 1040 (196 ) . However, we think the slim record in this case
makes it inappropriate to consider Gogurn's Fir~t Amendment arguments. Goguen's counsel argued that Goguen was engaged in a
"demonstration of one" with a clear purpose to communicate. Tr.
of Oral Arg. 36-37. The record does not back him up. Particu-
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sofar as the judgment below rests on the doctrine of
vagueness, it is affirmed.
It is so ordered.

larly in light of Goguen's decision not to take the stand, we are
left to speculate about Goguen's purpose. Perhaps Goguen's goal
was communication. Or perhaps Goguen was engaged in nothing
more than a thoughtless example of contemporary clothin fashion.
The difficulty of the First Amendment issu posed by flag contempt
statutes counsels against deciding those issues in a case where an
alleged intent to communicate rests on such a frail factual foundation. We also find wisdom in Judge Hamley's aversion to delicate
First Amendment issues where decision of them is unnecessary to
resolution of a case. 471 F. Supp., at 105.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNYrED STATES
No. 72-1254
Joseph Rmith, Rheriff of
\Yoreester County.
Qn Appeal from the United
Appellant,
States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit.
v.
Valaric Goguen.
[.January -, 1974]
Mn. .J FSTICE PowELL delivered · the OJ.HillOII of the
Court.
Thr ~heriff of Worcester County. Massachusetts, appeals from a judgment ·of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit holding the contempt provision of the · Massachusetts flag misuse statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Gogue·n v. Smith, ·471
F . 2d 88. aff'g. 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass. 1972), prob. juris.
Jloted. 412 U. S. ~)05 (1973). We affirm on the vagueness ground. \Ve do not reach the correctness of the
holding below on overbreadth or other First Amendment
grounds.
I
The slender record in this case reveals little more
than that Goguen wore a small cloth version of the
United States flag sewn to the seat of his trousers.' The
1

The rN·ord

C'ou~i~b

::>okly of the amended bill of excf'ptions

Cogtll'll Jikd i11 1he :\Ia~~aelntHr>tts. S11preme Judicial Court, the
oppo~ing brief~

bdore that court, the complaint under which Goguen
wa::> pro~(·cutNI. :tud Goguen'~ ff'df'ral hnbea::> corpus petition.
App('lldix 1-:3.", 42-4::!. Wf' do not hnvc a trial tran ~e ript, nlthough
Oogum', :unl'nc!t·d hill of t•xrrptiom; briefly summarize.; ~orne of the
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flag was approximately four by six inches aiH.l was
displayed to the l<>ft rear of Goguen's blue jeans. On
January 30, 1970, two police officers in Leominister, Massachus<>tts saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. The
first offi(•('r encoulltered Goguen standing and talking with
a p;roup of p<>rsons on a public street. The group apparently was not engaged in any demoustration or other protest as~ociated with Goguen's appareP No disruption of
traffir or· breach of the peace occurred. When this officer approached Goguen to question him about the flag,
the otlwr p<'rsons present laughed. Some time later, the
sC'cond officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking
in the downtown business district of Leominister.
Tlw following day the first officer swore out a complaint
against Goguen under the contempt provision of the
Massaehusetts flag misuse statute. The relevant part
of the statute then read:
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defacPs or treats contemptuously the flag of the
Fnited States . . . . whether such flag is public or
private property . . . . shall be punished by a fine
of not less than ten nor more than one hundred
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one
yc>ar, or both . . . .'' :•
tP~Iimon~· gin•n ~~~· witur~~P~ for the· pro~Prution nt hi::; :;tate trial.
CoguC'n did uot take· I he· ~tand. Thu~ wr do not ·havr of rrrord hi~
aC'<'OIIDI of wh;tl tran~pirrd at thr time of hi~ arrr::;t or of hi~ pltrpoHe
in Wl'arin!{ a flag on tlw ~<'at of his trou~rr:;.
2 Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-ti, :~5-:{() .
a :.ra~~ . (;pn, Law,: Ann. c. 2M, § 5 (1971). Omitting ~evernl
Ht'tllc•ucr~ prolrC't ing t lw crrrmouial activitiP:; of eertain Y<'lrran~ '
group~. tlw ~fatute r<'<Hl a~ followi' at tlw time of (logurn'~ arrest
and C'Oll\'irf ion:
·'§ 5. Flag; ; prnally for mi:;use
"WhoPvl'r publiel~· mutilntP~, lrampiP:o upou, defncr:o or trPnto
rontc•mptuou,;l~· llw flail: of thr United State:; or of ~la:;snchusrlts,
whrtlwr such ftng i~ public· or privatr proprrty, or whorvr}' displays
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Despite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was
not charged with any act of physical desecration.'' As
permitted by the disjunctive structure of the desecration
~neh

flag or

an~· n•prr~Pntation

thereof upon which arc word:;, figures,
or dt•,;ign~. or whoever r:nt::;r,; or permiti:i sueh flag
to lw u,;pd in a paradc• a,.; a n·c·cptnrlc for drpo,.;iting or collrcting
monP~' or an~· othrr nrtirlr or thing, or whoevrr rxpo~r~ to public
viPw. manttfactun·~. ,;pll~, c·xpe"r::; for :<air, giv~ awa~· or ha~ in
llO"""""ion for ,;alP or to giV<• away or for u~r for an~· pnrpo,.;r, any
artiPle· or Hlh,;tan<·<', ]l(•ing atl artirlr of mrrchnndi~r or a rrreptarle
of mPrehatHli~<' or artieiP~ upon which is attachrd, through a
wrapping or othrrwi~P. e•ngnlvPd or printrd in an~· mannrr, a rrpre:'e•n t:tlwn of the· l'ttitPd State•,; flag. or whorv<'r u;;r,; any rPprp,;pnta·
tion of the· arm,; or thP gn•at srnl of thr rommonwPalth for any
adn•rti~1ng or <·omnH·rcial pmpo,r. :<hall be pnni::;lwd b~· a fine of
not. jp,.;,~ than tPn or mor<' than onr hnndrrd dollar::; orb~· tmpri::;onlll('J)t for not more• than OIH' ~·t•ar, or botli: \Vorcb, figurrR, adver:_
tiH•ntc•nt,: or dP~ign:,: attadwd to. or direct!~· or indirectly comwctcd
with. ~neh Hag or any rPprr,entation thrrrof in ;;neh mnnner that
~ueh flag or it,; rrpn·:<e•ntation i" u~ed to attract attrntion to or
advc·rt 1~c· ~mh word~. figure~. adverti~rmr'nt;; or de~ign~, ~hall for
the· pttrpo~e·:; of thi~ ~ertion be drcmrd to be upon ;;uch !iag."
ThP ,;tatmc· i~ an amnlgmn of pro,·i~ion::; draling with flag d<'~<'rra~
tion and rontrmpt (thP fir~t 26 word,;) and with commercial mi~llS('.
or othc•r Pxploit:ttion or flag~ of tlw ;;tate and national gov<'l'nment.
Thi~ rtt~P c·otJe•c•m,; on!~· the ·•trPat,; rontrmptuou::;l~·" phrn:;e of thl•
~iatut<>, whieh h:1~ appare•ntl~· brPn in thr ;;tatut<' ~inrr it~ enaetment
in 11-\\JH. Oouaen '. Smith. ~upra. 471 F. 2d, Ht 90, n. 2.
ln lHil. "uh~PquPnt to Gogupn',; pro~reution, tlw dP:seeration and
eontc·mpt portion of tlw ,;tatute• wa,; amendC'd twice. On ~larc·h 8,
1971, tlw l<•gi:;laturr. pPr St. 19il, C. 74, modified thr fir,;t ~enteiH'l' b~·
in,;prting "burn,.: or ot herwi~P" bet ween the trrmro; "publici~·" and
"mutilat<·~,'' H!l(l. in additiou, b~· increasing thr fitH'.
:\Ia~l:'. Grn. Laii'H
Atm.<· . 21i~. § f> (197:~ Supp.}. On Augu:st 12,1971, via St. 1971, C. 655;
the l!'gi,;lat ur<' ttppPtltkd :1 1ww sentrnrc defining ''thP flag of the
·u nit!'d Htatl';;" phra,;c appearing in the fir;;t ,;rntencr: "For the
purpo"p of thi" ,.:<•ctioJt the tc·rm 'flag of thr Unitrd Statei:i' ;;hall
mean an.'· flag whieh ha .~ bl'rn designated b~· Art or Hl'~olution of
.the Congrr"'"' or the Unit<'d States a:,; the national embiPm, whPther
or not :::uch a de•"ignation j,; <'urrrntly in force." Ibid . The 1971
:ulwrti~e·mrnt~

[Poot11ote 4 is on p. 4]
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a1Hl eonh-'mpt portiou of the statute. the officer charged
SJW<'ifically and only that Goguen "did publicly treat contemptuously the flag of the United States. . . . " r,
Aftc'r jury trial in tlH' Worcester County ~uperior
Court. Gogupn was found guilty. The court imposed a
S('lltC'llC'!' of six months in the Massachusetts Hom:e of
Cort'l'ctions. Goguen appealed to the Massachusetts
Supn'nH' Judicial C'ourt, which affirmed. Commonwealth Y. Gouuen, Mass. - , 279, N. E. 2d 666
(1!172). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness arguIIH'nt with the comment that "rwlhatever tlw uncertainti<'s in other circumstances, we see no vagueness in
thC' statute as applied lwre. " !d.,- Mass., a t - , 279
~. K 2d. at 667 . The court cited no Massachusetts
preeedC'nts int<'rprC'ting the "treats contemptuously"
phrasl' of th{' statutf'.n
,\ftl'r Cogul'n began serving his sentence. he was
grantl•d bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas
corpus Ly the U nitf'd States District Court for the DistriC't of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Sntith, supra, 343
:tmrndnH•nt,- nn· r('lc-nnt to thi" ca~r only in tiH' tangPntial ~~·n~r
that the~· indil'ntP a n•rognitiotl b~· tiH• lrgi~lHtmr of the Jwed to
tightPn up thi>< impn•l'i::-!' o<tatute.
' Perhap" t hi,- 1\'a>< hrratl"(' of rhc diftirulty of the quro<twn wlwt her
Cogll('ll'>< l'OtldtH·t ('()llo<tit ttt I'd phy~irnl dc~erration of the Hag. cr.
Uouw'''· \' , Smith, ~upra. -til F. 2d, at 91 , 11. 4 ('' .. . I W_le arr not'
~o ~ttr1• I hat "1•winp; a J1ng to a hal'kground rlcurly af'f1·ct~ 'phy:sieal
inlcgrit.1·.' '').
" ApJwndix 4.
•;Ap]lt'llant <'OI'I'('I'tl~· <'Ollf'<'dc·d itt oral argument that Gogurn'~
ra~e i" tlH• fir~t n•eord('d ~dno<":lclltl:sctt:; tourt rrading of thi,; l:mgttag<'. Tr . of Oral Arg. 17-lR. Indeed, with the exePption of OIW
turn of lh!' t·<• ntllr~ · l'a~r involYing one of the ~tatutc'~ commercial
mi"u ~!' pro vi~ ion~, thr mt in· "tntutr hn~ bern l'><~entinlly devoid
of ~tat1• !'ourt inl<'rprrtation. ('ommomcealth v. R. ! . Shennan
Mwut . ('o., lH!J :\fa,;:s. 76 , 75 K. E. 71 (1905) .
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F. Rupp. 161. The District Court found the flag contempt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly
vague unclrr the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amrndment as well as overbroad under the First
Anwndmrnt. In upholding Goguen's void for vaguenet-:s eontentions. the court concluded that the words
"trPats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily
ascertainable standard of guilt." !d., at 167. Especially
in "th(•se days when flags are commonly displayed on
hats. !!:amwnts and vehicles ... ," the words under which
Goguen was convicted "leave conjectural, in many instanet>s, what conduct may subject the actor to criminal
prosPcution." IIJid. The court also found that the
statutory languagr at issue "may be said to encourage
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Ibid.
Tlw Court of Appeals, with one judge concurring,
affimwd thr District Court in all respects. Goguen v.
Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d 88. The Court of Appeals conclt!drd that "resolution of [Goguen 's void for vagueness I
challt>ngP to the statute as applied to him necessarily
adjudieates tlw statute's facial constitutionality . . . . "
!d., at 94. Treating as-applied and on-the-face vaguenrss attacks as essentially indistinguishable in light of
tlw imprecision of tlw statutory phrase at issue, id., at 92,
H4, th<' eourt found that the language failed to provide
ad(•quate warning to anyone, contained insufficient guidelim's for law enforcement officials, and set juries and
courts at large. !d., at 94-96. Then Circuit Judge, now
Senior Circuit Judge Hamley, sitting by designation_ ( - )
from the Xinth Circuit, concurred solely on void~
vagueness grounds. !d., at 105. Judge Hamley thought
the majority's extensive treatment of overbreadth and
other First Amendment issues unnecessary to the disposition of the case. Ibid.
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Wc ap;rN' with the holdings of the District Court and
the Court of Ap]><'al!" on thc due process doctrine of vague~
nesf':. Tlw settled principles of that doctrine require no
extt' nsi V(' rcsta tPlll(' n t lwrP .' The cloctri ne incorporates
notiont> of fair notice or waming.' Moreover, it rcq uires
lt'gislaturcs to set rPasonably clear guidelines for law cnfm·cpnwnt officials and triers of fact in order to (H'<'V<'nt
"arbitrary and discriminatory pnforcement."'" Where> a
statutt,.s literal f':eop<'. unaided by a narrowing state court
illtPrpretation. is rapahk of reaching expression sheltered
by the First AnH'lHinwnt, the doctrine demands a grcatcr
ThP <·l<•lll<'lll~ of t lw ,·oid lor vaguenr~~ doet ritw han• bPen
d('\"(']opPd in :t In 1'1!:<' bod~· or Jll'P('('d('JJ( from thi~ Court. Thr ('H;o;('~
:m· <'<ltPgorilwd in, c. u .. (;l'([lJ!Ied \".City of Hockford. 40S LT. S. 104,
10~-lO!l ( 1\Ji:!) .
:-it•(', Am,t Pnlam. "The Void-for-Va!!:lll'll<'"" Dortritt<•
ill th<· :-ittpn·m<· C'omt." 109 ll. Pa. L. Rev. ti7 (1960).
'E . (/ .. /'apal'hl'i~tou \ '. ('ity of Jar·hmll'ille. -W5 C. S. 15H, 1112'
(197:2) : Lanzetta v. NPw ./N~e!J, :~on. U. S. 451 , +5:~ (lU:~9):
":\o Oil<' nut~ · h<• n•qmn·d at pPril of lifP, librrt~· or prop<•rt~ · to
~p<·<·ulatP : t~ to th<· lll<':llling of p('nal ~tntut<'" . All ar<• Pntitlrd to
h<· mfornwd a~ to what thP 8tatP rommand~ or forbid~ . " (Citation~
omitt<•d .),
Collnally 1 . 01'111'/'a/ ('oll8truclwll Co., 2H9 U. S. :3R.'i, ..J.~)1 (19:~:2) :
,, . ].\] ~tat11t< · whi\'h PithPt' forbid~ or rPquirr~ thr domg of an
:t<·t in tPrnt~ ~o ,·ngu<• that lliPil of common intrllig<'IH'<' mu~t ncer~·
>"ttril~· p;ll<'"~ at it" nH':Irting: and difl'Pr a~ to it" application, violatr"
tlw fir~t <'""<'llfial of du<• pro<·<·,.;~ of 1:\w." (Citations omittPd.)
11 E . (/ .. Omy11ed. supra . ..J.OS l". S., at 108;
('nited 8tat1's v.
L Cohen Orocery ('o .. 225 r. S. i-11, x9 (1921) ('' .. . [T]o attrmpt
to <·nfon·p thP ~<·<·tiou would IH· thr <·xart rquivalent of an dfort to
<·arr~· o11t a :<fatlltP whic·h ill t('rlll~ mprrl~· prn:tliz<·d and puni,.;]wd
all acts detrinwntal to tlw publi<• intPrP~t wlwn unju,.;t ami um<•a,.;on;tblP i11 th\' <'"timat<' of th<· eo11rt and jur~· ."); l'uited States \'.
Reese. 0:2 P. S. :21-J.. :2:21 (1Si.5) ("lt would certain]~· lw dangerou~
if tlw l<'gi:<latlll'(' <'Ottld :<et a 11<'1 !urge <'nough to catch all po~~ibl<'
olf<·nd<>r~. and lr:l\'(' it to th<· court~ to ~tep in"id<' a11d ,.;a~· who
could ])(' ri~~;htfully d\'taitl<'d, and who eould be set at largt•.").
7

7'2-1'25-1-0L>l i\iON
S!\llTH v. <rOGUEN

dPgn'(' of specificity than in other contexts.'" The statutory language at issue here. "publicly . . . treats contPmptuously tlw flag of the United States ... .'' has such
~<·ope. e. g., Street , .. .\"ew York, 394 r. S. 5-76 (Hl69)
(verbal flag contempt). and at the relevant time was
without the benefit of judicial clarification."
Flag contempt statutes have been characterized as
void for lack of notice on the theory that "l w J hat is
contemptuous to one man may be a work of art for
another." '" Gogupn 's heha vi or can hardly be described
lmmaturi ty or "silly cone! uct '' '" probably
as art.
conwR closer to the mark. But we see the force of the
District ( 'ourt's observation that the flag has becomP
"an object of youth fashion and high camp . . . ."
:Ha F. Supp .. at 164. As both courts below noted, casual
tn•atnwnt of the flag in many contpxts has become a
wid<•spread contemporary phenomenon. !d., at 164,.
Hi7; 471 F. 2d. at !Hi. Flag wearing in a day of relaxed
elothing styles may lw simply for adornment or a ploy to
attraPt attention . It and many othPr current. careless
usf's of tfw ftali nevertheless constit"Ute unceremonial
treatJnPnt that many people may view as contemptuous.
Y Pt in a time of wid Ply varying attitudes and tastes for
~fi splaying something as ubiquitous as thP Cnit<>d States
flap; or rPpresPntations of it. it could hardly be the purpose of tlw Massach usf'tts legislature to make criminal
every informal us<' of the flag~ The statutory language·
onder which Gogue11 was charged'. however, fails to draw
10
/<J. (/ .. (;raynl'd. suwa. -101\ LT . S .. at 109; ~mith \'. California,
;{(il l '. S. 1-17 . 151 (Hl5!l). Comparr tlw fp~~ :stringt•nt rrquirrmrnt~
of t lw modPm vai-(IH'IlE'~~ ca~P~ d<·nling with pmely rronomic rrgula1ion. E . g.. l'nited .State~\' . National Dairy Prod~ Corp., ;{7:2 U. S.
29 (H)():3) (Hobiu:<on-Patman .-\ct) .
11 S<•P n. ll. supra.
' " .NotP, Hti .\lich. L. HP\'. 10-10. 105() (1\:Jt\S) .
"' Gogw'n \'. Smith, su;pra. ;{4;{; F .. Rupp ... a.t Hili"
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reasonably ekar lines between the kinds of nonccremonial
treatment that arC' criminal and those that an• not. Dw•
proc·p~s r<•quirPs that all "lw informed as to what the
f.ltat<' eomrnands or forbids . .. ," La11zetta Y. Yew Jersey,
;~Q() l r . ~- 4.~1. 4.~:3 ( Hl:3!l), and that "nwn of commort
intPlli~<·nc<'" 11ot bC' forc<'d to guess at tiH• mpaning of tlw
<~rilllinal law .
Connally Y. Genera.[ Construction Co. ,
:2()0 l'. ~- :38•). :3\Jl ( l\1:3:2 ). Given today's tendencies tu
tn•at tlw fta~ urlccrPnloniously. those notice standards
arc 11ot ~atisfipr] hPr<' .
\\'(' rPco~nize that in a noneotlllnereial context lwhavior a:s a ~<'ll<'ral rule is not mapped out in advance 011
tlw basis of statutory languag<'.'' In such cas<'s. perhaps
tlw mo ~t nl<'aningful asp<'Ct of the vagueness doctrine is
not actual noticl' but thP other principal element of the
doetrirw- tlw r<'quir<'lll<'llt that a legislature estab~
mini mal l!;llidrlhll'S to govern law enforccmcn t. 1t is[this
~
rc~ard that thP statutory language under scrutiny has its
most notahlP d<•ficiPrlcics.
ln its t<•rms, tlw language at issue is sutficieJJtly unbound<•<! to prohibit. as the District Court noted , "any
public d<•viation from formal flag etiquette . .. . " 343'
F. Supp .. at W7 . l ' nchanged throughout its 70-ycar
history,"' the "trc>ats con tcm ptuously" phrase was also·
de void of a narrowing state court interpretation at the
relevant tinw in this casP.'n We are without authority
11

Am~tc·rdam, .~1/fll '(l,

J ;,

1'4<'1'

109 l '. Pa. L. Hrv., at to;;{ , JL 79 .

II. ;{, S /1 j)/'(1.

ln ~-'<'<'

11. ti, ~upra . TIH• <·on tempt portion of thP .\la~,.;<tehu~<'t t~
to haYr lain fallow for <tlmotit it~ entire hi:>tor)·. Apparc•ntl)' fhpn• han· IH•<•n ahout a h:ilf dozen aiTe~t~ under thi~ part of
tlw ~tatJJl!' in rrc·rtJt )'<'HI'~, but nonr ha~ producrd a reportrcl'
d<•('i,ion . Tr. of Or;d Arg. :2k. In 19f\H, a tr<'IWg<'l' i11 L~·Jln ,
::\fa"";l(·hu~pt t" w;J,.; l'lwq.!P<I. <tppan•ntly undc>r the prr~rnt ~ tatutc,
with d<·~c·c·rating th<· lluitrd :::ltat<'~ by "<·wing piec·<'~ of it into ltii-:

~fa1Ute ~ < 'Pill~
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to cure that defect." Statutory language of such a
standard less sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and
juries to pursue their personal predilections. LegislaturPs may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting
the standards of the criminal law. E. g., Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 166-168 ( 1972). In
Gregory "· ('ity of Chicago, 394 U. S. 117. 120 (1969),
Mr. J usticc Black voiced a concern that we share against
CJJtrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judgment of tlw policeman on his beat." The aptness of
his admonition is evident from appellant's candid coneession during oral argument before the Court of Appeals
re~arcling state enforcement standards for that portion
of th<' statute under which Goguen was convicted:

" • • . I A ls counsel [for appellant] admitted, a war
protestor who. while attending a rally at which it
begins to rain, evidences his disrespect for the
American fiag by contemptuously covering himself
with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prosecuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a
mc.m ber of the American Legion who, caught in the
same rainstorm while returning from an 'AmericaLove It or Leave It' rally, similarly uses the flag,
but does so regrettably and without a contemptuous
attitude. would not be prosecuted.'' 471 F. 2d, at
102.
Where inherently vague statutory language permits such
selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process.
~l'Oil~<·r~ . New York TimP~, Aug11::;l 1, 1968, p. 31, rol. 1. The
le('nager wa~ ordt'n'd hr a ~tHtP di~trict court to prepare and deliver
an tway 011 the fing . Tlw rourt continuPd the case without a finding, dPpriving .it of any IH"<•cwlmtial valur.
J; f!J. !f., ('nited 8totes v. 87 Photographs, 402 U. S. 36:3, i36Q:

vHJ71).
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III
Appellant's argumeu ts that the "treats contemptu ..
ously" phrase is not impermissibly vague, or at least
should not be so held in this case, are unpersuasive.
Appellant devotes a substantial portion of his opening
brief. as he did his oral orgument, to the contention that
Goguen failed to preserve his present void for vagueness
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Appellant concedes that the issue of "vagueness
as applied" is properly before the federal courts.'s but
contends that Goguen's only arguable claim is that the
statute is vague on its face. The latter claim. appellant
insists, was not presented to the state courts with the
requisite fair precision. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270
(. Hl71). This exhaustion of remedies argume11t is belatedly raiscd.l!' and it fails to take the full measure of
Goguen's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the
statP courts.~" \Ve do not deal with the point at length,
' Rep]~· Brit'f 4.
"'The Di~triet Court dC'ei~ion in this ca~r wa.-; entc•rrd ~ub~equent
to l'i('(lrd, supra. Yc•t it apprar~ that appellant did not mise hi·
JH'C'~c·nt c•xhau~tion of rPmediP~ ur~umPnt beforr that court. The
Di~t riel Court comm(•utrd .-;perifirally on this omi~~ion: '·No contention j,., 11ow madr that l Goguml ha~ not exhaustrd state rrmrdiro,
11or that t hr con.-;t it ut ion a! i~:>ur:; prP~rnt rd hrrr wrrc> not raised
appropria t PI~· in :>In tp proerc·ding~." 34:3 F. Supp., at 154.
"" Goguc•n filc·d in :;tatP ~up!'rior court an Uli::'UC'C(•:;,;ful motion to
di~mi~~ tlw c·omplaint in which hr eited thr Fourtr(•nth Amendment
and :dll'~l'd that the st:tlutc' under which hr wa,., rhar~ed wa~ " impermi~::'ibl,\· Y:t~Ul' and inc·apab!C' of fair nnd reasonnblr intrrpretation
b~· public· oiliciak" Appendix 1. Thi~ motio11 wa<> altio before the
':\[a~~ac·hu~ctt~ 8upn·mp .Judicial Court, ::'incr it wa~ incorpornted iq
Gogum'~ amPndc·d !Jill of <'xecption,;. Ibid. In addition, Gogurn's
brirf before· that Court rai~<·d vaguc•ne,;~ point,; nnd cited vagueness
ea~e~ . /d., at 19. 21)- :27, eiting Lanzetta "· New Jersey, 306 U. S.
451 (19:{0), and Parker "· Morgan, 322 F . Suw. 5R5 (WD N. C.
1
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how<'v<'r. for we• find tlw relevant statutory language
imprrmissibly vague as applied to Uoguen. With~
ciut doubt tlw "substance" of this claim was "fairly
JH'PSPnt<:>d'' to thr stat~' courts under the exhaustion
standards of heard, supra, 404 L. S .. at 275. 278 .
.\ppellant's Pxhau~tion of remedies argument is premis<•d on tlw notion that Goguen's bcha vior rendered him
a hard-corP violator as to whom the statute was not
va!l:ll<'. whatevrr its implications for those engaged i 11 dif"!
ferPn t conduct. To lw sure there are statutes that
by th<'ir terms or as authoritatively construed apply
without question to certain activities, but whose application to other lwha vi or is uncertain. The hard-core
violator concept makes some sense with regard to such
statutes. Tlw pres<•nt statute. however. is not in that
cate~ory. This criminal provision is vague "not in tho
sense that it requin's a person to conform his conduct
to an imprPeiscj but eomprehrnsible normative standard,
hut rather in the sense• that no standard of couduct is
SJWCifi<•d at all." Coates\'. City of Cincinnati, 402
fHl. H14 ( 1071 ). ~uch a provision simply has 110 core.
This absPnC<' of any ascertainable standard for inclusion
and rxclusion is preeisely what offends the Due Process
Clause. Thr deficiency is particularly objectionable in

r. s.

Hl/1) (I hn•<'-JIHlgP r·our1) ( \' or1 h Carolina flag eon1 <'mpt :;ta tu1<•
Yoid for \'11!-(IH'IH''' and ovc•rureadth). Appellnn1 j, corrPe1 in a:;~rrt
ing; tha1 (:og;u<·n faihl 1o compar1mmtalize in hb ~tH 1<' cour1 brief
1h<' du<· pro<'<'~' do<"1 riur· of vag;ll<'llf'~~ and Fir:;t Anwndmru1 conrrp1~
of O\'('rhmtdlh. 8t•f• AppC'ndix 19-:24. Bu1 permi1ting a drgrce of
ll'akag;<' hP1WP('Il tho~<' par1ieular adjoiuiug r•omp:ll·tmrnt' i~ uuder~t:tndahl<-. C'f. \'ot<·. "Tiw Fir'1 Anwndm<'lll OvrrbrPnd1h Doctrill<'." 1-i:{ Han·. L. H<'\'. ,'\H. l·lil-~75 (Hl70). The highe~t ,;ta1e
court·~ opinion, whieh d<'alt 'f'Jlara1Pl~· with Gogm•n';; Fir,:1 Amendnwnt and \':II!;IH'Ill''~ claim~,- :\la~~ ., a t -, :279 l'\. E. 2d, a1 (i67,
indi<'a1<'' thai 1ha1 <·our1 \\'H' wE'll HW<Il't' 1hat Gogut>n rai:;<'d hot!~
~<'t~ of argunwn1,;.
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view of the unfettPrcd latitude thereby accorded law
enforcpnwnt officials and triers of fact. P n til it is cor:..
rectC'd either by anwndmPnt or judicial construction, it
affec·ts all who arc~ prosecutC'd under the statutory Jan~
guagr. 111 out· opinion the dPfect l'xists in this case.
ThP languagP at is~ll(' is void for vaguC'nf'SS as applit>d to
Goguen hf'eause it subjectC'd him to criminal liability
undC'r a ~tandard so indf'finitC' that police. court. and jury
were' frc•c• to react to nothing morp than their own JWf'fer('IICCS for tn•atmrnt of the flag.
Turning from the t•xhaustion point to the merits of
the vagu!'ncss question prC'SCll ted, appellant argues that
any notieP difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow subjN·t tnatt('r of tlw statut('. "actual" flags of thl' United
:-ltat('s." ' .\ppc•Hant contends that this "takt>s some of
the vagut'nef!s away from th(' phrase. 'treats contemptuou ~ly
· ·· .... .: \nyone \\·ho "\vants notice as to ~:hat
this statute• proserilws ... , immediately knows that it
has soni<'thing to do with flags and if he wants to stay
clear of violating this statutP, he just has to stay clear
of doiiip; sonwthing to thf' Pnited States flag." "a Apart
fro1n tl1C' ambiguities pres('nted by the concept of an
"actual " flag." ' WP fail to s<'e how this alleged particu"' .\pJ H' Ilant '~ Bril'f' 17; Tran~ . of Oral Arg . !:1.
"" Tr . of Oral .\q!; . !l

"" Ibid
"'At tht• tillH' of (;op:U('Il·~ pro~t·cution, tlH' ~tatutl' rpfrrred ~imp!)"
lu "tlw flag; of tht• l'nitl'd ~tatl'~ . .. ," \\'ilhuut furthrr drfinition .
That rai~< · ~ tht• oll\ · iou~ qnc·~tion \\'IH'thl'r (;ogtwn·~ miniatur<· rloth
flag; f'OII~titutc·d " thl' flag of tht• {lnitt•d Statt·~ .
. ." Cogul'n
nrgu<·d tlll~IH'C'l'~~full .\· l)('fon· tlw ~tatr rourt~ that tlw ~tatutr applied
only to flag~ thnt m<•t "ollicial ~tnndarcb" fur proportion~, ~nrh a~
rda I ion of IH'ight to width and t ht· ~izr of ~~ ripl'~ and t h(' firld of
~tar~. :11HI that thr· cloth lw \\'Ol'l' did not rnrrt tho~l' ;;tnndnnb .
Tr. of Or:d Arg. 11- 1:!, :!+-:.W: Appc·ndix :!. Tlwn· wa~ no.
di~pntt• that (;ogltl'n·~ adontmc•11t had thl' n•qni~itr nnmhrr of ~tnr~
lllld .~tripP~ :~nd l'Olor~ . . Tr .. of Or;tl Arg. 11- 12. The Ma~~a ,..

72-1~54>---{>Pl NlON

S!\IITH v. GOGUEN

i3

larity resolves the central vagueness q~.:estion-the
absence of any standard for defining contemptuous
treatment.
Appellant's remaining arguments are equally unavailmg. It is asserted that the first six words of the statute
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously" phrase.
and that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
customarily construes general language to take on color
from more specific accompanying language. But it is
conceded that Goguen was convicted under the general
phras<' alone, and that the highest state court did not
rely on any general-to-specific principle of statutory
interpretation in this case."'' Appellant further argues
that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has
r<'stricted the scope of the statute to intentional contempt."" Aside from the problems presented by an
appellate court's limiting construction itt the very case
i11 which a defendant has been tried under a previously
<~hu~Ptt ~ 8npremp .T nditia I C'onrt found Gogueu ·~ riot h flap; to be
rov<'n·d b~· th<· ~tatutr. noting that "Lt]ll(' ~tatntC' doC':::: not require
that tlw f!a~~; I)(' ·ofli!'ial'" Comrnontcealth \'.Goguen,- :!VIa::::~.-.
- . :2i9 ~. E. :2d li(ifi, li(ii-1 (197:2). The lowl'r fedrral court~ did
not addr<·~~ thi~ holding, nor do we. We uotC' only that the :'\Ia~~a
rhn"'<'tt~ Legi~laturr apparrntl~· ~en~E>d an nmbiguit~· in thi~ rr~prct,
IJ<'tau~c· ~uh~Pqurnt to Uogu<•n'~ pro~ecution it amrnded the ~tntutc
in au <'ffort to ddim• what it had uwant h~· tlw '·Hag of the
llnitrd State,;." St'e n. :3. ~upra.
"" Tr. of Oral Arg. 4.').
2 '; Th<• \Ja~~arlnt~l'tt~ court commented ~imp]~· that "[t]hr jury
!'ould inf<•r that tiH' violntion wa~ intentionnl without reviewiug an~·
word~ of thl' ddrndant." Commonwealth v. Goguen,- Mai:l~. - ,
- , 2i9 ~. E. :2d li!H'i, fi(ii-1 (197:2). Tlm~S, the court held that the
jur)· could iufl'r iniC'llt mrrely from Gogurn':,; conduct. Thi~S i~
:ipJl:ln'ntl~· al~o a holding that tlw jury rn~t find contemptuou~
int(•nt under t hr ~tnt uU·. although the rrquirPment amount~S to vt•ry
litrlr ~inrr i1 i~ ~o t•asil~· ~ati~fird. Tlw court'~ rcfrrencc to verbal
<·ommuniralion rrfl<'!'!<'d Ooguen',: rrliancp on Street v. New York,
::!94 11. H. 5i9 ( 191)9).
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unnarrowcd s tatute.~' this holding still does not clarify
what. eonduct constitutes contempt, whether intPntionai
or inadwrtent.
Finally. appellant argues that state law enforcement
authorities ha.vf' shown themselves rBady to interpret
this penal statute narro,.,·ly and that the statute, prop·
crly r<'ad. reaches only direct. immediate contemptuous
acts that "aetually impinge upon the physical integrity
of tlw fiag ... .' ' ~·' There is no support in the record
for tlw fomwr poi 11 t. "'' Similarly, nothing in the state
court's opinion in this ease or in any earlier opinion of
that eo ur t sustains the latter. In any event, GoguBn
was charp;('d only undPr the wholly open-ended language
~·

8 . !f .. A8hton ,.. Krutul'k!J, :3x4 ll. S. 195, 198 (19fil.i ).
ApJH'IIHni ',; Bri<·f 2:.! .
"'' Wi t h l'<'l!:tnl io pro~< ·<· utorial policies, app<•llant cite~ iwo puhli~lwd opinions of ihl' \l:",;aehuol'ti ,; Attorntoy GrnPrnl. + Op~:>. of
Att. (:t•n . .tiO (1915) (Ht•prodlll'l'd ai Appt>llant'~ Brief 30); Hrpori
of Ati~·. G<'u., Pub . Doe . Xo . 11. p. 192 (19(i~) (H('pnH.lurrd at
Jmi~. Siat!'llll'lli App . s:n. Ap]H'Ihmi conrl'dl'o that Ill'iilwr dra b;
wiih ilw <·o ni<•mpi poriion of tlw ~tatute umlrr which Goguen wa ~:>
coil\'idt•tl. Thu~. thl'~ · an• noi in point hrn'. Thl'~ · provided
guidaJH'l' i o no om· on t hP rt'lt•vmli ~t:t tutor~· Ia nguage . NPvrrt heIr~~ . npp<>llant 1 ~ <'OJT<'c! t hn t th e~· ~bow a t<•ndrnry 011 t lw part of
tlw :<iail' AtionH·~· (;l'IWI'III to n·ad othpr portion~ of ihr ,;tatutP
ll:IIT0\\' 1~·. Ai th<• ,;nnw time, tbp~ · rrftrct the lark of prrcision
rr!'mrinl! throughout ihP \ln,;~: t<·hu~<·it~ flag mi~u~<' ~tHiutr. Tlw
191.') opinion 11otrd t h:t t ;t Iii !'I':! I rmdi ng of Olll' pori ion of Hw ~ta tutP.
prohibiting rxhibition of t•ngravings of t be flag on <'Prtaill artirl<'l-,
would mah it a l'riminnl otl'Pn:;r to dit~pla~ · ihe flag ii ~r lf " in ma11~ ·
of ib !'lwapPr and mon• c•ontmoit form~." Apprllant 's Brid :n-:tl.
The ~ iatt' Attoni<>~· Urnc•ral c·on!'lml<•d that ibis would be :1 "manifeti1
ab~urdit~ ·." lrl .. at :~1. Th!' 19(i~ opinion advi~ed thai a flag repres<>ni<ttion paintrd on a door WH~ not "a flag of thr Unit<•d Statp~"
wiihiu ihP ltWHIIing of tlw ,;tntut(' . .fmis. StHt<' llll'llt App. 5:J-55 . . \
eont ru r~ · int <·rpr<'i a i ion would "rai:;r ~rriou,; qur,;i ions under til(>
Fir~t and Fourt<'rnth .'\m<>ndmrni~ .. . ," givrn thl' rt'quirenwni,
2'
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of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously.'' There
was no allegation of physical desecration.
There are arras of human conduct where. by the nature
of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot
establish standards with great precision. Control of the
broad range of disorderly conduct that may inhibit a
policeman in tlw prrformance of his official duties may
be onP such arPa. requiring as it docs an on-the-spot
assessment of the need to keep order. Cf. Colten \'.
Kentucky, 407 C S. 104 ( 1972). But there is no comparable reason for committing broad discretion to law
enforct>ment officials in the area of flag contempt.
Indeed, because display of the flag is so common and
takes so many forms, changing from one generation to
another and often difficult to distit1guish in principle. a
legislature should define with some care the flag behavior
it intends to outlaw. Certainly nothing prevents a legislature from defining with substantial specificity what
constitutes forbidden treatment of United States flags. '10
thnt behavior mack criminal mu~t bP "plainly prohibited by til('
langtwgc of the ~tatnt<>.'' !d .. at 54.
30 The federal flag rle~Pcration stntute, for examplr, rc·fl<-ct~ a
congre~sionnl purpo~e to do just that. In rP~pon~e to a warning
b~· the Pnited St;lte~ Attornp~· General that to u~e ~urh unbounded
trrm::: n~ "detir"''' or "ea~t~ cont.c·mpt ... rithrr by word or act" is
"to ri~k invnlidation" on due proce:;~ ground:;. S. TIP!>. ~o. 1287,
90th Cong:., :M Se:;,;., 5 (19fl~); H. H. Rep. No. ;{50, 90th Cong., h;t
SP~~ .. 7 (19()7), thr bill which became tlw federal ~tatutP wa~
amended. 113 Cong. Hrc. 164-l9, 16450 ( 1967), to reach onl~· actR
1hnt ph~·~icall~· damage tlw Hag. The de:::rcm t ion provi~ion of the
~tatutc. 1R U.S. C.§ 700 (a), declares:
"(a) Whoever knowin11:l~· ca:;t:; contrmpt 11 Jon any fin of thr
llnited State:; by publici~· mutilating rfacing. drfiling. buming, or
trampling upon it ~hall hr fint'cl not more than $1,000 or impri~oned
for not morr than one year, or both."
Thr legi,;IHtivc· hi~tor~· rrveal~ :1 clrar de~irr to r<'arh onl~· df•fineJ
phy:;icnl 11et:; of de~ecration. H. n. Rrp. No. aso, ~upra, at 3·
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The State's failure to approach that goal in the statutory
language at issue requires invalidation of Goguen's
conviction.:n The judgment is affirmed.
1t

u;

so ordered.

C'The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful, not acci~
dental or inadvertent public physical acts of desecration."); S. Rep.
No. 1287, supra, at 3 ("The language of the bill prohibits intentional,
willful, not accidental or inadvertent public physical acts of dese~
cration of the flag."). The act has been so read by the lower federal
courts, which hav<' upheld it ngainst vagueness challenges. United
States v. Cmsson, 462 F. 2d 96 (CA9) cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1064
(1972); Joyce v. United States, U. S. App. D. C. - , 454 F.
2d 971 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972). See Hoffman v.
United States,-- U. S. App. D. C.-, 445 F. 2d 226 (1971).
" 1 We ure awnrt>, of rourse, of tht> univt>rslll adoption of flag
desecration or contt>mpt statutt>s by the federal and state governments. See n. 30, supra. The statutes of the 50 States are synopsized in Hearings on H. H. 271, et al.. before Sub. Comm. No. 4
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Con g., 1st Sess., ser. 4,
pt. III, at 324-346 (1967). Most of the ~tate statutes art> patterned
after the Uniform Flag Act of 1917, which in § 3 provides that:
"No pt>rson shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy, trample
upon, or by word or act CHst contempt upon any such flag, stnndard,
color design or shield."
Compnre 9B Uniform Laws Annotated 52-53 ( 1966), with Hearings
on H. n·. 271, et al., supra. at 321-346. Because it is stated in
the disjunctive, this language, like that before us, makes possible
criminal prosecution solely for casting contempt upon the flag. The
validity of such statute;;, however, insofar as the vagueness doctrine
is concerned, will depend as much on their judicial construction an~
enforcement. history as their language.
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Ttw Hheriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts, ap~
peals from a judgment ·of the United States Court of
Appeals fo r the First Circuit holding the contempt provision of the Massachusetts flag misuse statute unconsti,ftutio nally vague a nd ovcrbroad~GoU§n v. Smith, ·471
2d 88, aft"g, 343 F. Supp. 161 Mass. 1972) , prob. juris.
noted, 412 U. S. 005 (1973).
e affirm on the vagueness ~round. We do not reach the correctness of the
holdin~ below on overbreadth or other First Amendment
groundR.
I

lE·

T he slender record in this case reveals little more
th an that Goguen wore a small cloth version of the
United States flag sewn to the seat of his trousers.' The
The rrro rd consiRts ~olely of the amended bill of exceptions
Uoguen filed in t he ~lassachu~etts. Supreme Judicial Court, the
opposing brirf~ be fore that court, the complaint under which Goguen
was. m>~er u trd . and Goguen's frdcral hnbeas rorpus petition .
A[>Jlf'Hdix l -3 , 42-43. We do not. have a trial transcript, although
Gognrn's amendrrl bill of exeeptions briefly summarizes some of the
1
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flag was a pproximately four by six inches and was
displayed to the left rear of Goguen 's blue jeans. On
J anu ary 30. 1970, t wo police officers in Leominister, Mas~
sachusetts saw· Goguen bedecked in that fashion . Th e
first officer enco untered Goguen standing and talking with
a group of persons on a public street. The group appar~
ently was not engaged in any demonstration or other protest associated with Goguen 's appareJ.2 No disruption of
traffic m· breach of the peace occurred. When this offict>r approached Goguen to question him about the flag ,
tlH' otlwr persons prese nt laughed. Some time later, the
serond officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking
111 tlw downtown business district of Leominister.
Tlw following day the first officer swore out a complaint
against Gogucu under the contempt provision of the
Masi'aehusctt~ flag ntisuse statute. The relevant part
of thC' f'.tntutC' then read .
''Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon , defaees or treats contemptuously the flag of the
P11ited States .. . , whether such flag is public or
private property ... , shall be punished by a fin e
of not less than ten nor more than one hundred
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one
yf'ar. or both . .. .'' 3
t(·~ tmwu~· gtven by wit11e~;;e~ fo r the prosecution at hi;; stat e t n al.
Goguen did not ta ke the stand. Thus we do not ·have of record his
ac-count of what r ra n ~ pirrd nt the time of his arrest or of his purpose
in wearing a flag on the seat of his trousers.
2 Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 35-36.
3 i\Ia~s . (l(•n. La ws Ann . cf 264, § 5 (1.971) .
Omitting several
sentence:; protecting t he ceremonial activities of certain veterans'
g roup~ , the sta tu te read as follows at the time of Goguen's arrest
Hnd eon viet ion:
"§ 5. Fl:tg; pena lty fo r m is u ~e
"Whoever publiely mu tilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats
contc•mptuously the flag of the United States or of Massachusetts,
whether ~'Uch ling is publie or private property, or whoever displays
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Drspitf' the first six words of the statute, Goguen was
not charged with any act of physical desecration. 4 As
permitted by the disjunctive structure of the desecration
"'lll'h tlag or an~· reprrsPntation thereof upon which arc words, figures,
ad\'l•rti~<·nwntH or de~ign~. or whoever rauses or permits such flag
10 hr u"'etl m a paradr a~ a. receptacle for depositing or collecting
motH'~ or any ot her article or thing, or whoever exposes to public
view, manufarturPs, sPib, exposes for sale, gives away or ha s in
po~"'~'"'~tou for ~n l e or to give away or for use for any purpose, any
art ich· or ~ub:;t:liH'l', being an article of merchandise or a receptacle
of nu•rchmHii~<' or art ici<'H upon which is attached, through a
wrappmg or othrrwi~r. Pn~?; raved or print('(! in any mann<'r, a repre"'<'llt:l twn of thP llnited Stat PH flag, or whoever uses any represent a·
tton of tlw arm;; or thr grrat sea l of the commonwealth for any
ad\'nlt~llll!; or f'Oilllll\'reinl purpose, shall be punished by a fine of
not Jp,..,._ than tPu or rnor<' than one hundred dollars or by imprisonID<'Ill for not lllOI'(' than Oil(' year, or botli: Words, figures, a elver:.
ti~l'llH·lll~ 01' dt'SI!l;ll<' attaehed tO. Or dirertJy Or indirectly COnnected
with. ~ueh flag or :my rcpre,;entation thereof in such manner that
~uch flag or it~ repreH!'ntation is used to attract attention to or
alh t•rti~e ,;urh wonb, figu re~. advertisements or cle~igns, shall for
t lu· pmJHl~t·~ of t hi~ ~t·etion b<' deemed to be upon such flag ."
Tlw ~tatntt> 1~ :In amn lgam of provisions dealing with flag desecra~
tion :IIHI rontt•mpt (th<' first 26 words) and with commercial mi~use
or ot lwr t'\ploitatwn of flag;; of the stat!' and national government.
Tlu~ <':1~<' <'OIH'Prn;.; onl~· t hP "treats contemptuou~ly" phras<' of the
~tatut!', wllll'h ha~ appareut l~· been in th!' statute :siure its enactment
111 lS\19.
Uortueu \'. Smith, supra. 471 F . 2d, at 90, n. 2.
Ill JHi J. ~ub~<'quent to Gogurn's prosecution, the de;;!'cration and
<·ont<>mpt portwn of the stat ute was amended twice. On :\farch 8,
JH71, tlw lc•g;i~lature, p<>r St. 1971 ,,£:. 74 , modified the ftrst sentence by
in,ertlllg "burns or otlwrwi,;e" between the terms " publicly " and
'' mutilate~," and. iu addition, by increasing the fine.
Mass. Gen. Law,.:
~--~AI Ill . 2ti4, § 5 ( 197:3 Supp.) . On August 12, 1971, via St. 1971 )!. 655;
the lrgi;.;Jature append!'d a new sentence defining "the flag of the
1Tnitc·d States" phra~e appearing in the first sentence: "For the
~mpo,:\l of thil:i s!'ct ion tht' term 'flag of the United Statet:~' shall
(V
nwau any flag which hn;.; been designnted by Act or Resolution of
the Congre~~ of the United States as th<' national embl<'m, whether
or not
dc·:-~ignation is currently in force." Ibid. The 197l

:mel(

[Footnote 4 is on p . 4]

72-1254-0PINION

SMITH v. GOGUEN

and eoJitPmpt portion of the statute, the officer charged
speeifieally and only that Goguen "did publicly treat con~
tNnptuously the flag of the United Statesr.-:-." 5
.\ ftcr .1 ury t rial in the Worcester Cot!'nty Superior
( 'ourt, Goguen was found guilty. The court imposed a
:sPut<>JWt' of six months in the Massachusetts Home of
( 'on·Pctions. Goguen appealed to the Massachusetts
~upreme .Judicial Court, which affirmed.
Commonwealth \'. Goguen, Mass. - , 279( '-N. E. 2d 666
( 107:2). That court rejected Goguen 's vagueness argu-.
IIH'Ilt with the comment that "fw]hatever the uncertawtws in other circumstances, we see no vagueness in
tlw statutP as applied here. " Id.,- Mass., at - , 279
?\. K 2d, at 667. The court cited no M11ssachusetts
Jll'<'C'<'d<'nt~ lnterprPting the "treats contemptuously"
phrast' of thf' statute.'1
Aftt•r Goguen began serving his sentence, he was
grant<•d bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas
corpus by the United States District Court for the Dist.ri('t of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343
:tlltPtHlllll'llts nn· n•]('yant to this caS(' only in thr tangrntial Sf'nse
that t IH'\ llldiC':tt(' n rProg;nition by thr lrgi ~lnture of th(' need to
ttl-(htr·n np th1" 11npn·ei~<· ~tat utl•.
' Pl'rh:tJl" tim; wa" IJrc·a u~<· of the difficulty of the qur~tion wlwther
(:ol-(111'11 ~ c·onduet <'Oil~titutrd phy~icnl dr::;rcration of the flag . Cf.
Uuutwn v. 8tmlh, 8upra, 471 .F. 2d, at 91 , n. 4 (" ... [WJc nrr not
~o ~un· that "t'Willg n f1ag to a background rlearly affrcts 'phy::;iral
111 t t•grlt )'. ·

")

·, Appl'ndtx 4
11
Appt•llant t•orrPrtly eonrrdrd at oral argument that Gogurn 's
('HI"l' '" thr fir>'t rt'rordrd Ma 8~achusetts court reading of this langnagt·. Tr of Oral Arg . 17- 18. Indeed, with the exception of one
turn of t hr <'('ntmy ca~e involvmg one of the statute 's rommercial
mtt<ttl"(' prov1~ton~,l! h r rnt irr ~ tatutr has been essentially rvot
of ~tnt<· eonrt mterprrtation . .fC'ommomvealth v. R . / . Sherman
~IU c'o lX\.) :\l a~~. 7(i, 75 N . E. 71 (1905)~

/
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F ;:,upp. 161. The District Court found the flag contPmpt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amt>ndmen t as well as overbroad under the First
Allle nd uw nt. In upholding Goguen's void for vagueness contentions. the court concluded that the words
"treats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily
ascertainable standard of guilt." I d., at 167. Especially
in "tlwsc days when flags are commonly displayed on
hats, garmen ts a nd vehicles ... ," the words under which
Goguen was convicted "leave conjectural, in many instances, what conduct may subject the actor to criminal
prosPcution.'' 1bid. The court also found that the
statutory la nguage at issue "may be said to encourage
arbitrary a nd erratic arrests and convictions. " Ibid.
Tht> Court of Appeals, with one judge concurring,
affirmed th e District Court in all respects. Goguen v.
Smith, supra, 471 F . 2d 88. The Court of Appeals concluded th at "resolution of [Goguen's void for vagueness]
challenge to t he statute as applied to him necessarily
adjudieates the statute's facial constitutionality . . . ."
!d., at \)4. T reating as-applied and on-the-face vagueness attacks as essentially indistinguishable in light of
the impr<>cision of the statutory phrase at issue, id., at 92,
!14, the court found that the language failed to provide
adequate warning to anyone, contained insufficient guidelilies for law enforcement officials, and set juries and
eourts at large. !d., at 94- 96. Then Circuit Judge, now
Sen ior Circuit .Judge Hamley, sitting by designation
from the Ninth Circuit, concurred solely. on voidtfor f
vag ueness grounds. /d., at l05. .Judge Hamley thought
tlw majority's extensive treatment of overbreadth and
other .First Amendment issues unnecessary to the disposition of the ease. Ibid.

(E)
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We agree with the holdings of the District Court and

tlw Court of Ap]wals on the due process doctrine of vague~
ness. The settlPd prineiples of that doctri11e require no
extensiv<' rPstatement here. 7 The doctrine incorporates
notions of fair notic<' or warning.' Moreover, it requires
legislatures to set rrasonably clear guidelines for law enforr<'lllettt officials a11d triers of fact in order to prevrnt
"arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.''" Where a
statute's litPral sr<>JW, unaided by a narrowing state court
lntrrprdatioll, is rapablr of reaching expression sheltered
by tll(' Fm;t Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater
' Th!' (']('mpnt,.: or t IH' VOid for vaguen0'H dortrme have bC'en
d<>n•lop('d in a Ia r~L' bod~ · of preeC'dent from thi~ Court. The ral:l<'i:i
ar<' ('atPgorizPd 111, e. o., Grayned Y. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
IOK-10!1 (I \l7:! l . SL'<' , Am~tt•rdam, ''The Void-for- Vagu<'llC'~~ DortrinP
m tlw H11pn•mr Court," 109 U. Pn. L. Rev. 67 (1960).
'E . rf., J>a]WI'hri8tou \'. City of J'ac!.:sonville. 405 U. S. 156, 16Z
(1972); LanZI.'tta "· Nl!w Jersey, 30ft. U.S. 451, 453 (1939);
"!'\o Oil<' lll;l~· bf' req11in'd at pNil of life, librrt~· or proprrt~· to
~Jl<'l'Uiat<' a~ to tlw nwaning of penal l:ltatutC';;. All arP C'lltitled to
he lllform<·d a:; to what tlw State rommand;; or forbid;;." (Citation~
om1ttrd .);
r--....Connally ' · Oellt'ral Coustructum Co., 269 U.S. 31\5, 91 (19~):
i A I ~tatui<' \\ hi<'h Pit hPr forbid~ or rrquirP~ thr domg of an
a<·t 111 trrm~ ~o ,·agu<• that men of common intelligrner must nece~
~arily gn<'~~ at its meaning and diffrr a~ to it;; application, violate8
thr firt't C'i:i<'('lltial of du(• proce::;..-. of law." (Citation:; omittC'd.)
"E ff., (;rayned. supra, 408 cr S .. at lOR; United States v. _
,sJ:,. Cohen Oror·ery Co., '2'l9 U. S. 81, 89 (1921) ('' .. . [T]o attrmpt
to t'nfon•(' the :::eC"tion would br thr exact cquivaiNlt of an rffort to
carr~· out a ~tatutP whieh in tC'nllH merely penalized and puni;;hed
all act~ detrnnC'ntal to thl' public intere~:>t whrn unju8t and unreason,
~0------:,.,...brl(·-111 fTH' e~tunat-;l of tht• court and jury."); United States v.
~
Reese. H2 ll. S. 214, :!'21 ( 1H75) (''It would certainly be dang<'rous
tf tlw l<•gii<lature could ~rt a nPt large enough to catch all posHiblo
off<•tJdrrs, and lt'avr it to tlw courts to ~tep insidC' Hnd ~ay who
.~
eould lw rightful!~· d('tainPd, and who . . he sC't at L'irgr ."j .
-c._::_~~_.)

.;z"
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degt'('<' of specificity than in other contexts. 111 The statu.:
tory language at issue here, "publicly . . . treats contf'tnptuously tlw flag of the United States ... ,"has such
scope, e. g., Street v. i\'ew York, 394 U. S. 5.76 (1969)
(verbal flag contempt). and at the relevant time was
without the benefit of judicial clarification . 1'
Flag contempt statutes have been characterized as
void for lack of notice on the theory that " [ w] hat is _
contemptuous to one man may be a work of art ~
anotlwr.'' 1" Goguen's behavior can hardly be described
as: art. Immaturity or "silly conduct" 1" probably
comes closer to the mark. But we see the force of the
District Court's observation that the flag has become
"an object of ybuth fashion and high camp . . . "
:34a F. Supp., at 164. As both courts below noted , casual
tn•atment of the flag in many contexts has become a
widespread contemporary phenomenon. /d., at 164 .
1~7; 471 F. 2d. at 96. Flag wearing in a day of relaxed
clothing styles may be simply for adornment or a ploy to
attract attention. It all<l many other current, careless
uses of thl' flag nevertheless constit11te unceremonialtreatment that many people may view as contemptuous.
Y('t in a time of widely varying attitudes and tastes for
f{isplaying something as ubiquitous as the United Rtates
flag or representations of it, it could hardly be the purpose of the Massachusetts legislature to make criminal
every informal use of the flag. The statutory language'
ander which Goguen was charged, however, fails to draw

'+'='

111
E . g., Gruynnf, supra, 40H U. S., at 109; Smith v. California;
;{til U. S. 147, 151 (195!)). Compare the le~s ~t ringent requirement ~
of the modern vagtH'IIe,:s ca:,:e~ dealing with purely economic regula-·
tion . E. g., United States\". National Dairy Pmd~ Corp., 372 U. S.
:29 (l!Hi:3) (Robinson-Patman Act) .
1 1 See 11. 6, supra.
I:! Note, (i(i Mich. L. Hev. 1040 , 105() (196R) .
I:< Gogunt v. Smith, ~u.pra. 34:3: F .. SL1pp .. a,t 160,,
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reasoJJably clear lines between the kinds of nonceremollia1
treatnwnt that are criminal and those that are not. Due
pro<'ess n'quires that all "be informed as to what the
~tat1• c·ommands or forbids ... ,"Lanzetta v . •Vew Jersey,
;{06 {T. ~. 451, 45:~ ( Hl39), and that "men of commort
intPiligellef'" not be forcPd to guess at the meaning of the
erimlllal law . Connally v. General Construction Co.,
~(:iSJ l'. ~ . :38.1. 301 ( 1H32). Given today's tendencies tO'
tl'(·at th<' flag uncerm1oniously, those notice standards
arl' not 1-'Htisfic•d h<'rP.
We• recogniz<' that in a noncommercial context be-!
havior a~ a g<'neral ruk is not mapped out in advance 011
tht> basis of statutory language. 14 In such cases, perhaps
tlw most mt>uningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is
11ot a('tual noticr but the other principal element of the
dQctmH· tlw requirement that a legislature establish
D
( lllinimal guid<'Jines to govem law enforcPment. lt i~&
rPgard that thl' statutory language under scrutiny has its
most notahk defici<'ncies.
l.n its terms. the }anguag~ at issue is sufficiently unhound<'d to prohibit, as the District Court noted, "ally
public (!Pviation from formal flag etiquette . . . . '' 343·
F ~u pp .. at Hi7. Fnchanged throughout its 70-year
h1story ,"' tlw "tr('ats contemptuously" phrase was also·
dPvoid of a JJarrowing state court interpretation at the
f·rl<'vtwt tinl<' in this case. 1 n We are without authority

s[.n.

-@

' > \m:::tPrdam, 11-upra, 109 ll . Pa . L. Rev., at
79.
"' H<'<' n. ;{, supra.
11
' H<'<' 11. (), supra. Tlw t•ontempt portion of the Mas~:>achusett~
~tatntl' ~'><'<'111~ to h:lvP lain fallow for almost it~:> entire history. Appart·utl~· t lwn' havt' b!'!'ll about a half doz!:'n arrests under this part of
tlw 'tatute Ill rrcPJJt yrar~, but none has produced a reported'
rleri~ion
Tr. of Om! Arg. 2'0L In 1968, a teenager- in Lynn,
:\In~~achu~ptt~ wa,; charg!:'d, apparently under the present statute,
\' 1th dP~<'l'rating the £1nitrd StMc::; by .,;ewing piece~ of it into loo
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to cure that defect. 11 Statutory language of such a
stamiardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and
juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legislatures may not so abdicate their responsibilities fo. r sett~~~
fa\
~lw standards of the criminal law. E.JJ.., Papachristou~
City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 16~1qi(1972) . In
('"f'l
Gregory \'. ('ity of Ch1:cago, 394 U. S. 11,(.""120 (1969),
'-.)
Mr . Justice Black voiced a concern that we share against
entrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judglliPnt of tlw policeman on his beat." The aptness of
his admonition is evident from appellant's candid conr·N;sion during oral argument before the Court of Appeals
regarding state enforcement standards for that portion
of th<' statute und<)r which Goguen was convicted:
..
l.\]s counsel lfor appellant] admitted , a war
protestor who. while attending a rally at which it
begins to rain, evidences his disrespect for the
Amf'rican flag by contemptuously covering himself
w1th it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prosecuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a
member of the American Legion who, caught in the
same rainstorm while returning from an 'AmericaLove It or Lf'ave It' rally, similarly uses the flag,
but dews so regrettably and without a contemptuous
a ttltudP. would not be prosecuted ." 471 F . 2d, at
w~,

Wlwre inherently vague statutory language permits such
self'rtivP law enforcement, there is a denial of due process.
f•rou~Pr~ .

:\ew York Times, August 1, 1968, p . 31, col. 1. The
ordered by a state dititrict court to prep11re and deliver
:m ('~;;ay on tlw Hag. Tlw court continued the case without a findI~Ppriving Jt of any pn•redential valur.
r~oi'J 7 R (I , Cnitnl .Sta.tes v. #i Photographs, 402 ( J. S. 363, 3691
tf'rn:q.t<•r

\;.\li l}.

wa~
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III
Appellant's argumellts that the "treats contemptu ...
ously" phra~e is not impermissibly vague, or at least
should not be so held in this case, are unpersuasive.
Appellaut devotes a substantial portion of his opening
brief, as he did his oral argument, to the contention that
Goguen failed to preserve his present void for vagueness
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdictiOJL Appellant concedes that the issue of "vagueness
as applied" is properly before the federal courts,' 8 but
contC'Hds that Gogueu's only arguable claim is that the
statute 1s vague on its face. The latter claim, appelhmt
inst~ts, was not prt'se11ted to the state courts with the
reqmsitC' fair precision. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270
(1071). This exhaustion of remedies argument is belat<:'uly raiscd,'u and it fails to take the full measure of
Goguen's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the
statf' courts. ~ 0 We do uot deal with the point at length,
"HqJiy Bnef 4

r-----1

"' Tlw Dlf'tl'iet Cem·i tlecieisu i11 tiHi rasP wlhi t'fltnl"tl~ub~equent
to J>u·m:d. ·"J!.l!..ra Y!'t it appears that app<.'llant did not raise hts
-----p-n-,~l'nt <•xhau~tHlll uT r('lllC'<h<'ll Hr~umrnt orTurrlt!hllt comt. 'Phe~
~kt111t <'I~ <·ommPntrd Hpecifically on this omi:s~iou: "No rontrution 1~ now madr that I Goguen] has not exhnustrd state rrmedirs,
nor th;lt the <"On:stttutlonal i~l:>uc:; presented here were not raise<f
approprwtrly m ::;tate- proreedings." 343 F. Supp., at 164.
eu GoF;uen filed in ~tatr superior court an unsurces:sful motion to
di::;mi~~ t hr eomplaint in which he cited tlw Fourternth Amendment
and ail('~(·d that the :statute undrr which he was charged wns "impermi~:-;iiJiy Y:tgue and inrnpnblr of fnir and reasonable interpretation
h.v pubhr officials." Apprndix 1. This motion wa:; also before the
l\la~~arhu~Ptt~ Supreme .Judicial Court, ::;ince it was incorporated i11
Gogum's amt>nded bill of rxceptions. Ibid. In addition, Goguen's
bnt>f befon• that Court rai~ed vagurnes:; points nnd cited vagueness
ca~l'~. Id., at 19, 26-27, citing Lanzetta '"· New Je1·sey, 306 U. S.
-!51 ( tn:m), and Parker v. llJ organ, 322 F. Supp. 51\5 (WD N. C.

Go.ju~n

+i /~J

h.t~

~~..P h~PrA.s J
Lor

&A' p.aJt"h~
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howewr, for we find the relevant statutory language
impermissibly vague as applied to Goguen. With~
out doubt the "substance" of this claim was "fairly
pn·1wnted" to the state courts under the exhaustion
standards of Picard, ~:>'Upra, 404 U. S., at 275, 278 .
.\ppellant's exhaustion of remedies argument is premised on the notion that Goguen's behavior rendered him
a hard-core violator as to whom the statute was not
vaguP. whatever its implications for those engaged in dif'1
ferPnt comluct. To be sure there are statutes that
hy thPir terms or as authoritatively construed apply
without questiou to certain activities, but whose applicatiou to otlwr behavior is uncertain. The hard-core
violator concept makes some sense with regard to such
statutt•s. The present statute, however, is not in that
category. This criminal provision is vague "not in thE)
sens<' that it requires a person to conform his conduct
to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard,
but ratlwr in the sense that no standard of coJJduct is
specified at all." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S.
611, (H4 ( 1D71). ~uch a provision simply has no core.
This absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion
and Pxclusion is precisely what offends the Due Process
C'lnus(-'. Th<' deficiency is particularly objectionable in
l!l71) (tiH'<'C'-JUUge court) (North Carolina flag contempt ~:>tatute
\'oid for \' H~?;UPilPo<~ anJ overbreadth). Appellant is correct in a~:>~:>ert~
in~ that (;o~u!'ll failed to compartmentalize in his stntr court brief
th(' due pro!·e~~ dortriJJe of Yaguene:,;s and Fir~l Amendment conrept~:>
of onrbreadt h. Se1• ApJwndix 19-24. But permitting a degree of
kakagP lwl Wf'!'ll tho~!' partirular adjoining compa rtmcnt~ is under~
HtandabiP. Cf. NotP, "The First Amendment Overbrradth Doc~
trine•," k:~ Han·. L. HPv. S44, 871-875 (1970). The highe;;t ~tate
rourt'~ opmion , whic·h d!'alt ~eparately with Goguen's F~n:wnd·
'llt and vaglH'nc::;H claim~,F Mass:;"at - , 279 N. E. 2d, at 667,
cheateo< that that f'Ourt wu;; well aware that Goguen raised botl~
t» of nrglmwnts.

~ .. ~Wt!tc.ffl{

v, C.r~l(ell\.)
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view of the unfettered latitude thereby accorded law
rnforcenwnt officials and triers of fact. Until it is cor:.
rectPd either by anwndment or j uclicial construction, it
affeets all who are prosecuted under the statutory Ian~
guage . In our opinion the defect exists in this case.
Tlw lan?;uagP at issue is void for 'vagueness as applied to
GogttPn because it Rubjected him to criminal liability
under a ~tandard so indefinite that police, court, and jury
were· free to react to nothing more than their own prefer(•nees for treatment of the flag.
Turnillg from the exhaustion point to the merits of
tlw vagueness questiou presented, appellant argues that
any 11otie(' difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow subjN~ t mattPr of tlw statute. "actual" flags of the United
~tates ." '
Ap]wHant contends that this "takes some of
thE' vaguPness away from the phrase, 'treats contemptuously . .
' " "" Anyone who "wants noticE' as to what
iis statutr proscribes ... , immediately knows that it
as somPthing to do with flags and if he wants to stay
lear of violatiug this statute, he just has to stay clear
of doing something to the United States flag." "" Apart
frotn the ambiguities presented by the concept of an
"actual'' fiag."' we fail to see how this alleged particu-

G
-

"' AppPll:lllt '~ BriPf l i; Tran~. of Oral Arg . 9
"" Tr of Oral Ar!J: . !!
~" I b11l
"'At tlw time of (1-ogurn'::; pro~l'Ciltiun, thr :;tat11tc rpferred Himply
to "tlw Ji:tg of th(• FnitPCl Statr:< . . . . " without further definition.
That rai~r,.: thr ohviou" qur~tion wiH•ther Gogtwn'~ miniature cloth
Hag ron~titutrd "thr flag of the United State·~ .
." GoguPt1
arg11Pd 1msurcr~~fully hdore t hr ~tatr rourt~ that the ~tatutr applied.
only to flag~ tha1 mP1 "olfirial ~tandard~" for proportion~, ~uch all
rrla tion of hright to width and t hP ~izr of l:itripe~ and t hr field of
~tar~ . and thnt thP cloth he worr did not mert thoHr l:itandard~ .
Tr. of Oral Ar~ . 11-12, 2+-:26; Apprndix :2 . Therr was no.
di:-ipute· that Uog;uru'~ adornmrnt had tlw rrqui~ite numbrr of l:'1ar"
:.)nd .~tripe•,.: and rolorl'.. Tr .. of Oml Arg. 11-12. Thr 1\fag:;a,..

~

.c....---~
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larity resolves the central vagueness qt:estion-the
absence of any standard for defining contemptuous
treatment.
Appellant's remaining arguments are equally unavailmg. It is asserted that the first six words of the statute
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously" phrase,
nnd that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
customarily construes general language to take on color
from more specific accompanying language. But it is
('Ottced~d that Goguen was convicted under the general
phrase alone, am! that the highest state court did not
rely on any general-to-specific principle of statutory
intf'rpretation in this case."'' Appellant further argues
that thf' Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has
rf'stricterl the scope of the statute to intentional contPmpt."'' Aside from the problems presented by an
appellate court's limiting constructiott in the very case
in which a defendant has been tried under a previously
ehn:;ett~

Suprrnw .Juda·ial Court found Goguen's cloth flag to be
eov<·red b~· the Htntutr. noting that "Lt]he ;;tatute docs not require
that tlw tla~ be 'ol!iC'ia l'" Commonwealth''· Goguen,- Ma~~- - ,
-. :!i9 !'\. E. :!d !iHo, MiS ( 1972) . Thr lowl'r federal rourts did
not addrr~s thi~ holdin~, nor do we. We note only that the ::\Iassachu"Nt~ Le~islaturr apparently sensed an ambiguity in this respect,
h(•(':tiN' sub~('(JUent to Gogul'n'~ proHecut ion it amended the statute
111 au l'ffort to dl'liJH' what it had meant by tlw '' flag of the
l'nitf'd :-:ltatPs. '' SeP 11. 3, supra.
tr. Tr. uf Om! Arg. -~S .
~I; The :\Ia~~achusPtt~ conrt commPnted ~imply that "[t]hP jury
r·otdd mfpr that t ht• violation was intentional without reviewing any
word,; of tlw dPfendant .'' Commonwealth v. Goguen,- Mas~.-,
- , :.!i!) N. E. :2d Htl6, GfiS (19i:2) . Thus, the court held that the
jmy could infrr intPnl merely from Goguen's conduct. This i:;;
apparPntly abo a holding that the jury must find r•ontemptuou~
int,·nt under tllP statutl·, although the requirement amounts to very
little ~mre it iH so easily ~atisfiPd. Thr court's rcferPnce to verbal
r•ommunieat ton rrflf:'rtr•d Goguen's reliauce on Street v. New York',
:l94 TT S. 571:) (L9!11:)),
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uunarrowed statute. 27 this holding still does not clarify
what con duct constitutes contempt, whether intentionai
or iuadvPrtent.
Finally. appellant argues that state law enforcement
authorities have shown themselves ready to interpret
this penal statute narrowly and that the statute, prop·
erly read. reaches only direct, immediate contemptuous
acts that "actually impinge upon the physical integrity
of the fiag . . .. '' "~ There is no support in the record
for tlw former point."" ~imilarly, nothing in the state
court's opinion in this case or in any earlier opinion of
that court sustains the latter. In any event, Goguen
was charged only under the wholly open-ended language
~~ g !I ·· A8htoll v. Kentur;ky, :384 U. S. 195, 198 (1966) .
"' Appellant';:; Bricf :22.
:!v With r<•gard to pro~pr·utonal policie~, appellant cites two pubh>'IJPd upltlion:; of the .'vltt""achu~et ts Attorney General. 4 Ops. of
Alt. (;pn . 470 (l!H5) (H<'prodnccd at Ap}wllant':s Brief 30); Report
of Atty . (;<•n., Pub. Do<'. ?\o. 1:2 , p. 192 (1968) (Reproduced at
Juri~ !::ltatPmPnt App. iS:l) . Appdlnnt concedes that nritlwr deals
wtt h I ht> eont<•mpt portion of till' statute under which Goguen was
L'OllVJdPrl. Thu~. thp~· are not in point here. They provided
guidan<·e to no onP on thr rPlrvaut statutory language. NevertheJr~,.,, npJwllant I>' eorrrrt that tht>y ~ how a tendency on thr part of
th(' ~tat<' .\tlonH'Y G<•tH•ra l to read other portion;,; of the ~ta tute
n;trrowb·. .".1 th<' ~ame tim(•, thry reflect the la ck of precision
rrrurnng thronghuut tlw ;\Ia:-~~arhw;etts flag misuse• ~ tatut e. The
1915 upimon nutrd that a liternl rrading of onr portion of the i,;tatute,
Jtruhihit ing Pxhihi tion of l'ngravmgti of the fl ag on crrtain article~,
would mak(• tt a erimmtli off<>n~r to dil:!play the flag it self ''in many
of it~ f'h<':IJlPI' and more common forms(' Appell::mt 's Brief 31-32.
Tlw ~ta t e Attom e)· C:rueral coneluded that this would be a "ma nifest
alt~urdity" !d .. nt :~2. The 1968 opinion advised that a flag rrprc•:>l'ntntJOJl pmntrd on a door was not "a flag of thr Unit<>d State~''
within 1he menning of t hr ~tiltutr. .Juris. Statement App. 53-55. A
coni rary intNprdation would "raise ~erious que~tion s under the
First and Fourt<·Pnlh Amrudme nt~ . . ," givcn the requirement
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of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously." There
was no allegation of physical desecration.
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature
of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot
establish standards with great precision. Control of the
broad range of disorderly conduct that may inhibit a
policeman in the performance of his official duties may
be one such area, requiring as it does an on-the-spot
assessment of the need to keep order. Cf. Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972). But there is no comparable reason for committing broad discretion to law
enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt.
Indeed, because display of the flag is so common and
takes so many forms, changing from one generation to
another and often difficult to distihguish in principle, a
legislature should define with some care the flag behavior
it intends to outlaw. Certainly nothing prevents a legis~
lature from defining with substantial specificity what
constitutes forbidden treatment of United States flags.:w
that behavior made criminal must be "plainly prohibited by the
language of the statute." ld., at 54.
ao The federal flag desecration statt1te, for example, reflects a
congressional purpo~e to do just that. In response to a warning
b~· the United State;; Attorney General that to use such unbounded
/*'": ~
terms as "defies" or "ca;;ts contempt ... either by word or act" is
"to 'risk invalidation" onl.i{tlt piOtt'!!S grounds, S. Rep. No . 1287,-----~j~
90th Cong., 2d Se;;s., 5 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 350, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 7 (1967), thr bill which became the federal st~ttute was
amended. 113 Cong. Rec. 16449, 16450 ( 1967), to reach only acts
that physically damage the flag. The desecration provision of the
stntute, 18 U. S. C. § 700 (a), declares:
"(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the
United States by publicly mutilating{cfefiicing, defiling, burnmg, or
trampling upon it shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
for not more than one year, or both."
The legislative history reveals a clear desire to reach only defined
physical a.cts of desecration. H. R. Rep. No. 350, supra, at 3:
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The State's failure to approach that goal in the statutory
language at issue requires invalidation of Goguen 1s
conviction. 3 1 The judgment is affirmed.
1t is

$0

ordered.

("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful, not accidental or inadvertt>ut public physical act s of desecration. " ) ; S. Rep.
No. 1287, BUpra, at 3 ("The language of the bill prohibits intentional,
willful, not accidental or inadvertent public physical acts of desecration of the flag.") . The net has been so read by the lower federal
courts, which have upheld it against vagueness challenges. United
States v. Crosson, 462 F . 2d 96 (CA9) cert. denied, 409 U . S. 1064
(1972); JQyce v. United States, U. S. App. D . C. - , 454 F .
2d 971 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 969 (1972) . See Hoffman v.
United States, - - U.S. App. D. C. - , 445 F . 2d 226 (1971) .
3 1 We are aware, of course, of the universal adoption of flag
desecration or contt>mpt statutes by the federal and state governments. Sre n. 30, supra. The statutes of the 50 States are synopsized in Hearings on H . R. 271 , et al., before Sub. Comm. No. 4
of the Houst> Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser . 4,
pt . III , at 324-346 (1967). Most of the state statutes are patterned
after the Uniform Flag Act of 1917, whi ch in § 3 provides that :
"No person shall publicly mutilnte, deface, defile, clefy , trample
upon. or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag, standard ,
color~ or shield."
Compare 9B Uniform Laws Annotated 52- 53 (1966 ), with Hearings
on H. R. 271, et al., supra, at 321-346. Beca use it is stated in
the disjunctive, this language, like tha t before us, makes possible
criminal prosecution solely for c sting c<m.tem.J2.!. upon the flag . The
validity of ~statutes owever, insofar as the vagueness doctrine
is concerned, will depend as much on their judicial construction ancl
~n£orcement history as thei1Giisui8~--.......
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 72-1254
Joseph Smith, Sheriff of
Worcester County,
On Appeal from the United
Appellant,
States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit.
v.
Valarie Goguen.
[January -, 1974]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opmwn of the
Court.
Tho Sheriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts, appeals from a judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit holding the contempt provision of the Massachusetts flag misuse statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Goguen v. Smith, 471
F. 2d 88, aff'g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass. 1972) , prob. juris.
noted, 412 U. S. 905 (1973). We affirm on the vagueness ground. vVe do not reach the correctness of the
holding below on overbreadth or other First Amendment
grounus.
I
The slender record in this case reveals little more
than that Goguen wore a small cloth version of the
United States flag sewn to the seat of his trousers. 1 The
1
Tho record consists solely of the amended bill of exceptions
Goguen filed in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the
opposing briefs before that court, the complaint under which Goguen
was prosecuted, and Goguen's federal habeas corpus petition,
Appendix 1-36, 42-43. We do not have a trial transcript, although
Goguen's amended bill of exceptions briefly summarizes some of the
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flag was approximately four by six inches and was
displayed to the left rear of Goguen's blue jeans. On
January 30, 1970, two police officers in Leominister, Mas~
sachusetts saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. The
first officer encountered Goguen standing and talking with
a group of persons on a public street. The group apparently was not engaged in any demonstration or other protest associated with Goguen's appareP No disruption of
traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this officer approached Goguen to question him about the flag,
the other persons present laughed. Some time later, the
second officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking
in the downtown business district of Leominister.
The following day the first officer swore out a complaint
against Goguen under the contempt provision of the
Massachusetts flag misuse statute. The relevant part
of the statute then read:
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats contemptuously the flag of the
United States ... ; whether such flag is public or
private property ... , shall be punished by a fine
of not less than ten nor more than one hundred
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one
year, or both . . . . " 3
trstimony given by witnesses for the prosecution at his state trial.
Goguen did not take the s1 and. Thus we do not have of record his
account of what transpired at the time of his arrest or of his purpose
in wearing a flag on the seat of his trousers.
2 Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 35-36.
a 1\hss. Gen Laws Ann. c. 264, § 5 (1971). Omitting '*'vera]
sentences protecting the ceremonial activities of certain veterans'
groups, the statute read as follows at the time of Goguen's arrest
and conviction:
"§ 5. Flag; penalty for misuse
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats
contemptuously the flag of the United States or of Massachusetts,
whether such flag is public or private property, or whoever displays
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Despite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was
not charged with any act of physical desecration.'' As
permitted by the disjunctive structure of the desecration
8tlch flag or any representation thereof upon which are words, figures,
adverti:;ements or drsigns, or whoever causes or permits such flag
to be used in a parade as a. receptacle for depositing or collecting
money or nny other article or thing, or whoever exposes to public
view, manufactmes, sell~, Pxpo;;es for sale, gives away or has in
po~:;ession for sak or to give away or for use for any purpose, any
article or substance, being an article of merchandise or a receptacle
of merchnndio;e or art iclPs upon which is attached, through a
wrapping or otherwioe, Pngraved or printed in any manner, a represrntatiou or the United Statrs flag. or whoever u:;es any representation of thr arm:; or the grrat seal of the commonwealth for any
advrrt ising or commercial purpose, shall be punished by a fine of
not. 1<'~:<.~ than ten or morP than one hundred dollars or by imprisonmmt for not more t hnn onr year, or both. Words, figures, advertisements or dP~igns attached to, or directly o1· indirectly connected
with, such flag or any representation thereof in such manner that
such flag or its rrpre 'entation is used to attract attention to or
aclvrrt i;;e such word:;, figure::;, advertisements or designs, shall for
the purpose:; of this section be deemed to be upon such flag. "
The stat ute i ~ an amalgam of provisions dealing with flng desecra•
tion nnd contempt (the fir:;t 26 worcb) and with commrrcial misuse
or other exploitation of flng:; of the state and national government.
This ca~e concernH only tbr " trea.ts contemptuously" phrasr of the
::;tatutr, whirh ha~ npparrntly been in the statute since it~ enactment
in 1899. (ioguen , .. Smith. supra, 471 F. 2d, at 90, n. 2.
In 1971, :,; ub~<'quent to Goguen's pro~ecution, the del:lerration and
contrmpt portion of thP ~tatute was amended twice. On March 8,
1971, the legil:llature, per St. 1971, c. 74, modified the first sentence by
inserting ''burns or othNwi:;e" between the terms " publicly" and
"mutilatrs," and. in addition, by increasing the fine. Mass. Grn. Lawl:l
Ann. c. 264, § 5 (197:3 Supp.). On August 12, 1971, via St. 1971, c.
655; the legis!at ure a]1pe11ded a new sentence defining "the flag of the
United States" phrasr appearing in the first sentence: "For the
purposr~ of this srction the term ·flag of the United States' shall
mean any flag which hal:l been designated by Act or Resolution of
the Congress of the United States as the national emblem, whether
or not s11eh de::;ignation is currently in force." Ibid . The 1971

[Footnote

4 is

on p .

4]
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and contempt portion of the statute, the officer charged
specifically and only that Goguen "did publicly treat contemptuously the flag of the United States .... " 5
After jury trial in the Worcester County Superior
Court. Goguen was found guilty. The court imposed a
sentence of six months in the Massachusetts HoUEe of
Corrections. Goguen appealed to the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed. Commonwealth v. Goguen, Mass. - , 279 N. E. 2d 666
(1972). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argument with the comment that "[w]hatever the uncertainties in other circumstances, we see no vagueness in
the statute as applied here.'' ld.,- Mass., at-, 279
N. E. 2d, at 667. The court cited no Massachusetts
prpceclents interpreting the "treats contemptuously"
phrase of the statute. 0
After Goguen began serving his sentence, he was
granted bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas
corpus by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343
amrndment~

nrc relevant to thi~ case only in the tangential sense
that tlwy indieat(' a recognition by the legislature of the need to
tightm up thi8 imprrci~e .-tatutc.
4 Perhaps this wa~ because of the difficulty of the question whether
Goguen'l:' conduct ron~tituted physical desecration of the flag. Cf.
Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d, at 91, n. 4 (" ... [W] e are not
so sure that sewing a Aag to a barkground clearly affects 'physical
integrity.'").
5 Appendix 4.
6 Appellant correctly conceded at oral argument that Goguen's
case i:o: the fir8t recorded \Ia~snchusetts court reading of this language. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18. Indeed, with the exception of one
turn of the C\:'ntmy ca~e involving one of the statute's commercial
misuse provisions, Commonwealth v. R. l. Sherman Manu. Co., 189
Mn::;s. 7(), 75 N. E. 71 (1905), the entire statute has been essentially
devoid of Rtate court interpretation.

72-1254-0PINION
SMITH v. GOGUEN

F. Supp. 161. The District Court found the flag contempt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as overbroad under the First
Amendment. In upholding Goguen's void for vagueness contentions, the court concluded that the words
"treats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily
ascertainable standard of guilt." I d., at 167. Especially
in "these days when flags are commonly displayed on
hats, garments and vehicles ... ," the words under which
Goguen was convicted "leave conjectural, in many instances, what conduct may subject the actor to criminal
prosecution." Ibid. The court also found that the
statutory language at issue "may be said to encourage
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Ibid.
The Court of Appeals, with one judge concurring,
affirmed the District Court in all respects. Goguen v.
Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d 88. The Court of Appeals concluded that "resolution of [Goguen's void for vagueness]
challenge to the statute as applied to him neces£arily
adjudicates the statute's facial constitutionality . . . . "
!d., at 94. Treating as-applied and on-the-face vagueness attacks as essentially indistinguishable in light of
the imprecision of the statutory phrase at issue, id., at 92,
94, the court found that the language failed to provide
adequate warning to anyone, contained insufficient guidelines for law enforcement officials, and set juries and
courts at large. !d., at 94-96. Then Circuit Judge, now
Senior Circuit Judge Hamley, sitting b:y designation
from the ~inth Circuit, concurred solely on void-forvagueness grounds. !d., at 105. Judge Hamley thought
the majority's extensive treatment of overbreadth and
other First Amendment issues unnecessary to the disposition of the case. Ibid.
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II
We agree with the holdings of the District Court and
the Court of Appeals on the due process doctrine of vague~
ness. The settled principles of that doctrine require no
extensive restatement here. 7 The doctrine incorporates
notions of fair notice or warning. 8 Moreover, it requires
legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent
"arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 0 Where a
statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court
interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered
by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater
7 The elemC>nts of the void for vagueness doctrine hnve been
developed in a large body of precedent from this Court. The cases
arc categorized in, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rock/01·d, 408 U.S. 104,
108-109 (1972). Sec, Amsterdam, "The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
in the Supreme Court," 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960).
8 E. g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162
(1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey , 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939):

"No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to
be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." (Citations
omitted.);

Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 885, 391 (1926):
"
. [A] stat ute which either forbids or requires the dcing of an
act. m terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of due process of law." (Citations omitted.)
9 E. g., Grayned, supra, 408 U. S., at 108; United States v.
L. Cohen Grorery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (" ... [T]o attempt
to enforce the sect ion would be the exact equivalent of an effort to
carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized and punished
all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and unreasonable in the estimation of the court and jury.") ; United States v.
Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 221 (1875) ("It would certainly be dangerous
if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders , and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large .").
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degree of specificity than in other conte'xts. 10 The statutory language at issue here, "publicly . . . treats contemptuously the flag of the United States ... ," has such
~cope, e. g., Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969)
b :erbal flag contempt), and at the relevant time was
without the benefit of judicial clarification. 11
Flag con tempt statutes have been characterized as
void for lack of J1otice on the theory that " [ w] hat is:
contemptuous to one man may be a work of art to
another." 1 2 Goguen's behavior can hardly be described
as art. Immaturity or "silly conduct" 13 probably
comes closer to the mark. But we see the force of the'
District Court's observation that the flag has become
"an object of youth fashion and high camp . . . .''
343 F. Supp. , at 164. As both courts below noted, casual
t'reat.ment of the flag in many contexts has become a
widespread contemporary phenomenon. !d., at 164,.
167; 471 F. 2d, at 96. Flag wearing" in a day of relaxed
clothing styles may be simply for adornment or a ploy to >
attract attention. It and many other current, careless·
uses of the flag · nevertheless constitute unceremonial
treatment that many people may view as contemptuous..
Yet in a time of widely varying attitudes and tastes for·
displaying · something · as ubiquitous as the United States
flag or representations of it, it could hardly be the purpose of the Massachusetts legislature to make criminal
every informal use of the flag. The statutory language
under which Goguen was charged, however, fails to draw·
10 E. g., Grayned; supra, 408 U. S., at 109; Smith v. California,
361 U. S. 147, 151 (1959). Compare the less stringent requirements
of the modern vaguene~s cases dealing with purely economic regula-·
tion . E. g., United · States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U. S..
29 (1963) (Robinson-Patman Act).
11 See n. 6, supra.
12 Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev . 1040, 1056 (1968) .
t 3 Cioguen " : Smith, supra, :lll3: F. Su:rn>., at 166 ~.
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reasonably clear lines between the kinds of nonceremoniai
treatment that are criminal and those that are not. Due
process requires that all "be informed as to what th€!
State commands or forbids ... ," Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939), and that "men of common
intelligence'; not be forced to guess at the meaning of the
criminal law. Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 U. S. 385. 391 (1932). Given today's tendencies to
treat the flag unceremoniously, those notice standards
arc not satisfied here.
Wf' recognize that in a noncommercial context behavior as a general rule is not mapped out in advance on
the basis of statutory language. 14 In such cases, perhaps
the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is
i1ot actual uoticc but the other principal element of the
doctrine-the requirement that a legislature establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. It is in
this regard that the statutory language under scrutiny
has its most notable deficiencies.
In its terms, the language at issue is sufficiently unbounded to prohibit, as the District Court noted, "any
public deviation from formal flag etiquette . . . . " 343
F. Supp., at 167. Unchanged throughout its 70-year
history, 1" the "treats contemptuously" phrase was also
devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the
relevant time in this case. 16 We are without authority
14

Am>:tNdam, supra, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 82, n. 79.
See n. 3, supra.
lG See n. 6, supra.
The contempt portion of the Massachusetts
statute seems to have lain fallow for almost its entire history. Apparently there have been about a hnlf dozen arrests under this part of
the statute in recent year:;, but none has produced a reported
deris.ion. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. In 1968, a teenager in Lynn,
Massachusetts was charged, apparently under the present statute,
with desrcrating the United States by sewing pieces of it into his
1r,
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to cure that defect. 1 ' Statutory language of such a
standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and
juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legisla~
tures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting
the standards of the criminal law. E. g., Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 165-169 ( 1972). In
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 120 (1969),
Mr. Justice Black voiced a concern that we share against
entrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat." The aptness of
his admonition is evident from appellant's candid concession during oral argument before the Court of Appeals
regarding state enforcement standards for that portion
of the statute under which Goguen was convicted:
" . . . [A]s counsel [for appellant] admitted, a war
protestor who, while attending a rally at which it
begins to rain, evidences his disrespect for the
American flag by contemptuously covering himself
with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prosecuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a
member of the American Legion who, caught in the
same rainstorm while returning from an 'AmericaLove It or Leave It' rally, similarly uses the flag,
but does so regrettably and without a contemptuous
attitude. would not be prosecuted." 471 F. 2d, at
102 (emphasis in original).
Where inherently vague statutory language permits such
selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process.
trousers. New York Times, August 1, 1968, p. 31 , col. 1. The
teenager was ordered by a state district court to prepare and deliver
an esBay 011 the flag. The court continued the case without a finding, depriving it of any precedential value.
17
E. g., United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S . 363,
369 (1971).
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III
Appellant's arguments that the "treats contemptu~
ously" phrase is not impermissibly vague, or at least
should not be so held in this case, are unpersuasive.
Appellant devotes a. substantial portion of his opening
brief, as he did his oral argument, to the contention that
Goguen failed to preserve his present void for vagueness
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Appellant concedes that the issue of "vagueness
as applied" is properly before the federal courts, 18 but
contends that Goguen's only arguable claim is that the
statute is vague on its face. The latter claim, appellant
insists, was not presented to the state courts with the
requisite fair precision. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270
(1971). This exhaustion of remedies argument is belatedly raised, 1 !l and it fails to take the full measure of
Goguen's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the
state courts. 20 We do not deal with the point at length,
18

Heply Brief 4.
Gogupn filPd his federal habeas corpus petition subsPquent
to Picar-d, sttpr-a. Yet it appears that appellant did not raise his
pre:>f'nt exhauf'tion of remedies argument before the District Court.
That court commented ~pecifically on this omission: "No contention i~ now madE' that [Goguen] has not exhausted state remedjes,
nor that tho con;;titutional issues presented here were not raised
appropriately in state proceedings." 343 F. Supp., at 164.
20 Goguen filed in state superior court an unsuccessful motion to
dismiss the complaint in which he cited the Fourteenth Amendment
and alleged that the statute under which he was charged was "impermissibly vague and incapable of fair and reasonable interpretation
by public officials." Appendix 1. This motion was also before the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, since it was incorporated in
Goguen's amended bill of exceptions. Ibid. In addition, Goguen's
brief before that Court raised vagueness points and cited vagueness
cases. !d., at 19 , 26-27, citing Lanzetta v. New Jer-sey, 306 U. S.
451 (1930), and Pw·ker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (WD N. C.
10

.
. .
72-1254--0PINION
~

SMITH v. GOGUEN

ii

however, for we find the relevant statutory language
impermissibly vague as applied to Goguen. With-'
out doubt the "substance" of this claim was "fairly
presented" to the state courts under the exhaustion
standards of Picard, supra, 404 U. S., at 275, 278.
Appellant's exhaustion of remedies argument is premised on the notion that Goguen's behavior rendered him
a hard-core violator as to whom the statute was not
vague. whatever its implications for those engaged in dif . .
fercnt conduct. To be sure there are statutes that
by their terms or as authoritatively constn:ed apply
without question to certain activitie!:, but whose application to other behavior is uncertain. The hard-core
violator concept makes some sense with regard to such
statutes. The present statute, however, is not in that
category. This criminal provision is vague "not in the
sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct
to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard,
but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is
specified at all." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S.
611, 614 (1971 ). Such a provision simply has no core.
This absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion
and exclusion is precisely what offends the Due Process
Clause. The deficiency is particularly objectionable in
1071) (three-judge court) (North Carolina flag contempt statute
void for vagueness and overbreadth). Appellant is correct in asserting that Goguen failed to compnrtmentalize in his state court brief
the due process doctrine of vagueness and First Amendment concepts
of overbreadth. Sec Appendix 19-24. But permitting a degree of
lcnknge between those particular adjoining compartments is understandable. Cf. Note, "The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine," 3 Harv. L. Rev. 844, 871-875 (1970). The highest state
court':; opinion, which dealt separately with Goguen's First Amendment am! vagueness claims, Commonwealth v. Goguen, sup1'a, Mass ., at - , 279 N. E. 2d, at 667, indicates that that court was
well aware that Goguen raised both set:; of arguments.
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view of the unfettered latitude thereby accorded law
enforcement officials and triers of fact. Until it is corrected either by amendment or judicial construction, it
affects all who are prosecuted under the statutory language. In our opinion the defect exists in this case.
The language at issue is void for vagueness as applied to
Goguen because it subjected him to criminal liability
under a standard so indefinit~ that police, court, and jury
were free to react to nothing more than their own preferences for treatment of the flag.
Turning from the exhaustion point to the merits of
the vagueness question presented, appellant argues that
any notice difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow subject matter of the statute, "actual" flags of the United
States.~ 1 Appellant contends that this "takes some of
the vagueness away from the phrase, 'treats contemptuously .. . . ' '' 22 Anyone who "wants notice as to what.
conduct this statute proscribes ... , immediately knows
that it has something to do with flags and if he wants to
stay clear of violating this statute, he just has to stay clear
of doing something to the United States flag." 23 Apart
from the ambiguities presented by the concept of an
"actual" flag,~• we fail to see how this alleged particu21
22

Apprllant '~ Brief 17; Trans. of Oral Arg. 9.
Tr. of Oral Arg . 9.

2 afbid.
21
At thr time of Goguen's j)rosecution, the statute referred simply
to "the flag of the United States ... ," without further definition.
That rai~es the obvious question whether GcguPn's miniature cloth
flag constituted "thr flag of the United States . . . . " · Goguen
argued un:snccrs:.:fnll~· before thr :state courts that the statute applied
only to flag:.: that met "oificial :standards" for proportions, such as
relation of height to width and the size of stripes and the field of
:stars, and that the cloth he wore did not meet those standards.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12, 24-26; Appendix 2. There was no
dispute that Goguen'~ adornment had the requisite number of stars
and slripe:s and color:s. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. The Massa-
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larity resolves the central vagueness qrestion-the
·absence of any standard for defining contemptuous
treatment.
Appellanes remaining arguments are equally unavailmg. It is asserted that the first six words of the statute
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously" phrase,
and that the Massachuretts Supreme Judicial Court
customarily com:trues general language to take on color
from more specific accompanying language. But it is
conceded that Goguen was convicted under the general
phrase alone, and that the highest state court did not
rely on any general-to-specific principle of statutory
interpretation in this case. 25 Appellant further argues
that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has
restricted the scope of the statute to intentional con~
tempt. 2 r; Aside from the problems presented by an
appellate court's limiting construction in the very case
in which a defendant has been tried under a previously
chuHetto Suprem0 Judicial Court found Goguen's cloth flag to be
rov<:>red by the statnt<:>, noting that " [t]he statute does not require
that the fla g be 'official'" Commonwealth v. Goguen,- Ma ss. - ,
- , 279 N. E. 2rl 666, 668 (1972). The lower federal courts did
not addr0sH this holding, nor do we. We note only that the MassachusC'tts Legi~latur0 apparently sensed an ambiguity in this respect,
ber:ms0 sub::;equent to Goguen's prosecution it amended the statute
in an effort to d0fin<:> what it had meant by the "flag of the
United Stat(':;." S0e n. 3, supra.
25 Tr. of Oral Arg. 48.
26
T h<:> Massachusetts court commented simply that "[t]he jury
could infer that the violation was intentional without reviewing any
words of th0 defendant." Commonwealth v. Goguen,- Mass . - ,
- , 279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). Thus, the court held that the
jury could infer intent merely from Goguen's conduct. This is
n.pparently also a holding that the jury must find contemptuous
int<:>nt under the statut0, although the requirement amounts to very
little since it is so easily ~atisfied. The court's reference to verbal
communication reflected Goguen's r<:>liance on Str-eet v. New York,

394 U. S. 579 (1969).
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unnarrowed statute. 27 this holding still does not clarify
what conduct constitutes contempt, whether intentionai
or inadvertent.
Finally, appellant argues that state law enforcement
authorities have shown themselves ready to interpret
this penal statute narrowly and that the statute, properly read. reaches only direct, immediate contemptuous
acts that "actually impinge upon the physical integrity
of the flag .... " 28 There is no support in the record
for the former point. 2 u Similarly, nothing in the state
court's opinion in this case or in any earlier opinion of
that court sustains the latter. In any event, Goguen
was charged only under the wholly open-ended language
E. g., Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195, 198 (1966) .
Apprllant 's Brief 22.
29 With regard to prosecutorial policies, appellant cites two publislwd opinion~:~ of the Mas:sachusetts Attorney General. 4 Ops. of
Att. Gen. 470 (1915) (Reproduced at Appellant's Brief 30); Report
of Atty. Grn., Pub. Doc. No. 12, p. 192 (1968) (Reproduced at
Juris. Statrment App. 53). Appellant concedes that neither deals
with thr contempt port ion of the statute under which Goguen was
convicted. Thus, they are not in point here. They provided
guidance to no one on tlw relevant statutory language. Nevertheless, apprllnnt is conect that they show a tendency on the part of
the sUtte Attorne~· General to read other portions of the statute
narrowly. At the same time, they reflect the lack of precision
recurring throughout the Massachusetts flag misuse statute. The
1915 opinion noted that a literal reading of one portion of the statute,
prohibiting exhibition of engravings of the flng on certain articles,
would make it n criminal offense to display tlw flag itself "in many
of it~:; cheaper and more common forms." Appellant's Brief 31-32.
The :>tate Attorne~· General roneluded that this would ben "manifest
absurdity." ld. , at 32. The 1968 opinion advised that a flag rrpresrntation painted on a door was not "a flag of the United States"
within the mraning of the statute. Juris. Statrment App. 53-55. A
contrary interpretation would "raise serious questions under the
Fir;;t and Fourtrenth Amendments . . . ," given the requirement
27

28
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of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously." There
was no allegation of physical desecration.
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature
of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot
establish standards with great precision. Control of the
broad range of disorderly conduct that may inhibit a
policeman in the performance of his official duties may
be one such area, requiring as it does an on-the-spot
assessment of the need to keep order. Cf. Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972). But there is no cornparable reason for committing broad discretion to law
enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt.
Indeed, becaus.e display of the flag is so common and
takes so many forms, changing from one generation to
another and often difficult to distinguish in principle, a
legislature should define with some care the flag behavior
it intends to outlaw. Certainly nothing prevents a legislature from defining with substantial specificity what
constitutes forbidden treatment of United States flags. 30
that behavior made criminal must be "plainly prohibited by the
language of the statute." !d., at 54.
30 The federal flag desecration statute, for example, reflects a
congrC'ssional purpose to do just that. In response to a warning
by the FnitC'd States Attorney General that to use such unbounded
term~ as "ddies" or "casts contempt ... either by word or act" is
'·to ri:sk invalidation" on vagueness grounds, S. Rep. No. 1287,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1968); H. R. Rep. No . 350, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 7 (1967), the bill which became the federal statute was
amended. 113 Cong. Rec. 16449, 16450 (1967), to reach only acts
that physically damagC' the flag. The desecration provision of the
statute, 18 U. S. C. § 700 (a), declares:
"(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the
Unit eel States by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or
trampling upon it shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
for not more than one year, or both."
The legislative history reveals a clear desire to reach only defined
pl1ysical acts of desecration. H. R. Rep. No. 350, supra, at 3
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The State's failure to approach that goal in the statutory
language at issue requires invalidation of Goguen's
conviction.'11 The judgment is affirmed.

It

tS

so ordered.

("The language of the bill prohibit~ intentional, willful, not acc1·
dental or inndvertPnt public phy~ical acts of de>;erration ."); S. Rep.
No. 12Ri, supra. at 3 ("Tlw language of the bill prohibits intent ional ,
willful, not accidental or inadvertE'nt public phy~ical acts of desecration of the fin g."). The act has beE'n ~o read by the lower federal
court~, which have uplwld it against vagueness chaliE'ngE'~. United
States v. Crosson, 462 F. 2d 96 (CA9) cE'rt. denird , 409 U. S. 1064
(19i2); Joycr' v. Unitr'd States. U. S. App. D. C. - , 454 F.
2d 971 (1971), crrt . denied, 405 U.S. 969 (19i2). SeE' Hoffman v.
United States, - - U. S. App. D. C.-, 445 F . 2d 226 (1971).
:H
are aware, of cour~r. of the univ E' r~al adoption of flag
dr~rcrntion or contempt stat ut E'~ by the fE'deral and state govcrnmrnts . Sre n. ao. supra. Thr ~ta tute · of the 50 States arc synopsized in Hearing;; on H. H. 2i1, et al .. before Sub. Comm. No . 4
of thr Hou~P Comm. on thE' Judiciar~· . 90th Cong .. 1st Sess., SE'r. 4,
pt . Til , at :{24-:{46 (196i). l\Iost of thE' ~tatE' statutes are patt erned
after the U niform Flag Act of 191i, which in § 3 providE's that:
"No pcr~on ~ hall publicly mutilate. deface , dE'file, defy, trample
upon, or br word or act cast contempt upon any such flag, standard ,
color, ensign or :-<hield."

·we

Comparr 9B l:niform Laws Annotated 52-53 (1966) , with Hearings
on H. R. 27 1, et al., supra. at 321-346. Because it is statE'd in
the di~junrtivE', t hi ~ language. like that before us, makes possible
criminal proHecution solely for casting contempt upon the flag. The
validity of ;;tnt utrs utilizing this language , however, insofa r as the
vagtH'IlE'oo doctrine is roncernrd, will deprnd as much on their
judicial co notruct ion a nd enforcement history as their liberal terms,
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MR. JuSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Sheriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts, appeals from a judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit holding the contempt provision of the Massachusetts flag misuse statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Goguen v. Smith, 471
F. 2d 88, aff'g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass. 1972) , prob. juris.
noted, 412 U. S. 905 (1973). We affirm on the vagueness ground. We do not reach the correctness of the
holding below on overbreadth or other First Amendment
grounds.
I
The slender record in this case reveals little more
than that Goguen wore a small cloth version of the
United States flag sewn to the seat of his trousers. 1 The
1 The record consists solely of the amended bill of exceptions
Goguen filed in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the
opposing briefs before that court, the complajnt under which Goguen
was proseruted, and Goguen's federal habeas corpus petition,
Appendix 1-36, 42-43. We do not have a trial transcript, although
Goguen's amended bill of exceptions briefly summarizes some of the
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flag was approximately four by six inches and was
displayed to the left rear of Goguen's blue jeans. On
January 30, 1970, two police officers in Leominister, Mas·
sachusetts saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. The
first officer encountered Goguen standing and talking with
a group of persons on a public street. The group apparJ
ently was not engaged in any demonstration or other protest associated with Goguen's apparel." No disruption of
traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this officer approached Goguen to question him about the flag,
the other persons present laughed. Some time later, the
second officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking
in the downtown business district of Leominister.
The following day the first officer swore out a complaint
against Goguen under the contempt provision of the
Massachusetts flag misuse statute. The relevant part
of the statute then read:
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats contemptuously the flag of the
United States ... ; whether such flag is public or
private property ... , shall be punished by a fine
of not less than ten nor more than one hundred
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one
year, or both . . . ." 3
testimony given by witnesse:: for the prosecution at his state trial.
Goguen did not take the stand. Thus we do not have of record his
account of what t ran8pired at the time of his arrest or of his purpose
in wearing a flag on the seat of his trousers.
2
Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 35-36.
" Mass. Gen Laws Ann. c. 264, § 5 ( 1971). Omitting I;<'Veral
sentences protecting the ceremonial activities of certain veterans'
groups, the statute read as follows at the time of Goguen's arrest
and conviction:
"§ 5. Flag; penalty for misuse
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats
contemptuously the flag of the Umted States or of Massachusetts,
whether such flag is public or private property, or whoever displays
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Despite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was
not charged with any act of physical desecration. 4 As
permitted by the disjunctive structure of the desecration
such flag or any repre~entntion thereof upon which are words, figures,
aclvcrtio<:'mcnts or designs, or whoever rauses or permits such flag
to b<:' used in a parade as a receptacle for depositing or collecting
monry or any othE'f article or thing, or whoever exposes to public
view, manufactureo, sells, expo~es for sale, gives away or has in
possession for sale or to give away or for usc for any purpose, any
article or ~ubstance, being an article of merchandise or a receptacle
of merchandi:o<:' or articles upon which is attached, through a
wrn]lping or at herwis<:', engraved or printed in any manner, a represrntation of the United States flag. or whoever uses any representatioll of the arms or the great seal of the commonwealth for any
advrrti~ing or commercial purpose, shall be punished by a fine of
not. les.~ than ten or more than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than onr year, or both. Words, figures, advertisrment::; or dr8igns attached to. or directly or indirectly connected
with, such flag or any rrpresentation thereof in such manner that
~nch flag or its representation is used to attract attention to or
advertise such words, figure::;, advertisements or designs, shall for
the purposes of this sertion be deemed to be upon such flag."
The Htatute is an amalgam of provisions dealing with flag desecra~
tion and contempt (the first 26 words) and with commercial misuse
or other exploitation of flags of the state and national govemment.
Thi~ ca;;r concrrn::; on]~· tlJP "treats contemptuously" phra ·e of the
statute, which has apparently been in the statute since its enactment
in 1c99. Goguen '. Smith, supm, 471 F. 2d, at 90, n. 2.
I11 1971, ::;ubsrquPnt to Goguen's pro::;ecution, the del:lecration and
contempt portion of the statute was amended twice. On March 8,
l!:li 1, the legislature, per St. 1971, c. 74, modified the first srntencr by
inserting "burns or otherwise" between the terms "publicly" and
"mutilates," and, in addition, by increa::;ing the fine. Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. c. 264, § 5 (1973 Supp.). On August 12, 1971, via St. 1971, c.
~ the legislature apprnded a new sentence defining "the flag of the
United State::;" phrase appearing in the first sentence: "For the
pmpose~ of thi;; :;ection the term 'flag of the United States' shall
mean any flag which has been designated by Act or Resolution of
the Congress of the United State::; as the national emblem, whether
or not such de::;ignation i<> currently in force." Ibid. The 1971
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and contempt portion of the statute, the officer charged
specifically and only that Goguen "did publicly treat contemptuously the flag of the United States .... " 5
After jury trial in the Worcester County Superior
Court, Goguen was found guilty. The court imposed a
sentence of six months in the Massachusetts Hom:e of
Corrections. Goguen appealed to the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed. CommonMass. - , 279 N. E. 2d 666
wealth v. Goguen, ( 1972). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argument with the comment that "[w]hatever the uncertainties in other circumstances, we see no vagueness in
the statute as applied here." /d.,- Mass., at-, 279
N. E. 2d, at 667. The court cited no Massachusetts
prrceclrnts interpreting the "treats contemptuously"
phrase of the statute.u
After Goguen began serving his sentence, he was
granted bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas
corpus by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343
amrndrnent~

are relrvant lo thi~ case only in the tangential sense
that they indicate a recognition by the legislature of the need to
t1ghten up this impreci~e ~tatute.
4
Perhaps this was brrause of the difficulty of the question whether
Gogu<>n '::; conduct ron~tituted physical desecration of the flag. Cf.
Goguen v. Smith , ~;upra, 471 F. 2d, at 91, n. 4 (" ... [W]e are not
so sure that sewing a flag to a background clearly affects 'physical
integrity.' ") .
5 Appendix 4.
6 Appellant corrrctly conreded at oral argument that Goguen's
case is thr fir~t recorded Nlas~achu:;ettl:i court reading of this languagr. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18. Indeed, with the exception of one
turn of thr c(.'ntury case involving one of the statute's commercial
misuse proviHions, Commonwealth v. R. I. Sherman Manu. Co., 189
Mal:iS. 76, 75 N . E. 71 (1905), thr entire statutr has been essrntially
devoid of state court interpretation.
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F. Supp. 161. The District Court found the flag contempt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as overbroad under the First
Amendment. In upholding Goguen's void for vagueness contentions, the court concluded that the words
"treats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily
ascertainable standard of guilt." I d., at 167. Especially
in "these days when flags are commonly displayed on
hats. garments and vehicles ... ," the words under which
Goguen was convicted "leave conjectural, in many in~
stances, what conduct may subject the actor to criminal
prosecution." Ibid. The court also found that the
statutory language at issue "may be said to encourage
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Ibid.
The Court of Appeals, with one judge concurring,
affirmed the District Court in all respects. Goguen v.
Srnith, supra, 471 F. 2d 88. The Court of Appeals concluded that "resolution of [Goguen's void for vagueness]
challenge to the statute as applied to him necessarily
adjudicates the statute's facial constitutionality . . .. "
!d. , at 94. Treating as-applied and on-the-face vagueness attacks as essentially indistinguishable in light of
the imprecision of the statutory phrase at issue, id., at 92,
94, the court found that the language failed to provide
adequate warning to anyone, contained insufficient guidelines for law enforcement officials, and set juries and
courts at large. !d., at 94-96. Then Circuit Judge, now
Senior Circuit Judge Hamley, sitting by designation
from the Ninth Circuit, concurred solely on void-forvagueneEs grounds. !d., at 105. Judge Hamley thought
the majority's extensive treatment of overbreadth and
other First Amendment issues unnecessary to the disposition of the case. Ibid.
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II
We agree with the holdings of the District Court and
the Court of Appeals on the due process doctrine of vague~
ness. The settled principles of that doctrine require no
extensive restatement here. 7 The doctrine incorporates
notions of fair notice or warning. 8 Moreover, it requires
legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent
"arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." u Where a
statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court
interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered
by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater
The elemmt~ of the void for vagueness doctrine have been
developed in a large body of precedent from this Court. The cases
arc eatC'gorizcd in, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104,
108-109 (1972). SC'c, Am~terdnm, "The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
in the Supreme Court," 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960).
8 E. g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162
(1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939):
"No one may be required at peril of life, libert~' or property to
spC'eulate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to
be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." (Citations
omitted.);
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926):
"
. rAJ statutP which either forbids or requires the dcing of an
act in trrms so vague that men of common intelligence must necestiarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of due process of law." (Citations omitted.)
9 E. g., Grayned, supra, 408 U. S., at 108; United States v.
L. Cohen Grorery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (" ... [T]o attempt
to enforce the section would be the exact equivalent of an effort to
carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized and punished
all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and unreasonable in the estimation of the court and jury."); United States v.
Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 221 ( 1875) ("It would certainly be dangerous
if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.").
7
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degree of specificity than in other contexts. 10 The statutory language at issue here, "publicly . . . treats contemptuously the flag of the United States ... ," has such
scope, e. g., Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 5-76 (1969)
herbal flag contempt), and at the relevant time was
without the benefit of judicial clarification. 11
Flag contempt statutes have been characterized as
void for lack of notice on the theory that " [ w] hat is:
contemptuous to one man may be a work of art to
another." 12 Goguen's behavior can hardly be described
as art. Immaturity or "silly conduct" l:l probably
comes closer to the mark. But we see the force of the'
District Court's observation that the flag has become
"an object of youth faEhion and high camp . . . ."
343 F. Supp., at 164. As both courts below noted, casual
t'reat.ment of the flag in many contexts has become a
widespread contemporary phenomenon. !d., at 164,.
167; 471 F. 2d, at 96. Flag wearing in a day of relaxed
clothing styles may be simply for adornment or a ploy to )
attract attention. It and many other current, careless·
uses of the flag · nevertheless constitute unceremonial
treatment that many people may view as contemptuous..
Yet in a time of widely varying attitudes and tastes for ·
displaying · something· as ubiquitous as the United States
flag or representations of it, it could hardly be the purpose of the Massachusetts legislature to make criminal
every informal use of the flag. The statutory language
under which Goguen was charged, however, fails to draw·
10 E. g., Grayned; supra, 408 U. S., at 109; Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). Compare the less stringent requirements
of the modern vagueness cases dealing with purely economic regula-·
tion. E. g .. United · States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp. , 372 U. S..
29 (1963) (Robinson-Patman Act).
11 See n. 6, supra.
12 Nole, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1040, 1056 (1968).
' 3 Cl:oguen v.: Smith, s·u:pra, 3..'13: F. Sum;>., at 166~.
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reasonably clear lines between the kinds of nonceremoniai
treatment that are criminal and those that are not. Due
process requires that all "be informed as to what th~
State commands or forbids ... ,"Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U. S. 451 , 453 (1939), and that "men of common
intelligence'; not be forced to guess at the meaning of th~
criminal law. Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 U. S. 385. 391 (1932). Given today's tendencies to
treat the flag unceremoniously, those notice standards
are not satisfied here.
We recognize that in a noncommercial context behavior as a general rule is not mapped out in advance on
the basis of statutory language. 14 In such cases, perhaps
the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is
not actual notice but the other principal element of the
doctrine-the requirement that a legislature establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. It is in
this regard that the statutory language under scrutiny
has its most notable deficiencies.
In its terms, the language at issue is sufficiently unbounded to prohibit, as the District Court noted, "any
public deviation from formal flag etiquette. . . ." 343
F. Supp., at 167. Unchanged throughout its 70-year
history, u; the "treats contemptuously" phrase was also
devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the
relevant time in this case. 10 We are without authority
14

Amsterdam, supra, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. , at 82, n. 79.
See n. 3, supra.
w See n. 6, supra. The contempt portion of the Massachusetts
statute srrms to have Jain fallow for almost its entire history. Apparently thcre havP bPen about a half dozen arre~ts under this part of
the statute in rE'cE'nt years, but none has produced a reported
derision. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. In 1968, a teenager in Lynn,
Massachu~etts was charged, apparent! under the resent statute,
with dr~ccrating tho UnitE'd States by sewing pieces of it into hls
15
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to cure that defect. 17 Statutory language of such a
standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and
juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legisla~
tures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting
the standards of the criminal law. E. g., Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 165-169 (1972). In
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 120 (1969),
Mr. Justice Black voiced a concern that we share against
entrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat." The aptness of
his admonition is evident from appellant's candid concession during oral argument before the Court of Appeals
regarding state enforcement standards for that portion
of the statute under which Goguen was convicted:
" . . . [A]s counsel [for appellant] admitted, a war
protestor who, while attending a rally at which it
begins to rain, evidences his disrespect for the
American flag by contemptuously covering himself
with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prosecuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a
member of the American Legion who, caught in the
same rainstorm while returning from an 'AmericaLove It or Leave It' rally, similarly uses the flag,
but does so regrettably and without a contemptuous
attitude, would not be prosecuted." 471 F. 2d, at
102 (emphasis in original).
Where inherently vague statutory language permits such
selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process.
trousers. New York Times, August 1, 1968, p. 31, col. 1. The
teenager was ordered by a state district court to prepare and deliver
an essay on the flag. The court continued the case without a finding, depriving it of any precedential value.
17
E. g., United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S . 363,
369 (1971).
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III
Appellant's arguments that the "treats contemptuously" phrase is not impermissibly vague, or at least
should not be so held in this case, are unpersuasive.
Appellant devotes a substantial portion of his opening
brief, as he did his oral argument, to the contention that
Goguen failed to preserve his present void for vagueness
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Appellant concedes that the issue of "vagueness
as applied" is properly before the federal courts/ 8 but
contends that Goguen's only arguable claim is that the
statute is vague on its face. The latter claim, appellant
insists, was not presented to the state courts with the
requisite fair precision. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270
( 1971). This exhaustion of remedies argument is belatedly raised.'!! and it fails to take the full measure of
Goguen's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the
state courts. 20 We do not deal with the point at length,
Reply Bripf 4.
Gogurn filed his federal habeas corpus petition subsequent
to Picard, supra. Yet it appears that appellant did not raise his
presrn1 exhaustion of remedies argument before the District Court.
That <·our1 commented specifically on this omission: "No contention i~ now made that [Goguen] has not exhausted state remeclies,
nor that the constitutional i~sues presented here were not raised
appropriately in sta te proceedings." 343 F. Supp., at 164.
20
Goguen filed in state superior court an unsuccessful motion to
dismis the complaint in which he cited the Fourteenth Amendment
and alleged that the statute under which he was charged was "impermissibly vague and incapable of fair and reasonable interpretation
by public officials." Appendix 1. This motion was also before the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, since it was incorporated in
Goguen's amended bill of exceptions. Ibid. In addition, Goguen's
brief before that Court raised vagueness points and cited vagueness
cases. !d., at 19 , 26-27, citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S.
451 (1930), and Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (WD N. C.
18
19
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however, for we find the relevant statutory language
impermissibly vague as applied to Goguen. Without doubt the "substance" of this claim was "fairly
presented" to the state courts under the exhaustion
standards of Picard, supra, 404 U. S., at 275, 278.
Appellant's exhaustion of remedies argument is premised on the notion that Goguen's behavior rendered him
a hard-core violator as to whom the statute was not
vague. whatever its implications for those engaged in dif . .
fercnt conduct. To be sure there are statutes that
by their terms or as authoritatively construed apply
without question to certain activitie~, but whose application to other behavior is uncertain. The hard-core
violator concept makes some sense with regard to such
statutes. The present statute, however, is not in that
category. This criminal provision is vague "not in the
sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct
to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard,
but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is
specified at all." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S.
611, 614 (1971). Such a provision simply has no core.
This absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion
and exclusion is precisely what offends the Due Process
Clause. The deficiency is particularly objectionable in
1071) (t hrce-jndge court) (North Carolina flag contempt statute
void for vagueness and overbreadth). Appellant is correct in asserting that Goguen failed to compnrtmentalize in his state court brief
the due process doctrine of vagueness and Fir01t Amendment concepts
of overbreadth. See Appendix 19-24. But permitting a degree of
leakage betwePn those pnrticular adjoining compartments is understandable. Cf. Note, "The First Amendment Overbreadth Doc~
trine," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844, 871-875 (1970). The highest state
court's opinion, which dealt ~eparately with Goguen's First Amendment and vagueness claims, Commonwealth v. Goguen, supra, Mass., at - , 279 N. E. 2d, at 667, indicates that that court was
well aware that Goguen raised both set~; of argument~; .
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view of the unfettered latitude thereby accorded law
enforcement officials and triers of fact. Until it is corrected either by amendment or judicial construction, it
affects all who are prosecuted under the statutory language. In our opinion the defect exists in this case.
The language at issue is void for vagueness as applied to
Goguen because it subjected him to criminal liability
under a standard so indefinite that police, court, and jury
were free to react to nothing more than their own preferences for treatment of the flag.
Turning from the exhaustion point to the merits of
the vagueness question presented, appellant argues that
any notice difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow subject matter of the statute, "actual" flags of the United
States. 2 1 Appellant contends that this "takes some of
the vagueness away from the phrase, 'treats contemptuously .... ' '' 2 " Anyone who "wants notice as to what
conduct this statute proscribes ... , immediately knows
that it has something to do with flags and if he wants to
stay clear of violating this statute, he just has to stay clear
of doing something to the United States flag." 23 Apart
from the ambiguities presented by the concept of an
"actual" flag,"' we fail to see how this a.lleged particuAppellant'~ Brief 17; Trans. of Oral Arg. 9.
Tr. of Ornl Arg;. 9.
23 Ibid.
21
At tlw time of Goguen's J)rosecution, the statute referred simply
to "the flng of the United States ... ," without further definition.
That rai~es the obvious quest ion whether Gcguen's miniature cloth
flag ron~tituted ''the flag of the United States . . . . " · Goguen
argued un~ucre~sfull~, before the state courts that the statute applied
only to flngs that met ''official ~tandards" for proportions, such as
relation of height to width nnd the size of stripes and the field of
~tar;;, and that the cloth he wore did not meet those standards.
Tr. of Oral Arg;. 11-12, 24-26; Appendix 2. There was no
di~pute thnt Goguen'~ adornment had the requisite number of stars
and stripe;:; and colors. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. The Massa21

22
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larity resolves the central vagueness qrestion-th~
absence of any standard for defining contemptuous
treatment.
Appellant's remaining arguments are equally unavail. .
mg. It is asserted that the first six words of the statute
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously" phrase,
and that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
customarily com:trues general language to take on color
from more specific accompanying language. But it is
conceded that Goguen was convicted under the general
phrase alone, and that the highest state court did not
rely on any general-to-specific principle of statutory
interpretation in this case.~ 5 Appellant further argues
that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has
restricted the scope of the statute to intentional con~
tempt.~ 6
Aside from the problems presented by an
appellate court's limiting construction in the very case
in which a defendant has been tried under a previously
chu~ett~

Supreme Judicial Court found Goguen's cloth flag to be
covered by the statute, noting that "lt]he statute docs not require
that the flag be 'otfirial'" Commonwealth v. Goguen, Mass. - ,
- , 279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). The lower federal courts did
not ncldrt'8S this holding, nor do we. We note only that the Massachusett;; Legi8lature apparently sensed an ambiguity in this respect,
because sub8equent to Goguen's prosecution it amended the statute
in an effort to define what it had meant by the "flag of the
United States." Seen. 3, supra.
2 5 Tr. of Oral Arg. 48.
26
The Massachusetts court commented simply that "[t]he jury
could infer that the violation was intentional without reviewing any
words of the defendant." Commonwealth v. Goguen,- Mass.-,
- , 279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). Thus, the court held that the
jury could infer intent merely from Goguen's conduct. This is
apparently also a holding that the jury must find contemptuous
intent under the statute, although the requirement amounts to very
little since it is so easily ~atisfied. The court's reference to verbal
commuuicat ion reflected Goguen's reliance on Street v. New York,
394 U. S. 579 (1969).
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unnarrowed statute, 27 this holding still does not clarify
what conduct constitutes contempt, whether intentionai
or inadvertent.
Finally, appellant argues that state law enforcement
authorities have shown themselves ready to interpret
this penal statute narrowly and that the statute, properly read. reaches only direct, immediate contemptuous
acts that "actually impinge upon the physical integrity
of the flag .... '' 28 There is no support in the record
for the former point. 2 u Similarly, nothing in the state
court's opinion in this case or in any earlier opinion of
that court sustains the latter. In any event, Goguen
was charged only under the wholly open-ended language
E. (]., Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195, 198 (1966) .
Apprllant 's Brief 22.
2 n With regard to prosecutorial policies, appellant cites two published opinions of the Massachusetts Attorney General. 4 Ops. of
Att. Gen. 470 (1915) (Reproduced at Appellant's Brief 30); Report
of Atty. Gen., Pub. Doc. No. 12, p. 192 (1968) (Reproduced at
Jmis. Statem<:>nt App. 53). Appellant concedes that n<:>ither deals
with the contempt portion of the statute under which Goguen was
convict<:>cl. Thus, they are not in point her<:>. They provided
guiclanre 1o no one on the relevant stntutory language. Nevertheless, appellant is correct that they show n tendency on the part of
the state Attorne~· General to read other portions of the statute
narrowly. At thr samr time, they reflect the lack of precision
recurring throughout the Massachusetts flag misuse statute. The
1915 O]linion noted that a literal reading of one portion of the statute,
prohibiting exhibition of engravings of the flag on certain articles,
would make it n criminal offense to displny the flag itself "in many
of its cheaper and more common forms." Appellant's Brief 31-32.
The state Attorney General ronduded that this would be a ''manifest
absurdity." !d ., at 32. The 1968 opinion advis<:>d that a flag repres<:>ntation painted on a door was not "a flag of the United States"
within the m<:>aning of the stat ute. Juris. Statement App. 53-55. A
contrary interpr<:>tation would "raise serious quel:ltions under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . ," given the requirement
27

2&
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of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously." There
was no allegation of physical desecration.
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature
of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot
establish standards with great precision. Control of the
broad range of disorderly conduct that may inhibit a
policeman in the performance of his official duties may
be one such area, requiring as it does an on-the-spot
assessment of the need to keep order. Cf. Colten v.
K entucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972). But there is no comparable reason for committing broad discretion to law
enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt.
Indeed, because display of the flag is so common and
takes so many forms, changing from one generation to
another and often difficult to distinguish in principle, a
legislature should define with some care the flag behavior
it intends to outlaw. Certainly nothing prevents a legislature from defining with substantial specificity what
constitutes forbidden treatment of United States flags. 3 Q
that behavior made criminal must be "plainly prohibited by the
language of the sta tute ." !d., at 54.
30 The federal flag desecration statute, for example, reflects a
congressional purpose to do just that. In response to a warning
by the United Statrs Attorney General that to use such unbounded
terms as "defies" or "casts contempt ... either by word or act" is
''to risk invalidation" on vagueness grounds, S. Rep. No. 1287,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 350, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 7 (1967), the bill which became the federal statute was
amended. 113 Cong. Rec . 16449, 16450 (1967), to reach only acts
that physically damage the flag. The desecration provision of the
statute, 18 U.S. C. §700 (a), declares:
"(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the
United State::; by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or
trampling upon it shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
for not more than one year, or both."
The legislative history reveals a clear desire to reach only defined
physical acts of desecration. H. R. Rep. No. 350, supra, at 3

fhe ski-t.d-ov~ .
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o approach that goal in the statutory
invalidation of Goguen's
IS affirmed.
It

tS

so ordered.

(''The langnnge of the bill prohibit~ intentionnl , willful, not accidental or inndvrrirnt public ph~·:sical acts of de~erration."); S. Rep.
No. 12R7 , supra. at 3 ("The language of the bill prohibit ~ intentional,
willful, not accidental or inadvertent public phy::;ical acts of desecration of the flag."). The act has been ~o read by the lower federal
court::;. which havr upheld it againHt vagueness challenges. United
States v. Crosson, 462 F. 2d 96 (CA9) crrt. deniPd , 409 U. S. 1064
(1972); Joyce v. United States, U. S. App. D. C. - , 454 F .
2d 971 (1971), rNt. drnird, 405 U.S. 969 (1972). See JJoffrnan v.
United States, -- U. S. App. D. C. - , 445 F. 2d 226 (1971).
'1 ' We arr awa re, of co ur~r. of the univ r r~n l adoption of flag
dr~rcrntion or rontrmpt :statut e::; b~· the fed era l and stat e government:> . Ser n. :m. supra. Thr :s tatute~ of thr 50 States a rc :synopsized in Hraring,; on H. H. :271, et a!.. brfore Sub. Corum. No. 4
of thr Hou~r Comm. on the .Judiciary. 90th Cong. , 1st Ses:s., ser . 4,
p t. lii, at 82+-:~46 (1967) . :'do:st of the ~tate stat utes arr patt ern ed
aftrr the U niform Flag Act of 1917. which in § 3 provides that:
"No pN;-;on ~ hall publicly mutilate. defa ce, defile, drfy, trample
upon , or by word or net ra::;t contempt U]lOn a ny such fl ag, standa rd ,
color, en~ ign or :<h ield ."
Comparr 9B Fniform Law::; Annotated 52-53 (1966). with H ea rings
on H. n. 271, et al., su71ra. at 821-346. Beca use it is :stat.rd in
th e di:sjunctive, thi:,; language. like that before us, makes possible
criminal pro~ecution solely for casting contempt upon the fl ag. The
validity of stat utrs utilizing this language, howrver, insofar as the
vaguenrss doctrinr i~ concernrd , will depC'nd as much on thC'ir
judi cial construct ion and enforcement history a;; their ly(ef"al terms,
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The• :-1hcriff of Worcester County. Massachusetts. appeals from a judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for tho First Circuit holding the contempt provision of the Massachusetts flag misuse statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Goguen v. Smith, 471
.F. 2d 88, aff'g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass. 1972). prob. juris.
noted . 412 l ' . S. 905 ( 1973). We affirm on the vagueness ground. \Ve do not reach the correctness of the
holding below on overbreadth or other First Amendment
grounds.

I
The slender record in this case reveals little more
than that Goguen wore a s1uall cloth version of tho
U nitecl :-1tates flag sewn to the seat of his trousers.' The
1
The fl'<'Ord <'Oilsist,; ~o l e!~· of tlw anwnded bill of exceptions
C:ognrn fikd 1n the :\la~:sachu::;ett;: 8nprE:'me .Judicia l Cou rt , the
oppo~ing hrirfs lwforl' that court, t hr complaint under which Goguen
wa" pro"rr11tPd, nne! CogHeJl ',; fedrral habcati rorpu~ petition .
App('ndix 1-:~(), 4:2- 4J. Wr do not havr a trial transcript, although
Cogupn':-; amrtHlPd bill of <•xecptioll" briefly summariz e~ oome of the
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flag was approximately four by six inches and was
displayed to the left rear of Goguen's blue jeans. 011
January 30. 1970, two police officers in Leominister, Massachusetts saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. The
first officer encountered Goguen standing and talking with
a group of person on a public street. The group apparently was not engaged in any demonstration or other protest asi"ociated with Goguen's apparel." No disruption of
traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this officer approached Goguen to question him about the flag.
the other persons present laughed. Some time later, the
second officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking
iu tlw downtown business district of Leominister.
The following day the first officer swore out a complaint
against Goguen under the contempt provision of the
Massachusetts flag misuse statute. The relevant part
of the statute tlwu read:
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats contemptuously the flag of the
Uuitecl States ... , whether such flag is public or·
private property .. , . shall be punished by a fine
of not less than ten nor more than one hundred
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one
year, or both . . .. '' 3
tt'~tm1ony ~1Vl'll by witnr~~r~ for the pro~rcution at his ~tatr trial.
Clogurn did not takr thr stand. Thus we do not have of record hi~
account of what I rani:lpirrcl nt the timr of hii:l arrri:lt or of hi~ purpoHr
in wParing a flag 011 the Hrat of hi;; trouHC'fti.
"Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 35-36.
:J Mn;;.•. Grn Law:< Ann. c. :26+, § 5 ( 1971).
Omittmg ;;rvl•rnl
,;ent f•ncr~ protC'ctiug the ceremonial activities of certain vetrranH'
group,;, thr Ht<1tutr read as follows at the time of Goguen's arre~t
and ronvietwn :
'·§ .5. Flag; pPnnlty for mi~use
·'WhorvPr pnhlicl~· mutilate~. tramplr::; upon, deface~ or treats
contrmptuously the flag of the United States or of 1\Iasl:iachu~ctt;;,
wlwthe.r "uch flag i~ public or private property, or whoever dit:~pla>'~
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' j

DPspite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was
not charged with any act of physical desecration.' As
twrmitted by the disjunctive structure of the desecrati011
~ueh flug ot· an~· l·rpre~rntatiott thrrcof upon which nrc words, figur~'8,
:l<h:prti~rnwnt~ or cl<·~tgn~. or ivhorvrr cau~r.~ or pNmit~ I>JtCh l~ag
to br usPd in n parade a::; a n'cPptarlP for depositing or collec·ting
mune~' or an.\' ot hC'!' artic'·lr or thing, or whoPver exposr;;; to public
\'I!'W, manufacture·~ . ~Pll~, t•xpo~·Ps for ,;ale•, give>~ away ur has ill
j>OH~c~::;iou for ::;alC' or to give ·uwu~· oi· for u::;r 'for any purposr, any
art iclc• or sub~t:uJcc•, bring an urticlc• of merchandise> or a rccrptnclc
of mrrchandisC' or ni'ticlc·::; uj1on which ts" ~tttilchrd, through fl
wrapping or otiH•rwi~c·. cngntvec! or printrd in any. munnrr, a rPprPc
.:::t•ntntwn of tlw Unitl'd Statps flag, or whoever u::;r::; any rrprrsentation of the· anns or the great sral of the commonwralth for any
.adverti:::ing or comnfercial Jlurpo::>r. shall br punished by a fine of
llot. le:-::; than tc•n or more' thim one hiindrecl dollnn; or b~: impri::;onmrnt for noi more than one rrar, or both. Word~. figurr~, ndvertt~t'lllC'nt~ or dP~igu~ :titacbed to. or diJ:ectly or indirectly connrrteci
with, ~uC'h flag or :fn~· rrprr~ent:ition thereof in s{tch manner that·
~HC'h Hag or its reprrsPntati.un is u~C'd to ' nttmct attrntion to or
advPrti~P such word~. figun·~. advertisement~ ~lr desi.gn~, ~hall for'
the pnrpo~c·;; of this ::;·prtion be deemed to br ttJ~On sttch flag."
ThP statute is 11n amalgam of provi"ions dealing ~vith flag deserrn~
tiou and contc•mpt (tlw first ~(i wo['(h;) and with commPrctal mi~use
Of UllWI' expJoitatillll of fi;tg~ Of the l:itHte and natiOnal gOV('l'lltnen(.
Tlu~ ca~r t•onr('l'n~ only t !w "trrat~ contemptuou~J~·" .Phrase of the
~tatutP, whtch has apparently bt'C'll in the ~tatute ::;ince 1t:; enartmeni
in lH\:19 . 0o(JIU'11 , .. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d, at 90, n. 2.
In 1971 , :;ub:;equput to Goguen's pro:;ecution, the de::;ecmtion and .
C'Ontempt portion of the stat utr wa:s amended twice. On March H,
1971, the legislatun•, per St. 1971, c. 74, modifird tlw first srntrncr b.v
insPrting "bum~ or otherwt~P" between the terms ''publicly" and
"mutilate>~," and, in addition, by inrrea~ing the fine.
:VIa:;s. Gen. Laws
Ann. c. 254, § 5 (1973 Supp.) . On Augu::;t 12, 1971, via St. 1971, c.
1155, thr lcgi:;lature appPndPd a nrw srntence defining "thr flag of the
United :::itate~" phra"c appc·anng in the fir~t sentence: "For the
purpo~e:; of this ~Pction thr tPrm ·Hag of the United Statr::;' shall.
IDfan any fiag which ha,.; brrn designated by Act or Rrsolution of ·
the Cougrr~~ of the United States a::; thr national rmblem, whriher
or not ~ueh designatioil l~" currputly 111 force ." Ibid. Tlw 1971
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and eontempt portion of the statute. the officer charged
spccincally and only that Goguen "did publicly treat contemptuously the flag of the United States .... '' ''
After jury trial in the Worcester County Superior
Court. Goguen was found guilty. The court imposed a
sent<'nee of six months in the Massachusetts Home of
Corrections. Goguen appealed to the Massachusetts
Supn'tnc Judicial Court, which affirmed. Commonwealth \'. Goguen, Mass. - . 279 N. E. 2d 666
( 1972). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argument with the common t that " [ w Ihatever the uncertainties in other circumstances, we see no vagueness in
the statute as applied here." !d.,- Mass., a t - , 279
~ . K 2d, at ()67. The court cited no Massachusetts
precP(kn ts in tc>rprcting the "treats con tcm ptuously"
phrase of tlw statute.';
After Goguen began serving his sentence. he was
granted bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas
corpus by the rnited States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343
amPndmc•nt~

:tr<' n·levant to thi~ c·a~(' on]~· 111 the tangrntll\l ~en~e
that tlw~ · llldicat<' a rr<'ognitton by thr lrgi~latur(' of th(' ll('E'U to
tightc·n 11p thi~ tmpn·ri~C' ~t:il11tr .
' l'<'rhap~ tin~ wa~ lwl':tll~l' of tlw tliflirHlt~ · of the· qur~tion whrthrr
Uoguc·n ·~ f'onduct l'Oll~tit ut c•d phy~iral d('~Pcra t ioll of tlw flag. Cf ..
Gu{IW' /1. \'. Snuth. wpra, 471 F. 2<.1, at 91. n. 4 (" ... IWJP arc not
~CJ ~11rc• th:il >'l'Wing a flag to a background C'lrarl~· affect~ 'phy:sieai
tllt('grit .1·.' '') .
'· Appt'IHli\ -1
" Appf'llant c·orn•etlr eonc·<·d<•d at oral argumrnt that Goguen's
casp i~ the fir~t rc•rordrd :\Ia~~nehu~C'tlH court r('ading of t hi~ langwtg<' Tr. of Or:d Arg. 17-lK Indrrd. with the exception of onr
tum of tlw c'C'llt\11'~· ra~C' 1m·olving otw of tlw ~tatute'~ commercial
ml:<ll&' provision~. Conw1ontcealth v. H. I. 8hPrman Mauu. Co., 189
:Vla"'-"· 7!i , 75 N. E. 71 (1905), thr ('ntirr :statute has bern e~srntially
llPvoid of "tate court Ult<'rim•tation.
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F. Supp. 161. The District Court found the flag con·
tempt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as overbroad under the First
Amemhm•nt. In upholding Goguen's void for vagueness contentions, the court concluded that the words
" treats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily
ascertainable standard of guilt.'' !d., at 167. Especially
in "these days when flags are commonly displayed on
hats. garments and vehicles : :. ," the words under which
Uoguen was convicted "leave conjectural. in many instances. what CC!nduct !~lay subject the actor to criminal
prosecution ... Ibid. The court also found that thr
statutory language at issue "may be said to encourage
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. ·• Ibid.
The Court of Appeals. with one judge concurring.
affirmed the District Court in all respects. Goguen v.
Smdh , supra, 471 F. 2d 88. The Court of Appeals COIIclud<'d that "resolution of I_ Goguen's void for vagurnessj
challenge to the statute as applied to him necessarily
aujudicates the statute's facial constitutionality .. . .,
!d., at 04. Treating as-applied ami on-the-face vagueness attacks as essentially indistinguishable in light of
the imprecision of the statutory phrase at issue, id., at 92,
04. the court found that the language failed to provide
adequate warning to anyone. contained insufficient guiclelim•s for law enforcement officials, and set juries and
eourts at large. I d., at 94-96. Then Circuit Judge, now
~€'nior Circuit Judge Hamley. sitting b:y designation
from thf' Ninth Circuit. concurred solely on void-forvagueness grounds. !d., at 105. Judge Hamley thought
the majority's extensive treatment of overbreadth and
other First Amendment issues unnecessary to the disposition of thf' case. Ibid.
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We ap;ree with the holdings of the District Court and
the Court of Appeals on the due process doctrine of vagueness. The settled principles of that doctrine require no
('xtensive restatement hen'.' The doctrine incorporates
notions of fair notice or warning." Moreover, it requires
legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and tri<'rs of fact in order to prevent
''arhitrary and discriminatory enforcement.''" Where a
statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court
interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered
by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater
' Tlw rlrmrnt~ of the voiJ for v:tgurnr:;::< doctrinE> haw U('l'll
dt•vrlojwd in a Ia rg<· bod~· of precrclent from t hi" Court. Tlw ea:;e:;
ar<' eategorizrd in, e. g .. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 40~ U.S. 104,
lOX- 109 ( 197:2). SP<'. Am~t erclmn. ··Thr Void-for- Vagurne:;" Dod rine
.Ill tlw Suprrmr Comt." 109 U. Pn. L. Hrv. 67 (1960).
'· E . y .. Paparhristou v. City of Jacksonville. 405 U. S. 15(), Hi2
(1972): Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 45;3 (1939):
"No OIH' may be> requirrd at prril of lifr, librrt~· or property to
8JWCtdat<' as to thr meaning of penal .;tatute:s. All are entitled to
lw informrd a:; to what thr State command;; or forbid~." (Citations
omitted.) ,
Conrwlly , .. General Construrtion Co .. 269 ll. S. :385, :391 (192()):
[Aj statui<· which l'ither forbid:,; or reqmre;; the clcing of au
aet in term::; ,;o vagur that men of common intelligPttcr mu;;t. nece~
"arily gll<'H::< at ib meaning and differ a~ to it.; application, violates
the fin;t E'ssential of due proce;;s of law." (Citations omitted.)
"E. g .. Orayned, supra. 40~ U. 8., at 1Qg; United States ''·
L. Cuhen Grocery Co .. 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (" ... [T]o attempt
to pnforce the t:iection wo11ld bP the exaet equivalent of an effort to
<·arry out a ::;tatute which in trrm~ mere!~· penalized and punished
all acts det nmpnt nl to tlw public interest when unju:st and unreasonable in the estimation of tlw court and jury."); United ~tates v.
Reese. 92 U. S. :214. 221 (1H75) (''It would certainly be dangerou,;
if the IPgislatun• could srt a net large pnough to catch all possible
otTrmlrrs, and !rave it to the courts to step inside and ;;a~· who
<:auld br rightfully drtained, and who should hr sf't at large.").
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degree of specificity than in other contexts. 1 " The statutory language at issue here, "publicly . . . treats contemptuously the flag of the United States ....:· has such
scope, e. g., Street v. !v'ew York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969)
(verbal flag contempt), and at the relevant time was
without the benefit of judicial clarification."
Flag contempt statutes have been characterized as
void for lack of notice on the theory that "[wlhat is
contemptuous to one man may be a work of art to
another."' " Goguen's behavior can hardly be described
as art. Immaturity or "silly conduct"'" probably
comes closer to the mark. But we see the force of the
District Court's observation that the flag has become
"an object of youth faehion and high camp . .. .' '
343 F . Supp., at 164. As both courts below noted, casual
treatment of the flag in many contexts has become a
widespread contemporary phenomenon. ld., at 164,
167; 471 F. :2d, at 96. Flag wearing in a day of relaxed
clothing styles may be simply for adornment or a ploy to
attract attention. It and many other current, careless
uses of the flag nevertheless constitute unceremonial
treatment that many people may view as contemptuous.
Yet in a time of widely varying attitudes and tastes for
displaying something as ubiquitous as the United ::-Jtates
flag or reprcsen tations of it. it could hardly be the purpose of the Massachusetts legislature to make criminal
('Very informal use of the flag. Tho statutory language
under which Goguen was charged, howf'ver. fails to draw
E. g., Graynerl. supra , ..J.O~ lJ. S., at 109; Smith\'. Califomia,
U. S. l..J.7 , 151 (1959). Compare the Irs~ Htringent rrquirrment~
of t lw modern v:1gurnr~~ cuKr~ drnling with purely economic regulation. E. g .. United States\'. National Dairy J>rod. Corp., 372 U. S,
29 (1963) (Hobin:;on-Patman Act) .
11 See n. 6, supra .
1
~ Note, 66 Mich . L. Hc>v. 10-J.O, 105() (1\)()8) .
1
a Goguen ' '· Smith , supra, a43 F. Supp., at H:i6.
H•
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reasonably clear lines lwtween the kinds of nonceremonial
treatment that arc criminal and those that are not. Due
proct'SS requires that all "be informed as to what the
HtatP COllllllands or forbids ... ,"Lanzetta\' . .Yew Jersey,
:30u C. H. 451. 45:3 ( 1039). and that "men of commo11
intelligenep" not be forced to guess at the meaning of tht>
cruninal law. Connally "· General Construction Co.,
269 l ' . H. 385. :391 ( 10:32). Given toclay's tendencies to
tn'at the fiag UJJCen'moniously, those notice standards
art> 11 o t sa tisfh'd here.
\VP recugnizP that in a noJJcommcrcial context bC'havior as a g<'JtNal rule is not mapped out in advance on
the basis of statutory language." In such cases, perhaps
thP most lltt>aningfu 1 aspect of the vagueness doctrine is
nut aetual notiCl' but the other principal rlement of tlw
doctri JH'- tlH• req uirrnwn t that a legislature establish
minimal guidrlines to govl'rn lav,· enforcement. It is in
this rpgard that the statutory language under scrutiny
has its most notable dPficicncies.
In its terms. the language at issue is sufficiently unbounded to prohibit. as the District Court noted, "any
public deviation from formal fiag etiquette . . . . ·· 343
11' . ~upp .. at 167. ruchanged throughout its 70-year
history."' the "trrats contcm ptuously'' phrase was also
devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the
tekvant time in this case."· We are without authority
11

Am:<trrdarn. supra, 109 U. l'a. L. Hrv ., at H:2, n. 79.

1"

~('(' ll . ;j, 8/I}Jt'(/.

~ Bc•p n. 11, 81t Jira . ThP <·ontl'mpt portion of the \la~~arhusNt r;
,-tatutc: ,.;('<'Ills to havr lain fallow for almost it:< L·ntin· histor~·. Appare>ntl~ · thPrr hav<' l><•t•n about a half do:wn arrC'~t" undrr thi~ part of
tho "ta tutr in rrernt ~·p:~ r,, but notlr ha,.; produced a rrportrd
dc•ci~ton . Tr. of Oral Arg. :2k-:29. In 1961-1, a t<·rnagrr in L~ · nn,
'\Ias~al'hw.:c•tt~ wa,.; l']wrgPd, iiJl]XIl'l'lltl~· under th!l prrsl'nt ~tatut~ .
with rbrerating thP !Tnitl•d Htntr,.; Hag h~ · "rwing pirrr~ of it into his
1
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to cure that Jefect. 17 Statutory language of such a
standard less sweep allows policemen. prosecutors, and
juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legisla~
tures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting
the standards of the criminal law. E. g., Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U. ~- 156. 165-169 ( 1972). In
Greuory v. City of Chicayo, 394 U. S. 111, 120 ( 1969),
Mr. Justice Black voiced a concern that we share against
f'Jltrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat.'' The aptness of
his admonition is evident from appellanes candid concession during oral argument before the Court of Appeals
regarding state enforcement standards for that portion
of thr statute under which Goguen was co11victed:

" .. . I A js counsel lfor appellant] admitted, a war
wotestor who, while attending a rally at which it
begins to rain. evideuces his disrespect for the
American flag by contemptuously covering himself
with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prosecuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a
member of the American Legion who, caught in the
same rainstorm while returning from an 'AmericaLove It or Leave It' rally. similarly uses the flag,
but does RO regrettably and without a contemptuous
attitude. would not be prosecuted." 471 F. 2d, at
102 (emphasis in origiual).
When~

inherently vague statutory language permits such
SPlective law enforcement. there is a denial of due process.
trom!Pt''. :.:rw York Time;,;, Augu~t 1, 1968. p. 31 , col. l. The
trenagl'l" wa~ order<•d b~· a ~tate di~trict court to prcpan• and deliver
an <.'~l>a~· ou thP fiag. ThP court ront innf'd the ra;;e without a find-

illg, d<·priving it of au~· prPr<'C!Pntial vnlue .
17
E. g., United States v. Thirty-seven Photogmphs, -!O:l U.S. :35:1,
:11)9 ( 1971 ) .
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III
Appellant's argunwn ts that the "treats con temptu~
ously'' phrase is not impermissibly vague, or at least
should not bt' so lwld in this case, are unpersuasive.
A.ppellant devotes a substantial portion of his opening
brid. as he did his oral orgument, to the contention that
Uoguen failed to preserve his present void for vagueness
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Appellant concedC's that the issue of "vaguelless
as applied'' is properly before the federal courts," but
con tends that GoguC'n 's only arguable claim is that the
:>tatute is vague on its face. Tlw latter claim, appellant
illsil'ts. was not prese11ted to the state courts with the
requisite fair JH'<'cision. Picard Y. Connor, 404 U. ~. 270
( 1\171). This <·xhaustion of remedies argument is belatedly raised."' and it fails to take the full measure of
Uog1wn 's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the
stat<' courts."" \\'e do not deal with the point at length ,
, , Hrph· BriPI' .J..
'" (;og;urn fiiPd ill>< fpdrrai habra~ eorput: Jl<'tttton ~111J~rqurnt
to /'l(·arrl. supm. YPt it appPar~ that apprllant did not rai"<' hb
pn·~(·nt Pxhau:,;tion of n•mNiir~ argumrnt hrfon• thr Di"t rict Court.
That romt romtnl'll t Pd ,..;pecifieall~· on thi~ omi~~ion: .. ~ o ro nt<•ntton i~ no\\· mad<' t h:tt 1 ( :ogtwnj ha~ not c•xhau~tc•d ~t:ttl' n•mrdi<'~,
not• that thr l'OII~tttutio11:tl i~~lH '>' prP~Pntt>d hrn· Wl'l'<' not rai;;l'd
approprta t Pi~· in :<tat c• prol·Prding::;." ;).t{ F. Supp., at ]().!,
"" <:ogtu'n fi!Pd in stall' ~upt>rior court :tn un~u<·C'<':<~fui motion to
di~mi~~ thr <·ompiaint in \\'hieh hr citrd thr FourtrPttth An1Pndm<·nt
and :tli<•gpd th,tt tlw ~tatutc• undl'r which iH' w:1~ ch:trgrcl w:t~ "impPrmi~~ihi~· vague and incapabk of fair and rea~onabir intPrprl't:ttiou
h~· public ofllciak" Appl·ndix l. Thi:< motion wa~ also bl'forr thl'
M:tssal'hll~Pt t~ 811 pn·nw .J udic·i:ti Comt, ~inN· it wa::; incorporatrd in
C:ogn<'n ·, anwndcd hill of excPpt ion:<. Ibid . lt1 addirion. Gogu<'n'~
hnd hdorl• that ( 'omt rai"l'd vagtH'nt·~~ point~ and citrd v:tguctw::;::;
<'H"l':<. lrl .. at 1!). :W-27. eiting Lanzetta v. Neu· Jersey , :mfi tf. 8 .
..f./)1 (Hl:{()). and /'ar/.' er \'. J\!oryan. :32:2 F . Supp. 51:15 (\VD '1'\. C.
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howf'vcr, for we fiild tlw relevailt statutory language'
impC'rmissibly vague as applied to Goguen. With..:
Gut doubt the "substance" of this claim was "fairly
pr<'sent<'d" to the state courts under the exhaustiotl
standards of Picard, supra, 404 U. S., at 275, 278.
Appt'llant's exhau::::tion of remedies argument is premIsed on the notion that Goguen's bella vior rendered hint
a. hard-core violator as to whom the statute was not
vaguE', whatevrr its implications for those engagC'd in dif~
fpn•nt conduct. To be surf' there are statutes that
hy their tf'rms or as authoritatively construed apply
without qu<'stion to certain activities, but whose application to other behavior is uncertain. The hard-core
violator concc>pt makes som<' sense with regard to such
statut('S. Tlw present statute. however, is not in that
cate~-~;ory. This criminal provision is vague "not in the
sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct
to au imprecise but comprehensible normative standard,
but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is
spceificd at all." Coates"· C·i ly of Cincinnati, 402 l'. S.
('ill, ()14 ( 1D71). :-;uch a provision simply has 110 cor€'.
This absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion
and ('Xelusion is precisely what offends the Due Process
( 'lause. The deficiency is particularly objectionable in
l!lil) (thn·<·-judgr t•our1) (\"orth Carohna flag l'ontempt ~tatute
,·oid for vagtH'lll'~~ and overbreadth). Appellnnt i~ correct in u~:><'rt
ing; tlwt Gog;ul'n failt•d to eompartmPntuliz<' in hi:; :;tate court bripf
t lw dn<' proce~~ doctrittr of vaguPnr~~ and Fir~t Am<>ndmeni eonrc•p!,;
of on·rbr<'adtb. St•t• Appl'ndix 19-2-t. But permitting a degrPr of
lt•aka~l' hetw<•rn tho~<· particular adjoininp; compartment:; ~~ under~1:llldabl<•. Cf. Xotr, ·'The First Ammdment Ovrrbreadth Doctrine." ~:~ Harv. L. H0v. k-!4, 1')71-~75 (19i0). The higbr:,;t ~tat<'
<'ourt.'~ oplllion, which dPalt ::;eparatpl~· with Goguen's Fir::;t Amrndmrnt and vap;urnr"" claim~, CommonweaLth \'. Gogue?t, supra, - l\Ia~~ .. at - , 279 X. E. 2d, at fil)7, indicate~ that that court wa~
well aware thut Ciogupu raio;ed both ~rt::; of argumPntl:l.
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vie·w of the unfettered latitude thereby accorded law
enforcement officials and triers of fact. Until it is corrected either by anwndment or judicial construction. it
affeets all who are proEecutecl under the statutory language. In our opinion the defect exists in this case.
The language at issue is void for vagueness as applied to
Goguen because it subjected him to criminal liability
under a standard so indefinitP that police. court. and jury
werP free to react to nothing more than their own preferences for treatment of the flag.
Turuing from the exhaustion point to the merits of
the vagueuess question presented, appellant argues that
any notice difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow subject matter of thP statute. "actual" flags of the Uuitecl
Rtaws."' Appellant contends that this "takes some of
the vagueness away from the phrase. 'treats contemptuously . ... ' """ Anyone who "wants notice as to what
conduct this statute proscribes .... immediately knows
that it has something to do with flags and if he wa11ts to
stay clear of violating this statute. he just has to stay clear
of doing something to the United States flag.""" Apart
from the ambiguities presented by the concept of an
"actual" f:lag/' we fail to see how this alleged particu~~ Ap]wllan(~

Brid 1i: Tran~. of Oral Arg. 9.
Tr . of Oral Arg . H.
2
" Ib id.
"' At t hC' titnC' of Uoguen'::; pro::wcut ion. the ::;tatute referred tiimply
to ''the flag of the l.TnitC'd Stale:< . . . . " without further definition.
That rai::;eR t lw obviou:,; que;;tion whether Goguen'ti miniature cloth
flng eontititutrd "the flag of tlw {' nited Sta.teti . . . . " Goguen
arguPclun:<ucer~tifull~· hefon' thP titatP court:,; that the statute applird
mll~· to fiag::< that mPt "olliciHl :,;tandard~" for JH'OJ10rtions, f<uch a;;
relation of !wight to width and thr :,;izr of tilripes and the field of
titar~. and that tlw cloth he worr• did not mret those tilamlards .
Tt·. of Oral At-g. 11-12, 24-:W; AppPndix 2. There wa~ no
di::q)ltte that Gogurn':< arlornmPnl had the rrquisitr number of ~tars
and ~t ripr" >tnd rolor,.;, Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12 . Tlw :'da~~n"
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larity resolv~s the central vagueness qL~estion-the
absence of any standard for defining contemptuous
treatment.
Appellant's remaini11g argumei1ts are equally unavailmg. It is asserted that the first six words of the statute
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously'' phrase,
and that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
customarily construes general language to take on color
from more specific accompanying language. But it is
conceded that Goguen was convicted under the general
phrase alone. and that the highest state court did not
rely on any general-to-specific principle of statutory
interpretation in this case. 2 '' Appellant further argues
that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has
restricted the scope of the statute to intentional contempt."!; Aside from the problems preseuted by an
appellate court's limiting construction in the very case
in which a defendant has been tried under a previously
rhu~ett~ Supreme ,Judicial Court found C'.oguen's doth fiag to be
coverPd b~· tlw :statute. noting thnt " [t]he statutr doe~ not require
that the Hag bP 'officia l'" Commonwealth Y. Goguen,- 1\In~~. - ,
- , 279 ~. E. 2d lit)o, (if)8 ( 1972). Th P lower federal courts did
not addn::;s t hi:; holding, nor do we. We note only that the Ma:ssarhu::;Pt t;; Lrgi:sla t urr apparent I~· sensed an ambiguity in l hi:s reHpect,
because ~nb:;equent to Goguen's pro~ecution it ammded the ~tatute
in an effort to defin<' what it had meant by the "flag of the
Pmted StatPH. '' Se<' n. 3, supra.
~ 5 Tr. of Oral Arg. 48.
26
Tlw :\Lt~:sachu~ett~ coml commented ~imply that " Lt]he jury
c-ould infer thnt the violation was intentional without reviPwing any
words of the defrmhl!lt." Commonwealth v. Goguen,- Ma:,;s. - ,
- -, 279 r\. E. :.?d 666, (:if)tl (1972). Thus. the court held that the
jmy could iufC'r intent mrrely from Goguen';; conduct. This is
apparently a!Ho a holding that the jury must find contemptuous
intent under thr ~tatutr, although the requirement amount~ to very
little ;,inC(' it i~ ,.;o C'a:sily ~ntisfied. The court'~ reference to wrbal
communicat iou rdlerted Gog;uen'$ reliance on ::)treet v. New York,
:394 u. 8 . 579 ( 19(19) .
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unnarrowecl statute."' this holding still does not clarify
what conduct constitutes contempt, whether intentional
or inadvertent.
Finally, app0llant argues that state law enforcement
authorities haV(' shown themselves ready to interpret
this penal statute narrowly and that the statute, properly read. reaches only direct. immediate contemptuous
acts that "actually impinge upon the physical integrity
of the fiag ... .'' ""' There is no support in the record
for the foruH•r point."" Similarly, nothing in the state
court's opinion in this case or in any earlier opinion of
that court sustains the latter. In any event. Goguen
was charged only under the wholly open-ended languagP
"' E. o., A~hton , .. Kentul'ku . a~,1 C S. 195, 19~ (19liti J
2 " Apprlla nt'~ Bri<-1' 22.
~"With rt•gard to pro~reutonal po l icie~, appPIJant cite~ two puhli~lwd opinion~'( of t hP ;\Ja~~aehu~dt~ Atlorm·,· Grnrral. -1 Op.~. of
Att. <lrn. +iO (HJ15) (Hrprodu<·Pd at AppPIIaut '~ Brirf :w); Heport
of Att~· . 0<'11., Pub. Doc. ~o. 12. p. 192 (l96X) (HeprodtH·<•d at
.Juri:;. StntrmPnt App . 5:3). Ap]wllant eonrPd<·~ that nritlwr clPab
with thr contrmpt portion of thC' ~tatute undN which GogtH'Il wa~
('OnviPt Pd. Tim~. t h<'~· arP not in poiut lwrc·. Thr~· providl•cl
guidanrr to no on<· on t hP rriPvant ~tat utOIT language. Nevrrt IH•Jp;;~, appPIIant i;; <'OI'I'PCt that thry ~how a IPtHlenc~· on the part of
thr ,;latP Attorne~· (;pneral to read othpr portion~ of tlw ~tatut<'
nHrrowl~· . At tlw t<anw limP, thl'~· refiPct thr lack of pn•ri~ion
rrrmring throughout thP :\ l a~~arhu;;ett:> flag miHtt::;P :,;tnttttP. The
1915 opinion notrd that a litc•nd n•ading of onl' portion of thP ;;tatute,
prohibiting Pxhihition of rngn11·ing~ of the flag on rl'rt:tin nrti('i<·~,
would makr it ;t ('l'itntttal offen~<' to di~p l ay thP fiag it:,;elf " in nutn~ ·
of it,; clwap<'r and morr common form;;." Appellant':; Brirf :n-:32.
The "tat<• At tome~· CPnPral c·on(']m!Pd that thi~ would be a " manifP::;t
ab::<mdit~·.'' /d .. at :32. TIH• 19(11\ opinion advi:;rd that a flag J'<•pn·,;pntation painted on a door w:1~ not '';t flag of the !Tnitcd StatPt<"
within tlw meaning of tlw "'tatutP. .Jmi::<. StatPmPnt App. 5:3-55. A
cont mr~· intrrprPtnt ion would "rai~P ~eriou;; qta•:;t ion" IIJHl<>r the
.Fir~t . :Ill([ FourtP<•nt h Am<>uclmrnt" . . . ," givPn t hr rrquirenH·nt
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uf publicly treating the flag "contemptuously ." There
was 110 allegation of physical desperation .
1'11<'re are an~ as of human conduct where, by the nature
of the prohlC'ms presented, legislatures simply cannot
estahli!"h flta ndards with great precision. Control of the
broad rangE> of clisonlcrly conduct that may inhibit a
polieelllan in the performance of his official duties may
lw o1w suc h area. requiring as it does an on-the-spot
assessment of the nec'd to keep order. Cf. Collen \'.
Kentucky, 407 r. S. 104 ( 107:2). But there is no comparable' reason for committing broad discretion to law
enforcemc 11t officials in the area of flag contempt.
lnd('<'d. lweaul'<' display of the flag is so common and
takPs so many forms. cha11ging from on e generation to
anotlwr and oftpn diffieult to distingui"h in prin cipl 0, a
legislature should ddi11c with some care the flag behavior
it in t<' nd s to outlaw. C'ertai nly nothing pre vents a legislatun' from defining 'vvith substantial specificity what
constitutes forbicldPn tn'atment of United States flags."Q
lhnt lll'li:tl'ior madP C'l'l llllll<il mu ~ t h<' " plainly prohibit<•d l>~ · tlH'
languag;t• of th<' "'la tll tP." ! d .. :11 54.
·"' Tht• l'edrrnl {]ap_ d<',.,f'('l'<ltioll ~talule, for pxamplt•. r!' fl ('rt~ :t
eollg;n'"'"'wllal JHtrpo~t· to do ju"'t thnt. In n·~pon~(' to a warning
h~ th<• l' nitPd Sl<~t<'"' Altornp~· (;<'lt Prnl that to IN' ~urh unbou11d Pd
lt·rm:< a:< "<kfip"'" or ··ra~t" c·oniPmpl . . . PithPr by word or act'' 1~
·· to n~k invnlidanon" on vaguc•nr~" g;roundH , S. 11 Pp. :\o. l:li-:7.
!:lOth ( 'oug., :ld St·~"' .. 5 (19!1~); I-J. H. HPp. ~o. :350, 90th l'ong., M
8e~l"., 7 (1\:.Hii), IIH' hill whi ch l)('ellfr}(' the· fpderal :,;tatu1t• wa:,;
aml' tHIC'd. 11:3 ( 'oug. Ht•c·. Hi44\:J, H\450 (l\:Jti7), to reac h on!~- art~
tlwt ph~ ·" u·all~· dnnwg<' tht• Ha~r. Tlw de:,;crration provi~ion of the
~tatut<. 11'-. l' :-;_ ('. ~700 (<~). dN·larP~:
"(a) WhoPwr knowing; I ~- ea"t~ ront<'lll]JI upon :tit~· flag of the
tlnit<'d State·~ h1· publirl~· mutilating;, ddn cing , defiling , burning, or
lr:unpbng; upon it "' hall])(' finpd 1101 more than :)1,000 or impri~oued
for not mon• t h<t11 m1P yenr, or bot h."
Tlw lt>g1~l<llil'l' ht ~to r~· n·YPnl~ n rlPnr ck~1rr to r(';Irh onl.1· d<:'tiuPd
]Jhy~i,·al a<'t~ of dP~t·c·ration . H . H . Hcp . :\o. :350, wwa. at ;)
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The statutory language at issuf' here fails to approach
that goal and is void for vaguetH'SS." 1 The judgment is
affirm eel.

1t is so ordered,

(' 'The language of t he• bill ]Jrohihiti'i int rntional, willful. not acei ~
dental or inadvrrtent public ph.,·~ienl act~ of de:;ecnttion."); S . Rep.
No. 12S7, supra. at :3 ("Tlw languagP of the bill prohibit~; intrntionnl,
willful, not acridrntal or inadvrrtent public physical acts of descemtion of th(' Hag.''). ThP act hal:i bern ~:;o read by tl1(' lower federal
court;;, whirh haYP nplwld it again:;! vaguenes~S challenge~. United
States v. Crosson, 462 F. 2d !:lti (CA!:l) crrt. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Joyce \'. C11itrd 8tates. U. S. App. D. C. - , 454 F .
2d 971 (1971), eert. d('JJied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972). See floffman \'.
United States. -- tT. 8. App. D. C . - , 445 F. 2d 22fi (1971).
:n We arr aware•, of !'our"r. of the univer~Sal adoption of flag
drtiecratwn or f'OnlPmJll ,;tat utt'~ by t hr federal and ~ta tr government,;. See n. :30. supra. The ~tatut<>~S of the 50 State~; arr ~ynop
~izcd in HParing~ ou H. H. 271, et a/ .. beforr Sub. Comm. No. 4
of tlw Hou~r Comm. on tlw .Judiciar~·. 90th Cong .. l~:;t Srs"·• :ser. 4,
pt. III. nt 32.J.-:34ti (1!:167). .\lo~t of the ~tnte ~tatutc;; arr patterned
a her t lw lJ nifom1 Flag Aet of 1917, which in § 3 provides that :
"No pt'r~on ~hall publici~· mutilate, defarr. defile•, def~·. trample
upon. or br word or act ea~t ('OlltC'mpt upon any ~Such flag, ~tandard,
color, en~ign or shi(•ld ."
Com parr 9H Uniform Law~ AtmotatPd 52-53 (19613). with Hearing~
on H. R. :271, Pt a/ .. supra. at :321-:346. Becau~:;e it i~ ~tatcd in
the di~junctiw, t hi~ language. likP that bPfore u~. make~ po~~Siblc
criminal pro~c('ution ~ole>]~· for catiling contempt upon the flag. TllC'
validit~· of statute~ utilizing thi~S language, however, insofar as thP
1·aguene::;;; doctrine is e·on('('l'!led, will depeud a~; much ou thrir
judicial eonstructwn and rnforeC'mcnt h1~torr Hs thC'ir litNal tC'rms .
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Tlw Slwriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts. ap~
JWals from a judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit holding the contempt pro~
vision of the Massachusetts flag misuse statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Goguen v. Smith, 471
F. 2d 88, aff'g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass. 1972). prob . juris.
not<><.!. 412 P. S. 905 ( 1973). We affirm on the vaguenest> ground. \Ve do not reach th€' correctness of the
holdiug below on ovPrbreadth or other First Amendment
grounds
I

Tlw slemler record in this case reveals little more
thau that Goguen wore a small cloth version of the
Fnited States flag S€'Wll to the seat of his trousers.' The
1
The record c·onsi:,;h,; ~olely of the amended bill of exceptionti
UogtH'll filed Ill the ~Iat<tiaehu::wtt;; Supreme Judicial Court, the
oppot'ing brief~ lwforc that eourt, Oil' complaint under which Goguen
wat< pro:;<>rutl'd , and Ooguen's fC'dera l habea~ corpus petition ,
AppC'mllx 1-:J(i, 42-t:l. Wf' do not havr a trial transcript , although
Ooguf'n';; Htn(;>ncled bill of ('Xccptiou;; hrirfly summarizes oome of the
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flag was approximately four by six iuches and was
displayed to the left rear of Gogue n's blue jeans. On
January 30, 1970, two police officers in Leominister, Massachusetts saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. The
first officer encountered Goguen standing and talking with
a group of person on a public street. The group apparently was not engaged in any demonstration or other protest asf'ociated with Goguen's apparel." No disruption of
traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this officer approached Goguen to question him about the flag,
the other p0rsous present laughed. Some time later, the
seeond officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking
iu thP downtown business district of Leominister.
The following day the first officer swore out a complaint
against GogU('n under the contempt provision of the
Masf'achusetts flag misuse statute. The relevant part
of the statu tc tlwu read.
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats contemptuously the flag of the
United States . . . , whether such flag is public or
private property . . , , shall be punished by a fine
of not less than ten nor more than one hundred
rlollars or by imprisonment for not more than one
year, or both .. .. " ~
te::;tmwn~ · ~tveu L~ · wittie~::;e~ for the pro~ecutlon at hi~ :;tate trial.
Goguell did not tnkr the ::;tnnd. Thu~ we do not have of record hi~
account of what tran::;pirrd at thr time of hi~ arre~t or of hi~ pmpoHe
in wra ring n nag on t liP ~eat of hi~ t rou~rrs .
"Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, :35-313.
~ l\ln&~ . GE>n Laws Ann. c. 264, §5 (1971). Omittm{l; sevPral
:sent encc::; protecting the ceremoni<ll activitif's of certam vrtrrans'
group:; , 1 he ;;tntutP read as follows at the time of Goguen's arre::;t
and convietion .
"§ 5 Flag; penalty for mi::;use
''Whoew.r publicly mutilate:;. trnmple~ upon, deface,; or treats
contE>mptuou:;ly the flag of the United States or of Ma~sachuo>etts,
whc•th<>.r ~uch flag i:o public or private propPrty, or whoever dispb;'~
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DPspite the first SIX words of the statute, Goguen was
not charged with any act of physical desecration .'; As
twrmitted by the disjunctive structure of the desecration
~llrh flag or ally l'f'Jlrt'::;('l1( at ion thereof upon wlnch are word~, figures,
;tdrl:'rtioem<•nt~ or de~tgno, or \vhoewr rau:seo or permits Hlt<'h fl_ag
1v br u::wd Ill a pnrade ao ;t rrc<>ptade for depo~iting or collecting
mune) or a1ty other artidr or thing , or whoever eXJ)O~es to vublic
\'I<'W , manufactur<'~. ~Plb, <·xpo~<'H for ~ale, givrt; away or ha~ ill

po~~<'o~ion for ~a iC' or to !!:IV<' ·a way oi· for tl~<' 'for any purpo::~e, any
art iek or :sub~ta uc<', bring an article of nlrrchandisr or a rec<'ptaclo
of lllC'l'Chandi~l' or ai'tJClPI:l Ui)OJ1 which is" attached, through U
wrapping or otlwrwi~e. engraved or printed in any manner , a reprec
. ~'('Jltatwn of tlw (' nit('(] StatPi:l Hag, or whoever llS<'i:l any rrpr~ent a11011 of thP arm~ or thr great seal of the commonwealth for any
11dVPrt 1~mg or commPrctn l purpo8f', ::~ hall be puni:shed by a fine of
not. le,-,; than 1<'ll or more thi111 on<' hi.indred dollars or by JmprisonmPtil for not more thnn one yrar, ·or both. Words, figure:;, ndverfH:i<'lll<'llf~ or d<·~ign~ attarhed to. or direrily or indirectly connected
w1t h. ~uch Hag or :iny rrpr(><;ent;ition thereof 111 SJ.tch manner 1hat·
~Hrh t!ng or itH repre~entati'on i:; u~ecl to. attrart at_tention to or
ndv<'rt i~e ~ueh word;:;, figurrH, adverti~ement;:; or designt;, :;hall for·
t h<' purpo~r~ of thi:; ~ection be deemed to be upon :;trch t!ag."
Th<· ~tat lltl' ~~ an amnlgam of provt~IO!lt; dea.Jing ~vrth flag desecrH~
tio11 and !'OIIft'mpt (the Jir~t ~(i word~) imd with commercial mi~u:;e
01 other t>XploitatJOll of fiag~ of the ota te and· natiOnal governmrnt
Tlu,; <·a~(· l'OllrPru~ only the " trPati:l contemptuously" _phra:;e of thu
~tatutt•, wln<'h haH <l]Jpar<·nt ly bl'ell in the :;tatute ~ ince Jt;:; enartment
in 18\:JH. Goguen v. Smith, supm, 471 · F. 2d, at 90, n . ~ .
In lUll. ::-ubH<'quent to Goguen'H prot;ecution, the de:;ecratwn :wd .
rontPmpt portwu of the :statutr wa8 amended twice. On :\-larch 8,
1971, the legi~lature, per St. 1971, c. 74, modified the first sentrncP by
in:-~Prtmg " burn~ or otherwt;:;e" between the terms " publicly" and
" mutilate·>'," aud, in addition, by increaoing the fine. Mat;:;. Gen. Law~;
Arm . c. :!64-, § 5 (197a Supp.). On August 12, 1971 , via St. 1971 , c
o5.'5, tlw legt:;laturr app!'nded a nrw ::;entence defining "the flag of the
1l mt (•d ~tn.te:s " phrat:i(' appParing in the fir:;t ::;entence: "For the
purpo>'f'~ of tb1s ~er tion the trrm 'flag of the United Statrs' :;hall .
mran auy Hag wlmh ha,; bPen de~ ignated by Act or Resolution of the Congrr~s of the Umtt>d Staws a,; the national emblem, whether
or U(J( ~ urh destgnation t:,c runrntly m force ." Ibid. The 1971
[Povtuotc 4 IS 0'/1 p 4]
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and eontempt portion of the statute. the officer charged
specifically and only that Goguen "did publicly treat contemptuously the flag of the United States .... '' ''
:\fter jury trial in the Worcester County buperior•
Court, Goguen was found guilty. The court imposed a
selltence of six months in the Massachusetts Hou~e of
Corrections. Goguen appealed to the Massachusetts
~upreme JuJicial Court, which affirmed.
Commonwealth v. Goguen, Mass. - , 279 N. E. 2d 666
( 1972) . That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argument \nth the comment that "[w Jhatever the uncertaintil's in other circumstances, we see no · vaguelless iu
thP statute as applied ht>re." !d.,- Mass., a t - , 279
N. E . 2d, at ()o7. The court cited no Massachusetts
prccPdeuts ill terprct1ng the "treats con temptuously l1
phrase of the statute."
After Goguen began serving his sentence, he was
granted bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas
corpus by the l' nitecl States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343
amPildlllPIIt " <ll'l' rl'!rvant to thi~ ca~r on!~· 111 thr taugPntml ;;t>nse
thnt tllC'~· ill(hral<' a rrcognition by thr lrgislaturp of thr need to
tJght PJJ 11p thts mtpn· ri~e ~talute .
• P<·rhap~ tlm; wa ~ becaus<· of the diHirult~· of the quP:stion whether
<1ogtH'll ':-- eondurt eonstitut<•d phy~iral dE'srrratioJJ of the flag . Cf.
Goguen ,.. Srruth. wpra, 471 F. 2d, at 91 , n. 4 (" .. . [WJr are not
~o ~lll'< ' that ~ cwmg a Hng to a background clearly affect~ 'phy~icaT
lllt<'grit~ · '")
,, A pp<'IHlt \ -t

Appt'llant <·orr('etly roll!'PU('d at oral argument that Gogucn'IS
<'H::><' i ~ thr fir~t r<'rordcd :\Ias~achu::><:'tt:s court reading of this Ian-·
guag<· Tr. of Oral Arg . 17-18. Iudrecl. with the exception of one
tum of thr e<·nhtr~· ra::;~· tm·olvmg one of tlw ::>tatutr's comm<:'rciaf
ml~ll>'t' proviHion;,; , Commonwealth v. R. I. Sherman Manu . C'o. , 189
MaK<' . 7!i, 75 N. E. 71 (1905), the entire ~tntutc has be<:'n <:'s~entmlly
<levoi<l of ~ t!t.tf:' eomi mtNJ.:>rPtation .
I;
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}". t:>upp. 161. The District Court found the flag contempt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as overbroad under the First
Alllendment. ln upholding Goguen's void for vagueuess contentions, the court concluded that the words
"treats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily
ascertainable standard of guilt.'' !d., at 167 . Especially
in "these days when flags are commonly displayed on
hats. garments and vehicles : : . ," the words under which
<ioguen was convicted "leave conjectural. in many installees, what conduct .'!lay subject the actor to criminal
prosecution ... Ibid. The court also' fouud that the
statutory language at issue "may be said to encourage
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Ibid .
The Court of Appeals, with one judge concurrin ,
OV\
boTk FtY..s: tffirmed the District Court
Goguen v:
,4v.. e~.-r cR ~P ttM cR
Smith, supra, 471 F. 2cl 88. ~ Court of Appeals conw;HA. ~-j~ +o
iiA:J'AJZ Y'-U7 ~J rt)~~Ps.
cluded that "resolution of !_Goguen's void for vagueness]
~ )/_J)eAchallenge to the statute as applied to him necessarily
adjudicates the statute's facial constitutionality . . . .''
3(0'-~/ .jAd
!d., at 04. Treating as-applied and on-the-face vagueness attacks as essentially indistinguishable in light of
the Imprecision of the statutory phrase at issue, id., at 92,
94, the court found that the language failed to provide
adequate warning to anyone, contained insufficient guidelines for law enforcement officials, and set juries and
courts at large. !d., at 94-96. Then Circuit Judge, now
~enior Circ~it Juc~ge _Hamley, sitting b:),' designation_
from the N!l)th Circmt, concurred solely foii void-for- ~
~-'---:v::a:-:g-:-:-u:-:
e,::-:1e:-.::s~
s ,gFOuud~ !d., at 105. Judge Hamle~ ~~f:HT-.,
the majority's extensive treatment of overbreadth and ~
other FiFst Amendment issues unneeessaFy to the disposi' '-L......- tiltH of tl::le case
lbid. ~
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v

UOGUE~

IT
Wt> agree with the holdings of the District Court aml
the Court of Appeals on the due process doctrine of vaguetwss. The settled principles of that doctrine require no
extensive restatement hen'.; ThC' doctrine incorporates
notions of fair notice or warning." Moreover, it requires
legislatures to set reasouably clear guiclelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent
''arhitrary and discriminatory enforcement."" Where a
statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court
interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered
by the First AmendrnC'nt, the Joctrine demands a greater
; TIH· Plemrnt;; of the void for vagm'ne:;~ doetnnr havf' Ut'l'll
dPvc·lopPd in a large• body of precrdPnt from this Court. Thl' <·asr~
an• ('atrgorized in, e. g .. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. 8 . 104,
10X-JU0 (197:l). Sre. Amstf'rdam. ''The Void-for-Vaguf'nP:;,; Doctruw
m the Supreme Court." 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960).
"E. IJ., Papal'hristou v. City of Jacksonville. 405 U. S. 156, Hi2
( 1\J?:l) : Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. 8. 451, 453 (1939):
" No Olll' may be requirrd at JWril of life·, liberty or proprrty to
8Jl(•c·nlatr as to the mC'aning of ]JE'nal statutr:s. All are entitled to
i>P mformed aR to what thr State commands or forbids." (Citation:s
onlltt<>d ) ,
('omwlly \. GeneraL Constructwn Co., 2()9 l 1• S. :385, :391 ( 1926):
I A I ;;tat u t <' wlueh <•it her forb1d;; or reqmrr;; t lw demg of au
a<:t 111 trrm~ so vngue that men of common intelligence must neces~arily gtwss at its meaning and differ ao; to its ttpplieatJOn, v10Jatrs
tlw fir;;t es;;ential of due proce;;s of law." (Citation;,; omittrd.)
"E . g., Grayned. supra. 40~ U. S., at 108; United State11 \ .
L. Cohen Grocery Cu., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (" ... [T]o attempt
to enforcr the ;;pction would be the exact equivalmt of an effort to
eany out a ;;tatute wh1ch in trrms merely penalized and punished
all acts dctnmf'ntal to thr publie interrst whrn unju:st and unreasonable in thr estimation of the court and jury."); United States v.
lteese, 92 U. S. 214, :221 ( 1~75) (';It would certamly be dangerous
tf the Ieg1sla turf' could :set a net large enough to catch all pos~:>ible
offenders, and leave it to the courts to ~:>tep in:side and ;;ay who
could. bt> nghtfully detamrd , and who should br set at large .") .
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degree of specificity than in other contexts. 1" The statutory language at issue here, "publicly . . . treats contemptuously the flag of the United States ... ," has such
scope, e. g., Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 5-76 (1969)
(verbal flag contempt), and at the relevant time was
without the benefit of judicial clarification. 11
Flag contempt statutes have been characterized as
voirl for lack of notice on the theory that "l w] hat is
contemptuous to one man may be a work of art to
another." '" Goguen's behavior can hardly be described
as art. Immaturity or "silly conduct" 1 " probably
comrs elos('r to the mark. But we see the force of the
District Court's observation that the flag has become
"an object of youth faEhion and high camp . . . ."
343 F . ~upp., at 164. As both courts below noted, casual
trratmrnt of the ftag in many contexts has become a
widespread contemporary phenomenon. ld., at 164,
167; 471 F. 2d, at 96. Flag wearing in a day of relaxed
clothing styles may be simply for adornment or a ploy to
attract attention. It and many other current, careless
uses of the flag nevertheless constitute unceremonial
treatment that many people may view as contemptuous.
Y ct in a time of widely varying attitudes and tastes for
displaymg something as ubiquitous as the United States
ftag or representations of it, it could hardly be the purpose of the Massachusetts legislature to make criminal
every informal use of the flag. The statutory language
under which Goguen was charged, however, fails to draw
"'E. g., Orayned. supra, 40H U. S., at 109; Smith , .. California,
:{!il U.S. l-l7. 151 (1959). Compare the Irs;; ;;tringent rrquirement;;
of tlw modrrn vaguruc~s ca~r~ draling with purely economic regulation. E. g.. United States\'. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U . S,
29 (196:3) (Hobinsou-Patman Art) .
11
See n . 6, supm .
'".1\:otr , 6!) ~Iirh. L. Ht'v . 1040, 105(1 (1968) .
1
~ Guguen v. Smith. supra, ;~43 F . Supp., at 1()(),

S\IITH u. GOC'.UE~
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lines between the kinds of nonceremouial
tr(•a tllJ(•nt that are criminal and those that are not. Due
process rPq uircs that all "br informed as to what the
;-)tate commands or forbids ... ," La11zetta v. X ew Jersey ,
:30f) C. S. 451.4.53 (1D39), and that "men of common
J n tP lligenct' ·· not be forced to guess at the meaning of tlw
c•rinunal law. Connally ,., General Construction Co.,
:2fi!J lT. ;-;, :385, :3~)1 (1032) . Givell today 's tendencies to
treat tlw fiag unceremoniously, those notice standards
an' 1101. satisfiC'd lwr(' .
WP rPcoguizP that in a llOncommercial context lwhavior as a general rule is not mapped out in advance 011
the basis of statutory language." In such cases, perhaps
tht- most lfl(•aningful asr)('ct of the vagueness doctrine is
not actua l noti ce but the other principal elemeut of tlw
doetmw-- tlw requirrment that a legislature establish
tniitilllal gniddi nes to govPrn law enforcement. It is in
this regard t hat the statutory language under scrutiny
has its most notable deficiencies.
ln its terms, the language at issue is sufficiently unbounded to prohibit, as the District Court noted, "any
public deviation from formal flag etiquette . . . . " 343
F. Supp .. at Hi7. Unchanged throughout its 70-ycar
history ."' the "trrats contemptuously'' phrase was also
d(•void of a narrowi ng state court interpretation at the
rt>l(•vant tinw in this casP."; ·w e are without authority
Atnt<tPrdmn . .supra, 109 (J. Pa . L. Hev., at H:2, n. 79
8r<· 11. :{, supra.
1'; ~,.,, n. fi, 8UJ1ru.
Tlw contempt portwu of thr :\la :;;;ar hu~rtt~
~tat111<' "<'('nt~ to havr lain fallow for almo~t it:; entirr llll'tory . App:trrntl~· tht-r<• havP b<•L'n :tbout a half dozen arrrst:,; under thi~ part of
tho "tat ut e 111 n•c·rnt )'Par,., but none has produced a reportPd
deeii'ion. Tr of' Oral Arg. 2h-29. In 196H, a teenagpr m L~ · n y
\la,.,.arhuH•tt" wa,; rhnrgPd, apparl'ntly undPr th!l prp~;ent ><1Htut~~
with d(•,;eerating tlw £TnitPd Stntr" ling b~· :;ewin~~: piPrP:; of it int o l1i:-<
1

'
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to cure that defect.'; Statutory language of such a
stam1ardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and
juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legisla~
tures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting
the standards of the criminal law. E. g., Papachristou v.
('ity of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156. 165-169 ( 1972). In
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 120 ( 1969),
Mr. Justice Black voiced a concern that we share against
entrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat.'' The aptness of
hi8 admonition is evident from appellant's candid concession during oral argument before the Court of Appeals
regarding state enforcement standards for that portion
of tlw statute under which Goguen was convicted:

I AJs counsel lfor appellant] admitted, a war
protestor who, while attending a rally at which it
brgins to rain. evidences his disrespect for the
American flag by contemptuously covering himself
with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be proseeuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a
member of the American Legion who, caught in the
same rainstorm while returning from an 'AmericaJ,ove It or Leave It' rally, similarly uses the flag,
but does 8o regrettably and without a contemptuous
attitude . would not be prosecuted." 471 F. 2d, at
102 (emphasis in original).
Wlwre inlwn,n tly vague statutory language permits such
selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process.
tro1t:oC'r~ . 1\<-'w York Time::;, Augu:si 1, 19U8, p. ;n, col. l. The
t E'<'nager wa:s ordl'r('d by a tit a tf' di~t rict court to prepare and ddive1

an t'H~ay 011 thr flag_ ThE' court continued thn ratie without a findiug, oPpnviug it of an~· prcct>d<:ntial value .
17
E . g. , (Tnded States v. Thirty-seven Photographs , 402 U.S 86:),
81i9 (197! ) .
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III
.\ppellant's arguments that the "treats contemptu~
ously " phrast- is not impermissib ly vague, or at least
should not be so hPld in this case, are unpersuasive.
Appellant devotes a substantial portion of his opening
briC'f. as he did his oral orgument, to the contention that
Goguru failed to preserve his present void for vagueness
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus j urisdiction. Appellant concedes that the issue of " vagueu ess
as app lied" is properly before the federal courts," but
cont<'tHis that Goguen's only arguable claim is that the
::;tatute is vague on its face . The latter claim. appellant
mst~ts, was not pre8e n ted to the state courts with the
requisit(' fair prt>cision. Picard"· Connor, 404 U. 1:-1. 270
(l!J71 ). This exhaustion of remedies argument is belatt-'dly raisrd.'" ami it fails to take the full measure of
Goguen's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the
state courts."" We do not deal with the point at length ,
" Hc· pl~· BriPI' . J..
'" (;ogupn f11Pd hi>' fPdrral habra:; corpu:-; pt>tition ::;ub,.:rqurnt
lu l'u·ard, 8/t]Jm. Yt>l II appc•ar,; that appPIIant did not rai,;e hi:;
prP>'!'IIt rxha u::;tioll of remrd irs a rgmnrnt brforr the Di:;trict Comt.
That l'ourt commPntl'd sprcifically on thi" omi:;:;ion: ··No contl'ntwn i~ now mmlr that I (ioguPnj ha::; not rxhau~tc>d :state· remc•clic>:;,
nor that thr eon,.;ti tutwnal i~"\ll'~ prC'~<·ntt>d hrrC' wrrr not rai"ctl
ap]n·opnatP I~ · i11 ,;ta t<' pro<·Peding;;." :{4:{ F. Supp., at 164.
"" ( :oguen fiiPd in ~ tatt• ~nperior court an un ~ u<· CE'l:lt:> ful motion to
dbmi~' the eompla mt in whirh hr cited th<' Fourt renth Amrndnwnt
and atl!'~?:Pd that the ~ tatutr umkr which IH' wa::; clwrgrd wa ~ " impPrmi ~~~ bl~· Yagup all(! incapable• of fair and rrat:>ouabk int €'rpretati on
hy publie offieiab.'' ApJwndix 1. Thi~ motion wa ::; abo brfor<' thr
J.\.la,;~achn~l'tt~ Supn·mp .Jndieia l Conrt, ~incr it wa t:> incorporated in
(1ogu<'n ·~ amPmkd bill of Pxcrption~. Ibid. In addition. Gogurn'::;
bnrf hl'fon· t Ill It l'ou rt rai~<'d Yagurm'"" poilltl:l and ritPd vaguPJlPi:i~
ra~(·~
!d .. nt 19. 2H-:27. ri ling Lauzetta v. Neu· Jerse y, :306 F . S,
-Hil (mm ), a11d l'arker ' · Mor(falt. :l:2:2 F . Supp . 585 (WD )I C.

...

.

~

.
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hovwver. for we flitd tlw relevailt statutory ianguagc
Impermissibly vague as applied to Goguen. With.:
Gut doubt thP "substance'' of this claim was "fairly
pn'seu ted" to the state courts under the exhausti01l
standards of Picard, supra, 404 tJ. S., at 275, 278.
Appellaut's exhaustion of remedies argument is prem•
]sed on the notion that Goguen ;s behavior rendered hini
a. hard-core violator as to whom the statute was not
vague. whatever its implications for those engaged in different conduct. To be sure there are statutes that
by their terms or as authoritatively construed apply'
without question to certain activitie~. but whose applicatiott to other behavior 1s uncertain. The hard-core
violator concept makes some sense with regard to such
statutes. The present statute, however, is not in that
category. This criminal provisio11 is vague "not in the
sense that it requ]res a person to conform his conduct
to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard,
but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is
speeificd at all." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 P. ~.
()11, 614 (1071). ~uch a provision simply has no core.
This absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusiou
and exclu sion is precisely what offends the Due Process
('laust'. The deficiency is particularly objectionable in
(North Carolina Hag co11tempt ~tatut(·
i~ correet in a~::;ert 
llll); rhnt Uogm·n fnilNl to compartmentalize ill hi~ :-;tnte court bri(·f
rlw dup ]Jrore~~ doctrine of vagu<>ne~~ and Fin;t Anwndment concept~
of ov<·rbn·ndth. 8(•n AppPndix 19-24. But permittmg a degree of
]('akagP lwtwPPil tho~e particul:tr adjoining compartmf'nt~ js mu.ler~t andnuh •. C f. 1\'ote. ·'Tlw Fir~t Amendment Overbreadth Doctrin e,'' 1'\3 Harv. L. HPv. 1->44, ::l71-875 (1970). The highPst :;tate
<'ourt.'~ opmion, which dealt ~eparatdy with Goguen's Fin;t Amendm(•nt and vaguenPss claims, Commonwealth v. Goguen, supra, - ;vJ as". at - . 279 'N. E. :2d, at G67, indicates that that court wa::;
wPJI awan' that C.oguen rai~(> d both ~P1~ of nrguments.
Hl71)

(thrr('-Jildi!;(' court)

nml for vnguellPH>i and overbreadth). Apprll:mt
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vit--w of the unfettered latitude thereby accorded laV\'
enforcement officials and triers of fact. Until it is corrected either by allwndment or judicial construction, it
affects all who are prosecuted under the statutory languagP. [n our opinion the defect exists in this case.
The language at issue is void for 'vagueness as applied to
Goguen because it subjected him to criminal liability
under a standard so indefinite that police, court. and jury
were frt'<' to react to nothing more than their own preferenci~ S for ir<'atlllent of the flag.
Turning from the exhaustion point to the merits of
the vagueness question presented, appellant argues that
any notice difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow subject matter of the statute, "aetual" flags of the United
Stat<'s .~ '
Appellant contends that this "takes some of
the vagueness away from the phrase, 'treats contemptuously .. .. ' " ~~ Anyone who "wants notice as to what
conduct this statute proscribes .... immediately knows
that it has something to do with flags and if he wants to
stay clear of violating this statute, he just has to stay clear
of doing something to the United States flag.""" Apart
from tlw ambiguities pres<'nted by the concept of an
"actual" fiag,"' we fail to see how this alleged particu"' .\p]wllant ·~ Brid 17 ;
"" Tr . of Oral Arg . H.
2

"

Tran~.

of Oral Arg. 9.

Ibid .

"'At the timr of Goguen's JHOsecution. tlw ::;tatute referred simply
to "tlw flag of the United State;; ... ," without further definition .
Tlwt rmHe~ tbt' obviou;; que;;tion whetlH'r Goguen's miniature cloth
flag ron;;titutrd " thr flag of the United States . . . .'' Goguen
arguetlun~ucce~~full.' · befort' the state court;; that the statute applied
onl~· to flag~ that mPt '"ollicial ::>tandardt>" for proportions, such aH
rt>la1JOn of hPight to width and th<' t>iZ<' of stripes and the field of
~tan;, and t hn t the cloth he wore did not meet thosE' t>tnndarcls
Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12, 24--26; Appendix 2. There was no
dtsp111e thnt Coguen'~ adornment had the requisite number of stars
and ~t ripPo: and color~ . Tr . of Oral Arg. 11-12. Tht> i\!tU:iHU -
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larity resolves the central vagueness qvestion-the
absence of any standard for defining contemptuous
treatme11 t.
Appellant's remaining argumei1ts are equally unavailtllg. It is asserted that the first six words of the statute
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously'' phrase,
and that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
customarily construes general language to take on color
from more specific accompanying language. But it is
conceded that Goguen was convicted under the general
phrase alone. and that the highest state court did not
rely on any general-to-specific principle of statutory
illterpretation iu this case."'' Appellant further argues
that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has
restricted the scope of the statute to intentional contempt."'' Aside from the problems presented by an
appellate court's limiting construction in the very case
iu which a defendant has been tried under a previously
ehu,ett, Supreme .Juchcwl Court found Goguen's C'loth fiag to be
covered b)· the ~tntute, noting that "Lt]he statute doei:l not re<.juir•e
that the fiag be· 'official'" Commonwealth Y. Goguen,- Mni:ls. - ,
- , :279 N. E. 2d fi()(), (j(jg (1972). The lowE>r federal courts did
not addrc~,.; tl11~ holding, nor do we. We note only that the l\lla,.;l:larlnr~Ntl:l Lcgi,.;lature apparent!)· i:lCUsed an ambiguity in thii:l rci:lpect,
becau~c· ~ubs<'quPnt to Gogupn's prosecution it amended the statute
in an effort to dcfinp what it had meant by the ''flag of the
!lmtPd State,.;." See n. 3, supra.
25
Tr. of Oral Arg. 48.
2
H The Mu,~achusett~ court commemerl ~imply that "l t] he JUry
c·otdd infer that the viOlation was intentional without reviewing any
word" of the cldendant." Commonwealth v. Goguen,- Mass.-,
--, 279 N. E. 2d 666, 6()g (1972). Thu:s. the court held that the
jury eould mft·r intent merely from Goguen'~ conduct. Thii:l is
apparently also a holding that the jury must find contemptuou~
intent under tlw ~tat ute. although the requirement amounts to very
little ~inee it i~ so eai:li!y ~atiHfied. The court's reference to verbal
l'ommunicatwn n•flected Gog:uen's relianre on f:!.t1·eet v. New York ,
;{94 lf s 579 ( 1969) .
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unnarroweJ statute. 2 ' this holding still does not clarify
what conduct constitutes contempt, whether intentional
or inadvertent.
Finally, appellant argues that state law enforcement
authorities have shown themselves ready to interpret
this penal statute narrowly and that the statute, proprrly read. reaches only direct. immediate contemptuous
acts that "actually impinge upon the physical integrity
of the flag . . . . " "' There is no support in the record
for the former point."!' Similarly, nothing in the state
court's opinion in this case or in any earlier opinion of
that court sustains the latter. In any event, Goguen
was charged only under the wholly open-ended language
A11hton 1 . Kenturk!J , ;~8-1 U . S . 195, 191-\ (19(ili )
Bri<'f :2:2 .
"!' " ' ith reg:ard to pro~<·rutorial poliriP::;, apJH'lhmt e1te::; two JHlbh::;hed opinion~ of thP N!a~~nehu~ett::; Atlorne~· Genrntl. 4 Op;;. of
Att. Gen. 470 (1915) (H<'JHodnrf•d at AppPIIant '~ Brief ;{0) : Heport
of Atty. UPu., l'nb. Dor. ?\o . 1:2. p. 19:2 (1968) (Reprodur<'cl at
.Juri::;. Stat<'nwnt App. 5:3) . Appellant conct'clc.•:s that nPithPr deal ~
with thP <'O!ltcmpt portion or thC' statute undpr which GogUl'll WHI:'
ronvict<•d . Tim~. th<',l' are not ill point lwrc. ThPy provitkd
guidallcC' to no Oil(\ Oil the rdt•vant ~tat u tor~· languagr . Nev<'!'tiH•les~, apprllaut i ~ corrPct that th ry ~how a tc•ndPJlc~ · on the• part of
tlw ~ tate Attom<·~ · Urnpral to rPad uthrr portion::; of tlw ::;tatut<:'
na rrowl~ · At t lw :<a mr t imr, t hr~· rrHrct t hr lack of pn•cJ~lOn
rrrurring throughout thr :Vln~~arhn~<'t t~ Hug mi;;u:;e ::;tnt utc . The
1915 opimon notrd that a litrraln•ading of onr portion of th<' "tHtute,
prohibiting Pxhihition of t•llgraving~ of thr flag on certain articlc•,.;,
would makr it :1 crimmal offen~r to di~play the flag it ~:> elf ·'in man~ ·
of 1ts cheaper and morl' rommon form::;. " Appellant ':> Brirf :u-a2.
The btat<' Attome~ · (;rlleral roneluded that thi" would be a "manifP:;t
absurdity ." /d ., at :Q . TlH' 19fil'l opinion :1dvi~c·d thHt a flag n•pn·::;pntntiou painted on a door wu" not "a flag of thr United Statp,.; "
within the mf'aning of the ~tatutr . .lmi~. Statemrnt App . 5:~-55. A
rontrary iuterpr<'tation ll'ould "rai:,;e ;-;erious que::;tion~ lliHirr t hr
F1r,;t and FourtPr nth An1eudmrnts . . . ,'' given thr n ·quin•mPnt

"' E.
2

(f.,

~ Appellant ·~

l.'i
of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously." There
was no allegation of physical desecration.
Tlwrc• arE' areas of human conduct where, by the nature
of the problems presented. legislatures simply cannot
Pstablish standards with great precision. Control of the
broad rang<' of disorderly conduct that may inhibit a
policeman in the performa11ce of his official duties may
lw one such area, requiring as it does an on-the-spot
asfo'etoismcnt of the need to keep order. Cf. Colle·n v
Kentucky, 407 ('. ~. 104 (1072). But there is uo comparable reason for committing broad discretion to la\'v'
pnforemwn t officials in the area of flag contempt.
f ndeed. lwcalJi''(' display of the flag is SO COllllllOn and
takP::; so tuany forms. cha11ging from one generation to
a11otlwr and often difficult to distinguish in principle, a
legil"lature should define with some care the flag behavior
Jt intends to outlaw. Certainly nothing prevents a legislature from definiug with substantial specificity what
eonstitutPs forbidden treatment of United States fiags.' 10
that l•l'il:tvim maJ<· cnmJwtl mu~t \w "plainly pruhibitPd br tlw
language of tlw ,.:tntut<•." ld .. at 54-.
·'" Thl' I'PdC'ral tln~t dl',.:<'cmtion ~JtntutP, for <'xamplP. rdl0ct~ :1
t•ongl · <·~ ~ !ounl purpo~t· to do JU~t that. ln re~Jpon~P to a warning
ll\ th<· l llltPd :::\tat<'., .-\ttorup~· C:PJIC'ral that to llllC' ~uch ltllbouud<'d
t<·rm"' a"' " d<'fw,.:" or · ·ca~t,.: C'OJJtcmpt . .. citlwr b~· word or aet" 1~
" to n ,.: k IIIVHiid<tl!on" on VH~ILPIIP~~ ~round~, S. Hrp. ~o. 12X7.
HOtl! ('ong . 2d :-\('~,.: .. 5 (19ol-.): H. H. H<'p. :\io. :~50. 90th l'ong., lot
8e,.:,.: ,, 7 (J~(i71. tlw bill which bream<' the fl>deral ~JtatutP wa,.:
anu•n<i<•d , lt:i C'ong HP<'. Hl-449, 16450 (l~(i7), to reach on!~· actH
t lw t ph~ :-ic · all~ · damngr I he· Hag. The de~ccrn tion provision of the
:-llltut(', J~ l ' :-\ . l' . §700 (a), d<'clar!',.::
·(a) Wlwc·v<•J kuomngl~· ca,.:t::; contempt upon any flag of the
l 1JiitPd Stat Po: b~ · pubhrl~· mut ilnt ing. drfacmg, defiling, burning, or
tramphug 11pon it "'hall lw fin('(! not mor<' than !)1,000 or nnpri;;mwd
f01 nut mon• t ha11 OJH' )'Par, or both."
Tlw lPgJ,.:Iatn·p ln~tor~· r<·vc•ab a rl<'ar dc,.;u·r to r<'aeh on!) ddil!(·d
phy~tcnl aet~ of c!P,.:c•cn1tion . H. H. Hrp. :'oio. :350, suwa. at ·~
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The statutory language at issue here fails to approach
that goal and is void for vagut•ness."' The judgment is
-affirmed. ~

1t is so ordered.

("'The language of I he bill prohibit~ intrntional, willful, not acri~
dental or inadvrrtenl public physical act;; of drsecration."); S. RPp.
No. 1:2H7 . supra. at :3 (''ThP languagE' of the bill prohibits intPntional,
willful, not acridPntal or inadvertent public physical act8 of dr:;ecmtion of the flag."). Tlw net ha;; bcpn ;;o read by the lower frderal
court;;. which havr uphrld il again~! vaguenes;; challenge;;. United
States v. C1'osson, 462 F. :2d 96 (CA9) cPrt. dPnied, 409 U.S . 1064
(1972}; Joyce v. U11ited States, U. S. App. D. C. - . 454 F .
2<.! 971 (1971), CPrt. drnird, 405 U.S. 969 (1972). Src Hoffman,.
United States. -- LT . S. ApJJ. D. C. - , 445 F. 2d 22(i (1971) .
11
'
W e arr awar<' , of r·our~r. of the univer;;al adoption of flag
de~ecralion or r·ontrmp1 statutes by thP frderal and statr govemment ;; . SPe n. 30 . :>upm. The ::;tatutrs of the 50 8tate:; are Hynop~ized 111 HParin~J:~ 011 H . H. :271 , et a/. beforr Sub . Comm . No . .f
of tlw IIouHr Comm. on thr .Judiriar~· . 90th Cong ., 1;;t Srss ., srr. 4,
pt. Ill. at 3:24-34G ( 1967). :\lo,:t of the :;tatr statute· arr patternPd
after tlw Uniform Flag Act of 1917. which in §3 provideti that :
"No prr"'on ~hall publici~· mutilate, defarr, clPfile, defy , tramplP
upon. or hy word or act ca~t eontPmpt upon any such /lag, standard,
color, eu~ign or shield."
Compare 9B Uniform Law~ AuuotatPd 52-53 (1966), with Hearmg::;
on H. R. :271 , et a/ .. supra. at :3:21-:346. Brcau:;e it i~ :;tated in
the di::;junrtivr, thi"' language. like that beforP u::;, make,.; po::;;;ible
criminal proi:ieeution ~ole!~· for ea~ting contempt upon the flag. The
validity of :;latutr:; utilizing thi::; language, howPver, insofar as thP
vaguenrso; doctrine i~ roncPrnPd , will dPprnd a~ much on their
judicial con:;trnctwn and rnforerment history a>: their htPral term~ .
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Rider A, p. 16 (new footnote)
Smith v. Goguen

~e have not addressed Goguen's First Amendment arguments

because, having found the challenged statutory language void for vagueness, there is no need to decide additional issues. Moreover, the
skeletal record in this case, see n. 1, supra, affords a poor opportunity for the careful consideration merited by the importance of the
First Amendment issues Goguen has raised. MR. JUSTICE WHITE,
concurring in the result, posits that "the jury was appropriately
informed that the defendant, if he was to be convicted, must have

that Goguen was punished for what he communicated. But, as counsel
for appellant confirmed at oral argument, there is no extant record
of the jury instructions in this case

tJ vz;;t? I C
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.SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 72-1254
Joseph Smith, Sheriff of
Worcester County,
On Appeal from the United
Appellant,
States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit.
v.
Valarie Goguen.
[January - , 1974]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Sheriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts, appeals from a judgment of the United States C'ourt of
Appeals for the Fi~st Circuit holding the contempt provision of the Massachusetts fil:l-g misuse statute unconsti·tutionally vague and overbro&d. Goguen v. Smith, 471
F. 2q 88, aff'g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass. 1972), prob. juris.
noted, 412 U. S. 995 (1973). We affirm on the vagueness ground. We do not reach the correctness of the
holding below on overbreadth or other First Amendment
grounds.

I
The slender record in this case reveals little more
than that Goguen wore a small cloth version of the
United States flag sewn to the seat of his trousers. 1 The
1 The record consists. solely of the amended bill of exceptions
Goguen filed in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the
opposing briefs before that court, the complajnt under which Goguen
was prosecuted, and Goguen's federal habea~ corpus pPtition.
{\.ppend.ix 1-36, 42-43. We do not have a tr.wl transwpt, although
'CJoguen's amended bill of exceptions briefly Hummamt>s some of the
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fl.ag was approximately four by six inches and was
displayed to the left rear of Goguen's blue jeans. On
January 30, i970, two police officers in Leomiuister, Mas..
sachusetts saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. Th€1
first officer encountered Goguen standing and talking with
a group of persons on a public street. The group apparently was not engaged in any demonstration or other protest associated with Goguen's apparel. 2 No disruption of
traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this officer approached Gogue11 to question him about the flag.
the other persons present laughed. ~ome t1me later. the
second officer observed Goguen in the same attire walkmg
in the downtown busi11ess district of Leominister
The following day the first officer swore out a complaint
against Goguen umier the con tempt provision of the
Massachusetts flag misul:)e statute. The r(']cvaut part
of the statute then read.
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats contemptuottsly tlw flag of the
United States
, whether such flag is public or
private property
. . shall bf' punished by a fine
of not less than ten nor morP than one hundrecl
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than onP
year, or both
testimony given by WJtue"~e~ for the pro:.:Pt·utlou at lllH ~tah· triaL
Goguen did not talw tlw ~t<l!Jd. Thti~ we do not have of record hiH
account of what transpired nt the tiuie of hi~ arrest or of lm; purpo~e
in wearing a flag on the >;cat of hi~ trou~er~ .
2 Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-5, 35-36 .
3 Mass. Gen Law~ Ann. c. 264, §5 (1971).
Omitting I-I!'Yeral
sentences protecting the ceremoflial actJvJhe~ of certam veterans'
group~, the statute read aH follow~ at thl' tJmf• of Goguen's arrest
and conviction.
'~§ 5. Flag; penalty for nususe
"Whoever publicly mutilate~:-~, trampler- upun, defaces or treats
contemptuously the ffa!( of the United Statl'~ or of Massachusetts,
whether sttch flag is IHthlic or privatr property, or who(wer displayH
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Despite the fir-st six words of the statute, GGguen was
not charged with any act of physical desecration. 4 As
permitted by the disjunctive structure of the desecrati<Jii
:such flag or any representation thereof upon which are words, figures,
_advertisements or designs, or whoever eattses or petinits such flag
to be used in a parade as a receptacle for depositing or collecting
~oney or any other article or thing, or whoever expose:; to p11blic
,view, manufactures, sells, exposes for sale, gives away or has in
posse~sion for sale or to give away or for use for any purpose, any
article or l:lubstance, being an article of merchandise or a receptacle
of merchandise or articles upon which is attached, through a
:wrapping or otherwise, engraved or printed in any mannPr, a repre·
sentation of the Uni!e4 Stat~§ flag, or whoever uses any rPpresenta·
tion of the arms or the great seal of the commonwealth for any
~dvertising or commercial purpose, shall be punished by a fine of
pot less than ten pr more than one.. hundred dollars or by imprison·
ment for not more than one year, or both. Words, figmes, advcr•
tisements or designs attached to. or directly or indirectly connected
~ith, such flag or any representation ther~:of in l:lnch manner that
such flag or its representation i:; used to. attract attention to or
advertise such words, figures, adverti:;ements or designs, l:lhall for
the purposes of this section be dermed to be upon such flag."
.The statute is an amalgam of provisions dealing with flag dPl:lecra•
tion and contempt (the fir~t 26 words) and with commercial misuse
or other exploitation of flags of the state and national government.
This case concerns only the " treat:; eontemptuously" phrase of the
statute, which has apparently been in the statut i.' since its enactment
in 1899. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 47~ F.. 2d, at 90, n . 2.
In 1971, subsequent to Go~uen '~< prosPcntion, the desccrahon and
contempt portion of the statute was amended twice. On March 8,
1.971, the legislature, per St. 1971, c. 74, modified the first ;;entence by
inserting "burns or otherwise" between the terms ''publicly" and
"mutilates," and, in addition, by increasing the fine. Mass. Gen . Laws
Ann. c. 264, § 5 (1973 Supp.) . On August 12, 1971, via St. 1971, c.
65.5, the legislature appendPd a new sentence defining ''the flag of tho
United States" phrase appearing in the first sentence: "For the
purposes of this section the term 'flag of the United States' shall
l;llean any flag which has been designated by Act or Resolution o~
the Congress of the United Stntes a:; tht• national emblem, whether
or not such designatJo~ is currently m forcP ." lb~d The 1971

[Ji'ootnote 4 1s vn p 4]
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and contempt portion of the statute, the officer charged
specifically and only that Goguen "did publicly treat contemptuously the flag of the United States .... " "
After jury tr:ial in the Worcester County Superior
Court, Goguen was found guilty. The court imposed ~
sentence of six months ii1 the .Massachusetts House of
Corrections. Goguen appealed. to the 1\fassachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, whiqh affirmed. Commonwealth v. Goguen, Mass. - , 279 N. E. 2d 666
( 1972). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argument with the comment that " [ w] hatever the uncertainties in other circumstances, we see no vagueness in
the statute as applied here." !d.,- Mass., at-, 279
N. E. 2d, at 667. The court cited no Massachusetts
precedents interpreting the "treats contemptuously"
phrase of the statute.6
After Goguen bega11 serving h1s sentence, he was
·granted bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas
corpus by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343
F. Supp. 161. The District COurt found the flag coniunendments are relevant to this case only m the tangential sense
that they indicate a. recognition by the legislature of the need to
tighten up this imprecise statut e.
4
Perhaps this wa~ because of the difficulty of t!w question whether
Goguen's conduct constituted physical drseeration of the flag. Cf.
Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F . 7d, at 91 , 11. 4 (" ... [WJe are not
so sure that sewing a flag to a background clearly affects 'physical
integrity.' ") .
"Appendix 4.
6
Appellant correctly conceded at oral argument that Goguen's
case is the first recorded Massachusetts court reading of this language. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18. Indeed, with the exception of one
turn of the century case involving one of the ~tatute 's commerc@
misuse provisions, Commonwealth v. R . /. Sherman Manu . Co., 189
Mass. 76, 75 N. E. 71 (1905), the entire statut E· has been essentially
devoid of state court interpretation.
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tempt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as overbroad under the First
Amendment. In upholding Goguen's void for vagueness contentions, the court concluded that the words
~'treats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily
ascertainable standard of guilt." I d., ~t 167. · Especially
in "these days when flags are commonly displayed on
,hats,
garments and vehicles . . . ," the words under which.
'
Goguen was convicted "leave ~onj1ctural, in many in..
stances, what conduct .may subject the ac)tor to criminal
prosecution." Ibid. The court also found that the
statutory language at issue "may be said to encourage
arbitrary and erratic arrests and conviotions." Ibid.
. The Court of Appeals, with one judge concurringt
affirmed the District Court on both First Amendmen
.and vagueness groqnds. Goguen . v. Smith, supra, 471 F
2d 88. With regard to the latte~ ground, . the .Court o.f
Appeals concluded that 11 resolution of [Goguen's void for
vagueness] challenge to the statute as applied to him
necessarily adjudicates the statute's facial constitutionality . . . ." !d., at 94. Treating as-applied and on-theface vagueness attacks as essentially indistinguishable in
light of the imprecision of the statutory phrase at issue,
id., at 92, 94, the court found that tJ1e language failed to
provide adequate warning to anyone. contained insufficient guidelines for law enforcement officials, and set
juries and courts at large. I d., at 94- 96. Then Circuit
Judge, now Senior Circuit Judge Hamley, sitting by designation from the Ninth Circuit, concurred solely in the
void-for-vagueness holding. !d., at 105. Judge Hamley
saw no need to reach the 11 far broader constitutional
ground" of First Amendment overbreadth relied on by
the · majority, noting the "settled principle of appellate
ad;iudication that constitutional questiont< are not to be

..
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dealt with unless this is necessary to dispose of the \
appeal." !bid.

TI
We agree with the holdings of the District Court and
the Court of Appeals on the due process doctrine of vague~
ness. The settled principles of that doctrine require no
.extensive restatement here. 7 The doctrine incorporates
notions of fair notice or warning. 8 Moreover, it requires
legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent
1'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." " Where a
statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court
7 The element~:~ of the vmd for va~uen<'8~ dodrine have been
.developed in a large body of precedent from this Comt. The cases
are categorized in, e.(/ .. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108-109 ( 1972). See, Amstt>rdam, "The Void-for-Vaguem"',; Doctrine
.in the Supreme Court," 109 U. Pa. L. H.t>v. 67 (19()0).
8 E. g., Papachl'istou v. City of Jar:kso.nville. 405 U. S. 156, 1G~
(1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939):
"No one may be required at peril of lift', liberty or pf{)perty to
speculate ao; to the mt>nniqg of JW1111l statutes. All ure entitled to
be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." (Citations
omitted.);
Connally v. General Construction Co., 2ti9 U. S. a85, ;~91 {192()):

" . . . [A] statute winch rither forbids or reqmre,; the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intrlhgeuce must. neces"·
sarily gpess at its meaning and differ tt,; ( o it~ apphcation, violatt>s
the first essential of due procest~ of law." (Citations omittt>d.)
0 E. g., Gm11ned, supra, 408 U. S., at 108; United States v.
L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (" . .. [T]o attempt
. to enforce the section would be the exact equivalent of an t>ffort to
carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized and punished
all acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and unreason~
able in the estimation of the court Hnd jury."); United States v.
'{leese, 92 U. 8. 214, 221 (1875) (''It would cPrtninly be dangProus
if the legislature could set a net large enough to ratch all possible
pffenders, and le[J..ve it to the court~ to Htep m~ide aucl ~ay wqQ
pould be rightfully detaineq, and who should be ~Pt ~t lHrge.") .

.

.

~

..
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i.nterpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered
by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a great&:
degree of specificity than in other contexts. 10 The statu~
tqry language at issue here, "publiciy . . . treats cont~:mptuously the flag of the United States ... ,"has such
scope, e. g.,. Street. v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969)'
(verbal flag· conteir,ipt), and at the relevant time was
without the benefit of judicial clarfficationP
. Flag contempt statl,.l~es have been characterized as
t-oid for lack 6f notice· on t:he theory that " [ w] hat .ls
90ntemptuous to one man may be a work of art to
another." 12 Goguen's behavior can hardly be described
11~· art.
Immaturity or "·silly conduct''. Ia probably
~6mes closer to the mark. But we see the force 6{ the
District Court's observation that ·the flag has become
~'ar1 obje·c t of y6uth fashidn and hig'h camp
·rr
343 F. Supp., at 164. . As both courts below noted, casual
treatment of the flag· in many contexts has become a
'jVidespread contemporary phenomelJOn. ld., at 164,
167; 471 F. 2d, at 96., Flag· wearfng· in a cfay 6f relaxed
()lathing styles may be' simply for adon1ineilt or a ploy to'
~ttract attention, It and many other current, careless
Uses of the flag nevertheless constitc1te Oncere'm6ni:d
treatment th~t .many people may view as contemptuous.
)'"et in a time of ·widely varying .attitudes and tastes for
displaying something as ub1quit6'us as the United States
flag or representations of it, it could hardly be the purpose of the Massachusetts legislature to make crimina!
• 10 E. g., Grayned, supra, 408 U. S., at 109 ; Smith v. California;
361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). Compare the less ~tringent requirements
of the modern vagueness oases dealing with purely economic regula~
tion. E. g., United States v. National Dairy Prod~ Corp., 372 U. S,
2'1-J (1963) (Robinson-Patman Act)
11 See n. n, supra .
12 Note, 66 Mich . L. Rev 1040, 1056 (1968 ).
118 Ooguen v. Smith, supra, 843 F . Stlpp., at 11) 6~
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every informal use of the flag. The statutory language
under which Goguen was charged, however, fails to draw
reasonably clear lines between the kinds of nonceremonial
treatment that are criminal and those that are not. Due
process requires that all "be informed as to what the
State commands or forbids . . . ,'' Lanzetta v. l'v' ew Jersey,
306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939), and that "men of common
intelligence" not be forced to guess at the meaning of the
criminal law. Connally v, General Co·nstructio11 Co.,
269 U. S. 385. 391 (1932). Given today's tendencies to
treat the flag unceremoniously, those' notice standards
are not satisfied here.
We recognize that 111 a noncommermal context behavior as a general rule is uot mapped out in advance on
the basis of statutory language.' ' In such cases, perhaps
the most meaningful aspC'ct of thr vagueness doetrine is
not actual notic<' but the othN' pdllclpal f•lement of the
doctrine-the requir€•ment that a legislature Pstablish
minimal guidelines to govern law Pnforcenwnt 1t is ill
this regard that the statutory language' uuder serutiuy
has its most notable clcficicneies,
In its terms, the language at issue 1s sufficiently unbounded to prohibit, as the District Court noted. "any
public deviation from formal flag etiquette. . " 343
F. Supp.. at Hi'l. Unchanged throughout its 70-year
history,' " the "treats contemptuously'' phrase was also
devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the
relevant time in this case.'" We are without authority
Amsterdam, supra, 109 U. Pa . L. Rev .. at 8~. n 79.
See n. :~, supra.
16 See n . 6, supra.
The \'Ontetnpt port wn ol the \lla:;::;achusetts
statute seems 1o lmve lam fallow for altllo::;t it~ entire hi:;tory. Appar~
ently there have been n bout a ha If doZP.ll a rrC'::;t~ under thi:> part of
the :>tatute in recent year,.;, but none ha:; produced a. reported
decision. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29 . In 19fi8, a teenager in Lynn,
Massachu;;ett:; wt~s chnrged, apparent!) under the pn~::;ent .;tatute,
14
15
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to cure that defect. 17 ~tatutory language of such a
standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and
,juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legislatures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting
the standards of the criminal law. E. g., Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 165-169 (1972). !ri
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 120 ( H.i69),
Mr. Justice Black voiced a concern that we share against
entrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his heat." The aptness of
his admonition is evident from appellanes candid concession during oral argument before the Court of Appeals
tegarding state enforcement standards for that portiort
of the statute under which Goguen was convicted:
" ... [A]s counsel lfor appellant] admitted, a war
protestor who, whilf> attending a rally at which it
begins to rain, evidences his disrespect for the
American flag by contemptuously covering himself
with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prosecuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a
member of the American Legion who, caught in the
same rainstorm while returning from an 'AmericaLove It or Leave It' rally, similarly uses the flag,
but does so regrettably and without a contemptuous
attitude, would not be prosecuted .'' 471 F 2d, at
102 (emphasis in original) .
Where inherently vague statutory lauguage permits such
selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process.
with desecrating thf United State~> flng by sewing pwce:> of it into his
trousers. New York Time~>, Augu~t 1, 1968, p . 31 , col. 1. The
teenager was ordered by a state district cotirt to prepare and deliver
an essay on the flag. Tho eourt continued the case without a finding, depriving 1t of any pl'ecedential vahw

E. g., United States v, Thirty-8e'IWtt f'hoto(traph s, 402 U, S :36;.j1
369 (1971),
17
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III
Appellant's arguments that the "treats contemptupusly" phrase is not impermissibly vague, or at least
~Should not be so held in this case, are unpersuasive.
Appellant devotes a substantial portion of his opening
brief, as he did his oral_Qrgument, to the contention that
Goguen failed to preserve his present void for vagueness
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Appellant concedes that the issue of "vagueness
tts applied" is properly before the federal courts/ 8 but
contends that Goguen's only arguable claim is that the
statute is vague on its face. The latter claim, appellant
insists, was not presented to the state courts with the
requisite fair precision. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270
(1971). This exhaustion of remedies argument is belatedly raised,t 0 and it fails to take the full measure of
_Goguen's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the
state courts. 20 We do not deal with the point at length,
18

Reply Brief 4.
Goguen filed his federal habeati corpus petition subsequent
to Picard, supra. Yet it nppears that appellant did not raise his
present exhaustion of remedies argument before the District Court.
That court commented specifically ou this omJstiion: ''No contention is now made that [Goguen] has not exhausted state remedies,
nor that the constitutional itism•s pn'tiented here Wfrf not raised
appropriately in state proceedings." 343 F. Supp., lit 164.
20
•
Goguen filed in state superior court an unsucces::sful motion to
dismiss the complaint in which he cited the FourtePnth Amendment
and alleged that the statute under which hf was charged was "impermissibly vague and incapable of fair and reasonable interpretation
by public officials." Appendix 1. This motion was also before the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, since it was incorporated in
Goguen's amended bill of exceptions. Ibid. In addition, Goguen's
prief before that Court raised vngneness points and citffi vagueness
cases. Id., at 19, 2ti-27, citing Lanzetta v. N ew Jerseu, :306 U. S,
451 (1930), and Parker v Morgan , :322 F. Supp. 585 (WD N . C.
'10

72-1254-0PINION
SMITH v. GOGUEN

11

however, for we find the relevant statutory language
,Impermissibly vague as applied to Goguen. Without doubt the "substance" of this claim was "fairly
presented" to the state courts under the exhaustion
standards of Picard, supra, 404 U. S., at 275, 278.
Appellant's exhaustion of remedies arg·umei1t is preni7
fsed on the notion that Goguen,.s behavior rendered him
a hard-core violator as to whom the statl,lte was not
vague, whatever its implications for those engaged in different conduct. T-o be sure there are statutes that
by their terms or as authoritativ~ly ·construed apply
without question to certain activities, but whose appli~
cation to other behavior is uncertain. The hard-core
violator concept makes some sense' with regard to such
statutes. The present statute, however .. is not in that
category. This crimil'lal provision is vague "not in the'
sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct
to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard,
but rather in the sense tha.t u.o standard of conduct is
specified at all." Coates v. C1:ty of Oincinnati, 402 U. S,
611, 614 (1971). Such a provision simply has no core·,
This absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion
f1Bd exclusion is precisely what offends the Due Process
Clause. The deficiency is particularly objectionable in
1971) (three-judge court) (North Carulinn flag contern1lt statut9
void for vagueness and overbreadth). Appellant is correct in assert.,ing that Goguen failed to compartmentalize in his state court brief
the due process doctrine of vaguenetis and First Amendment concepts
of overbreadth. See Appendix 19-24. But permitting a degree of
leakage between those particular adjoining compartments Js under~
standable. Cf. Note, "The First Amendment Overbreadth Doc~rine," 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844, 871-875 ( 1970) . The higlwst state
court's opinion, which dealt separately with Goguen's First Amendment and vagueness claims, Commonwealth v. Goguen, supra, - Mass., at - , 279 N. E. 2d, at 667, indicates that that court wa~
well aware that Goguen raised. both Het.s· of argmnrnt::-r,
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view of the unfettered latitude thereby accorded law
enforcement officials and triers of fact. Until it is corrected either by amendment or judicial construction. it
affects all who are prosecuted under the statutory language. In our opinion the defect exists in this case.
The language at issue is void for vagueness as applied to
Goguen because it subjected him to criminal liability
under a standard so indefinite that police, court, and jury
were free to react to nothing more than their own preferences for treatment of the flag.
Turning from the exhaustion point to the merits of
the vagueness question presented, appellant argues that
any notice difficulties are ameliorated by the narrow subject matter of the statute, "actual" flags of the United
States. 21 Appellant contends that this "takes some of
the vagueness away from the phraEe, 'treats contemptuously .... ' " .2 t Anyone who "wants 11otice as to what
conduct this statute proscribes ... , immediately knows
that it has something to do with flags and if he wants to
stay clear of violating this statute. he just has to stay clear
of doing something to the United States flag." 28 Apart
from the ambiguities presented by the concept of an
"actual" flag, 2<1 we fail to see how this aUeged partiCuAppellant's Brief 17; Trau~. of Oral Arg . 9.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 9.
23 Ibid.
24
At the time of Goguen's prosecution, th€' statute referred simply
to "the flag of the United States ... ," without further ddinition.
That raises the obvious question whether Gogu€'n's miniature cloth
flag constituted "the ffag of the United States . .. ." Goguen
argued unsuccessfully before the state cotirts that the statute applied
only to flags that met "official stan&trds"· for proportions, such as
relation of height to width nne! the size of stripes and the field of
stars, and that the cloth he wore did not meet those standards.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12, 24-26; Appendix 2. There was no
· c!'ispute that Goguen's adornmf'nt had the reqnisitc number of ~tars
and stripes and colors. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. The Mass~t~
21

22
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larity resolves the central vagueness question-the
absence of any standard for defining contemptuous
treatment.
Appellant's remaining arguments are equally unavaii=ing. It is asserted that the first six words of the statut~
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously;; phrase,
and that the Massachusetts Suprerpe Judicial Court
customarily construes general language to take on color
from more specific accompanying language. But it is
conceded that Goguen was convicted under the general
phrase alone, and that the highest . state court did not
rely on any general-to-specific pr,inciple of statutory
interpretation in this case. 2 fi Appellant further argues
that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has
restricted the scope of the statute to intentional con~
~empt. 20
Aside from the problems presented by an
appellate court's limiting construction in the very case
in which a defendant has been tried under a previously
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court found Goguen's cloth flag to be
covered by the statute, noting that "[t]he statute does not require
that the flag be 'official'" Commonwealth v. Goguen, Mass. - ,
- , 279 N . E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). The. lower federal courts did
not address this holding, nor do Wf'. ·We note only that the .Massachusetts Legislature apparently ~ensed an ambiguity in thi8 respect,
because subsequent to Goguen's prosecution it · amended the statute
in an effort to define what it l!ltd meant by the "flag of the
United States." See n . 3, supra.
2 5 Tr. of Oral Arg. 48.
26
The Massachusetts court commented simply that "[t] he jury
could infer that the violation was intentional without reviewing any
words of the defendant ." Commonwealth v. Goguen, Mass. - ,
- , 279 N. E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). TllUs, the court held that the
jury could infer intent merely from Goguen's conduct. This is
apparently also a holding that the jmy m·ust find con1emptuous
intent under the st atut e, although the rPqui~ement amounts to very
little since it is so easily sat isfied. The eou,rt's, reference to verbal
Q.qfllmunica~~on ,reflected Goguen's reliance on Street v. New York;
394 u. s. 579 (1969).
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unnarrowed statute, 27 this holding still does not clarify
what conduct constitutes contempt, whether intentional
or inadvertent.
Finally, appellant argues that state law enforcement
authorities have shown themselves ready to interpret
this penal statute narrowly and that the statute, properly read, reaches only direct, immediate contemptuous
acts that "actually impinge upon the physical integrity
bf the flag ...." 28 There is no support in the record
for the former point. 2 n Similarly, nothing in the state
court's opinion in this case or in ailY earlier opinion of
that court sustains the latter. In any eveut, Goguen
was charged only under the wholly open-ended language

U. S. 195, 198 (1966) .
Appellant's Brief 22.
29 With regard to prosecutorial policie~, appellant cites two published opinions of the Massachusetts Attorney General. 4 Ops . of
Att. Gen. 470 (1915) (Reproduc~·d at Appellanfs Brief 30) ; Report
of Atty. Gen., Pub. Doc. No . 12, p. i92 (1968) (Reproduced at
Juris. Statement App. 5S). Appellant concede~ that neither deals
with the contempt portion of the s1 atute under which Goguen was
convicted. Thus, they arei riot in point here. They provided
guidance to no one on the relevant ~tatutory Janguag('. Nevertheless, appellant is correct that thry show a tendency on thr part of
the state Attorney Generai to 1:ead other portions of ti1e statute
narrowly. At the same time, they reflect the lack of precision
recurring throughout the Massacl~tisctt~ flag misuse statute. Ti1e
1915 opinion noted that a literal reading of one portion of tlw ~tatute,
J)rohibiting exhibition of ei1graving~ of the tl'ag on certain articles,
would mnke it a. criminal offense to di~play tlw flag itself " in many
of its cheaper and more common forms ." Appellant's Brief 31-32.
The state Attorney General concluded that this wmild be a ''manifest
absurdity." I d., at 32. Tht> 1968 opinion advi~rd that a flag rrpresentation painted on a door wns not "a flag of the United States"
within the meaning of the statute. Juris. StatemC'nt App . 53-55. A
contrary interpretation would "raise serious questions undPr the
First and FmWteentl1 All)'e ndment" .
," given the reqmremc1l't
·27

28

'.

E. g., Ashton v. Kentucky, :384
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of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously." There
was no allegation of physical desecration.
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature
bf the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot
establish standards with great precision. Control of the
broad range of disorderly conduct that may inhibit a
policeman in the performance of his official duties may
be ~:me such area, requiring as it does an on-the-spot
·assessment of the need to keep order. Cf. Cotten v.
Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972). But there is no comparable reason for committing broad discretion to law
enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt.
Indeed, because display of the flag is so common and
takes so many forms. changing from one generation to
another and often difficult to distfl1guish i11 priucit)le,
legislature should define with some care the flag behavior
lt intends to outlaw. Certainly nothing prevents a legislature from defining with substantial specificity what
constitutes forbidden treatment of United States fiags. 30

a

that behavior made criminal must be 1'plainly probib1ted by the
language of the sh1tute." !d., at 54.
30 The federal flag desecration statute, for exampl<>, reflects a
?ongressional purpose to do just that . In re~pon~e to a warning,
by the United States Attoruey General that to use such unbounded
terms as "defies" or "casts contempt . . e1thPr hy word or act " is
"to risk invalidation" on vaguene~~ ground~, S. Hep._ No . 1287,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (l!J68); H. R. Rep . No. 350, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 7 ( 1967), the bill which became the federal statute was
amended, 113 Cong. Rec. 16449, 16450 (1967), to reach only acts
tbat physically damage the flag. The desecration provision of the
statute, 18 U. S. C. § 700 (a), declares:
"(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the
United States by publicly mutilating, defacing, ciC'fi!ing, burning, or
trampling upon it shall be fined not rn()re than $1,000 or imprisoned
for not more than one year, or both."
The legislative history reveals a clear desire to reach only defined
physical acts of desecration, H . R ~ Rep. No . :350, BUj;JI"a, at 3;
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The statutory language at issue here fails to approach
that goal and is void for vagueness. 31 The judgment is
affirmed. 32
It is so ordered.
("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful, not acci·
dental or inadvertent public physical acts of desecration.").; S. Rep.
No. 1287, s-upra, at 3 (''The language of the bill prohibits intentional,
willful, not accidental or inadvertent public physical acts of dcce~
cration of the flag."). The act has been so read by thelower federal.
courts, which have upheld it against vagueness challenges. United
States v. Crosson, :162 F, 2d 96 (CA9) cert. denied, 409 U . S. 1064
(1972); Joyce v. United States, U. S. App. D. C. - , 454 F .
2d 971 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972) . .See Hoffman v.
United States,- U. S. App. D. C.-, 445 F. 2d 226 (1971).
31 We are aware, of course, of the universal adoption of flag
desecration or contempt statutes by the federal and state governments. See n. 30, supm. The statutes of the 50 S.tates are synopsized in Hearings on B. B. 271, et al., before Sub .. Comm. No. 4
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4,
pt. III, at 324-346 ( 1967). Most of the state statutes are patterned
after the Uniform Flag Act of 1917, which in § 3 provides that:
"No person shall publicly mutilate, def;1ce, defile, defy, trample
upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag , standard,
color, ensign or shield."
Compare 9B Uniform Laws Annotated 52- 53 (1966) , with Hearings
on H. R. 271, et al., supra, at 321-346. Because it is ;;tated in
the disjunctive, this language, like that before us, make::; possible
criminal prosecution solely for casting contempt upon the flag. The
validity of statutes utilizing this language, however, insofar ns the
vagueness doctrine is concerned, will .depend as . much on thrir
j~dicial construction and enforcement history as their literal terms.
~·We have not addressed Goguen's First Amrndment arguments
because, having found the challenged statutory language void for
vagueness, there is no need to de~ide additional issue'~. Moreover,
the skeletal record in this ca,;e, see n. 1, supra, affords a poor
opportunity for the careful consideration mrritrd by the importanee
of the First Amendment issue::; Goguen ha:,; raised. Mit. JmnrcE
WHITE, concurring in the result; positR that " the jury wa;; appropriately informed that the defendant, if he was to be convicted 1
must have intended to treat the flag contemputonsly ... .'' Antt: 1
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nt - . This nssumption appears to be the prPmis<' for tlw concurring opinion's conclusion that Goguen was puni"hrd for what h(•
communicated. But, as counsel for ap]wllant confirmerl at oral
argument, there is no extant. rE-cord of the jury instrnctions in thi~
case, Tr. of Oral Arg. 51, and thus we have no wny of knowin~ whnt
the .jur.y was informed,

JAN
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NOTE: Where It Is fenstble, n syllabus (headnote) wlll be re·
lensed, as Is being done in connection with this case, at the time
the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for
the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
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SMITH, SHERIFF v. GOGUEN
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 72-1254. Argued November 12-13, 1973Decided J anuary -, 1974
Appellee, for wearing a small United States flag sewn to the seat of
his trousers, was convicted of violating the provision of the Massa~
ehusetts fbg misuse statute that subjects to criminal liability any~
one who "publicly . . . treats contemptuously the flag of the
United States .... " The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
affirmed. The District Court in appellee's habeas corpus action
found the "treats contemptuously" phrase of the statute uncon~
stitutionally vague and overbroad. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. The challenged statutory language, which had received no
·narrowing state court interpretation, is void for vagueness under
the Due Process Clause of fhe Fourteenth Amendment, since by
failing to draw reasonably clear lines between the kinds of nonceremonial treatment of the flag that are criminal and those that
are not it does not provide adequate warning of forbidden conduct
and sets fortn a standard so indefinite that police, court and jury
·are free to react to nothing more than their own preferences for
treatment of the flag. Pp. 6-9, 12.
2. By challenging in state courts the vagueness of the "treats
contemptuously" phrase as applied to him, appellee preserved his
due process claim for purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270, since the challenged language is void for vagueness as applied to appellee or to anyone
else. A "hard-core" violator concept has little meaning with
·regard to the challenged language, 'because the phrase at issue is
vague not in the sense of requiring a person to conform his
·conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible standard, but in .
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the sense of not specifying any ascertainable standard of conduct
at all. Pp. 10-12.
3. Even if, as appellant contends, the statute could be said
to deal only with "actual" flags of the United States, this would
not resolve the central vngueness deficiency of failing to define
contemptuous treatment. Pp. 12-13.
4. That other words of the desecration and contempt portion
of the statute address more specific conduct (mutilation, trampling, and defacing of the flng) does not assist appellant, since
appellee was tried solely under the "treats contemptuously" phrase,
and the highest state court in this case did not construe the
challenged phrase as taking color from more specific accompanying
language. P. 13.
5. Regardless of whether restriction by that court of the scope
of the challenged phrase to intentional contempt may be held
against' appellee, such an interpretation nevertheless does not
clarify what conduct constitutes contempt of the flag, whether
intentional or inatl.vertent. _Pp. 1;3-1:,4,

4?1 F. 2d 88, affirm'?!f·
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SMITH, SHERIFF v. GOGUEN
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 72-1254. Argued November 12-13, 1973Decided January -, 1974
Appellee, for wearing a small United States flag sewn to the seat of
his trousers, was convicted of violating the provision of the Massachusetts flag misuse statute that subjects to criminal liability anyone who "publicly . . . treats contemptuously the flag of the
United States .... " The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
affirmed. The District Court in appellee's habeas corpus action
found the "treats contemptuously" phrase of the statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. The challenged statutory language, which had received no
narrowing state court interpretation, is void for vagueness under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since by
failing to draw reasonably clear lines between the kinds of nonceremonial treatment of the flag that are criminal and those that
are not it does not provide adequate warning of forbidden conduct
and sets forth: a standard so indefinite that police, court and jury
are free to react to nothing more than their own preferences for
treatment of the flag. Pp. 6-9, 12.
2. By challenging in state courts the vagueness of the "treats
contemptuously" phrase as applied to him, appellee preserved his
due process claim for purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270, since the challenged language is void for vagueness as applied to appellee or to anyone
else. A "hard-core" violator concept has little meaning with
regard to the chaltenged language, because the phrase at issue is
vague not in the sense of requiring a person to conform his
conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible standard, but ~:
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the sense of not specifying any ascertainable standard of conduct
at all. Pp. 10-12.
3. Even if, as appellant contends, the statute could be said
to deal only with "actual" flags of the United States, this would
not resolve the central vagueness deficiency of failing to define
contemptuous treatment. Pp. 12-13.
4. That other words of the desecration and contempt portion
of the statute address more specific conduct (mutilation, trampling, and defacing of the flag) does not assist appellant, since
appellee was tried solely under the "treats contemptuously" phrase,
and the highest state court in this case did not construe the
challenged phrase as taking color from more specific accompanying
language. P. 13.
5. Regardless of whether restriction by that court of the scope
6f the challenged phrase to intentional contempt may be held
against appellee, such an interpretation nevertheless does not
clarify what conduct constitutes contempt of the flag, whether
intentional or inadvertent. Pp. 13-14.
471 F. 2d 88, affirmed.
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DouGLAS,
BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARt~HALL, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment. BLACKMUN, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which BunGER, C. J., joined. REHNQUIST, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which BunGER, C . J., joined.

NOTICE : This opinion Is s ubJ ect to for mal r evision before publication
In t he prelimina r y prin t of the United St ates Reports. Reader8 a re requ est ed to noti fy the Hepor ter of Decisions, Supreme Co urt of t he
U nited Stutes, Washin gton, D.C. 20543 , of any t y p o~:ra phi ca l or other
formal errors, in order tlutt corrections may be made lJefore t he preliminary print goes to press .

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 72-1254
Joseph Smith, Sheriff of
Worcester County,
On Appeal from the United
Appellant,
States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit.
v.
Valarie Goguen.
[March 25, 1974]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Sheriff of Worcester County, Massachusetts, appeals from a judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit holding the contempt provision of the Massachusetts flag misuse statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Goguen v. Smith, 471
F. 2d 88, aff'g, 343 F. Supp. 161 (Mass. 1972), prob. juris.
noted, 412 U. S. 905 (1973). We affirm on the vagueness ground. We do not reach the correctness of the
holding below on overbreadth or other First Amendment
grounds.
I
The slender record in this case reveals little more
than that Goguen wore a small cloth version of the
United States flag sewn to the seat of his trousers.1 The
1 The record consists solely of the amended bill of exceptions
Goguen filed in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court , the
opposing briefs before that court, the complaint under which Goguen
was prosecuted, and Goguen's federal habeas corpus petition.
Appendix 1-36, 42--43. We do not have a trial t ranscript , alt hough
Goguen's amended bill of exceptions briefly summarizes some of the
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flag was approximately four by six inches and was
displayed to the left rear of Goguen's blue jeans. On
·January 30, 1970, two police officers in Leominister, Massachusetts saw Goguen bedecked in that fashion. The
first officer encountered Goguen standing and talking with
., a group of persons on a public street. The group appar' .ently was not engaged in any demonstration or other protest associated with Goguen's appareP No disruption of
traffic or breach of the peace occurred. When this officer approached Goguen to question him about the flag,
the other persons present laughed. Some time later, the
second officer observed Goguen in the same attire walking
in the downtown business district of Leominister.
The following day the first officer swore out a complaint
against Goguen under the contempt provision of the·.
Massachusetts flag misuse statute. The relevant part
of the statute then read:
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats contemptuously the flag of the
United States : .. , whether such flag is public or
private property . . ; , shall be punished by a fine
of not less than ten nor more than one hundred
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one
year, or both . . . ." 3
testimony given by witnesses for the prosecution at his state trial.
. Goguen clid not take. the stand. Thus we do not have of record his
account of what transpired,at the time of his arrest or of his purpose.
i in wearing a flag on the seat of his trousers.
2 Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6, 35-36.
3
Mass. Gen Laws Ann. c. 264, § 5 (1971). Omitting several
sentences protecting the ceremonial activities of certain veterans'
, groups, the statute read as follows at the time of Goguen's arrest
and conviction:
.. ~'§ 5. Flag; penalty for misuse
"Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats.
contemptuously the flag of the United States or of Massachusetts,
whether such flag is public or private property, or whoever displays
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Despite the first six words of the statute, Goguen was
not charged with any act of physical desecration. 4 As
permitted by the disjunctive structure of the desecration
such flag or any representation thereof upon which are words, figures,
advertisements or designs, or whoever causes or permits such flag
to be used in a parade as a receptacle for depositing or collecting
money or any other article or thing, or whoever exposes to public
view, manufactures, sells, exposes for sale, gives away or has in
possession for sale or to give away or for use for any purpose, any
article or substance, being an article of merchandise or a receptacle
of merchandise or articles upon which is attached, through a
wrapping or otherwise, engraved or printed in any manner, a representation of the United States flag, or whoever uses any representation of the arms or the great seal of the commonwealth for any
advertising· or commercial purpose, shall be punished by a fine of
not fess than ten or more than one hundred dollars or by imprison~
ment for not more than one year, or both. Words, figures, advertisements or designs attached to, or directly or indirectly connected
with, such flag or any representation thereof in such manner that
such flag or its representation is used to attract attention to or
advertise such words, figures, advertisements or designs, shall for
the purposes of this section be deemed to be upon such flag."
The statute is an amalgam of provisions dealing with flag desecra~
tion and contempt (the first 26 words) and with commercial misuse
or other exploitation of flags of the state and national government.
This case concerns only the "treats contemptuously" phrase of the
statute, which has apparently been in the statute since its enactment
in 1899. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F. 2d, at 90, n. 2.
In 1971, subsequent to Goguen's prosecution, the desecration and
contempt portion of the statute was amended twice. On March 8,
1971, the legislature, per St. 1971, c. 74, modified the first sentence by
inserting "burns or otherwise" between the terms "publicly" and
"mutilates," and, in addition, by increasing the fine. Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. c. 264, § 5 (1973 Supp.). On August 12, 1971, via St. 1971, c.
65.5, the legislature appended a new sentence defining "the flag of the
United States" phrase appearing in the first sentence: "For the
purposes of this section the term 'flag of the United States' shall
mean any flag which has been designated by Act or Resolution of
the Congress of the United States as the national emblem, whether
or not such designation is currently in force." Ibid. The 1971
[Footnote 4 is on p. 4]
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and contempt portion of the statute, the officer charged
specifically and only that Goguen "did publicly treat con~emptuously the flag of the U nitcd States .... " 5
After jury trial in the Worcester County Superior
Court, Goguen was found guilty. The court imposed a
sentence of six months in the Massachusetts House of
Corrections. Goguen appealed to the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed. CommonMass. - , 279 N. E. 2d 666
wealth v. Goguen, (1972). That court rejected Goguen's vagueness argument with the comment that "[w]hatever the uncertainties in other circumstances, we see no vagueness in
the statute as applied here." !d.,- Mass., at-, 279
N. E. 2d, at 667. The court cited no Massachusetts
precedents interpreting the "treats contemptuously"
·phrase of the statute. 6
After Goguen began serving his sentence, he was
granted bail and then ordered released on a writ of habeas
corpus by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343
F. Supp. 161. The District Court found the flag conamendments are relevant to this case only in the tangential sense
that they indicate a recognition by the legislature of the need to
tighten up this imprecise statute.
4 Perhaps this was because of the difficulty of the question whether
Goguen's conduct constituted physical desecration of the flag. Cf.
Goguen v. Smith, suprQI, 471 F . 2d, at 91 , n . 4 (" ... [W]e are not
so sure that sewing a flag to a background clearly affects 'physical
integrity.' ").
5 Appendix 4.
6
Appellant correctly conceded at oral argument that Goguen's
case is the first recorded Massachusetts court reading of this language. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18. Indeed , with the exception of one
turn of the century case involving one of the statute's commercial
misuse provisions, Commonwealth v. R. I. Sherman Manu. Co., 189
Mass. 76, 75 N. E. 71 (1905), the entire statute has been essentially
devoid of state court interpretation.
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tempt portion of the Massachusetts statute impermissibly
vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as overbroad under the First
Amendment. In upholding Goguen's void for vagueness contentions, the court concluded that the words
"treats contemptuously" did not provide a "readily
ascertainable standard of guilt." I d., at 167. Especially
in "these days when flags are commonly displayed on
hats, garments and vehicles ... ,"the words under which
Goguen was convicted "leave conjectural, in many instances, what conduct may subject the actor to criminal
prosecution." Ibid. The court also found that the
statutory language at issue "may be said to encourage
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions." Ibid.
The Court of Appeals, with one judge concurring,
affirmed the District Court on both First Amendment
and vagueness grounds. Goguen v. Smith, supra, 471 F.
2d 88. With regard to the latter ground, the Court of
Appeals concluded that "resolution of [Goguen's void for
vagueness] challenge to the statute as applied to him
necessarily adjudicates the statute's facial constitutionality .... " !d., at 94. Treating as-applied and on-theface vagueness attacks as essentially indistinguishable in
light of the imprecision of the statutory phrase at issue,
id., at 92, 94, the court found that the language failed to
provide adequate warning to anyone, contained insufficient guidelines for law enforcement officials, and set
juries and courts at large. I d., at 94-96. Then Circuit
Judge, now Senior Circuit Judge Hamley, sitting by designation from the Ninth Circuit, concurred solely in the
void-for-vagueness holding. !d., at 105. Judge Hamley
saw no need to reach the "far broader constitutional
ground" of First Amendment overbreadth relied on by
the majority, noting the "settled principle of appellate
adjudication that constitutional questions are not to be
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dealt with unless this is necessary to dispose of the
appeal." Ibid.
II
We agree with the holdings of the District Court and
the Court of Appeals on the due process doctrine of vague·
ness. The settled principles of that doctrine require no
extensive restatement here. 7 The doctrine incorporates
notions of fair notice or warning. 8 Moreover, it require·s
legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforceinent officials and triers of fact in order to prevent
('arbitrary and. discrih1inatory enforcement." 0 Where a
statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court
The elcmen't11 of the void for vagueness doctrine have been
develbped in a large ·body of precedent from this Court. The cases
are categorized in, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104,
108-109 (1972). Sec, Amsterdam, "The Void-for-Vngueness Doctrine .
jn the Supreme Court," 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960).
8 E. g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162
(197Q); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939):
"No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to
speculate as to the meaning of penni o;tatutes. All are entitled to
be informed as to what the State Jlommands or forbids." (Citations
omitted.);
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926):
" ... [A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of ar!
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must Iieces..sarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
ihe first essential of due process of law." (Citntions omitted.)
0 E. g., Grayned, suprd 408 U. S., at 108; United States v.
1
L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 89 (1921) (" ... [T]o attempt
to enforce the section would be the exact equivalent of an effort to
carry out a statute which iri terms merely penalized and punished
all' acts detrimental to the public interest when unjust and unreason·
abie in the estimation of the court and jury." ); United States v.
Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 221 (1875) ("It would certainly be dangerous
if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who
could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.").
7
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interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered
by the First Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater
degree of specificity than in other contexts.1.o The statutory language at issue here, "publicly . . . treats contemptuously the flag of the United States ... has such
scope, e. g., Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969)
(verbal flag contempt), and at the relevant time was
without the benefit of judicial clarification. 11
Flag contempt statutes have been characterized as
void for lack of notice on the theory that " [ w] hat is
contemptuous to one man may be a work of art to
another." 12 ' Goguen's behavior can hardly be described
as , art. Immaturity or "silly conduct" 13 probably
eomes closer to the mark. · But we see the force of the
District Court's observation that the flag has become
"an object of youth fashion and high camp . . . ."
343 F. Supp., at 164. As both courts below noted, casual
treatment of the flag in many contexts has become a
widespread contemporary phenomenon. /d., at 164,
167; 471 F. 2d, at 96. Flag wearing in a day of relaxed
clothing styles may be simply for adornment or a ploy to
attract attention. It and many other current, careless
uses of the flag nevertheless constitute unceremonial
treatment that many people may view as contemptuous.
Yet in a time of widely varying attitudes and tastes for
displaying something as ubiquitous as the United States
flag or representations of it, it could hardly be the purpose of the Massachusetts legislature to make criminal

t

10 E. g., Grayned, supra, 408 U. S., at 109; Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959). Compare the less stringent requirements
of the modern vagueness cases dealing with purely economic regulation. E. g., United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S.
29 (1963) (Robinson-Patman Act).
11
See n. 6, supra.
12 Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1040, 1056 (1968).
13 Goguen v. Smith, supra, 343 F. Supp., at 166.
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every informal use of the flag. The statutory language
under which Goguen was charged, however, fails to draw
reasonably clear lines between the kinds of nonceremonial
treatment that are criminal and those that are not. Due
process requires that all "be informed as to what the
State commands or forbids ... ,"Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939), and that "men of common
intelligence" not be forced to guess at the meaning of the
criminal law. Connally v. General Construction Co.,
269 U. S. 385, 391 (1932). Given today's tendencies to
treat the flag unceremoniously, those notice standards
are not satisfied here.
We recognize that in a noncommercial context behavior as a general rule is not mapped out in advance on
the basis of statutory language. 14 In such cases, perhaps
the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness doctrine is
not actual notice but the other principal element of the
doctrine-the requirement that a legislature establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. It is in
this regard that the statutory language under scrutiny
has its most notable deficiencies.
In its terms, the language at issue is sufficiently unbounded to prohibit, as the District Court noted, "any
public deviation from formal flag etiquette. . .. " 343
F. Supp., at 167. Unchanged throughout its 70-year
'h istory/ 5 the "treats contemptuously" phrase was also
devoid of a narrowing state court interpretation at the
relevant time in this case. 16 We are without authority
Amsterdam , supra, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev., at 82, n. 79.
See n. 3, supra.
18 See n. 6, supra. The contempt portion of the Massachusetts
statute seems to have lain fallow for almost its entire history. Appar·.ently there have been about a half dozen arrests under this part of
the statute in recent years, but none has produced a reported
decision. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29. In 1968, a teenager in Lynn,
Massachusetts was charged, apparently under the present statute,
14

15
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to cure that defect. 17 Statutory language of such a
standardless sweep allows policemen, prosecutors, and
juries to pursue their personal predilections. Legislatures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for setting
the standards of the criminal law. E. g., Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 165-169 (1972). In
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 120 (1969),
Mr. Justice Black voiced a concern that we share against
entrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat." The aptness of
his admonition is evident from appellant's candid concession during oral argument before the Court of Appeals
regarding state enforcement standards for that portion
, of the statute under which Goguen was convicted:
" ... [A]s counsel [for appellant] admitted, a war
protestor who, while attending a rally at which it
begins to rain, evidences his disrespect for the
American flag by contemptuously covering himself
with it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prosecuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a
member of the American Legion who, caught in the
same rainstorm while returning from an 'AmericaLove It or Leave It' rally, similarly uses the flag,
but does so regrettably and without a contemptuous
attitude, would not be prosecuted." 471 F. 2d, at
102 (emphasis in original).
Where inherently vague statutory language permits such
selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process.
with desecrating the United States flag by sewing pieces of it into his
trousers. New York Times, August 1, 1968, p. 31, col. 1. The
teenager was ordered by a state district court to prepare and deliver
an essay on the flag . The court continued the case without a finding, depriving it of any precedential value.
11
E. g., United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363,
369 (1971).
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III
Appellant's arguments that the "treats contemptuously" phrase is not impermissibly vague, or at least
should not be so held in this case, are unpersuasive.
Appellant devotes a substantial portion of his opening
brief, as he did his oral argument, to the contention that
Goguen failed 'to preserve his present void for vagueness
claim for the purposes of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Appellant concedes that the issue of "vagueness
as applied"- is properly before the federal courts/ 8 but
contends that Goguen's only arguable claim is that the
statute is vague on its face. The latter claim, appellant
insists, was not presented to the state courts with the
requisite fa.ir precision. Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270
(1971). This exhaustion of remedies argument is belatedly raised/ 0 and it fails to take the full measure of
G'oguen's efforts to mount a vagueness attack in the
state courts. 20 We do not deal with the point at length,
18

Reply Brief 4.
Gogurn filed his federal habea s corpus prt it ion subsequent
to Picard, supra. Yet it appears that appellant did not raise his
present exhaustion of remedies argument before the District Court.
That court commented , prcifically on this omiRRion: "No contention is now made that fGoguen] has not exhausted state remedies,
nor that the constitutional issues pre cnted here were not raised
appropriately in state proceedings." 343 F . Supp., at 164.
20 Goguen filed in Rtate superior court an unsuccessful motion to
dismiss the complaint in which he cited the Fourteenth Amendment
and alleged that the statute under which he was charged was "imper•
missibly vague and incapable of fair and reasonable interpretation
by public officials." Appendix 1. This motion was also before the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, since it was incorporated in
Goguen's amended bill of exceptions. Ibid. In addition, Goguen's
brief before that Court rai ~ed vagueness points and cited vagueness
cases. /d., at 19, 26-27, citing Lanzetta v. New J ersey, 306 U. S.
451 (1930), and Parker v. Morgan, 322 F. Supp. 585 (WD N. C.
19
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., ~owever, for we find the relevant statutory language
impermissibly vague as applied to Goguen. Withbut doubt the "substance" of this claim was "fairly
presented" to the state courts under the exhaustion
standards of Picard, supra, 404 U. S., at 275, 278.
Appellant's exhaustion of remedies argument is premised on the notion that Goguen's behavior rendered him
a hard-core violator as to whom the statute was not
vague, whatever its implications for those engaged in dif.
ferent conduct. To be sure there are statutes that
by their terms or as authoritatively construed apply
. without question to certain activities, but whose applii;ation to other behavior is uncertain. The hard-core
violator concept makes some sense with regard to such
statutes. The present statute, however, is not in that
category. This criminal provision is vague "not in the
sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct
to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard,
but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is
specified at all." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U. S.
r611, 614 (1971). Such a provision simply has no core,
This absence of any ascertainable standard for inclusion
and exclusion is precisely what offends the Due Process
Clause. The deficiency is particularly objectionable in
1971) (three-judge court) (North Carolina flag contempt statute
void for vagueness and overbreadth). Appellant is correct in asserting that Goguen failed to compartmentalize in his state court brief
the due process doctrine of vagueneRs and First Amendment concepts
of overbreadth. Sec Appendix 19-24. But permitting a degree of
leakage between those particula.r adjoining compartments is understandable. Cf. Note, "The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine," 83 I-Iarv. L. Rev. 844, 871-875 ( 1970). Tho highest state
court's opinion, which dealt separately with Goguen's First Amendment and vagueneRR cl:1ims, Commonwealth v. Goguen, supra, Mass., at - , 279 N. E. 2d, at 667, indicates that that court was
well aware that Goguen rai ·ed both sets of arguments.
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view of the unfettered latitude thereby accorded law
enforcement officials and triers of fact. Until it is corrected· either by amendment or judicial construction, it
affects all who are prosecuted under the statutory language. In our opinion the defect exists in this case.
The language at issue is void for vagueness as applied to
Goguen because it subfected him to criminal liability
under a standard so indefi'nite that police, court, and jury
were free to react to nothing more than their own preferences for treatment of the flag:
Turning from the exhaustion point' to the merits of
tlie vagueness question pre~ented; appellant argues that
any notice difficulties are a:me·liorated' by the narrow subject matter of the statute, "actual" flags of the United
States. 21 Appellant contends that tnis "takes some of
the vagueness away from the phrase, 'treats contemptuously .... ' " 22 Anyone who "wants notice as to what
conduct this statute proscribes ... , immediately knows
that it has something to do with flags and if he wants to
stay clear of violating this statute, he just has to stay clear
of doing something to the United States flag." 23 Apart
from the ambiguities presented by the concept of an
"actual" flag/ 4 we fail to see how this alleged particu21
22

28

'Appellant's Brief 17; Trans. of Oral Arg. 9.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 9.

Ioia.

At the time of Goguen's prosecution, the statute referred simply
tO' "the flag of the United States ... ," without further definition.
That raises the obvious question whether Goguen's miniature cloth
flag constituted "the flag of the United States . . . . " Goguen
argued unsuccessfully before the state courts that the statute applied
only to flags that met "official standards" for proportions, such as
relation of height to width and the size of stripes and the field of
stars, and that the cloth he wore did not meet those standards.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12, 24-26; Appendix 2. There was no
dispute that Goguen's adornment had the requisite number of stars
and stripes and colors. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. The Massa24
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larity resolves the central vagueness question- the
absence of any standard for defining contemptuous
treatment.
Appellant's remaining arguments are equally unavailmg. It is asserted that the first six words of the statute
add specificity to the "treats contemptuously" phrase,
and that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
customarily construes general language to take on color
from more specific accompanying language. But it is
conceded that Goguen was convicted under the general
phrase alone, and that the highest state court did not
rely on any general-to-specific principle of statutory
interpretation in this case. 25 Appellant further argues
that the Supreme Judicial Court in Goguen's case has
"restricted the scope of the statute to intentional contempt.26 Aside from the problems presented by an
,appellate court's limiting construction in the very case
in which a defendant has been tried under a previously
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court found Goguen's cloth flag to be
covered by t he statute, noting that " [t]he statut e does not require
t)1at the flag be 'official'" Commonw ealth v. Goguen, Mass. - ,
- , 279 N . E. 2d 666, 668 (1972). The lower federal courts did
not address this holding, nor do we . We note only that the Massachusetts Legislature apparently sensed an ambiguity in this respect,
b ecause subsequent to Goguen's prosecution it amended the statute
in an effort to define what it had meant by the "flag of the
United States." See n. 3, supra.
2 5 Tr. of Oral Arg. 48.
· 26The Massachusetts court commented simply that "[t]he jury
·could infer that the violation was intentional without reviewing any
words of the defendant ." Commonwealth v. Goguen , - Mass. - ,
- , 279 N . E. 2d 666, 668 (1972) . Thus, the court held that the
jury could infer intent merely from Goguen's conduct . This is
apparently also a holding that the jury must find contemptuous
intent under the statute, although the requirement amounts to very
little since it is so easily satisfied . The court's reference to verbal
communication reflected Goguen's reliance on Street v. N ew York,
394 U. S. 579 (1969).
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unnarrowed statute, 27 this holding still does not clarify
what conduct constitutes contempt, whether intentional
or inadvertent.
Finally, appellant argues that state law enforcement
'liuthorities have shown themselves r·eady to interpret
this penal statute narrowly and that th~ statute, properly read, reaches only Clirect, immediate contemptuous
acts that "actually impinge upon the physical integrity
of the flag .... " 28 'There is no support in the record
for the former point. 29 Similarly, nothing 'in the state
court's opinion in this case or in any earlier opinion of
that court sustains the latter. In any event, Goguen
was charged only under the wholly open-ended language
E. g., Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195, 198 (•1966).
Appellant's Brief 22.
29 With regard to prosecutorial policies, appellant cites two published opinions of the Massachusetts Attorney GeneraL 4 Ops. of
Att. Gen. 470 (1915) (Reproduced at Appellant's Brief 30); Report
of Atty. Gen., Pub. Doc. No. 12, p. 192 (1968) (Reproduced at
Juris. Statement App. 53). Appellant concedes that neither deals
with the contempt portion of the statute under which Goguen was
convicted. Thus, they are not in point here. They provided
guidance to no one on the relevant statutory language. Nevertheless, appellant is correct that they show a tendency on the part of
the state Attorney General to read other portions of the statute
narrowly. At the same time, they reflect the lack of precision
· recurring throughout the Massachusetts flag misuse statute. The
1915 opinion noted that a literal reading of one portion of the statute,
' prohibiting exhibition of engravings of the flag on certain articles,
would make it a criminal offense to display the flag itself "in many
of its cheaper and more common forms." Appellant's Brief 31-32.
The state Attorney General concluded that this would be a "manifest
aBsurdity." !d., at 32. The 1968 opinion advised that a flag representation painted on a door was not "a flag of the United States"
within the meaning of the statute. Juris. Statement App. 53-55. A
contrary interpretation would "raise serious questions under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . ," given the requirement
27

2s
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of publicly treating the flag "contemptuously." There
was no allegation of physical desecration.
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature
of the problems presented, legislatures simply cannot
establish standards with great precision. Control of the
broad range of disorderly conduct that may inhibit a
policeman in the performance of his official duties may
be one such area, requiring as it does an on-the-spot
assessment of the need to keep order. Cf. Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104 (1972). But there is no comparable reason for committing broad discretion to law
enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt.
Indeed, because display of the flag is so common and
takes so many forms, changing from one generation to
another and often difficult to distinguish in principle, a
legislature should define with some care the flag behavior
it intends to outlaw. Certainly nothing prevents a legislature from defining with substantial specificity what
constitutes forbidden treatment of United States fiags. 80
that behavior made criminal must be "plainly prohibited by the
language of the statute." Id., at 54.
30 The federal flag desecration statute, for example, reflects a
congressional purpose to do just that. In response to a warning
by the United States Attorney General that to use such unbounded
terms as "defies" or "casts contempt ... either by word or act" is
"to risk invalidation" on vagueness grounds, S. Rep. No. 1287,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 350, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess., 7 ( 1967), the bill which became the federal statute was
amended, 113 Cong. Rec. 16449, 16450 (1967), to reach only acts
that physically damage the flag. The desecration provision of the
statute, 18 U.S. C. §700 (a), declares:
"(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the
United States by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or
trampling upon it shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
for not more than one year, or both."
The legislative history reveals a clear desire to reach only defined
physical acts of desecration. H. R. Rep. No. 350, supra, at 3
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The statutory language at issue here fails to approach
that goal and is void for vagueness. 31 The judgment is
affirmed. 82
It is so ordered.

("The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful, not acci-'
dental or inadvertent public physical acts of desecration."); S. Rep:
No. 1287, supra, at 3 ("The language of the bill prohibits intentional,
willful, not accidental or inadvertent public physical acts of dese~·
cration of the flag."). The act has been so read by the lower federal
courts, which have upheld it against vagueness challenges. United'
States v. Crosson, 462 F. 2d 96 (CA9) cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1064
(1972); Joyce v. United States, U. S. App. D. C. - , 454 F.
2d 971 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972). See Hoffman v.
United States, U. S. App. D. C.-, 445 F. 2d 226 (1971).
81 We are aware, of course, of the universal adoption of flag
desecration or contempt statutes by the federal and state governments. See n. 30, supra. The statutes of the 50 States are synopsized in Hearings on H. R. 271, et al., before Sub. Comm. No. 4
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4,
pt. III, at 324-346 ( 1967). Most of the state statutes are patterned
after the Uniform Flag Act of 1917, which in § 3 provides that:
"No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy, trample
upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag, standard,
color, ensign or shield."
Compare 9B Uniform Laws Annotated 52-53 (1966), with Hearings
bn H. R. 271, et al., supra, at 321-346. Because it is stated in
the disjunctive, this language, like that before us, makes possible
eriminal prosecution solely for ca ·ting contempt upon the flag.
But the validity of statutes utilizing tins language, insofar as the
vagueness doctrine is concerned, will depend as much on their
judicial construction and enforcement history as their literal terms.
32
We have not addressed Goguen's First Amendment arguments
because, having found the challrnged statutory language void for
vagueness, there is no nerd to decide additional issues. Moreover,
the skeletal record in t.his case, see n. 1, supra, affords a poor
opportunity for the careful consideration merited by the importance
of the First Amendment issues Goguen has raised.
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the judgment.

It is a crimP in Massachusetts if one mutilates,
tramples, defaces or "treats contemptuously" the flag of
the lTnitcd States. Respondent Gogue11 was convicted
of treating the flag con tC'mptuously, the evidence being
that he wore a lihness of the flag on the seat of his
pants. The Court holds this portion of the statute too
vague to provide an ascC'rtainable standard of guilt in any
situation, including this one, Although I concur in the
judgment of affirmance for other reasons, I cannot agree
with this rationale,
lt is self-Pvident that there is a whole range of conduct
that anyone with at least semblance of common sense
would know is contemptuous conduct and that would
be covered by the statute if directed at the flag. In
these instances, there would be ample notice to the actor
and no room for undue discretion in enforcement officers,
There may be a variety of other conduct that might or
might not be claimed contemptuous by the State, but
unpredictability in those situations does not change the
certainty iu others.
I am also confident that the statute was not vague
with respect to the conduct for which Goguen was arrested and convicted, It should not be beyond the rea~

::l.-7- 7Y
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sonable comprehension of anyone who would conform
his conduct to the law, to realize that sewing a flag ou
the seat of his pants is contemptuous of the flag. Furthermore, the jury was appropriately informed that the
defendant, if he was to be convicted, must have intended
to treat the flag contemptuously; and the jury found
this to be the case. Goguen can hardly complain that
be did not realize his acts were in violation of the statute, for he intended the very acts which the statute
forbids. "fT Jhe requirement of specific intent to do a
prohibited act may avoid those COllsequences to the·
accused w·hich may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid . . . where the punishment imposed is only for an act knowingly done with the purpose
of doing what the statut<' prohibits, the accused cannot
be said to suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that
the act which he does is a violation of law. " Screws v.
United States, 325 U. S. 91, 101-102 (1945).
If it be argu<'d that the statute in this case merely
requires an intentional act, not a willful one in the sense
of intending what the statute forbids, then it must be
recalled that respondent's major argument is that wearing a flag patch on his trousers was conduct that "clearly
expressed an idea. albeit unpopular or unpatriotic. about
the flag or about the country it symbolizes .. . Goguen
may have meant to show that he believed that America
was a fit place only to sit on or the proximity to that
portion of his anatomy might have had more vulgar
connotations. Nonetheless, the strong and forceful communication of ideas is unmistakable." Appendix 13.
Goguen was under no misapprehension as to what he
was doing and as to whether he was showing contempt
for the flag of the United States. As he acknowledges
in his brief here, ". . it was necessary for the jury to
find that appellee conveyed a contemptuous attitude in
order to convict him ." 1 cannot! therefore! agree that
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the Massachusetts statute is vague as to Goguen; and
if not vague as to his conduct, it is irrelevant that it
may be vague in other contexts with respect to other
conduct. "In determining the sufficiency of the notice
a statute must of necessity be examined in the light of
the conduct with which a defendant is charged." United
States v. Xational Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29,
33 (1963). Statutes are not "invalidated as vague
simply because difficulty is found in determining whether
marginal offenses fall withiu their language.'' I d. , at 32.
The unavoidable inquiry, therefore, becomes whether
the "treats contemptuously" provision of the statute, as
applied in this case, is unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. That amendment, of course, applies to
speech ami not to conduct without substantial com·
municative intf'nt and impact. Even though particular
conduct may be expressive and is understood to be of
this nature, it may be prohibited if necessary to further
a nonspeech interest of the Government that is within
the power of the Government to implement. United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968).
There is no rloubt in my mind that it is well within
the powers of Congress to adopt and prescribe a national
flag and to protect the integrity of that flag. Congress
may provide for the general welfare, control interstate
commerce, provide for the common defense and exercise any powers necessary and proper for those ends.
These powers, and the inherent attributes of sovereignty
as well, surely encompass the designation and protection
of a flag . It would be foolishness to suggest that the
men who wrote the Constitution thought they were
violating it when they specified a flag for the new Nation,
Act of January 13, 1794, 1 Stat. 341 (c)(1), just as they
had for the Union under the Articles of Confederation.
8 Journal of the Continental Congress 464 (June 14,
1777). It is a fact of history that flags have been asso-

72-1254-CONCUR

4

SMITH v. GOGUEN

ciated with nations and with government at all levels,
as well as with tribes and families. It is also an historical fact that flags including ours, have played an
important and useful role in human affairs. One need
not explain fully a phenomenon to recognize its existence and in this case to concede that the flag is an important symbol of nationhood and unity, created by the
nation aml endowed with certain attributes. Conceived
iu this light, I have no doubt about the validity of laws
designating and describing the flag and regulating its
use. display and disposition . The Fnited States has created its own flag, as it may. The flag ts a national
property. and the Xation may regulate those who would
make, imitate, sell. possess or usc it.
I would not question those statutes which proscribe
mutilation , defacement or burning of the flag or which
otherwise protect its physical integrity. Neither would
I find it beyond congressional powf'r. or that of state
legislaturf'S, to forbid attaching to or putting 011 the flag
a11y words. symbols or advertisements. All of these objects, whatever thf'ir naturr. are foreign to thf' flag,
change its physical character and interfere with its clesign and function. There would seem to be little question about the power of Congress to forbid the mutilation of the Lincoln Memorial or to prevent overlaying
it with words or other objects. The flag is itself a
monument, subject to similar protection.
The Massachusetts statute, however, cloes not stop
with proscriptions against defacement or attaching foreign objects to the flag. It also makes it a crime if one
"treats contemptuously" the flag of the United States.
To violate this part of the statute, it is not enough that
one "treat" the flag; he must also treat it "contemptuously," which, in ordinary understanding is the expression of contempt for the flag. In the case before us, as
has been noted, the jury must have found that Goguen
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not only wore the flag on the seat of his pants but also
that the act-and hence Goguen himself-was contemptuous of the flag. To convict on this basis is to convict
not to protect the physical integrity or to protect against
acts interfering with the proper use of the flag, but to
punish for communicating ideas about the flag unaccept1
'
•
able to the controlling majority in the legislature.
Neither the United States nor any State may require
any individual to salute or express favorable attitudes
towards the flai. West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U. 8. 624 ( 1943) . It is also clear under
our cases that disrespectful or contemptuous spoken or
'
l
written words about the flag may not be punished con ..
\
'
sistently with the First Amendnwnt. Street v. LYew
York, 394 u; S. 576 ( 1969). Although neither written
nor spoken, an act may be sufficiently communicative to
invoke the protection of the First Amendment, Tinker

v. Des Moines Independent Community School Distr-ict,
393 U. S. 503 (1969). and may not be forbidden by law
except incidental to preventing unprotected conduct or
unless the communication is itself among those that falls
outside the protecticHl of the First Amendment. In
O'Brien, the Court sustained a conviction for draft card
burning, althou~h admittedly the burniu~ was itself expressive. There, destruction of draft cards, whether
cornmunicative or not, was found to be inimical to important governmental consiaerations. But the Court
made clear that if the cohcern of the law was withm :t;:l_,.,
expression associated with th~ act, the result would be
otherwise:
"The case at bar is th~refore unlike one where
the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to th e .conduct is itself
thought to be harmful. In Strombe1·b v: California,
1

'

'a
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283 U.S. 359 (1931), for exampl~, this Court struck
down a statutory phrase which punished people who
expressed their 'opposition to organized government'
by displaying 'any flag, badge, banner, or device.'
Since the statute there was aimed at suppressing
communication it could not be sustained as a regulation of noncommunicative conduct.'' 391 U. S.
367, 382 (1968).

It would be difficult, therefore, to believe that the convictiOJ1 in O'Brien would have been sustained had the
statute proscribed only contemptuous burning of draft
cards.
Any conviction under the "treats contemptuously.l>provision of the Massachusetts statute would suffer from the
same infirmity. This is true of Goguen's conviction,
~nd I concur in the Court's jud~ment,
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diss<'nting.

I agree with the concurring opinion of my Brother
insofar as he concludes that thP Massachusetts
law is not unconstitutionally vague. but l do not agree
with him that the law uuder which respondent Goguen
was convicted violates the First and .Fourteenth Amendments. The issue of the application of the First Amendment to exprPssive conduct. or "symbolic speech," is
undoubtedly a difficult one, and in cases dealing with
the United States flag it has unfortunately been
expounded only i11 ·dissenting opinions. :-lee Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576. Warren, C. J .. dissenting, id., at
594; Black, J., diss<'nting. id., at 609; WHI'l'E. J .. dissenting, id., at 610; Fortas. J .. dissenting, id., at 615; and
Cowgill v. California, 396 P. :-1. :371 ( Hl70), Harlan . J.,
concurring, ibid. ~ onetheless, swce I disagree with the
Cotfrt's conclusion that the statute is unconstitutionally
vague, I must, uulike the Court. address petitioner's First
Amendmellt contentions.
The question whether the Statp may regulat<' the display of the flag iu thf' circumstances shown by this record
appears to be an open one under our decisions. Halter
v. Nebraska, 20.5 F. S. 34 (1907); 'Street ,. Sew York,
394 U. S. 576 (196~)); Cowuill v. California, an6 C. S. 371
(1970), Harlan , J ., concurring; PeoplP v. Radich, 26
WHITE

2
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N.Y. 2d 114, 257 ).;'.E. 2d 30. aff'cl by an equally divided
Court. 401 e. fl. 531 (1971).
What the Court rightly describes as "the slender record
in this case:' ante, p. 1. shows only that Goguen wore
a small cloth version of the enited States fiag sewn to
the seat of his blue jeans. When the first police officer
questioned him. he was standing with a group of people
on Main Street in Leominster. Massachusetts. The
people with him ,,.·ere laughing. \Yhen the second police
officer saw him. he was "walking in the downtown business district in Leominster. wearing a short coat, casual
type pants ami a miniature AmPriean fiag H<'wn on tlw
left side of his pants.'' Goguen did not LPstify , and there
is nothing in the record beforP us to indicat<> what h(>
was attempting to communicate by his conduct . Or,
indeed. whether he was attempting to communicate anything at all. The record before us Joes not even coilelusively reveal whether Goguen sewed the fiag on the
pants himself. or whether the pants were manufactured
complete with flag; his counsel here. howevC>r, who was
also his trial counsel, stated in oral argument that of his
own knowledge the pauts wrre not manufactured with
the flag 011 theln. Finally. it dors not appear whether
appellee said anything during his journey through the
streets of Leominster; his bill of exceptions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts made no mention
of any testimony indicating that he spoke at all.
Goguen was prosecuted under the Massachusetts statute set forth in the opiuion of the Court. and has
asserted here not only a claim of unconstitutional vagueness but a claim that thf' statute infringes his right under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

I
There is a good dPal of doubt on this record that
Goguen was trying to communicat~ any particular idea,
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and had he been convicted under a statute which simply
prohibited improper display of the flag I would be satisfied to conclude that his conrluct in wraring the flag on
the seat of his pants did not come within even the outermost limits of that sort of "expressive conduct" or "symbolic speech'" which is entitled to any First Amendment
protection. But Goguen was convicted of treating the
flag contemptuously by the act of wearing it where he
did, and I have difficulty seeing how Goguen could be
found by a jury to have treater! thP flag contemptuously
by his act and still not to have Pxprcsscd any idea at all.
ThPre arc. therefore, in my opinion. at least marginal
elements of "symbolic speech" in Goguen's conduct as
reflected by this record.
Many casf's which could be said to involve conduct
no less expressive that Goguen·~. however, have never
been thought to require analy~is in First Amendment
terms becaus<' of the presence of other factors. One who
burns down the factory of a con1pany whose products he
dislikes can exprct his First Amendment defense to a
consequent arson prosecution to he given short shrift by
the courts. The arson statutf' safeguards the government's substantial interest in preventing the destruction
of property by means dangerous to human life. and an
arsonist's motiw is quite irr<>levant. The same fate
would doubtless await the First Amendment claim of
one prosecuted for destruction of government property
after he defaced a speed limit sign in order to protest the
stated speed limit. Both the arsonist and the defacer
of traffic signs have infring<'d on the proprrty interests
of others, whether of another individual or of the governmeHt. Yet Goguen, unlike eithf'f, has so far as this
record shows infringed on the ordinary property rights
of no one.
That Goguen owned the flag with which he adorned
himself, however, is not dispo~iti ve of the' First Amend-
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ment issue. Just as the govem men t may not escape
the reach of the First Amendment by asserting that it
acts only in a proprietary capacity with respect to streets
and parks to which it has title, Hague v. CIO, 307 F . S.
496, 514-516 ( 1939), a defendant such as Goguen may
not escape the reach of the police power of the State of
Massachusetts by asserting that his act affected only his
own property. Indeed, there are so mauy well-established exceptions to the proposition that one may do
what he likes with his own property that it cannot be
said to have even the status of a ~t'IJPral ru]p
The very substantial authority of state and local ~ov
eming bocliPs to regulate the use of land . aud thereby
to limit the uses available to the owner of the land , w~
established nearly a half century ago in Euclid\' , Amber
Realty Co., 272 F. H. 365 (1D20) . LaJJd use regulatio'n s
in a residential zoning district typically do 11ot merely
exclude malodorous and unsightly rendering plants; they
often also prohibit erection of buildings or monuments.
including ones open to tlH' publie, which might itself
in an aesthetic sense involve substantial elements of
"expressive conduct." The p<'rfonnance of a play may
well constitute expressive conduct or "pure' ' speech, but
a landowner may not for that reason insist on the right
to construct and operate a theater in an arc>a zoned for
noncommercial uses. So long as tlw zoning laws do not,
under the guise of ll<'Utrality. actually prohibit the
expression of ideas bf'cause of their content, tlwy have
not been thought open to challenge under the First
Amendment.
As may land. so may other kinds of property be subjected to close regulation and control. A person with
an ownership interest in controlled drugs, or in firearms,
cannot use them, sell them, and transfer thern in whatever manner he pleases. The copyright laws, 17 11. R. C.
~ 1 et seq., limit what use the purchaser of a copyrighted
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book may make of his acquisition. A company may be
restricted in what it advertises on its billboards. Packer
Corp. v. Utah, 285 F. ~. 105 ( 1032).
The statute which Goguen violated. howevPr. docs uot
purport to protect the related interests of other property
owners, neighbors, or indeed any competing ownership
interest in the same property; the interest which 1t
protects is that of the Government. and is not a traditional property interest.
Even in this. however, laws regulating use of the flag
are by 110 means unique. A numl.>Pr of examples can
be found of statutes enacted by Congress whieh protect
only a peculiarly govemmental intrrest in property
otherwise privately owned. 1R t'. S C. ~ 504 ptoh~bits
the printing or publishing in actual sile Ol' ill actual
color of any Pnited States postagP or revenue stamp,
Or of any obligation or security of tlw United :::ltates.
It likewise prohibits the importation of any plates for
the purpose of such imprinting. H~ r. S. C. ~ :~:n prohibits the alteration of any FedPral Reserve note or
national bank note. and 18 C. :-1. C. ~ 333 prohibits the
disfiguring or defacing of a11y naLioJJal bank note or ~ ScJA. cJcoin . 18 U. R. C. ~ 702 prohibits th<' wearmg of a mili-J
o...
u
tary uniform, any part of such uniform. or anything ~J 3';8 4 . ~ SB
similar to a military uniform or part thereof without (tcno) rwev.StV::{
proper authorization. 18 C. :-1. <'. ~ 704 prohibits the
.} . . _. _ -~
.
.I
•
f
.
I
1
I
.
.
h
£c..n...u <C'f"ICJ'\. ~
unaut11onzeu weanng o service me( as.
t IS not w1t ~
~
out significance that many of these statutes. though a--c-t vel
-4
long on the books. have newr bf•en judicially construed ,-..,.. b~ til l.s+
~~ (~,1-tttJ~---.
or even challenged .
My Brother WHJn; says, however, that whakver may
lk, ()vi J &latk.')
be said of neutral statutes simply designed to protect a
· ·
governmental interest in private property, which in the
case of the flag may be characterized as an interest in
preserving its physical i11tegrity , th<> Massachusetts statute here is not neutral. It punishes only Lhose who

6

treat the flag contemptuously. illlposing no JWnalty on
those who "treat" it otherwise, that is. thosr who impair
its physical integrity 111 somP other way.

II
Leaving aside for· thP nwruent the nature of the governmental interest in protrcting the physical integrity
of the flag, I cannot accept the conclusion that the Massachusetts statute must be invalidated for punishing only
some conduct that impairs the flag's physical integrity .
It is true, as the Court observes. that w<:' do not haw in
so many words a "narrowing com;truction" of the stat utc
from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
But the first of this Court's d{'cision:s cited in the short
rescript opinion of the ~upremc Judicial Court is Halter
v. Xebraska, 205 F. ~. :34 ( 1907). which uplwld against
constitutional attack a Nebraska statute which forbade
the use of the United Stat<>s flag for purposes of advertising. We also have the benefit of au opinion of the
Attorney General of the CommOil\\'f'alth of Massachusetts that the statute under which Goguen was prosf'cuted, being penal. "is not to lw Pnlarged l)('yond its
plain import. and afl a geueral ruiP iR strictly constru<'d.''
Rep. A-G Pub. Doc. ~o . 12 ( 19fi8) 102- Hl3. With
this guidance. and tlw further assiRtance of the content
of the entire statutory prohibition, I think the SuprPme
Judicial Court wonld read the langH&ge "wiH::l~"gr pnblicly mutilates, tramples upon, deface

1-1ow ~ --t;l<.R.

Co~Ml .;y ~ c._ ,
d.if>'~'"'h~ ~'j
% .41& ~?
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performed at a distance from the flag. as well as purely
verbal disparagement of it.*
If the statute is thus limited to acts which affect the
£hysical integrity of the flag, the question remains
whether the State has sought only to punish those who
impair the flag's physical integrity for the purpose of
disparaging it as a symbol. while permittiug impairment
of its physical integrity by those who do not seek to
disparage it as a symbol. If that were the case. holdings
like Schacht v. United States , 398 U. S. 58 ( 1970) , suggest that such a law would abridge the right of free
expressiOn.
But Massachusetts metes out punishment to anyone
who publicly mutilates, tramples. or defaces the flag ~
regardless of his motive or purpose . It also punishes the
display of any "words. figures , advertisements or designs"
on the flag, or the use of a flag iu a parade as a receptacle
for depositing or collecting money. Likewise prohibited
is the offering or selling of any article on which is engraved a representation of the United ~tates flag.
The variety of these prohibitions demonstrates that
Massachusetts has not merely prohibited impairment of
the physical integrity of the flag by those who would
cast coutempt upon it. but equally by those who would
seek to take advantage of its favorable image in order
·X·To the extPut that coun::;pf for [Wtitwnrr who argm·d 11!E' cnu~r
iu tlw Court of Apprab rna)· havr intimntrd a broackr con~truction
ill thr colloquy in that court quotf'd in thi~ Court',; opinion, ante ,
p. 9, I would attach littlr Wf'ight to it. Wf' havP previou~ly ~aid
that we are '"loath to nttarh ronclu::;iv<' weight to the rrlatively
spontaneou~ re::;pon::;e:> of rou!l::;el to rqually >-'pontanron~ qne::;t ioning
from th<' Court during orlll nrgumrnt," Moose Lodge No . 1U7 , ..
lrvis, 407 U. S. 1();3, 170, and if that be thr ra;;p ,;urf'ly f'VPll [p~,;
w~·ight should bP a;;eribeu by u~ to a rolloquy whirh took pine'<' ln
'another court.

tvo+
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to facilitate any commercial purpose, or those who would
seek to convey any message at all by tneans of ituprinting words or designs on the flag. These prohibitions are
broad enough that it can be fairly said that tlw Mas~a
chusetts statute is one essentially designed to preserve
the physical integrity of the flag. and not mPrely to
punish those who would infringe that integrity for the
purpose of uisparaging the flag as a symbol. While it is
true that the statute does not appear to cover one who
simply wears a flag. unless his conduct for oth('r reasons
falls within its prohibitions. the legislature is not required to ad.dress evrry related mattt>r in an area ''lith
one statute. Katzenbach v. Morgan, :~84 U, ~ . 641, 656658 (1966). It may well be that the incidence of such
conduct at the time the statute was enacted was not
thought to warrant legislation in order to preserve the
physical integrity of the flag.
In United States v. O'Brien, 391 P. ~ . 367 (19G8) , the
Court observed:
"We cannot accept the view that apparently limit~
less variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech'
whenev~r the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." 391 U. S .. at 37().

~rhftt, proceeding "on the assumption that the alleged
communicative element in O'Brien 's conduct was sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment," the
Court held that a regulation of conduct was sufficiently
justified
"If it is within the constitutional power of th€'
government; if it furthers an important or substan..flA. -1- +- ca......t+ he_
tial governmental interest; if the governnwntal in., {_
~
terest is unrelated to the suppressiOn of free S f'vJ2.c
expression; and lf the ll1Cldental restrictiQll on a].,.
:I
~ ,;rutzle~ed First Amendment freedqms is no gr<>atPr than
J:~~~Vl.

{t

?.
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is essential to the furtherance of that interest.''
P. R.. at 377.

0

:3Dl

While I have some doubt that the first enunciation of
a group of tests such as those established in O'Brien sets
them in concrete for all time, it does seem to me that
the Massachusetts statute substantially complies with
those tests. There can be no question that a statut<'
such as the Massachusetts one here is "within" th<' constitutional power of a State to enact. Since the statute
by this reading punishes a variety of . uses of the ffag
~hich would impair its physical integrity, without rrg!ircl
to presence or character of expressive conduct in connection >vith those uses. 1 thlllk the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppressio11 of free expression. 'l'lw
question of whether the governmental interest is "substantial" is not easy to sever from the question of whether
the restriction is "no greater than is essential to tlw
furtherance of the interest." and I therefore treat thosP
two aspects of the matter together. I believe that both
of these tests are met, and that the governmental interest
is sufficient to outweigh whatever collateral supprPssion
of expressive conduct was involved in the actions of
Goguen. I11 so concluding, I find myself in agreement
not only with my Brother 'W HITE in this case. but with
those members of the Court referred to earlier in this
opinion who dissented from the Court's disposition in
the case of Street v . .Vew York, supra.
My Brother WHITE alludes to the early legislation of
both the Con tin en tal Congress and of the Congress of
the new nation dealing with the flags . and observes.
"One need 110t explain fully a phenomenon to recognize
its existence and in this casP to concede that the flag is
an important symbol of nationhood and unity, created
by the nation and endowpd \Vi th certain attributes:
Conceived in this light, I have 110 doubt about the
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validity of laws designating and descriLi11g tlw flag and
regulating its use. display and disposition.·· I agree.
On September 17, 1787. as thr last meml><'rs of tlw
Constitutional Convention W<'r<' ~igning tlw instrUllH'nt,
James Madison in his "X otes'' dPscribrs thP occun·pnce
of the following incidPnt:
"Whilst the last members were signing it Doc·tor
Franklin looking towards the PresidPnt's Chair. at
the back of which a rising sun happ<'nf'd to be
painted. observed to a few mt>mbc·rs npar him, that
Painters had found it difficult to di~tinguish in their
art arising from a setting sun. l have said lw. often
and ofte11 in the course of th<' ;-;<>ssio11, and tlw viei situdes of my hopes and fears as to its issu<·. looked
at that bPhind the President without being able to
tell whethE'r it was rising or setting;: But now at
length I have the happiness to know that it is a
rising and not a Sf'tting sun.'' \i\'ritings of Jamc>s
Madison, Vol. 4, pp. 482-483. (G. P. Putnam's
Sons 1903.)
Writing for this Court more than one hundred yPars
later, Mr. Justice Holmes made> the familiar statement:

"... l W]hen we are dealing with words that also
are a constituent act. like the Constitutivn of the
United States, vve must realize that they have caiJ~d
into life a being the development of which could
not have been foreseen completely by the most
gifted of its begE'tters. rt was enough for them to
realize that thE' hopE' that they had crE'atc>d an organism; it has takC'n a century and has caused their
successors much sweat and blood to prove that they
created the natio11. The casp before us must be
considered in the light of our whole exp€'riencE' and
pot merely in that of what wa~ said a hundred y~ar~
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ago.)) Missouri v. Holland, 252 P. ~. 416. 433
(1920).
}'rom its earli<'st days. the art and literature of our
country have as~:;igned a special place to the> flag of the
United States. It figures prominently in at least one
of Charles Wilson Peale's portraits of Gfjrqge Washington, showing him as leader of thf' forces of the 13 colonies
during the Re>volutionary \Var. ::\o one who lived
through the Second World War in this country can forget
the impact of the photograph~ of th e membc>rs of the
Fnited Stat<'S Marine Corps raising the Pnitcd States
flag on the top of Mount foiuribachi on the Island of lwo
Jima. which is now commemorated in a statue at th<' I wo
Jima Memorial adjoining Arlington :\Tational C:cnwtary.
Ralph Waldo Emerson. writmg .50 years aftc>r the
battles of Lexington and Concord, wrote> :
"By the rude !wid* that arclwd the fiood
Their flag to A]>ril'~ br(•eze unfurled
Here once thf' embattled farmers stood
And fired the shot hf'ard 'round tlw world .''
Oliver Wendell Holmes, SE'nior. celebrated the flag that
had flown on "Old Ironsides" during tht' War of 1812,
and John Greenleaf Whittier lllade Barbara Frietchie's
devotion to the "silken scarf' in the tPC'th of Stonewall
Jackson's ominous threats the central theme of his
familiar poem . John Philip i-lousa's "Stars and /-\tripes
Forever'' and GPorgc M. Cohan's "It's a Grand Old Flag"
are musical cc>lebrations of the flag familiar to adults a]](l
ehildrcu alike. Francis Scott Key 's "Star Spangled
Banner" is the cou11try's national anthem.
\Vhile most of the artistic C'vocations of the flag occur
in the context of times of national strugglf', and correspondingly greatf'r depf'tHif'nre on th e> flag as a symbol
of national unity. the importanf•e of t he flag is by no
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means limited to the field of hostilitirs. The United
i::ltates flag flies over every ff•deral courthouse in our
:!'; ation, and is promi1wntly displayed in almost ev<~ry
f0deral, stak or local public building throughout the
land. It is the onp visible f'mbodinwnt of the authority
.of the National GovPrnllleilt, through which the laws of
the Nation and the guarantres of the ( 'onstitution are
enforced.
It is not <'mpty rhetoric to say that the rnited States
Constitution, ev<'n the First and Fonrteenth Amt>lHlments undrr which Uogue11 seeks to upset his convietioJJ ,
does not invariably in tl1e world of practi<~al affairs rnforer
itself. Going baek no further than tlw m0morir-s of most
of us presently alive. the United States flag was carried
by federal troops stunmo1wd by the Preside11t to rnforce
decrees of federal eourts in Littk Hock. Arkansas. in 19.57,
and in Oxford. Mississippi , in 1!162.
The significanee of the flag. and the drep emotional
feelings it arousfs in a )arg<' part of our citi~enry. cannot
be fully expressed in the two dimrnsions of a lawyer's
brief or of a judieial opiuion. But if the government
may create private proprietary interests in written work
and in musical and theatrical performances by virtue of
copyright laws, 1 sec no reason why it may not, for all
of the reasons mentioned, create a similar governmental
interest iu the flag by prohibiting even thos0 who have
purchased the physical object from impairing its physi~
cal integrity. For what they have purchased is not
merely cloth dyed red. whik and blue. but also the oue
visible m.anifestation of two hundr<>d years of nationhood-a history compiled by generations of our forbears
aud contribut<>d to by streams of immigrants from the
four corners of the globe. which has travelled a course
sinee th(:' ti_me of this country's origin that could not
have be<;>n "fQrf)se~~!l by the most gifted of its b~gett~rs,"
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Tlw JWrmissible ocopr of p;overnment regulation of thi's
uniqul' physical obj(•ct eannot he~ adequately dealt with
in tenus of tlw law of private property or by a highly
abstract. sellolastic interpretation of the First AnwndllWilt. Massaehusetts has not prohibited Goguen from
wearing a sig11 sewn to thl' seat of his pants expressing
in words his low opi1lion of the flag. of the country. or
anything els<-'. It has prohibited him from wearing there
a particular symbol of extraordinary significance and
GOIItent. for which significancl' and eontenr~ UogliC'II is
in 110 wise~ responsiblP. 'J;'he flag of the Pnitcd_:jt tes is
not just anotlwr "thin · ''
· ··
~11o1ther /
"idea''; i ·s not primarily an idPa at alL . ·- - - - - - '
Here Goguc·n was. so far as this r~cord .appeats. qf1ite
free to exprPss verbally whatevpr vwws 1t w·as· hl-' was:
seeking to express by wearing a flag sewn to· his pants,
on the streets of Leominster or in any of its parks or
commons wht~re free speech and assembly was custo~
marily permittrd. He was not compelled in any way
to salute the flag, pledge a11egiallel' to it. or mah• any
affirmative gestun' of support or resp<-~ct for it such as
would COiltravPne West ViriJ'I:nia Board of Education Y.
Barnette , :31!l P. S. 624 ( 1943). He was sirnply prohibited from illlpairing the physical integrity of a Ullique
national symbol which has bePn given colltent by genPratwns of his and our forebears. a symbol of which he
had purchased a eopy. 1 believe Massachusetts had a;
right tol enaet this pwbibitio11.
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Uniform Flag Act:
No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy,
trample upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag, standard,
color, ensign or shield.

Different:
Alaska "while owned by others"
Connecticut "puts indignity upon"
Georgia "contemptuously abuse flag"
Iowa

"satirize, deride or burlesque"

Massachusetts - "whether such flag is public or private property"
"treats c ante mptuous ly"
Nevada -

mulilates, tramples upon, or who tears down or wilfully ~nd
maliciously removes while owned by others, or defames,
slanders, or speaks evilly or in a contemptuous manner of
or otherwise defaces or defiles any of the flags, or ensign,
which are public or private property.

Oklahoma - "tears down, . . . treats with indignity, or wantonly destroys
the flag" ·
South Carolina - "jeer at"
;:;': Wisconsin-

Wyoming -

·.

Whoever intentionally and publicly mutilates, defiles, or
casts contempt upon the flag may be fined not more than $100
or imprisoned not more than 3 months, or both. ? ? ?
"tears down"

No persone shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy, trample
upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag, standard,
color, ensign or shield.
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PENALTIES FOR DESECRATION OF THE FLAG
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Mr.

DIRKSEN,

from the Committee on the Judicia.ry,
submitted the following

~

REPORT
)URE
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*
*
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~ production
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H.n. 10480]

Til(' Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill
ILK 10480) to prohibit desecration of the flag, and for other
!1\l rj•oc:cs, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with
•·.' II!'IH.!Inent.s and recommends t.hat the bill as amended do pass.
AMENDMENTS

1. On page 1, line 8, after the word "whoever" insert the word
"i,Hrt\\·ingly".
'2 . On page 1, line 9, after the word "defiling," insert the word
· hn rning,".
PunPOSE OF AJ\.mNDMENTS

The purpose of amendment No.1 is to make it clear that knowledge
r.r, d Intent must be present to constitute n. crirninaJ act; and amend''1•· nt :\o. 2 is to make it clear that the bill proscribes public burning
d thr flag along with other contemptuous acts of destruction.
PuRPosE

Th<' p\ll·pose of t.he proposed legislation, as amended, is to prohibit
e; d punish by Federal law certain public acts of desecration of tho

,,··''

·~·

S'1' A'rr~ 1\U~N'r
'

!pt. 1286

Tlti;; bill wou_ld prohibit and_ punish by Federu~ lftw certain public
' of desecratwn of the Amenca.n Jlag. It seems meongruous, but at

1

bil-007

,_

2

PENALTIES FOR DESECHA'l'I,ON OF THE FLAG

the present time there is no Federal crirninnJ sta tue makin"
desecration of the flag a criminttl oil'en~c, with tho solo exception of~
statuto codiflcd .i n 4 U.S.O. 3, and duplicated in 22 D.O. Oodo 3414
which applies oxclu~ively to the District of Columbia. That statut~
prohibits, subject to a fino not exceeding $100 or impri~onmc nt for
not more than 30 days, or both, tho usc of the flag for ad vcrtising or
on merchandise, as well as the mutilation or dc~ccrntion of tho Hng.
The in~tn,nt bill is occasioned by a munbcr of recent public Hag.
burning incidents in various parts of the United States and in foreign
countries by American citizens. It is dcsignccl to remeLly an anomah·
in existing bw where de~ecr11tion of tho flag is proscribed by Feclerlil
sLtttute only in the District of Columbia. While each of the 50 State,;
by stut ute prohibits certain acts of flag desecration, the penaltie)
imposed by the State sttttutcs vary widely. This bill would extend
Federalprotection to our nn,tional t\alY.
The House bill will assure F.e deral investigative and prosecutil'e
jurisdiction over those who would cast contempt by publicly mutili\ting, defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling upon tho flng of the United
States. It is intended Lhat ~ttttc jurisdiction in this mtttter shotdd
not be disphtced. Often, tho only immediate method of detection i\tHI
apfn·ehension of those who desecmLe tho law mn,y be SLate and local
po ice. In other areas, the exercise of Federal jurisdiction mn,y Ill'
critical in tho enforcement of the lttw. It is in tho wttional interest that
concurrent j urlsdiction be exorcised by Fedeml and State law enforcement agencies over this subject.
Recent ne"·s dispatches indicn,te that somo American citizen'
abroad httvc publicly burned or otherwise publicly defiled the flagl•i
tho United Stntes. Tho bill intends that the prohibitions apply JlPl
only within the United States but also to tho acLion of Am erica n
citizens abroad. By its decision in United States v. Bowman (2GO U.~
94 (1 022)), the Supremo OoUl't made clear that citizens of the Unilt•l
States while in a foreign country arc s ubject to the penal htws enacted
to protect the United States or its property, though there was Ill'
express statutory declaration to that effect. (See n,lso ll.1a1·in v. Un,ilt •i
States, 352 Fed. 174 (O.O.A. 5, 1965), where the proscriptions of secLiou
174, title 21, United States Code- importing narcotic drugs-wcrl·
held to htwe cxtraterritoral application to U.S. citizens.) Uncle•
section 3238, Litle 18, United States Code, crimes against the Unitt I
States are triable in the district where tho offender is found, or i11t••
which he is first brought.
. The committee believes that the bill is constitutional. It is impressed
with the conclusion reached and the reasoning expounded in Uni~t J
States v. Miller (367 Fed. 2d 72 (O.O.A. 2, 1966), certiorari denitJ
35 U.S. Law Week, 3278). There, the Second Circuit Court of .Appc~J·
affirmed a draft card burning conviction against a challenge of tL•
Federal statute as an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom ' f
speech. (Of. O'Brien v. United States, Fed. 2d (O.O.A. 1, Apr. ll'.
19G7) .) In that case tho court stated:
* * * Except to prohibit destruction of certificates, the
statute does not prevent political dissent or criticism in any
way. It is narrowly drawn to regulate a limited form of action,
Undel' the statute, aside from destroying certificates,
appellant and otbel's can protest n,gainst tho draft , tho
S. Rcpt. 1287
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military action in Vietnam, n,nd tho stn.tut.e itself in any terms
they ";ish- and indeed did so n.t the rn1ly where appellant
wus lUTes ted. Appellltnt claims, ho\\·evcr, that the burning
<•f n dmfL card is more dramatic than mere speech and that
he has lt right to the most effective mon,Hs of communicu,tion.
Hut surely this gcnemlization hits its own limits. * * *

"'

the
tn any
wtion.
1eatos,
'L, the

*

*

p

c:an citizens
d the flagof
s apply not
of American
:n (2GO U.S.
r the United
11 ws enacted
\.ere was no
in v. United
.ts of section
!rugs-wore
'ns.) Under
the United
md, or intu

;s,

*

We are supported in this conclusion by the knowledge that appellant n,ud those who n.gree with hint remain
free, as indeed they should be, to criticize natioHal policy a::;
·dgorously as they desire by the written or spoken word;
t.hey are simply not free to destroy Selective Service certificates (367 Fed. 2d at 81, 82).
The committee believes that H. R. 10480 will successfully withstand
11 11 constitutional chnJlenges to which it may be subjected in the courts.
The bill does not prohibit speech, the communication of ideas, or
p<,Jiticlll dissent or protest. The bill does not prescribe orthodox
('"nduct or require affirmative action. The bill does prohibit public
nd~ of physical dishonor or destruction of the flag of the United
:)tntcs. The language of the bill prohibits intentional, willful; not
Hcridental or inadvertent public physical acts of desecmtion of the J
lla". Utterances are not proscribed. Specific examples of prohibited , .
<'lll~dnct under the bill would include casting contempt upon the flag
hy burning or tearing it and by spitting upon or otherwise dirtying it. 1
'lllll're is nothing vague or uneerLain about the terms m~cd in the bill. j
. Of ~ourse, ~othing ~n t~e bill will prohibit any person f1:om complylng \\1.Lh secLwn 176(]) title 36, Umted States Code, which provides
t bn L when the il~tg "is in such condition that it is no longer a fitting
t·mhlem for dis~)lay [it] should be destroyed in a dignified way, prefrrnhly by burmng." Compliance with this provision obviously does
nn! cast contempt on the flag.
Public burning, destruction, and dishonor of the national emblem
irdlids n.n injury on the entire Nation. Its prohibition imposes no
~ubstantinl burden on anyone. Enactment of this legislation 1s wholly
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Aecordingly, the committee recommends fltvorable consideration of
lf.H. 10480, as n.mended.
ALLnched hereto and made tt part hereof is the letter from the
Attorney General of the United States to the chairman of this commit tee with respect to similar flag desecration bills pending before the
((llnmittee.
OFFICE OF •rJIE A:r'l'OHNEY GENEHAL,

·w ashington, D.C., May 15, .1067.
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Tl1is is in respon,.;c to a request for the views
,.f thc DcpnrtmcnL of Justice on S. 515, S. 151)3, S. 1020, S. Hi2G, and
..;enute H(',.;olut.ion 73, nll \riLh respect to Jescenttiou of Lhe flng of
:h<· Ur1it c,l SL,!Les.
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There is uo Feclcru1 criminnJ legislation on this subject with the
sole exception of 11 s ttttute codified in 4 U.S.C. 3 u.nd duplicated in
22 D.C. Code 3414, whiclt applies exclusively to the District of
Columbitt. It prohibits, s ubject ton fine not execeding $100 or imprisonment for not more Lhm1 :30 dn.ys, or both, the use of the flag for
advertising or ou merchandise, as well as the mutilation or desecration
of the flu.g.
Three of the bills here considered, i.e., S. 515, S. 1583, u.nd S. 1626,
would amend 4 U.S.C. 3 for the purpose of exLeuding purt or all of
it to genernlmtlional applicability. 0£ this group, S. 515 and S. 158:3
would retain u.ll of the htuguttge presently in section 3 but differ as to
penalty provisions. S. 1G26 would modify the advertising provisions
of section 3 as well as the provisions rclatiug to defacement or defilement of the flag 11ud change tho penalty provisions. S. 1620 would add
provisions to chapter 33 of the Criminal Code making it an offense
to burn, deface, mutilate, or trmnple upon the flag of the United
Stales. Differing from these measures, to impose a pennlty for deseemtion of the flag, is Senate Resolution 73 whieh would ltuthorize 1\
comprehensive study and investigation, by the Senate Judiciary
Committee or any Lluly authorized subcommittee for report and
recommendations to the Senate, on all matters pertaining to the display
n.lH.l use of the flag.
These proposals, and others presently pending in the Congress,
are the result of a number of recent flag-burning incidents.
The American people are deeply devoted to their flag. It is in the
hearts and minds of our citizens, the symbol of our national ideal:
"liberty and justice for all." We are deeply hurt when our flag is
dishonored for it represents not only a noble history and the sacrifice
and spirit of our fathers, but our aspirations for our children and their
fulfillment.
Whenther a Federal criminal statute is the proper redress for the
injury inflicted on the Nation when the flag is burned and whether il
would serve as a needed deterrent against further transgressions is n.
question for the Congress.
As you address yourselves to these issues, I would urge study of the
following considerations:
The real tmgedy when the flag is willfully burned is not the loss of
the flag, but the fact that there are those among us, however few, who
have so little love for country, or confidence m its purposes, or are
otherwise so thoughtless or insensitive, that they want to burn th~
flag. Today their number is infinitesimal; a handful among 200 million.
Should their number ever become substantial, and there is no evidence
of any likelihood of this, then their conduct would be a matter of
deepest concern, which all history shows no statute can resolve.
We are a federal system . Our national strength depends on tllc
strength of State and local governments and their devotion to the
Union. We have survived tho tests of 179 years with ever-increusin~
strength. Each of the 50 States, like tho District of Columbia, hn.'
laws prescribing criminal lenalties for desecration of the flag. Until
this time, a general Fedora law has not been found necessary. Ideally.
we would look to the States for effective enforcement of their ln'~"'
against such local conduct. Their devotion to tho Hag is no loss thu•l
that of Federal officials who are also citizens of the several Stu.tes.
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PENALTIES FOR DESECRATION OF THE FLAG

I

u!.! the N n,tion's flag shou14 be .a Federal offense, th? Departm~nt of
.T11 stice can, and of course w1ll, vigorously prosecute vwln.tors. 'iV1thout
fl ntltionnJ police force, which no one wants, Federal ofncials cannot,
hnwoYer, effectively prevent the commission of the erime in many
situations where only local police 11re av11ilable in adequate numbers.
lf Congress decides to en11et such legislation, it should be clea,r
!l11d· the St11tes will not by such enactment be precluded from prosecut~
irw for desecration of the nationn,l fl11g. A provision to preserve State
ju;isdietion could read as follows:
"This act shall not be construed as indicating an intent on
the part of Congress to deprive any State, territory, possession
or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico of jurisdiction over any
offense over which it would have jurisdiction in the absence of
this act."
Particular care should be exercised to avoid infringement of free \
<.pccch. To make it a crime if one "defies" or "casts contempt * * *
t'i llwr by word or act" upon the national flag is to risk inva,lidation.
Such language reaches toward conduct which 1nay be protected by
lir,;t 111nendment gua,mntees. The courts hn,ve been insistent on guard~
ing against sn,nctions which re11ch the protected expression of ideas
nnd also have struck do1vn on grounds of vagueness provisions which
ure so broad that they might include protected speech along with
conduct that could constitutionally be penalized.
These issues were not involved in Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34
(1907) which upheld the power of a. State to enact legislation with
rc.-; pecL to the flag, but. are suggested by more recent decisions of the
•·uurts dealing with other conduct im·olving manifestations of respect
or disrespect for the flag and the system of government. in represents.
SrP, e.g., West Virginia State Board of Edttcation v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943); Stromberg v. C<;Z,ifornia, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Baggett
'. Bulh'tt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
Phrases prohibiting speeeh m·e in fact unnecessnry to accomplish
the goal of prohibiting direct acts of disrespect or deseeration, becau se
!he ren:11inin~ ln.nguage comprehensiye]y deseribes such acts. Accord~
tt1gly, m orcier to . reduce the risk of challenge on vagueness a,nd \
Ji!·st amendmenCg1·ounas, ·it'is i;CZ..ori11rienctcd -thattlie\\,Oi·d . ·aefies"
nnc1 th~ phrase "or casts contempt, either by \\'OJ'cl or act," be a.voidcd
tt-i ~cpnrate 11Cts eonsLituLing offenses. To secure further profectiorl
1\;.;ninst such constitutional cbi1lleng-e', we suggest thnt t.he objective
nets described in the provision be made criminal only if performed as
t\ means of casting contempt upon the fl11g.
The eentrallangua.ge, as thus rc\'i,;ecl, \\'CHild Lhen rend:
"'VhocYer casts contempt upon fLny fln.g, sinndard, colors, or
ensign of the United States by publidy mutilating, defacing,
defiling, or tramplin g upon it., shall be punished by * * *."
If this legislation is to be ennet.ed, iL is the view of tl1is Department
th at \\·bile the selection uf the approprin,te penalLy for deseemtion of
ll. t· flng is a mntt.er of legislati\·e polic·y, thoro should be fl 11nifonn
' 111 \lt!e for the Distriet. of Columbia and for the United States. S. 515
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or S. 1G20 would res ult in incun::;is tent p enalties, applicltble to Lhe sam e
condu ct in cases !Lrising in the Di::; Lrict. We also s ugges t that th n
Di::; Lrict of Columbia Code pro vision be conformed or deleted to avoid
any incon::;is lency \\·it.lt the United S ttttes Code provi:>ions Lhat will he
applie!Lblo in the Dis trict. Additionally, we s ugges t o.voicl!Lnce of a
r equirement of fine "ttnd" impri,:;mnncnt a::; proposed in S. 515. Snrh
mmlin g is inconsi.-; ient with the s entencing flexibil.ity genero.Jly provided by Federal erirninall!Lws.
We uecd only n,dd that we would find unobjec tionable the proposal
in S. Res. 73 for 11 ::; tmly and recommeudtttion s to the Uo11gress if it is
felt that issues in t.his area cannot othm·\\·i::; e be resolved.
The Burettll of the Budget has advis ed that tl10re is no objection lu
the s ubrnis~;ion of this report from the ::; LandpoinL of the !LdminislraLion's program..
Sincerely,
RAMSEY CLAHK,

Allor ney General.

1J1LE 4
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TITLE 18·- UNITED STATES CODE- CRIMES AND CRIMINAl.
PROCEDURE
Chapter 33.- EMBLEMS, INSIGNIA, AND NAMES
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§700. D esecration of the flag of the United States; penalties.
(a) Whoever knowingly casts contempt ·upon any flag of the United
States by p1.tblicly rmLtilating, defacing, defiling, burning, o·r trampling
upon it shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more
than one year or both.
(b) The term "flag of the United States" as used in this section, shall
include any flag, standard, colors, ensign or any picture or representat-ion
of either, or of any part or parts of either, made of any substance or
represented on any substance, of any size eviclently p·urpoTting to be
either of said flag, standard, colors or ensign of the United States of
America, or a pict·ure or a representu.tion of either, ·upon which shall be
shown the colors, the stars and the stripes, in any number of either thereQf
or of any part 07' parts of either, by which the average person seeing the
same without deliberation mcty believe the same to represent the flag,
standards, colors or ensign of the United States of America.
(c) Nothing ·in this section shall be construed as indicating an intent
on the pw·t of Congress to deprive any State, territory, possession or thr
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico of j 1trisdiction over any offense over wh-ich
it would have jurisdiction in the ctbsence of this section.
S. Rept. 1287
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CHANGES IN ExisTING LAw

In compliance with subsection (4) of rule XXIX of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, changes in exis tin()' law made by the bill, as
reported, are shown as follows (exis ting
proposed to be omitted
is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, exi s ting
law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):
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TITLE 4- UNITED STATES CODE-- FLAG AND SEAL, SEA'f
OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE STATES
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Chapter 1-THE FLAG

§ 3. Use of flag for adver tising purposes; mutilation of flag.
Any person who, within the District of Columbia, in any manner,
fur exhibition or display, shall place or cause to be placed any word,
figure, mark, picture, design, drawing, or any advertisement of any
n 11 ture upon any flag, standard, colors, or ensign of the United States
uf America; or shall expose or cause to be exposed to public view any
such flag, standard, colors, or ensign upon which shall have been
printed, painted, or otherwise placed, or to which shall be attached,
nppeuded, affixed, or annexed any word, figure, mark, picture, design,
or drawing, or any advertisement of any nature; or who, within the
DisLrict of Columbia, shall manufacture, sell, expose for sale, or to
public view, or give away or have in possession for sale, or to be
gi,·cn away or for usc for o,ny purpose, fLny o,rticle or substo,nce being
nn article of merchandise, or tt receptacle for mercho,ndise or article
or thing for carrying or transporLing merchandise, upon which shall
luwe been printed, painted, atto,ched, or otherwise placed a representl\tion of any such flo,g, standard, colors, or ensign, to advertise, call
attention to, decorate, mark, or di:s tinguish the o,rticle or substance
on wlrich so placed [; or who, within the District of Columbio,, shRJl
publicly mutilate, deface, defile or defy, trample upon, or co,st contempt, either by word or act, upon o,ny such fiag, st.andard, colors, or
ensign,] shall be deemed guilty of a misdeameo,nor o,ml sho,ll be punished by a fine not exceeding $100 or by imprisonment for not more
tlum thirty days, or both, in the discretion of the court. The words
"Jirrg, standard, colors, or ensign" o,s used herein, sho,ll include any
Hag, standard, colors, ensign, or any picture or representation of
either, or of any part or parts of either, mo,de of o,ny substance or
represented on any substance, of any size evidently purporting to be
either of sR.id flag, sta,ndn,rd, colors, or ensign of the United States of
America or a picture or a representation of either, upon which shall
be shown the colors, the stars o,nd the stripes, in o,ny number of either
thereof, or of any J?art or parts of either, by which the o,vemge perso n
seeing the same w1thout deliberation may believe the same to repref'C ut the flag, colors, standard, or ensign of the United Sto,tes of
America.
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l'E~ALTIES FOR DESECH.ATION OF THE FLAG
, "· ~~ . J!l(ii. - llcf(•rrrd to the Honse Cnlenclar and ordered to be printed

'I·

RocEns of Cnlomdo, from the Committee on the Judiciary,
submitten the follo\Ying

. REPORr:C
[To accompnny II. H.. 104SO]

Tl1<' Committee on the Judir·i1ry, to whom \Yil.S referred the bill
ii . IL J04SO) to pruhihit. dcsccrntion of the flug, ha.Ying considered
,, "arne, report fn.YoJ'1Lhly thereon with amendments n.nd recom,.,, t! thnl the bill do ]HlS'-'.
TJ, ;• <illlCtlclrncuts 1ll'C a~ fnllo"·s:
c In page 1, line 9, nfter "<lcfilin~," in sert "burning,".
On p;1ge 3, line 15, after "deltling," insert "burning,".
ExPk\~A'l'ION oF A~rE~JDIEC\TS

T hP pnrpo.-;c of the ttmenclmenis is io make clea.r that the bill pro' Jil<'"i puhlic bmning of the flng n1ong with other contemptuous acts
·f clP,trnclion.
PunPOsl~

ThP purpose of ihe hill is to prohihit a.nd punish by Fcdeml hLw
···linin puldic ads of dc,;e~·mtion of tl1e flag.

S·rA TI·:~n;NT
'l' lt P 1Jill i..; oe<·;~Sioncd hy a numhcr of rcccJlt pulllic Hng-hmning
~·' tdPnh in Y:t.ri(tlls pa.r!s of the l'nitcd St:ttes and in forPign ('ountries
'1 .\nwrir·nn <·.itizeus. ft j,; dcsig;ned to rPmeclY tW fLnomnlY in cxistin0;
l \\ ,,.IH'f'cin clesccmtion of 1he f!:tg is pros('i·ibcd by Fedeml stntut'c
1_, in the District (If ('olu11Ji:in. \\'hat is more, nllhough Pnch of the
· 1 :--tn_trs b~· slldtrte proltihits certain :tds of Jlng d<:>:.:C'l'f'i1tion, tl1e
i :J.tl\rC's in1posed 1>.1' thr :)(air sl:>tutt's Y:try \\·idcly. 'l'ltc c·mnrnit.tr•c
:·:wlttd<•s that the n:ttional CJnlJlrm should 1e giycn coll<'lll'f'Cnt.
l··d (•ral prolrdion.
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